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Abstract 
 
 
Since the late 1990s, the corporate governance of state-owned companies 
(SOCs) has moved to the forefront of the political agenda in several Western 
European countries and elsewhere. Triggered by large corporate scandals, 
international corporate governance developments, and the recurring criticism 
of state ownership administration, we have seen political attempts to cope 
with issues of firm monitoring and control. Among the governance issues 
which have received the most attention are board appointments (who should 
serve as chairmen of SOC boards?), chief executive compensation contracts 
(how much should top managers be paid, and should incentive schemes be 
included in the compensation contracts?), and dividend payments (how 
much dividends should be extracted from SOCs?). In this thesis, I offer a 
comprehensive treatment of these issues insofar as I provide both thorough 
descriptive accounts and rigorous statistical analyses of the factors which 
might explain governance decisions. The empirical investigation draws on 
data from a broad sample of SOCs in the two Scandinavian countries of 
Norway and Sweden over the period 2000-2005.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, the question of what happens to governance 
decisions in the case of state ownership relates to the motivation of key 
decision-makers (i.e., incumbent politicians and corporate directors). 
Probing the political economics and corporate governance literatures on this 
very issue, the thesis distinguishes between three models of government-
owner motivation: Politicians care about creating a favourable reputation as 
professional representatives of shareholder welfare (reputation motive); 
maintaining their popularity among voters so as to keep their positions (re-
election motive); or implementing their preferred party-policy (ideology 
motive). In a similar vein, corporate directors care about their reputation as 
competent representatives of the shareholder electorate (reputation motive), 
but also their prospects of being re-elected to current board seats (re-election 
motive). Moreover, I add to these models some institutional features and 
firm characteristics, which makes for a more realistic picture of governance 
decision-making. 
 
While, in the area of SOC board appointments, theoretical ideas and actual 
practice seem in fact disassociated, the empirical results suggest that the 
governance models framing the explanation of CEO compensation contracts 
and dividend payments capture important aspects of reality. Indeed, the 
empirical findings provide support for both the reputation and the re-election 
model. In all three studies, the results are also sensitive to the institutional 
system and national context within which SOCs operate. The results have 
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important implications for public policy and practice insofar as the scope for 
political influence seems to produce governance decisions which are 
possibly not conducive to efficiency. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Over the past decades, the corporate governance of state-owned companies 
(SOCs) has been the subject of major public interest and political debate.1 
The broad issues in this debate are how politicians (when acting in their 
capacity as government-owners) and corporate directors should monitor, 
control, and incentivise the behaviour of corporate managers in SOCs. More 
precisely, discussions often revolve around governance decisions like: Who 
should be appointed to sit on the SOC boards? Should incentive schemes be 
included in managerial compensation contracts, and how much should SOC 
managers be paid? How much dividends should be extracted from SOCs? 
For instance, in Norway, the exercise of high-value stock options on the part 
of some SOC managers has raised considerable public concern about 
fairness, morale, and social responsibility. Attempting to satisfy public 
opinion, this prompted government-owner intervention in the design of 
managerial compensation contracts. Likewise, in Sweden, the government-
owner has strongly recommended that incentive schemes directed at the top 
managers in SOCs should be avoided. There has also been dispute about 
board appointments (do politically affiliated corporate directors have the 
necessary competence to take seats on SOC boards, and would they be 
inclined to serve self-interested politicians rather than the interests of the 
firm?) as well as dividend payments (do high dividends make it difficult for 
SOCs to carry out profitable investment projects?). 
Within a political context, corporate governance is often seen as a 
relatively new phenomenon. But surely, issues related to state ownership 
have always spurred political debate, if for no other reason that the question 
of state versus private ownership reflects party-political concerns. What is 
‘new’ about corporate governance is that, since the late 1990s, governments 
have paid more systematic attention to their ownership role. Why is that? 
First, it might be seen as an honest attempt to comply with the often-made 
criticism that SOCs suffer just as much from passive state ownership as from 
undue political ownership interference (OECD, 2005). To afford politicians 
                                                 
1 In the literature, state-owned companies are also referred to as state (-owned) enterprises, 
state (-owned) firms, and even as public firms. While I return to the definition of a state-
owned company in Section 1.4, these terms are considered to be interchangeable and will be 
used as such. 
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increased legitimacy in their ownership role, a binding commitment to 
principles of ‘good corporate governance’ has therefore been hailed as a 
possible solution. In general, such compliance is supposed to make the 
management of state ownership portfolios more transparent and predictable. 
More specifically, improved professionalism is deemed necessary to enhance 
confidence in the neutrality of the government in those sectors where it acts 
both as owner and regulator, like in telecommunications and energy (OECD, 
2003). Increased transparency and predictability is also seen as necessary to 
assure that the state as a dominant shareholder will not exploit the interests 
of co-investors (Becht et al., 2003).  
Second, the focus on corporate governance reflects a general trend in 
the business society towards focusing on shareholder activism. In particular, 
the political debate on corporate governance was fuelled by some large 
corporate failures surfacing in the Nordic, Western European, and US region 
alike. While these scandals ultimately led to enquiries, new legislation, and 
recommendations (as illustrated by the Cadbury Code, 1992; the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, 2002; and the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004), 
they also had the accompanying effect that the media nowadays regularly 
reports instances of ‘governance failures’. Clearly, few public commentators 
can resist populist attacks on, say, ‘excessive’ pay levels. To avoid harmful 
voter reactions, politicians may therefore attempt to prevent seemingly 
unpopular governance decisions from being made.  
Third, although there is little party-political struggle over the need 
for making corporate governance issues more explicit, the debate has 
activated a left-right dimension on the substance of corporate governance. 
While left-wing parties emphasise the need for political control, right-wing 
parties tend to argue that political concerns should not be confused with 
business concerns. There is therefore an ideological dimension to corporate 
governance as well, which becomes particularly manifest in the debate about 
whether politicians might benefit from mimicking the corporate governance 
practices of privately owned firms. 
This strong practical interest into the issue of corporate governance 
certainly encourages researchers to take a closer look at what happens to 
governance decisions in the case of state ownership. Accordingly, this thesis 
asks: What factors might explain some of the key governance decisions that 
are made by either politicians or corporate directors? More precisely, I want 
to know whether we might possibly trace governance decisions to some 
distinct sets of motives carried by politicians and corporate directors. 
Moreover, I would like to explore whether governance decisions are 
influenced by the institutional context in which SOCs operate and some of 
the basic firm characteristics distinguishing firms under state control.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, Section 1.1 elaborates on the 
broad plan of the research project. Next, Section 1.2 clarifies how the thesis 
contributes to the literature on state ownership and corporate governance, 
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while Section 1.3 places the research topic in its broader theoretical context. 
Section 1.4 gives a thorough definition of the term ‘state-owned company’. 
Then, Section 1.5 comments on an omitted variable which is conventionally 
included in corporate governance research. Finally, Section 1.6 presents the 
different parts of the thesis.    
 
 
1.1 The Broad Plan of the Thesis  
Consistent with the basic idea of corporate governance, the essential task of 
politicians and corporate directors is to deal with the presumed self-serving 
behaviour of corporate managers. For this purpose, they might rely on 
certain governance mechanisms, such as the board of directors (e.g., to ratify 
major strategy plans and to select, compensate, and evaluate top managers), 
chief executive officer (CEO) compensation contracts (to incentivise and 
attract managerial talents), and dividend payments (to limit the financial 
discretion of corporate managers). The aim of this thesis is to investigate 
what factors can explain the use of such governance mechanisms. Thus, the 
empirical study raises three specific questions: Who gets appointed to SOC 
boards, and why? Why are some CEOs paid more and differently (e.g., in 
terms of incentive-pay) than others? Why do some SOCs pay higher 
dividends than others? 
Before proceeding, we should note that there is certainly more to 
corporate governance than this thesis looks at, including some more informal 
or less regularly observed forms of governance mechanisms.2 Examples of 
the latter include Parliamentary discussions on the long-term strategies and 
financial plans of SOCs (relevant for some fully state-owned firms only), the 
possibility that the government-owner may use the general assembly for 
issuing political directives, as well as formal and informal contact between 
Parliamentary committees/members and firm representatives. The reason for 
not including such governance mechanisms relates to the fact that they are 
either not observable (at least not on a regular basis) or applicable to all 
SOCs. For instance, most of the board’s activities are unobservable, which 
means that any attempt to isolate the influence of corporate directors on 
governance decisions have to concentrate on their observable actions 
(Weisbach, 1988) – and one striking board action is the setting of CEO 
compensation contracts (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). Thus, the thesis focuses 
                                                 
2 It should also be noted that there is more to the ownership function than corporate 
governance. In fact, the basic function of shareholders is to provide capital to the firm. Also, 
some shareholders provide the firm with competence and networks. In the case of state 
ownership, it is not very controversial to argue that most politicians have no special 
competence or networks to offer SOCs. Thus, the function of corporate governance stands out 
as the most viable candidate for empirical investigation. 
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on observable governance mechanisms for which publicly available 
information is regularly disclosed.  
How can we explain the above governance decisions? At its most 
basic level, the question of what happens to governance decisions in the case 
of state ownership has to do with the motivation of those people responsible 
for making such decisions. As far as the government-owner is concerned, 
this is a non-trivial issue, since politicians have no direct cash flow rights 
from the firms in which they hold ownership stakes. Therefore, we might 
expect politicians to pursue other goals than profit maximisation as such. 
Indeed, we might infer from the political economics literature that politicians 
who are currently in office care about creating a favourable reputation as 
professional representatives of shareholder welfare (reputation motive), 
maintaining their popularity among voters so as to keep their positions (re-
election motive), or implementing their preferred party-policy (ideology 
motive). Likewise, corporate directors are likely concerned about their 
reputation as competent representatives of the shareholder electorate 
(reputation motive), but also their prospects of being re-elected to current 
board seats (re-election motive). While these motivational concerns in some 
cases overlap, they might also conflict. Therefore, I keep them analytically 
distinct. Using these motives as baseline models, we might possibly make 
some more specific conjectures of what governance decisions will be made. 
Interestingly, we already note the possibility that governance decisions 
might in fact serve other purposes than to curb managerial opportunism.   
However, making inferences about how decision-makers’ motivation 
affect governance decisions provides only one part of the governance story. 
In addition, we should account for the fact that both politicians and corporate 
directors operate within some broader institutional framework, which both 
constrains and enables certain types of behaviour. For instance, in firms 
under partial state control, the government-owner is legally prohibited from 
exploiting the interests of co-investors. On the other hand, Norwegian 
company law also gives the government-owner certain privileges in fully 
state-owned firms. Naturally, the institutional framework applies irrespective 
of motivational concerns, but its effect might differ according to decision-
makers’ motivation. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that different types 
of governance decisions are optimal for different types of SOCs. For 
instance, politicians who care about their re-election prospects would 
probably find it more important to exert some influence upon the governance 
decisions in highly visible SOCs (e.g., in terms of firm size) than in those 
SOCs that are less visible to the voters. Or, there is the case in which 
corporate directors who care about their reputation would consider how 
commercial SOCs have different needs than non-commercial SOCs. Thus, 
not only do institutional features and firm characteristics interact with 
motivational concerns, but they might also contribute to explain why 
governance decisions vary across the state ownership portfolio. 
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In sum, therefore, the thesis seeks to explain governance decisions 
by first differentiating between the motivational concerns of key decision-
makers; that is, politicians and corporate directors. The next step is then to 
examine how governance decisions are influenced by various institutional 
features and firm characteristics, and how these interact with motivational 
concerns. To empirically investigate these issues I use a broad sample of 
SOCs in the two Scandinavian countries of Norway and Sweden over the 
period 2000-2005. As regards the survey period, we note that it coincides 
with the controversy over corporate governance, thereby providing a sample 
that is affected by recent shareholder activism. However, such activism 
would only be problematic if being biased towards one particular motive. 
But, as I expect that politicians who care about their reputation would be 
equally more attentive to issues of corporate governance as would politicians 
who care about being re-elected or those preoccupied with ideology 
concerns, the sample period does not prevent from us from drawing valid 
conclusions.3  
 
 
1.2 Contributions to Research 
In the literature, the topic of state ownership and corporate governance has 
received far more theoretical interests than empirical evaluation. The reason 
for this empirical scarcity is quite comprehensible, since data on both SOCs 
and corporate governance are usually not available in public registers. Any 
serious attempts to collect data on these matters are thus highly valuable for 
descriptive as well as explanatory purposes. Admittedly though, there is 
already a small but intriguing literature which has grown to test hypotheses 
on the determinants of governance decisions in the case of state ownership 
(on the issue of CEO compensation, see Greve, 1997; Wolfram, 1998; Cragg 
and Dyck, 2003; on the issue of dividend payments, see Megginson et al., 
1994; Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; D’Souza et al., 2000; Gugler, 2003). 
Broadly stated, the research strategy of these studies has been to portray 
politicians as the key decision-making authority, who are being motivated by 
their re-election prospects only; to look for variation across the state 
ownership portfolio by comparing firms under full state control to partly 
state-owned firms; to focus on single governance mechanisms; and to 
perform their tests on single-country or very large-country samples. 
Undoubtedly, this research provides valuable insights into various issues of 
corporate governance. Not surprisingly, however, it also leaves several 
questions open for empirical enquiry. In short, the most pressing among 
these questions are the following: 
                                                 
3 Note that the same argument applies to corporate directors. 
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i) Should we conceive of politicians as being motivated solely by their 
chances of staying in office – or is it possible that they pursue other 
objectives as well?  
ii) What is the role of the board of directors in making governance 
decisions? 
iii) Do governance decisions differ across the state ownership portfolio 
as a function of other features than only the state ownership 
structure?  
iv) What are the relationships between different governance 
mechanisms?  
v) Do governance decisions depend on the national context?   
 
It is precisely the attempts to fill these voids in the literature that provide the 
more specific contributions of this thesis. First, I find it reasonable to 
question whether politicians, when acting in their capacity as shareholders, 
only worry about voter popularity. Probing the broader literature on political 
economics, I have already suggested that we broaden our scope of political 
motivation to also include other concerns. More precisely, the thesis takes on 
the rather straightforward insights that politicians are motivated not only by 
their re-election prospects, but also by the chances of implementing their 
preferred party-policy or by the prospects of reputation-building. 
Second, I argue that we cannot achieve a complete understanding of 
corporate governance under state ownership without taking into account the 
impact of the board of directors. Indeed, there is a growing interest in the 
role of boards within a public sector context (Farrell, 2005). With regard to 
the special organisational form of SOCs, however, the literature has been 
focusing on the government-owner as the key decision-making authority 
whereas boards’ influence is a largely neglected issue (but, see Wolfram, 
1998). Importantly, this is at odds with real-world business, where only a 
small part of governance decisions is made by shareholders themselves. In 
fact, the government-owner (like any other shareholder) is required by 
company law to delegate much of its decision-making authority to a board of 
directors, which then acts as the fiduciary representative of the government-
owner and potential co-investors.4 Accordingly, this suggests that we study 
not only the motivation of politicians, but also the motivation of corporate 
directors. Like politicians, I suggest that corporate directors care about both 
their reputation and re-election prospects.  
The third major contribution from this study has to do with the 
institutional framework in which corporate governance is exercised and the 
great heterogeneity of the state ownership portfolio. Somewhat surprisingly, 
                                                 
4 The board of directors has thus a dual function in that itself represents a governance 
mechanism but is also responsible for making governance decisions on its own, like deciding 
on CEO compensation contracts.  
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institutional features and firm characteristics are little emphasised in the 
literature, with some exceptions in the theoretical work by Aharoni (1986) 
and Vickers and Yarrow (1991). Yet, the idea of such approach is appealing. 
For instance, if we start from the premise that politicians only care about 
their re-election prospects, we might ask if political considerations are likely 
modified by the presence of co-investors, and if it does matter whether co-
investors are of private or public type? Moreover, are politicians likely to be 
more attentive to the governance decisions of large SOCs (whose actions are 
visible to, and even personally affect, many voters) than that of small ones? 
In general, these examples point toward an interesting dynamic: Governance 
decisions depend not only on the motivation of politicians and corporate 
directors, but also on various factors on the institutional and firm level.  
Fourth, the thesis contributes to shed light on the multidimensional 
task of corporate governance by exploring whether different governance 
mechanisms are internally related. In the corporate governance literature, 
examples of such approach for firms other than SOCs are provided by 
Rediker and Seth (1995), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Crespi et al. (2004), 
and Bøhren and Ødegaard (2006). Reflecting the main ideas of these works, 
this thesis empirically investigates a comprehensive set of governance 
mechanisms, such as board appointments, CEO compensation contracts, and 
dividend payments. To give just one example: If the government-owner 
worries that high-value compensation packages give raise to voter concern 
about fairness and morale, could the appointment of politically affiliated 
chairmen plausibly be causing lower levels of executive compensation? 
Seeking the answers to such questions, I attempt to explore some broader 
trends of corporate governance in the context of state ownership.  
Finally, the thesis seeks to clarify whether governance decisions 
depend on the specific national context in which politicians and corporate 
directors perform their governance function. This is a vital issue, since the 
corporate governance literature demonstrates the importance of nation-
specificity (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Gugler, 2001). Yet, in the few 
large-country studies of SOCs, attention has been directed to the broad 
patterns of corporate governance rather than cross-country variation. The 
latter is deemed important, however, as there might be different, and often 
history-specific, legal and regulatory frameworks that guide corporate 
governance. To explore this issue I use a broad sample of SOCs in the two 
Scandinavian countries of Norway and Sweden, which differ in terms of the 
institutional framework within which the government-owner and board of 
directors are to influence upon corporate governance. Being rather similar in 
most other respects, the two countries of Norway and Sweden are yet highly 
comparable. Thus, it should be possible to make sound inferences about the 
causal effects of nation-specific institutional arrangements on governance 
decisions.  
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1.3 Theoretical Foundations 
Having pinpointed the very details in the literature about state ownership and 
corporate governance, it is time to step back and trace the theoretical roots of 
this research. The purpose of this exercise is two-fold. First, it offers the 
reader an introduction to the theoretical building blocks on which this thesis 
rests: The overall perspective is grounded in an agency conception of SOCs, 
which hinges on the assumption of self-interested individuals, a contractual 
perspective on corporate relationships, analysis via principal-agent models, 
and a focus on how to curb self-serving behaviour. Second, it demonstrates 
how we might combine insight from two related, yet distinct, research fields 
to improve our understanding of a topic that lies on the intersection of 
politics, finance, and economics. Broadly stated, the thesis combines insights 
from the research fields of corporate governance (why do we need corporate 
governance, and which governance mechanisms are available to limit self-
serving behaviour?) and political economics (what is the distinctive 
character of state ownership, and how does it influences governance 
decisions?).5 
To set the scene for the theoretical discussion, we start by illustrating 
the firm hierarchy in the case of state ownership, which appears at the left-
hand side of Figure 1.1. In conventional terms, the firm hierarchy concerns 
the relationships among shareholders (those people who invest their money 
in the firm), corporate directors (those people who act as fiduciary 
representatives of the shareholder electorate), and corporate managers (those 
people who run the firm). In firms where the state holds ownership rights, 
even more actors are involved. More precisely, the citizens/taxpayers are the 
ultimate owners of SOCs, who then vote for political parties to represent 
their interests. Thereafter, the party (or coalition of parties) with the majority 
of Parliamentary seats appoints a government to act on voters’ behalf. In 
practice, this means that voters delegate their ownership rights to the 
government through elections. For that reason, we normally refer to the 
government as the actual owner of SOCs.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that there are other conceptions of corporate governance than the one 
pertaining to the firm level. In fact, corporate governance research spans today several levels 
of analysis, from within the firm to the nation-state and beyond (Davis and Useem, 2002).   
 
6 In practice, this firm hierarchy is even more complex as it also includes the bureaucrats who, 
in support of their ministers, oversee the state ownership portfolio on a daily basis.    
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Figure 1.1. The firm hierarchy under state ownership. 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to this figure, we note three specific characteristics of the firm 
hierarchy. First, there is an extensive delegation of control rights, from 
voters to politicians and down on the hierarchy to the corporate managers (as 
shown by the dense arrow lines). Second, every actor in the firm hierarchy is 
held accountable by their superiors (as shown by the dotted arrow lines). 
Third, although often unspoken, the very same actors are held accountable 
also by future employers in the sense that their current professional 
achievements are evaluated by the external job market (note that political 
parties as such are not held accountable by future employers, only their 
party-members can be). In the economics literature, the above relationships 
are usually modelled as principal-agent (or, simply, agency) relationships.7 
Formally, an agency relationship is defined as “…a contract under which 
one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision-making authority to the agent” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 
                                                 
7 The landmark papers on this issue are due to Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), 
Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b). 
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308). In terms of Figure 1.1, we note that aside from the ultimate principals 
(voters, but also future employers) and ultimate agents (corporate managers) 
every actor in the firm hierarchy occupies a dual role in which they serve 
both as principal and as agent. That is, our key decision-makers (incumbent 
politicians and corporate directors) are both delegating authority and being 
held accountable by their superiors.  
Importantly, there is a good reason why the principal wants to 
delegate the power to decide: As a specialist in his or her area, the agent is 
more likely than the principal to have the experience, judgment, and 
information to decide wisely (Maskin and Tirole, 2004).8 Moreover, if we 
assume away any interest conflicts between principal and agent, delegation 
could perfectly well bring about the desired results for the principal. The 
agent will simply be prepared to carry out the instructions from the principal, 
and his or her effort is reimbursed directly (Hart, 1995a). But, can we really 
trust the agents in the state firm hierarchy to act in the principals’ interests? 
If we were to believe the theoretical perspectives underlying this thesis (and, 
not to forget, a vast amount of real-world cases) the answer is certainly ‘no’. 
In what follows, I will elaborate on this position and show how the described 
theoretical elements come into play in the present context. 
 
1.3.1 Why do we need corporate governance? 
According to corporate governance theory, the most striking feature of the 
firm hierarchy is the separation of ownership from management, which 
means that those people who bring equity to the firm are not the same people 
who make decisions about corporate behaviour on a daily basis (Berle and 
Means, 1932). Portraying this separation as an agency relationship between 
shareholders and corporate managers, the shareholders are the principals 
who then contract with the corporate managers (the agents) to act on their 
behalf.  
Perhaps not very surprising, the contractual relationship between 
shareholders and corporate managers carries a built-in delegation problem – 
most often referred to as the agency problem. One part of the agency 
problem is that corporate managers have private information – about their 
‘true type’ (e.g., their motivation and skills) or their actual behaviour (e.g., 
on-the-job-consumption) – that are largely unavailable to the shareholders.9 
The other part is that that every individual acts to maximise his or her own 
utility, which makes us likely to experience cases in which the interests of 
                                                 
8 Maskin and Tirole (2004) use this argument to explain why the citizens delegate decision-
making powers to elected representatives. Apparently, this logic applies equally well in most 
other agency relationships. 
 
9 In the principal-agent literature, these cases are known as ’adverse selection’ (hidden 
knowledge) and ’moral hazard’ (hidden action), respectively.  
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shareholders and corporate managers do not coincide. A few examples might 
contribute to illustrate the agency problem. For instance, corporate managers 
may undertake certain actions (e.g., providing favours to business 
companions or enjoying extravagant business trips) which are difficult for 
shareholders to observe. Accordingly, shareholders have no possibility for 
raising their voice against corporate managers. Or, there is the case in which 
corporate managers perform highly observable actions (e.g., they pursue an 
acquisition strategy), but the shareholders cannot know for sure what are 
managers’ motivation for doing so or, even, what are the possible effects on 
shareholder value. In fact, corporate managers might decide on firm strategy 
mainly as a means to increase their power and status (caring less about the 
effects on shareholder value), or as a means to look competent in the eyes of 
present and future employers (which necessitates that they positively 
influence shareholder value). But, since shareholders are typically little 
informed about corporate managers’ factual motivation (and, perhaps, even 
their talent), this also makes them less prone to interfere in firm activities. In 
sum, therefore, the agency problem is due to asymmetric information and 
potential interest conflicts between shareholders and corporate managers.  
Is there so any possibility for shareholders to alleviate the agency 
problem? Viewing the firm as a nexus-of-contracts, it is tempting to suggest 
that the agency problem might easily be resolved by way of including in the 
contract some clauses against potential shareholder abuse. But unfortunately, 
improved contracting alone is not a sufficient solution. This presumption is 
due to the very nature of contracting: Because it is extremely expensive, if 
not impossible, to write and enforce contracts which deal with all aspects of 
the shareholder-manager interaction, shareholders are likely to give up any 
specific control rights over corporate management. Instead, they end up 
purchasing the residual control rights, which include all control rights 
except those given away in any initial contracts. In practice, this means that 
shareholders have to accept those contractual agreements which the firm has 
made with, say, employees and debt holders. Apart from this, however, 
shareholders are given almost carte blanche to intervene in those company 
matters which are not regulated by any preceding contracts (Grossman and 
Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995a, 1995b). But also, company 
legislation provides an effective impediment to shareholder intervention in 
that it prescribes a clear division of roles between shareholders, the board of 
directors, and corporate management.  
Leaving aside the impact of company legislation (to which we return 
in Section 1.4 and, later, in Section 3.1), it seems intuitive to expect that 
shareholders will use their residual control rights to actively intervene in 
corporate decision-making, since this would make them capable of acquiring 
at least some valuable information and thereby ease the agency problem. But 
for this to happen, shareholders need both be capable and willing to engage 
in corporate issues. One might easily argue, however, that most shareholders 
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have neither the possibility nor desire to perform this task on a day-to-day 
basis. For one thing, this might be due to the simple fact that shareholders 
lack the time and competence necessary to engage in corporate decision-
making. Recalling from above, this is exactly why shareholders delegate 
decision-making authority to corporate managers in the first place. As to 
government-owners, this argument is particularly valid as politicians are 
generally not specialists in corporate issues. Additionally, state ownership is 
only one among several important policy areas which demand political 
attention. For another, shareholders’ ownership stakes might be too small for 
active intervention to pay off, or they simply lack enough power to influence 
corporate managers. While these arguments are certainly not applicable to 
government-owners, who by virtue of their sheer ownership stakes at least 
have the necessary power to engage in corporate decision-making, 
politicians might abstain from involvement for other reasons. Perhaps most 
importantly, non-intervention is necessary to the extent that state ownership 
is administered under Parliamentary responsibility. Thus, for the Parliament 
not to hold the government responsible for company-related decisions, the 
government-owner needs to refrain from intervention in corporate decision-
making. Moreover, we have already noted the fact that the state may in some 
sectors act both as an owner and a regulator. To avoid role conflicts and 
charges against the government-owner for intervening in firm activity to the 
detriment of competitors, this suggests that significant control rights are 
delegated to corporate managers. Finally, the government-owner might 
abstain from intervention in order to prove that it will not exploit potential 
co-investors, whose interests might possibly conflict with political interests. 
In sum, therefore, there exist strong arguments as to why shareholders in 
general and government-owners in particular should normally refrain from 
direct intervention in the decision-making of SOCs and leave room for 
managerial discretion.  
Yet, it is hard to believe that shareholders totally give up on their 
residual control rights, only hoping for the possibility that corporate 
managers will not take advantage of their position. By contrast, we often 
observe that shareholders spend large amounts of effort and ingenuity 
attempting to influence corporate behaviour. The point is, however, that 
shareholders normally do not exercise their control rights by observing and 
adjusting the behaviour of corporate managers on a daily basis. Instead, they 
rely on a set of closely defined governance mechanisms, which use is 
regularly decided upon by shareholders themselves or by corporate directors. 
Thus, shareholders do exercise control, but this happens by way of some 
finer mechanisms which do not take up too much of shareholders’ time or 
interfere with managers’ decision-making authority.  
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1.3.2 Which governance mechanisms? 
The above discussion leads naturally to the question: How can shareholders 
curb managerial opportunism? Following corporate governance theory, 
shareholders most efficiently discipline corporate managers by way of 
providing them with some kinds of incentives, which may take the form of 
implicit or explicit inducements. Implicit incentives are normally present in 
the form of career concerns inside or outside the firm, which means that 
corporate managers can only hold on to their jobs if keeping an eye on a 
certain threshold of utility for the shareholders (Fama, 1980; Holmström, 
1982; Dewatripont et al., 1999a, 1999b). Thus, while corporate managers 
might get away with some types of self-seeking behaviour, their concern for 
future employment within and outside the firm provides a major motivation 
for pleasing shareholders. Within the firm hierarchy it is but not the 
shareholders themselves who hold corporate managers accountable. Instead, 
shareholders delegate this task to the board of directors, which means that 
the major responsibility of corporate directors is to make sure that corporate 
managers strive to fulfil shareholders’ objectives. Basically, shareholders 
thus use the board of directors as a governance mechanism to alleviate the 
agency problem.  
Yet, in reality, the managerial labour market is not fully competitive, 
due to both informational problems and sticky labour contracts. Therefore, 
even though career-concerns do motivate corporate managers to increase 
shareholder welfare, we cannot expect that implicit incentives will entirely 
solve the agency problem.10 But shareholders normally rely on some other 
governance mechanisms as well, which use is decided upon by shareholders 
themselves or by the board of directors. Among these governance 
mechanisms, most attention has been devoted to explicit incentives, which 
are associated with financial rewards such as bonuses, profit sharing, stock 
options, shareholdings, and so on (Prendergast, 1999). Additionally, the 
agency problem might be successfully handled by placing some outright 
boundaries on corporate managers’ discretionary behaviour – for instance, 
by restraining the cash available for managerial spending on corporate 
activities. However, there may still be incentive aspects to such a 
disciplinary device if shareholders are prone to lessen their control when 
corporate managers identify profitable investment projects.  
From this, it follows that shareholders may rely on three types of 
governance mechanisms to discipline corporate managers, which includes 
                                                 
10 In principle, shareholders may also rely on the market for corporate control to mitigate the 
agency problem. In this case, corporate managers are disciplined by the threat of takeovers, 
which involves hostile bidders acquire control of poorly performing firms and remove 
corporate management. But like the labour market, the takeover market is not fully 
competitive. Even more important, however, the takeover threat does not apply very well to 
most SOCs, whose ownership structure is rather persistent over time.     
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the board of directors, CEO compensation contracts, and dividend payments. 
According to the literature, these governance mechanisms should be decided 
upon so that the following criteria are met: First, shareholders should appoint 
corporate directors who possess the necessary competence to represent the 
interests of the firm (overviews of the economic literature on the board of 
directors are given by Becht et al., 2003; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). 
Although fulfilling the competence requirements, however, the agency view 
suggests that corporate directors will not necessarily act as loyal 
representatives of the shareholders. Ironically, the upshot of this is that 
shareholders must strive to discipline the behaviour of not only corporate 
managers, but also that of corporate directors. But like corporate managers, 
it seems reasonable to suggest that also corporate directors are motivated by 
career-concerns inside and outside the firm. Therefore, corporate directors 
are likely kept accountable by implicit incentives in terms of re-election 
prospects and the possibility of being nominated for other directorships or 
managerial positions in the private or public sector.11 Moreover, to facilitate 
the board selection process, shareholders will normally rely on some 
personal characteristics (e.g., professional background) of board candidates 
to proxy for their competence and loyalty. Overall, this suggests that who is 
appointed by the shareholders to serve on the SOC boards is vital to ensure 
that corporate managers are held accountable to shareholders’ interests. 
Second, the board of directors should decide on the level and 
structure of CEO compensation contracts so that corporate managers are 
encouraged to behave according to shareholders’ interests (for an overview 
of the economic literature on executive compensation, see Murphy, 1999). 
As to the salary level, theory simply predicts that CEOs should be paid no 
more than what is justified by market considerations (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1988, 1995; David et al., 1998). The other part of this argument 
states that if firms are offering salaries which are significantly below market-
efficient levels, they are likely to experience difficulties in the recruitment of 
managerial talents. Moreover, theory posits that corporate directors most 
efficiently protect shareholders’ interests by offering CEOs high-powered 
incentive schemes (see, for example, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Tirole, 
2001). Finally, some management perquisites, like golden parachute 
contracts, mainly reflect an agency cost associated with inefficient board 
control and should therefore be avoided – if not explicitly invoked on 
business grounds (Wade et al., 1990). In short, therefore, theory suggests 
that shareholders should put pressure on the board of directors to offer the 
                                                 
11 Although more rare in a Scandinavian context, it might also be the case that corporate 
directors are being offered explicit incentives (e.g., stock options and shareholdings) by the 
shareholders. 
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CEO a market-clearing salary level, performance-based pay components, 
and make restrictions on the use of management perquisites.   
Finally, the board of directors (or, in some cases, the shareholders) 
should extract enough dividends from the firms so as to restrain corporate 
managers’ financial discretion (for an overview of the dividend literature, 
see Correia da Silva et al., 2004). This argument is derived from the 
theoretical prediction that the worst agency problem occurs in equity-based 
firms with poor investment opportunities and excess cash, which would 
imply that shareholders pressure low-growth firms to pay earning out as 
dividend rather than retain it (Jensen, 1986). While dividend payments 
certainly help to limit firms’ financial discretion, such governance decisions 
might also have an important incentive effect. Normally, this would be the 
case if firms with good growth prospects are allowed to keep enough money 
to invest in profitable projects.  
To this broad picture, the corporate governance literature suggests 
that a number of factors might have an effect on governance decisions. In 
particular, some of the special characteristics of SOCs indicate that 
governance decisions cannot simply be explained by conventional economic 
arguments. But, even more basic, we cannot explain governance decisions 
without also asking what motivates politicians when acting in their capacity 
as shareholders. 
 
1.3.3 What motivates politicians? 
So far, I have surveyed the very essence of corporate governance research: 
Why do we need corporate governance, and what can shareholders do to best 
protect their interests? In this stream of research, one most often starts from 
the assumption that shareholders’ primary motivation is to maximise profit. 
Naturally, most shareholders care about getting a return on their investments. 
But, as some authors point out, “[t]he assumption that all external 
shareholders are equally concerned with profit maximisation…is overly 
simplistic and ignores the differing incentives the various external 
shareholders will face” (Short, 1994, p. 228). Accordingly, we should expect 
that the identity of shareholders will have important implications for their 
objectives and how they engage in corporate governance (Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 2000). In particular, this thesis will discuss how the government-
owner is quite different from other types of shareholders.  
Considered the fact that corporate governance theory is rather silent 
about the identity issue in general and state ownership in particular, I turn to 
the research field of political economics for further insights. As the term 
signifies, political economics straddles the disciplines of economics and 
political science (Dunleavy, 1991). More precisely, it carries the use of 
economic tools to study policy decisions and, ultimately, how different 
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policies affect economic outcomes.12 The core assumption of this theoretical 
framework is that politicians, like anyone else, act in pursuit of their private 
interests. Making qualified assumptions about these interests is thus a first 
step towards our goal of achieving a richer understanding of corporate 
governance in the case of state ownership.  
Following the theory of political economics, politicians derive their 
utility from the power, rents, and policy influences that go with the job (see, 
for example, Persson and Tabellini, 2000). If we keep in line with the 
motivational concerns of other actors in the firm hierarchy (i.e., corporate 
managers and corporate directors), it thus seems natural to interpret these 
objectives as if politicians are motivated by their within-politics career 
prospects. In terms of Figure 1.1, we note that in order for politicians to hold 
on to their positions, this means they have to please both the party-group 
and, ultimately, the voters. To complete the line of reasoning of such career-
concern motivation, we should take into account the possibility that 
politicians also care about their non-political career prospects (Alesina and 
Tabellini, 2007, 2008). 
Interestingly, though, mainstream political economics suggests that 
political motivation does not necessarily correspond to that of the career-
concern model. In fact, politicians are assumed to care about policy 
influences for other reasons than to preserve the loyalty of the party-group 
and the voters – for instance, for the sake of increasing the welfare of 
particular groups in society. From this view, we should therefore distinguish 
between the cases in which politicians’ motive is simply that of re-election 
(which allows them to maintain their power and/or extract rents) or that of 
implementing their preferred policies (Alesina et al., 1999; Persson and 
Tabellini, 2000). Importantly, the distinction between the re-election motive 
and the ideology motive is crucial not only to the discourse about political 
motivation, but for analytic purposes as well. This is because the two 
motivational concerns might induce different behaviour. In fact, if politicians 
do only care about issues of power and rents, they would mainly seek to 
please the voters (when also keeping an eye on a lower threshold level of 
support from the party-group). By contrast, if politicians are exclusively 
concerned with policy influences (as we assume is also the primary objective 
of the party-group), this means they might be willing to sacrifice office so as 
to preserve ideological commitments.  
While, in the political economics literature, these motivational 
models are mainly used to study policy decisions in other areas than that of 
corporate governance, they might certainly prove relevant to the latter as 
well. However, in order to render the models valid descriptions of corporate 
governance issues, some refinements are needed: As regards the re-election 
                                                 
12 Note, however, that political economics (often also referred to as ‘political economy’) has 
been used in various contexts to refer to different intellectual projects (Besley, 2005).  
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motive, we need to make some assumptions about voters’ rationality 
(including voter preferences and voter information) on the issue of corporate 
governance. As to the ideology motive, we should convincingly argue that 
different political parties follow distinct corporate governance policies and 
thereby differently attempting to influence upon governance decisions when 
in office. Finally, as regards the reputation motive, we need to identify what 
are the preferred governance decisions from the point of view of future 
employers.  
 
1.3.4 Some final remarks on the notion of self-interests  
At the start of this theoretical discussion, we introduced the assumption of 
self-interested individuals. Although this assumption is today standard, some 
authors have found it necessary to note that there is nothing inconsistent 
between self-interested and altruistic behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1994; 
Jensen, 1994). Naturally, most people do not care only about their own 
welfare, but also about the welfare of others. Also, people might care about 
their own welfare in ways that stretch beyond that of pecuniary implications. 
From this view, I add two more remarks to the notion of self-interest. First, I 
assume that self-interest tends to dominate altruism, which means that 
people mostly think about their own wellbeing rather than the wellbeing of 
others. Second, I do recognise, however, that self-interests may appear in 
many forms; for instance, as a matter of achieving material benefits or 
increasing individuals’ self-esteem. As we return to these issues in Chapter 
2, suffice it to say here that it is possible to incorporate more considerations 
of individual motives into our models without loosing any precision in 
predicting empirical outcomes.  
 
 
1.4 What is a State-owned Company?  
In practice, state ownership takes a number of forms ranging from entities 
that are functionally, but not legally, distinct from the state to incorporated 
companies. In this thesis, the label state-owned company is confined to those 
firms that are organised as separate legal entities distinct from the 
government, with the freedom to dispose of their own capital and income. 
Moreover, attention is drawn to those firms in which shareholders’ 
responsibility is limited to the capital they have invested; that is, limited 
liability companies. As a shareholder in limited liability companies, the 
government can thus only be held accountable for company debts equivalent 
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to the invested amount.13 We also note that the term state-owned company is 
used to embrace both those firms in which the state is the single owner and 
those firms in which the state owns less than 100% of the stock.14 Thus, a 
company is denoted as state-owned irrespective of the state equity fraction 
being large or small. Finally, the thesis concentrates on those companies that 
are directly administered by the government. Accordingly, it excludes the 
wide range of firms which are indirectly owned by the state, through 
subordinate governmental agencies or state institutional investors, like the 
Norwegian Folketrygdfondet and Norges Bank Investment Management.  
In both Norway and Sweden, there are two types of limited liability 
companies – public and private.15 The two company types differ regarding 
the rules that regulate the firm’s ownership structure. More precisly, a 
publicly held company is obligated to raise new capital through a public 
offering. By contrast, a privately held company can raise capital from 
existing shareholders only, unless otherwise is stated in the firm’s articles of 
association. In addition, publicly held companies are subject to some special 
requirements regarding the size of capital and board composition, amongst 
others. Norwegian and Swedish firms that are listed on the national stock 
exchanges are all publicly held. As regards the government-owners in 
Norway and Sweden, they are engaged in both publicly and privately held 
companies. Firms that are fully owned by the state are naturally considered 
                                                 
13 While the limited liability company (aksjeselskap) is the company type most commonly 
used for Norwegian SOCs, the latter can also be organised as companies subject to special 
laws (særlovsselskaper) and as companies with a more sectoral profile (statsforetak). Yet, 
studies have shown that there is no close match between the legal status and the arguments 
used by politicians to decide on a specific company type (Statskonsult, 1998). Until year-end 
2002, the major difference between the company forms related to the fact that the state 
guaranteed for the company debt in statsforetak. As to the governance mechanisms relevant 
for this thesis, there are few differences between the three company types. In principle, 
therefore, all Norwegian SOCs are subject to inclusion in the data set. Today, Norwegian 
policy sets out as a general rule that the limited liability company should be chosen as the 
appropriate company type. As regards Swedish SOCs, they are all organised as limited 
liability companies.  
14 In many countries, partly state-owned companies (also known as mixed enterprises) are a 
very common owner type. As the term suggests, partly state-owned companies involve a 
partial divestment of the firm to non-governmental shareholders or the set-up of a new firm 
partly owned by non-governmental shareholders and partly owned by the state (see, for 
example, Boardman and Vining, 1989; Bös, 1991). Note that, in the literature, partly state-
owned companies are most often referred to as partly privatised companies. Using instead the 
term partly state-owned, this thesis recognises that potential co-investors can be of any type – 
public as well as private. 
 
15 Note that these terms do not imply anything about the ownership of firms. Therefore, 
publicly held companies should not be confused with state-owned companies. As will be 
described, state-owned companies may be organised as either private or public limited 
liability companies.  
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as privately held companies, since the stock is not traded. In those limited 
liability companies in which the state co-invests with others, SOCs can be of 
private or public type, depending on whether the SOC is listed or not.  
While the company legislation governing limited liability companies 
is discussed later in this thesis, suffice it to say here that there should be a 
clear division of roles between the shareholders, the board of directors, and 
the corporate management. Obviously, this role division is a direct 
implication of the fact that shareholders can only limit their responsibility if 
also withdrawing from taking active part in the firm’s business operations. 
Interestingly, this argument adds some institutional reality to the theory 
described above, which suggests that shareholders freely delegate large part 
of their control rights to corporate managers while at the same time 
attempting to discipline managerial behaviour by relying on some adequate 
governance mechanisms. In practice, therefore, shareholders do not delegate 
decision-making authority only because they like to, but because the limited 
liability company form compels them to do so. In the case of state 
ownership, the broad implication is that corporate managers in SOCs are 
shielded from direct political intervention in their daily operations insofar as 
the government-owner should engage in corporate governance through 
formal corporate bodies, such as the general assembly.  
 
 
1.5 A Comment on Omitted Variables 
In the process of selecting variables to be included in the empirical analysis, 
the aim of this thesis is to fortify the theoretical and policy debates on state 
ownership and corporate governance. For one thing, this means I include in 
the analysis those variables which are deemed the most obvious candidates 
when putting theoretical ideas to empirical tests. For another, some of these 
variables also represent key issues in the political debate about corporate 
governance (e.g., how large state ownership share is needed to influence 
upon governance decisions, or what are the effects of drawing a sharp 
distinction between commercial and non-commercial SOCs?). The interest 
also lies in whether some basic variables are (non-)significant predictors of 
more than one type of governance decisions. 
In the very same process of selecting variables, I consciously ignore 
a wide range of potential determinants of governance decisions. As there are 
clearly some econometric caveats associated with omitted variables (these 
issues are discussed in Chapter 5), the purpose is here to draw attention to 
one special variable of interest which is conventionally included in corporate 
governance research, but excluded from this analysis; namely, that of firm 
performance. Notably, firm performance constrains and enables certain types 
of behaviour, and is thereby important to most organisational activities. Yet, 
there are sound reasons why firm performance is not included in this study. 
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Most importantly, the heterogeneous nature of the state ownership portfolio 
means that there is no commonly accepted indicator of firm performance. In 
fact, since SOCs are typically assigned very different objectives and operate 
in completely different industries or sectors, the task of designing reliable 
SOC performance measures would represent by itself a vital contribution to 
the literature. To avoid running into the problem of comparing the 
incomparable, firm performance is therefore subsumed under the umbrella of 
omitted variables.  
 
 
1.6 The Structure of the Thesis 
The rest of this thesis is organised in eight chapters. Chapters 2 through 4 
provide the theoretical framework. Chapter 5 describes the data and 
discusses the econometric methods. Chapters 6 through 8 discuss the 
empirical results. Chapter 9 summarises the results and concludes. To further 
clarify the structure of the thesis, we take a look at each chapter in some 
more detail.    
Chapter 2 provides a thorough discussion of motivational models 
and asks what encourages politicians and corporate directors to engage in 
corporate governance. Probing the political economics literature, it seems 
reasonable to distinguish between three types of political motivation: The 
motive to build a professional reputation; the motive to become re-elected; 
and the motive to implement party-policies. As regards corporate directors, 
the corporate governance literature suggests that they are motivated to 
become re-elected or to build a professional reputation. While there are 
certainly some grey areas between these models, they are also possibly in 
conflict. Therefore, the models are kept separate when discussing their 
broader implications for corporate governance.  
Chapter 3 takes into account the fact that politicians and corporate 
directors do not operate in a vacuum. By contrast, they are affected by both 
institutional features and firm characteristics. The chapter describes the 
institutional framework that applies to state ownership in Norway and 
Sweden. Additionally, the chapter looks at what theory has to say about the 
influences of firm characteristics on corporate governance. The theoretical 
discussion is accompanied by descriptive accounts of the state ownership 
portfolios in the two countries. 
With the basic theory in place, the aim of Chapter 4 is to build some 
richer models of governance decision-making. Discussing how motivational 
concerns interact with institutional features and firm characteristics, the 
chapter develops some specific hypotheses about what governance decisions 
are made in the areas of board appointments, CEO compensation contracts, 
and dividend payments.  
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Chapter 5 deals with the data and method that are used to test the 
empirical hypotheses. First, the chapter provides answers to why Norway 
and Sweden represent suitable cases to examine the topic of state ownership 
and corporate governance. Second, the chapter gives a careful description of 
the sampling approach, variable definitions, and methods for data collection. 
Third, attention is given to specification of the econometric methods that are 
used to analyse panel data, and how to resolve some inherent problems in the 
present data set.    
Chapter 6 presents the results from the empirical analysis of SOC 
board appointments. As to the question of who chairs the SOC boards, the 
analysis shows that the fraction of political representatives is rather similar 
in Norway and Sweden. However, the fraction of political chairmen who are 
appointed by their own government is significantly larger in Norway. 
Moreover, while in Norway, the majority of SOC chairmen are recruited 
among private sector employees, the opposite pattern holds for Sweden. The 
results of the multivariate analyses indicate though that theoretical ideas and 
actual practices are weakly associated. Despite of some significant partial 
effects, the models have all low explanatory power. Additionally, nearly all 
significant results are nation-specific, which make the governance models 
less applicable across national boundaries. 
Chapter 7 presents the empirical results on the topic of CEO 
compensation contracts. As to the very content of pay packages, the overall 
finding it that CEO pay packages differ across both firms and countries, as 
well as over time. One noteworthy result is that CEOs do not seem to incur 
any particular risk with their pay insofar as there are mostly upside effects 
related to the use of incentive schemes. Besides, CEOs are commonly 
generously compensated for the risk of being dismissed. The findings from 
the multivariate analyses show that CEO compensation design is affected by 
a wide range of factors, including economic criteria, political forces, 
managerial influences, and even nationality and time effects. Although the 
results are broadly consistent with some distinct motivational logics, it thus 
not seems that the pay design of firms under state control is easily explained 
by a single governance model. 
Chapter 8 presents the empirical findings in the area of dividend 
payments. The results indicate that more than half of the SOCs in sample are 
candidates for paying dividends, and that a great majority of these are actual 
dividend-payers. The major result from the multivariate analyses is that 
nation-specific legal systems matter to dividend payments. Generally, and in 
line with theoretical expectations, the Norwegian results are consistent with 
the re-election model, while the Swedish case supports the idea of the 
reputation model.  
Finally, Chapter 9 provides a summary of the empirical findings and 
discusses how these results match up with theoretical ideas. The chapter 
ends with a view to the future research agenda. 
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Chapter 2 
 
What Motivates Politicians and Corporate 
Directors to Engage in Corporate Governance? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How do the government-owner and the board of directors seek to monitor, 
control, and incentivise the top management in SOCs – if, in fact, this is 
really what they are trying to do? As a first step to answer this question we 
look at the motivation of politicians and corporate directors to engage in 
corporate governance. As far as political motivation is concerned, we start 
from the assumption that politicians only care about their reputation – they 
want to appear competent to outside observers. In line with this reputation 
model, politicians are likely to choose those governance decisions that 
display conformity to normative benchmark criteria about corporate 
governance, since such behaviour would signal their talent. Alternatively, we 
might assume that politicians care solely about their re-election prospects. 
The essence of this re-election model is that politicians have no policy 
preferences of their own, so they choose the kinds of governance decisions 
that maximise their chances of electoral victory. Finally, we make the 
assumption that politicians strictly care about political ideology. According 
to this ideology model, politicians would decide upon corporate governance 
in line with partisan profiles. 
From the perspective of political economics, both the re-election and 
the ideology models represent well-known views of political motivation (an 
introduction to these models is provided by Alesina et al., 1999, Chapter 1; 
Persson and Tabellini, 2000, Chapter 1). By contrast, the reputation model 
represents a less-standard position (see, in particular, Maskin and Tirole, 
2004; Alesina and Tabellini, 2007, 2008). While all three models capture 
important aspects of reality, there are some ambiguous issues and 
intermediate cases between the models. For analytical purposes, however, 
the models clearly help to identify how different motivational concerns have 
different implications for corporate governance.  
As regards corporate directors, we might safely assume that they are 
motivated by some of the similar concerns which apply to politicians. In 
particular, we assume that corporate directors are concerned about their 
reputation, which means they would choose those governance decisions that 
are most likely to signal their talent (the reputation model). Alternatively, we 
might assume that corporate directors care about their chances of being re-
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elected to current board positions, which makes them inclined to vote for the 
kinds of governance decisions that please the government-owner and 
potential co-investors (the re-election model).  
While, in a research context, the motivation of corporate directors 
has received less attention than the issue of political motivation, we need 
only confer with the classical literature on corporate governance to suggest 
that corporate directors are likely concerned about their reputation and career 
prospects both within and outside the firm (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 
1983a). From a theoretical point of view, therefore, both the reputation 
model and the re-election model seem appropriate candidates for 
understanding the motivation of corporate directors. Whereas, also in this 
case, there might be some grey areas within and between the models, their 
distinctions are important since they carry different implications for 
corporate governance. 
Without being specific about what kinds of governance decisions 
that are likely to be made (we deal with this issue in Chapter 4), this chapter 
explores the motivational models in some more detail. Section 2.1 lays out 
the three motivational concerns that apply to politicians and discusses some 
general implications for corporate governance. Likewise, Section 2.2 looks 
at the motivational concerns of corporate directors and considers some 
broader implications pertaining to these models. Section 2.3 provides a brief 
summary. 
 
 
2.1 The Motivational Concerns of Politicians 
While the motivational concerns of politicians are drawn from the broader 
literature on political economics, only some of these insights have been 
applied in the literature on state ownership and corporate governance. 
Perhaps most surprisingly, very little attention has been paid to the ideology 
model, which focuses upon the impact of party differences on governance 
decisions. Nor has much attention been paid to the reputation model, which 
builds on the idea that politicians are concerned about signalling their 
competence. Thus, research provides little guidance into the issue of how 
politicians will choose governance decisions that are considered right for the 
society in general and the business community in particular. By contrast, 
most research on corporate governance in the context of state ownership has 
been carried out within the framework of the re-election model, which 
elevates the idea that politicians are concerned with how they might insure 
themselves against negative voter reactions. More precisely, this literature 
focuses attention on how the government prefers those governance decisions 
which are most likely not to stir up controversy among interest groups and 
the general public – even if they are at odds with the public interest. In the 
following, we take a closer look at each motivational model.  
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2.1.1 The reputation model 
As a starting point for analysis, we assume that politicians care about their 
reputation in the sense that they want to signal their competence to outside 
observers. Interestingly, there are several reasons why politicians might seek 
to behave as reputation-builders. The most intuitive reason is that they want 
to appear talented to the voters, since voters might use information about 
past performance to select the most competent politicians (Persson and 
Tabellini, 2000, see in particular pp. 81-87; see also Wittman, 1995). As I 
will discuss in the next section, however, there are sound reasons why we 
may doubt the notion of effective voter-control on the issue of corporate 
governance. Accordingly, we might expect that politicians care about their 
reputation for other reasons – perhaps primarily because they want to appear 
talented to the outside (non-political) labour market (Alesina and Tabellini, 
2007, 2008). In fact, it seems very reasonable that politicians care about the 
perception of their ability in the eyes of those that may offer them alternative 
job opportunities, since any incumbent politicians are conditional on loosing 
office. Moreover, we cannot ignore the possibility that politicians care about 
their reputation as a matter of self-image, pride or legacy, irrespective of the 
immediate career implications (Maskin and Tirole, 2004).16   
If accepting the assumptions underlying the reputation motive, we 
are naturally led to ask: What are the implications for corporate governance? 
In general terms, we expect that politicians’ concern for their reputation as 
being competent would induce them to act in the public interest, since this is 
the normative benchmark for policy-maximising in a political context. This 
means we first have to pin down the public interest in the context of state 
ownership, which is ultimately given by the publicly stated (statutory) 
objectives of SOCs. Thereafter, we have to identify the normative criteria 
which guide the choice of specific governance decisions that might further 
these objectives. Unfortunately, however, economic theory has not provided 
any conclusive insights into what these normative criteria are. Nor has 
empirical research provided any decisive evidence of which governance 
decisions are in the best interest of specific SOCs. Still, we might expect the 
ideas of economic theory to affect the climate of public opinion within 
which such decisions are made (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991), insofar as the 
dominant voices in the debate about corporate governance include business 
school researchers, financial sector representatives, and policy consultants 
(e.g., the OECD). Therefore, we should expect that the governance decisions 
which are most likely to signal competence are those that display conformity 
to prevalent ideas about corporate governance – as these are reflected in the 
                                                 
16 The same argument is applied by Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008) when modelling the 
motivational concern of bureaucrats. Certainly, the argument applies equally well to 
politicians, bearing resemblance to the legacy motive of Maskin and Tirole (2004).   
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academic literature and practical guidelines. Nonetheless, we should also 
note that there is a possibility for the public interest not to coincide with the 
interests of the firm. This is likely the case if the aggregate effects of certain 
governance decisions, which are deemed well-founded from the point of 
view of the firm, might have negative consequences on the economy as a 
whole. Therefore, it seems more precise that we refer to politicians who care 
about their reputation as taking care of the public interest instead of the 
interests of single SOCs – even though these interests are likely to converge. 
 
2.1.2 The re-election model 
Now, assume instead that politicians care only about winning the upcoming 
election, which is the standard motive in the political economics literature. 
The desire to stay in office is mainly because politicians might have a taste 
for wielding power or that they like to enjoy the perquisites that come with 
the job (Maskin and Tirole, 2004). In any case, the main concern of 
politicians is how to satisfy the wider public so as to increase their chances 
of being re-elected. In the ideal case, such responsiveness to voter demands 
would imply that politicians choose those actions which they believe is right 
for society. As suggested above, however, the notion of effective voter-
control has been severely criticised in mainstream political economics 
theory. More precisely, this literature claims that, on many policy issues, we 
cannot expect the electorate to collect information and learn about the 
optimality of policy decisions before the next the election takes place. 
Instead, voters are seen to have either poor or biased information and they 
have usually little interests in learning about the effects of prior decisions. 
Obviously, this notion of voter-control carries dismal predictions for policy-
making in the sense that politicians who care only about holding office are 
likely to make decisions that reflect the imperfect or prejudiced information 
of voters. 
But why, really, do we believe that voters are so badly informed, and 
what are the implications for corporate governance? Probing the political 
economics literature on state ownership, we may distinguish between three 
models of informational problems. The first model leans on Down’s (1957) 
hypothesis about ‘rational voter ignorance’. The idea is that since acquiring 
information on various political issues is costly for voters, and the impact of 
any voter on the election outcome is marginal, individual voters are in fact 
acting rationally when choosing to stay uninformed. When also taking into 
account the more specific argument that voters have no direct cash flow 
rights from SOCs, this suggests that voter-control will be rather weak on the 
ownership issue (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). But if voters are little engaged 
in questions about corporate governance, this also suggests that the control 
efforts of politicians have a large opportunity cost as political efforts can be 
more efficiently used for other relevant (i.e., more voter-sensitive) purposes 
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(McCubbins et al., 1987). Thus, as we cannot expect voters to be vigilant 
monitors of the government as shareholder, the latter has weak incentives to 
actively engage in corporate governance. The upshot of this is that 
ownership issues are offered only low priority by politicians, and the 
resulting governance decisions should therefore not be interpreted as the 
outcome of any concerted strategy. Besides, weak political engagement 
suggests that both corporate directors and corporate managers are left with 
considerable discretion to influence upon corporate governance.  
Our second model emphasises instead the differential information 
among voters. Specifically, the literature on state ownership suggests that 
some voter groups will be more attentive towards corporate governance than 
others (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Boycko et al., 
1996; Hart et al., 1997; Shleifer, 1998). This is likely the case as the effects 
of governance decisions are normally concentrated among a few 
stakeholders, like SOC employees and their trade unions. For organised 
interest groups, therefore, we might expect the cost/benefit calculation of 
engagement in corporate governance is positive, which means they are 
willing to supply politicians with money and votes if they get what they 
want. In contrast, few other voter groups are directly affected by governance 
decisions, making such policy issues relatively unimportant. The notion that 
interest groups are more responsive to governance decisions than the average 
citizen therefore leads to the expectation that, in order for politicians to 
become re-elected, they need to cater to the demands of these interest 
groups. In other words, the tendency is for politicians to make policy 
decisions which concentrate benefits on the well-organised and well-
informed interest groups in the short run, and disperse the costs among the 
unorganised and ill-informed voters in the long run.  
Finally, our third model claims that voters are victims of biased 
information. One interpretation of biased information is that media reports 
on certain governance decisions so as to exaggerate its negative effects 
(Wittman, 1995). For instance, to attract the voters’ attention, media might 
report on SOC managerial compensation contracts which have led to great 
amounts of pay. For those who read this, such anomalies are understood to 
be very common, while the possible positive effects are underreported. From 
this view, we should expect that politicians who care about their re-election 
prospects are likely to abstain from those governance decisions that lead to 
high media exposure. Another interpretation of the biased information 
problem starts from the notion that voters continuously will update their 
beliefs about the government’s preferences on various issues. But since 
voters are always left with less than perfect information about the real 
preferences of politicians, they will use governance decisions (and several 
other policy decisions) as a sign (Dalen et al., 2000). For instance, from the 
decision to compensate SOC managers by potential high-value incentive 
contracts, voters might draw the conclusion that the government pays less 
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emphasis to distributional concerns. The implication is that politicians who 
seek re-election will take the signalling effects of its actions into account, 
and thereby avoid certain governance decisions. In accordance with both 
interpretations of the biased information problem, we might therefore expect 
that politicians abstain from unpopular governance decisions and pander to 
public opinion, even if this means that economically rational decisions are 
deprived.17  
Importantly, the three interpretations of the voter-control problem 
carry different implications as to whether politicians behave passively versus 
actively towards corporate governance. However, the models are not 
incompatible. Rather, they might be combined in the following argument, 
which also forms the basis for the political economics’ critique of state 
ownership: In their capacity as shareholders, politicians are normally only 
weakly motivated to engage in corporate governance, but might become 
activated in situations of interest group dissatisfaction or strong public 
attention to governance issues. For the most part, therefore, politicians are 
likely to take action toward corporate governance only on matters which 
have caught the attention of interest groups or which have received intense 
public attention through media coverage. To conclude, the re-election model 
thus carries the prediction that politicians are more likely to adopt a strategy 
of ‘fire-alarm’ control rather than ‘police-patrol’ oversight in order to protect 
themselves against misjudgements and criticisms (McCubbins and Schwartz, 
1984). 
 
2.1.3 The ideology model 
A third competing view of what motivates politicians concerns their 
ideological orientation, with the simple claim of the ideology model being 
that different parties pursue different partisan profiles when in office. As to 
the reasons why politicians care about ideology, they might care about the 
well-being of particular groups in society and choose policy so as to increase 
their social welfare (Hibbs, 1977). Alternatively, politicians might be driven 
by a sense of what is just or legitimate that transcends individual benefits 
(Persson and Tabellini, 2000). In any case, this means that we can only 
properly understand the outcomes of corporate governance if we take into 
account party-political differences on the socioeconomic dimension.  
In considering the implications for corporate governance I draw on 
insight from Lijphart’s (1984) comparative analysis of partisan conflicts. 
One of the basic lessons from this research is that political parties differ from 
                                                 
17 Note that the argument of pandering can also be interpreted within the framework of 
Down’s (1957) median voter model, which suggests that politicians will offer a moderate 
policy to gain re-election.  
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each other along multiple policy dimensions, including the one of 
socioeconomics. In fact, the socioeconomic dimension tends to dominate the 
political debate and carries a clear left-right division. Of particular interest to 
the present study, Lijphart emphasises three leftist versus rightist party 
positions on socioeconomic policy: (i) Government versus private ownership 
of the means of production; (ii) a strong versus weak governmental role in 
economic planning; and (iii) support of versus opposition to redistribution of 
wealth from the rich to the poor. More specifically, this leads us to expect 
that left-wing governments would be concerned about securing political 
control of SOCs, whereas right-wing governments would seek to avoid 
unwarranted political interference in the governance of SOCs. Moreover, we 
might expect that whereas left-wing governments are likely to emphasise the 
social and distributional aspects of SOC behaviour and performance, right-
wing governments are more inclined to stress economic aspects. Importantly, 
Lijphart concludes that the distance between the political parties on the left-
right spectrum appears to be greatest in (amongst others) the Scandinavian 
countries. Thus, in both Norway and Sweden, socioeconomic issues like 
corporate governance are likely of high salience, which proves the relevance 
of the ideology model.  
 
2.1.4 Discussion  
Thus far, it seems clear that the three motivational models (which, in the 
following, are labelled governance models) carry different implications for 
corporate governance. Table 2.1 summarises the key insights of the different 
governance models. One crucial point to note from the above discussion is 
that, within each governance model, the ultimate reason why politicians care 
is not clear. For instance, I have pointed to the possibility that politicians 
might care about their reputation due to pride, but also because this might 
enhance their career prospects in the outside labour market. Also, politicians 
might care about holding office not (only) due to perceptions of status and 
power, but because this allows them to extract material benefits. Thus, the 
main rationale(s) that lie behind the different motives is not clear. In the 
following analysis, I will not make any attempt to identify the ‘true’ 
motivation of politicians. Instead, the purpose has simply been to make some 
convincing arguments for which broader concerns that might possible 
motivate politicians, and to elucidate these ideas in the context of corporate 
governance. It is naturally of great importance, however, that it has no 
bearing on corporate governance outcomes whether, say, politicians who 
care about their reputation do so out of concern for their future employment 
opportunities or for their self-image.   
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Table 2.1. Governance models: The case of politicians. 
 
Governance model Motivational concern Implications for corporate  
governance  
 
Reputation 
 
 
Politicians seek to build 
a reputation for being 
talented 
 
 
Politicians engage in corporate 
governance so as to look competent to 
outside observers 
 
Re-election 
 
Politicians seek to stay 
in office  
 
Politicians engage in corporate 
governance so as to insure themselves 
against negative voter reactions 
 
Ideology 
 
Politicians seek to 
implement party-
political goals  
 
Politicians engage in corporate 
governance so as to strengthen partisan 
profiles 
 
 
 
Yet, there is not only uncertainty about politicians’ underlying rationale 
within the confines of each governance model. More importantly, we also 
need to take into account the aforementioned possibility that there are 
intermediate cases between the three models. For instance, it is possible that 
politicians seek to get re-elected in order to implement their desired policies, 
which suggests some blurry lines between the re-election model and the 
ideology model. In this case, politicians would pander to popular opinion on 
some issues which have caught strong public attention, so that they come in 
position to pursue their partisan profiles on (for the politicians concerned) 
other important areas. Essentially, this might lead to cases where the rhetoric 
of right-wing governments might resemble that of left-wing governments, if 
only for the purpose to comply with popular concerns. Or, there is the case 
in which politicians who care about holding office are obliged to implement 
party-policies – because of the need to preserve their voters’ loyalty (Persson 
and Tabellini, 2000) and/or to secure support from their own party group. 
While these caveats point to a large grey area between models of political 
motivation (Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Alesina and Tabellini, 2007, 2008), 
the present analysis does not allow direct empirical testing of such complex 
political trade-offs. Nevertheless, the three governance models are clearly 
useful as a first important step to identify how different types of political 
motivation have different implications for corporate governance.  
 
 
2.2 The Motivational Concerns of Corporate Directors 
The corporate governance literature suggests that corporate directors are 
concerned about both their reputation and career prospects, which imply that 
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they would attempt to please both present and future employers. In principle, 
the reputation concern and the re-election concern would be one and the 
same. That is, in order to get re-appointed, corporate directors need to appear 
competent. But, as we are now well acquainted with the possibility that the 
government-owner might not (solely) care about satisfying the public 
interest, this suggests that politicians put less emphasis on the talent of 
corporate directors when selecting board members. What it takes to get re-
elected by the government-owner might therefore differ from what it takes to 
build a reputation for acting competent. In what follows, I elaborate on these 
views.   
 
2.2.1 The reputation model 
Intuitively, it seems easy to accept the assumption that corporate directors 
care about their reputation for being competent in their jobs. In particular, 
this motivational concern is forcefully stressed in the corporate governance 
literature, which suggests that corporate directors will use their directorships 
to signal talent to internal and external job markets (see, for example, Fama 
and Jensen, 1983a; Weisbach, 1988; Zajac and Westphal, 1996). Indeed, for 
most business people, the value of their human capital greatly depends on 
their performance as corporate directors. From this view, therefore, it seems 
likely that corporate directors want to appear talented to both politicians and 
potential co-investors, since shareholders might use information about past 
performance in future hiring decisions. However, as corporate directors 
cannot rely on the government-owner to emphasise competence exclusively, 
it seems more likely that corporate directors care about their reputation as a 
means to signal their talent to the non-political job market. But also, like in 
the case of politicians, it is quite possible that corporate directors care about 
their reputation as a matter of self-esteem or pride, regardless of the direct 
career implications.   
In considering the implications for corporate governance, we would 
generally expect that corporate directors’ concern for reputation-building 
lead them to act in the best interest of the SOC (which, we recall from above, 
are given by the firm’s statutory objectives). As previously discussed, 
however, academic and practical debate has provided us with few normative 
criteria with which to choose governance decisions in the context of state 
ownership. Yet, we might expect that corporate directors will behave in 
accordance with economic theory, which have strongly affected the climate 
of public opinion within the business sector. In line with our prior ideas, 
therefore, it seems likely that corporate directors will signal competence by 
choosing those governance decisions which display conformity to prevalent 
views about corporate governance. 
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2.2.2 The re-election model 
Alternatively, we assume that corporate directors care only about being re-
elected to current board positions. Naturally, this concern would make 
corporate directors very much attentive to shareholders’ interests insofar as 
they are voted into office by the shareholders and have a fiduciary 
responsibility to protect their interests (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). As 
to the shareholder interests, we note that, in principle, the government-
owner’s interests are given by the SOC statutory objectives, which are 
broadly agreed upon across party-political lines. Even so, politicians might 
be motivated by quite different concerns which carry different implications 
for corporate governance, like when politicians care about their popularity 
among voters and would so adjust to short-term pressure from interest 
groups regarding critical board decisions (e.g., on downsizing). The problem 
arises, therefore, when the government-owner communicates different 
messages about its interests. Related to this it seems likely that, in cases 
which the state co-invests with others, the shareholder electorate might 
display different motives for engaging in businesses. For instance, whereas 
the government-owner might be concerned about public reactions to 
apparently unpopular governance decisions, private co-investors might deem 
the same decisions being rational on business grounds. Out of concern for 
their own re-election prospects, this suggests that corporate directors will 
choose to obey political interests in those firms which the state is the single 
owner, but are possibly more attentive to the interests of co-investors in 
firms under partial state control.  
 
2.2.3 Discussion 
Once more, we have discussed how the engagement in corporate governance 
depends on the motivation of key decision-makers. In the case of corporate 
directors, Table 2.2 summarises the key points associated with the reputation 
model and the re-election model. Like in the case of political motivation, we 
note that it is difficult to identify the ultimate rationale that lies behind the 
motivational concerns. Thus, I cannot convincingly say whether corporate 
directors seek to ensure the effective running of SOCs because this signals 
their competence to the markets, because such behaviour is vital to their self-
image, or both. Yet again, our most important task has been to make a clear 
distinction between different governance models, which each carry different 
implications for corporate governance. Provided that the ultimate interests of 
corporate directors have no bearing on what governance decisions are made 
within the confines of each model, I consider this to be an open question. 
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Table 2.2. Governance models: The case of corporate directors. 
 
Governance model Motivational concern Implications for corporate  
governance  
 
Reputation 
 
 
Corporate directors seek 
to build a reputation for 
being talented 
 
 
Corporate directors engage in corporate 
governance so as to look competent to 
outside observers 
 
Re-election 
 
Corporate directors 
Politicians seek to stay 
in position  
 
Corporate directors engage in corporate 
governance so as to fulfil the interests 
of the government-owner and/or 
potential co-investors 
 
 
 
More important, however, is the above-discussed possibility of intermediate 
cases between the governance models. To illustrate this, it might be the case 
that corporate directors dispute political signals in order to signal their 
professional competence. However, corporate directors might also ignore 
political signals in order to get re-elected to SOC board positions in firms 
where co-investors hold major stakes. With these caveats in mind, the 
governance models are considered as helpful building blocks to identify how 
different motivational concerns have different implications for corporate 
governance.  
 
 
2.3 Summary 
To explain governance decisions in a state ownership context requires that 
we have a proper understanding of the motivation of decision-makers. 
Accordingly, this chapter raised the question: What are the reasons for 
politicians and corporate directors to engage in corporate governance? 
Probing the broader literatures on politics economics and corporate 
governance it was possible to identify a set of reasonably distinct governance 
models, which each reflect important aspects of reality. Yet, although the 
different governance models carry different implications for why decision-
makers engage in corporate governance, there is the problem that various 
models might bring about fairly similar governance decisions. For instance, 
as will be shown later in this thesis, politicians can extract high dividends 
from SOCs out of concern for their re-election prospects as well as their 
reputation for being competent. Attempting to discriminate between the 
various models, it seems therefore necessary to add some more complexity 
to the world in which politicians and corporate directors operate. In view of 
that, the next chapter looks at the institutional framework governing state 
ownership and some of the firm characteristics that are likely to affect 
governance decision-making.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Institutional Framework and Firm Characteristics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In a stylized world, we assume that politicians and corporate directors 
pursue a well-defined set of objectives. As concerns politicians, they care 
about becoming re-elected or implementing their preferred party-policy, or 
perhaps about creating a reputation in the external labour market for acting 
professionally. As concerns corporate directors, they care about being re-
appointed to SOC board positions or creating a good job reputation that 
might qualify for additional directorships in the private sector. While these 
motivational concerns are not necessarily in conflict, they might in some 
cases be so. Therefore, we prefer to keep them analytically distinct. To put 
more flesh to the bone, however, it is now time to add some institutional and 
corporate features to the world in which politicians and corporate directors 
operate. Obviously, the inclusion of such features makes for a more realistic 
picture of governance decision-making. In addition, it makes it possible to 
explain why governance decisions are not the same across different SOCs. 
Most important, however, we might use this insight to differentiate between 
the various governance models.  
Seeking to explore the issues of institutional framework and firm 
characteristics, this chapter first asks: What are the constitutional, legislative, 
and other formal aspects pertaining to corporate governance in the case of 
state ownership? I address this question in Section 3.1, providing descriptive 
accounts of the institutional context that surrounds state ownership 
administration in Norway and Sweden. Given the motivational concerns of 
politicians and corporate directors, I also suggest some general implications 
for corporate governance. Thereafter, I take a closer look at the 
heterogeneity of the state ownership portfolio. Thus, Section 3.2 asks: By 
what firm characteristics are SOCs likely to differ? In order to make this 
matter even more specific, I also provide descriptive accounts of SOCs in 
Norway and Sweden. Moreover, I make some brief comments on how the 
different firm characteristics interact with the motivation of decision-makers 
and point to some broader implications for corporate governance. As to the 
more specific questions of how institutional features and firm characteristics 
are brought into play for the purpose of discriminating between various 
governance models, and what are the effects on particular governance 
decisions: I save these for the next chapter. At this point, the aim is simply to 
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highlight those factors other than motivational concerns that might affect 
corporate governance.  
 
 
3.1 Institutional Framework 
The institutional framework governing state ownership in Norway and 
Sweden is manifested mainly in four aspects.18 First, the government’s 
administration mandate is laid down by the Constitution, which also states 
the division of roles between the government and the Parliament on 
ownership matters. Second, the fiduciary duties of the government-owner 
and the board of directors are laid down in company law and other 
legislation. Third, both politicians and corporate directors should comply 
with some commonly accepted principles of ‘good corporate governance’. 
Finally, in making governance decisions, politicians and corporate directors 
are directed by certain guidelines concerning the specific governance 
mechanisms. The following section offers some more detailed descriptions 
of this institutional framework. Thereafter it broadly discusses how the 
various institutional aspects are likely to affect corporate governance.  
 
3.1.1 Constitutional and parliamentary aspects 
According to both Norwegian and Swedish Constitution, the state’s funds 
and other assets are at the disposal of the government. The Parliament 
should, however, determine the bases for the administration of the state’s 
property.19 More precisely, the government is required to consult the 
Parliament in the event of significant changes of direction by SOCs, dilution 
of ownership, capital contributions, incorporation, and the sale and purchase 
of shares. Even so, the Parliament may authorise the government to make 
certain changes on these matters – normally within a certain time-span. In 
this respect, it should be noted that a decision by the Parliament is not 
required by acquisitions, disposals or close-downs that SOCs carry out 
within the direction of operations decided upon by the Parliament. Also, the 
Swedish government is authorised to sell the state’s shares in firms where 
                                                 
18 Information concerning the institutional framework that applies to Norwegian SOCs is 
drawn from NOU 2004:7, the State Ownership Report 2005, and White Paper (St.meld.) no. 
13 (2006-2007). Information about the institutional context relevant to Swedish SOCs is 
drawn from the State Ownership Policy 2005 and the Annual Reports on State-Owned 
Companies over the years 2000-2005. 
 
19 Cf. Articles 3 and 19 of the Norwegian Constitution, and Chapter 9, Articles 8 and 9 of the 
Swedish Constitution. 
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the state has less than half of the votes for all the shares or participation 
rights in the firm unless the Parliament has decided otherwise.  
As to the administration of state ownership within the government, 
the prime minister delegates responsibility to the respective ministers.20 The 
ministers then exercise state ownership rights under constitutional and 
parliamentary responsibility. Yet, the government normally acts as a uniform 
decision-maker on very important and/or controversial ownership issues. To 
ensure that the ministers have performed their duties as administrators of 
state interests in accordance with the Parliament’s resolutions and intentions, 
the National Audit Offices in Norway and Sweden are both entitled to 
scrutinise the government’s activities.21  
 
3.1.2 The Companies Act and other legislation 
In both Norway and Sweden, SOCs are subject to the same legislation as 
privately owned firms, such as the Companies Act, the legislation on 
competition, the accounting legislation, the Securities Trading Act 
(Norwegian firms only), and the Insider Information Act (Swedish firms 
only). Additionally, firms active in a particular sector may be subject to 
special sector legislation, such as the Postal Services Act and the Electronic 
Communications Act. Finally, both SOCs and privately owned firms need to 
comply with the EU provisions on government assistance.22  
The basic rules governing the exercise of state ownership rights are 
provided by the Companies Act.23 Considering the special characteristics of 
state ownership, two aspects pertaining to this Act are of particular 
importance. The first aspect concerns the division of responsibility between 
                                                 
20 Cf. Article 12 of the Norwegian Constitution, and Chapter 7, Article 5 of the Swedish 
Constitution. According to the latter, the prime minister has delegated special responsibility to 
the Minister for Industry, Employment and Communications on matters which make demands 
for a uniform owner policy or which concern board nominations.  
 
21 Cf. Article 75k of the Norwegian Constitution and the Act on Auditing of Government 
Accounts. See also Article 20-7 of the Norwegian Companies Act. In the Swedish case, see 
Chapter 12, Article 7 of the Swedish Constitution and the Act on Auditing of State Activities. 
See also Chapter 9, Article 8 of the Swedish Companies Act.  
 
22 In the case of capital contributions from the government to SOCs operating in the 
competitive market, the market economy investor principle should be applied. Normally, this 
principle is complied with if the capital contribution is provided on conditons and terms that 
would also have been acceptable to a private investor.  
   
23 Cf. Chapter 1, there are two types of limited liability companies – public and private. In 
Sweden, all limited liability companies are governed by the Companies Act 
(Aktiebolagslagen). In Norway, there are two acts relating to limited liability companies. The 
Limited Liability Companies Act (Aksjeloven) applies to private companies whereas the 
Public Limited Liability Companies Act (Allmennaksjeloven) applies to public companies. In 
what follows, both Norwegian laws are referred to as the Companies Act.    
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the shareholders, the board of directors, and the corporate management. 
Recalling from Chapter 1, the limited liability company form offers 
shareholders the benefit of limiting their responsibility to the capital they 
have invested in the firm.24 In return, shareholders are compelled to give up 
their rights to directly intervene in the firm’s daily operations. Instead, 
shareholders exercise ownership rights through formal corporate bodies, 
such as the general assembly.25 At these meetings, shareholders give their 
consent, among others, to the selection of board members and the 
distribution of dividends. Yet, the Norwegian Companies Act gives the 
government-owner certain privileges as some special provisions apply to 
firms that are 100% controlled by the state.26 For instance, the board 
members are appointed by the general assembly (i.e., the minister) also in 
those SOCs that are required to have a corporate assembly.27 Moreover, in 
the area of dividend payments, the Norwegian government-owner is not 
bound by the recommendations of the board. Instead, the government-owner 
establishes the dividend payments for fully state-owned firms. As the 
dividends are set through the state budget, this implies that, in the case of 
minority governments, it is in fact the political majority in the Parliament 
who decides on dividend payments. By contrast, regular company law 
strictly forbids the Swedish government-owner to approve a higher dividend 
than the board proposes or accepts, since there are no special rules in the 
Swedish Companies Act that apply to SOCs (except the provision for insight 
by the National Audit Offices).  
The second important aspect of the Companies Act concerns the 
protection of co-investors’ interests.28 In the case of state ownership, this 
means that the government-owner should not negatively affect the rights or 
economic interests of other shareholders through its conduct. Yet, the 
government-owner is entitled to use its voting rights to influence corporate 
activities – provided that it keeps with the general direction of the firm as 
                                                 
24 Cf. Article 1-2 of the Norwegian Companies Act and Chapter 1, Article 3 of the Swedish 
Companies Act. 
 
25 Cf. Article 5-1 of the Norwegian Companies Act and Chapter 7, Article 1 of the Swedish 
Companies Act. 
 
26 Cf. Article 20-4 of the Norwegian Companies Act. See also Articles 20-5 – 20-7 (Ibid.).  
 
27 Following Article 6-35 of the Norwegian Companies Act, a company with more than 200 
employees is required to have an elected corporate assembly with 12 members. Shareholders 
elect two thirds of the members of a corporate assembly through the general assembly, and 
one third are elected by and among the employees. 
 
28 Cf. Articles 4-1, 5-21 and 6-28 of the Norwegian Companies Act. Cf. Chapter 4, Article 1 
and Chapter 7, Article 47 of the Swedish Companies Act.  
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stated in the SOC’s articles of association. From this view, we should also be 
aware of certain threshold levels of shareholder influence.29 Basically, most 
corporate decisions are taken by a simple majority of the votes, including the 
approval of annual financial accounts and dividend payments. Interestingly, 
we note that the Swedish Companies Act prescribes only relative majority of 
the votes for decisions about board appointments, while the Norwegian 
counterpart lays down simple majority on the board issue. For other 
decisions, a super-majority of the votes (i.e., two thirds of the voting rights) 
are needed. In both Norway and Sweden, this is the case for very important 
corporate decisions, such as the amendments of articles of association, 
mergers and demergers, and the increase or reduction of share capital.30 The 
other side of this coin is that a shareholder can oppose the same type of 
decisions by holding negative control (i.e., more than one third of the voting 
rights). In sum, this means that the government-owner can exert influence 
upon corporate decisions by holding voting rights which marginally exceeds 
33.33% (negative control) or 50% (simple majority) of the stock, or which at 
least equals 66.67% (super-majority) of the stock.  
 
3.1.3 Principles of corporate governance 
Over the years, government-owners have frequently been criticised for both 
undue political interference in SOC behaviour and totally passive ownership 
(OECD, 2005). Attempts to improve on the management of state ownership 
portfolios beyond the requirements set by company legislation are therefore 
deemed as necessary to justify continued political control of SOCs. Related 
to this, the recent upsurge in the field of corporate governance has inspired 
government-owners and political consultants to establish sets of ‘best 
practices’ or ‘codes of conducts’, which are to guide politicians in their 
ownership role.  
At the international level, both Norwegian and Swedish state 
bureaucrats have participated in development of the OECD Guidelines on 
the Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises (2005).31 The 
guidelines cover a range of areas, including the state ownership function, the 
                                                 
29 In its extreme form, some governments have retained some sort of decisive voting rights in 
partly state-owned firms even after a majority of the voting rights have been sold. For 
instance, in the United Kingdom, the government has been able to retain a golden share, 
which made it possible for politicians to veto mergers, liquidations, asset sales, and other 
major corporate events (Bortolotti et al., 2001, p. 47). Nowadays, the EU allows this type of 
ownership only in special occasions.  
 
30 Note that Norwegian and Swedish law differ somewhat as regards which issues require 
simple versus super-majority decisions. For instance, firm dissolutions require simple 
majority in Sweden, but super-majority in Norway.  
 
31 These guidelines add to the OECD’s general Principles of Corporate Governance (2004). 
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government-owner’s relationship with co-investors and other stakeholders, 
transparency and disclosure, and the responsibilities of SOC boards. For 
instance, it is recommended that the state’s ownership functions are carried 
out by a centralised ownership entity, or through effectively coordinated 
entities. Interestingly, this prescription reflects current trends in both Norway 
and Sweden, in which the government-owners have reassigned the 
administration of several SOCs from sectoral ministries to a more 
professional ‘ownership ministry’. Moreover, on the issue of board 
representation, the OECD guidelines urge that the government-owner should 
respect the independence of SOC boards, and focus its attention on the 
nomination and appointment of board members through transparent 
procedures. In this respect, it should be noted that, as of 2003, the Swedish 
government-owner has delegated responsibility for all board appointments to 
the Minister of Industry, Employment and Communications (the ownership 
ministry) – a policy practice that possibly enhances coordination and 
transparency in the board selection processes. This practice contrasts with 
that of previous years as well as Norwegian policy practice, which maintains 
that every minister is responsible for board appointments in those SOCs that 
sort under his or her administrative control.  
Similar efforts towards improving the administration of state 
ownership have taken place at the national level. In both Norway and 
Sweden, codes for corporate governance have been produced by expert 
groups consisting of representatives of the business community.32 With the 
aim of acting in a credible and predictable way, the government-owners 
consider these codes as part of their framework for owner administration.33 
In addition, both Norwegian and Swedish government-owners have 
established their own principles for good corporate governance of SOCs. To 
illustrate this, Table 3.1 gives an overview of the Norwegian state’s 
corporate governance principles. Since the codes for corporate governance 
are to be applied in accordance with the principle ‘comply or explain’, such 
efforts may actually increase politicians’ credibility on ownership matters.  
 
                                                 
32 The Swedish Code for Corporate Control deals with the decision-making system by which 
the owners directly or indirectly control the firm. The Code was to be applied by the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange from 1 July 2005. Similarly, the Norwegian Code of Practice for 
Corporate Governance focuses more comprehensively on the division of roles between 
shareholders, the board of directors, and corporate management than is required by company 
legislation. Being issued in December 2004, it applies to all firms listed on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange. 
 
33 Also note that, in Norway, the basis for government administration of state ownership is set 
forth in Article 10 of the Regulations on financial management within central government. 
Pursuant to this provision, the government-owner is required to establish written guidelines 
for the way in which state ownership is to be administered.  
 
  39
Table 3.1. The Norwegian State’s principles of good corporate governance. 
Source: The State’s ownership report 2005. 
 
 
1. All shareholders shall receive equal treatment. 
2. There shall be transparency in State ownership of companies. 
3. Ownership decisions/resolutions shall be taken/adopted at the annual general meeting. 
4. The State, in cooperation with other owners when relevant, shall set performance targets for 
the companies; the boards shall be responsible for achieving these targets. 
5. The capital structure of the company shall be consistent with the objective of the ownership 
and circumstances of the company. 
6. The composition of the board shall be characterised by competence, capacity and diversity, 
and reflect the distinctive characteristics of the company. 
7. Wage and incentive schemes shall be formulated so that they promote value creation in the 
companies and are perceived as reasonable. 
8. On behalf of the owners, the board shall exercise independent control of the company 
management. 
9. The board shall adopt a plan for its own activities and work actively to develop its own 
competencies.  
10. The company shall be aware of its responsibility to society at large.  
 
 
 
3.1.4 Guidelines concerning the use of governance mechanisms 
In addition to the general codes of corporate governance, both Norwegian 
and Swedish government-owners have established some more specific 
guidelines concerning the use of governance mechanisms. As to board 
appointments, the Swedish government-owner is represented on the SOC 
boards by presently serving politicians or state bureaucrats. By contrast, 
Norwegian policy practice prohibits current political representatives and 
civil servants in the central government from serving on SOC boards. The 
fact that Norwegian ministers or state bureaucrats are not allowed to take 
SOC board seats implies that the Parliament does not hold the government-
owner responsible for business-related decisions that fall under the authority 
of the firms as stipulated in corporate legislation. However, rather than 
interpreting the Norwegian policy practice as an earnest attempt to avoid 
political interference in the boards’ work, it has actually been shaped by a 
concern with scandal prevention following the ‘Kings Bay affair’ in 1963.34  
With regard to CEO compensation contracts, both Norwegian and 
Swedish government-owners have issued advisory guidelines concerning 
terms of employment. The terms include recommendations relating to salary 
                                                 
34 The ‘Kings Bay affair’ refers to the historical tragedy that many employees lost their lives 
in the state-owned coal mines at the Svalbard islands. As a result, the mines were closed and 
in 1963 the population left. The prime minister at the time, Einar Gerhardsen, had to resign 
after a no-confidence vote in the Parliament on this very issue.  
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levels, incentive schemes, and severance (golden parachute) pay.35 While the 
guidelines primarily pertain to companies that are fully owned by the state, 
they should be applied as far as possible also in partly state-owned firms, 
following a dialogue with the other shareholders. In practice, therefore, the 
government-owner expects the board of directors to comply with these terms 
of employment when deciding on CEO compensation contracts.  
Probing the specific parts of the compensation contract, both 
Norwegian and Swedish government-owners recommend that salaries and 
other benefits to persons in executive positions should be competitive but not 
wage-leading in relation to comparable firms. As concerns the use of 
incentive schemes, the Swedish 1999 guidelines state that if an incentive 
scheme is introduced there should be a direct link between the targets which 
form the basis for reward and the SOC’s overall business goals. However, 
the government-owner signals a cautious approach to incentive schemes in 
stating that the guidelines should not be interpreted as that the government 
recommends that such schemes be introduced. The Swedish government-
owner’s reluctance to adopt incentive schemes was made even more explicit 
from year-end 2003, as the new guidelines strongly recommend that 
incentive programmes directed at the CEO should be avoided – allegedly in 
response to some major corporate failures in the Swedish business 
community. By contrast, in the period covered by this study, the Norwegian 
guidelines draw no particular attention to incentive schemes. According to 
the State’s principles for good corporate governance it only says that 
incentive schemes “shall be formulated so that they promote value creation 
in the companies and are perceived as reasonable”. As in the Swedish case, it 
should therefore be a clear relationship between the SOC’s business targets 
and the targets in the incentive programme. Moreover, the Norwegian and 
Swedish government-owners have rather similar views on the adoption of 
severance pay. The Swedish guidelines state that if notice of termination is 
given on the part of the firm, severance pay may be payable to at most 18 
monthly salary payments excluding the period of notice (which should not 
exceed six months). In similar terms, the Norwegian government-owner 
recommends that the severance pay do not exceeds 12 months salary 
payments. Accordingly, it seems that the government-owners are willing to 
guarantee the managers security during a transitional period. 
                                                 
35 The Norwegian guidelines relevant for the sample period include those terms of 
employment adopted by the Bondevik II-government on 28 June, 2004, which replaced the 
previous guidelines adopted by the Stoltenberg I-government on 3 September, 2001. The 
Swedish guidelines include those terms of employment adopted by the Persson-government 
on 9 October, 2003, which replaced previous guidelines concerning compensation terms 
adopted 5 December 1996 and guidelines for incentive schemes adopted 25 November 1999 
(both adopted by the Persson-government). Note that both Norwegian and Swedish guidelines 
also concern pension terms, which are not covered by this thesis.  
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Finally, guidelines concerning dividend payments are articulated in 
terms of the dividend policy that is set for individual firms – and are 
normally only established for SOCs with commercial objectives. In 
formulating the long-terms expectations regarding dividends a number of 
criteria are normally assessed, among which the dividends’ disciplinary 
effect on managerial spending is only one criterion. Other criteria include 
firm-specific conditions, such as the firm’s strategy, growth opportunities 
and life cycle, capital structure, investment history, and potentially weak 
developments in the rate of return. In addition, the government-owners 
consider the dividend policy in comparable firms. The ministry’s 
expectations for the dividends of individual SOCs are usually formulated as 
a percentage of the annual earnings and are valid for a period of three to five 
years. Interestingly, the government-owners in Norway and Sweden have 
chosen some different practices as regards the communication of dividend 
policies. In the annual reports on SOCs, the Swedish government-owner 
clearly announces the dividend policy for each firm. By contrast, the 
Norwegian ownership reports do not convey any information about dividend 
policies. In certain cases though, dividend policies are communicated in the 
budget document for fully state-owned firms. However, there is no uniform 
ownership policy pertaining to Norwegian SOCs concerning the 
communication of dividend policies.  
 
3.1.5 Implications for corporate governance 
Regardless of what motivates politicians and corporate directors, we should 
account for the fact that they operate within an institutional framework 
which both constrains and enables their engagement in corporate 
governance. As to the constitutional framework governing state ownership, 
this manifests the government as the key political authority on ownership 
issues. However, both the Norwegian and the Swedish Constitution also 
emphasise the authority of Parliament on issues like capital contributions 
and the sale of state shares. Following company law, the Norwegian 
Parliament is given authority even on the issue of dividend decisions – as the 
dividend is set through the state budget for fully state-owned firms. By 
contrast, in Sweden, a decision by the Parliament is not required for 
dividends since this is part of normal company administration.   
Besides some special provisions that apply to Norwegian firms 
under full state control, both the Norwegian and Swedish Companies Acts 
carry two important implications for the exercise of state ownership rights. 
First, they prohibit direct political intervention in company matters, since the 
government-owner (like every other shareholder) is required to raise its 
voice through formal corporate bodies. Second, in both countries, the law 
affords co-investors the right to protect their interests. Taken together, this 
implies that the government-owner needs to rely on formal governance 
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mechanisms instead of direct intervention and abstain from promoting any 
political interests that do not serve the interests of the shareholder electorate.  
As for corporate governance principles, these have little direct effect 
on what governance decisions are made other than providing some general 
guidance on the division of roles between shareholders, the board of 
directors, and the corporate management that goes beyond that of company 
legislation. Indirectly, however, these prescriptions might indeed have a 
significant influence on governance decisions. For instance, we might expect 
that certain governance decisions are more efficiently handled when 
administered by a professional ownership ministry. From this perspective, 
the decision to let the Swedish Minister of Trade and Industry act as the 
state’s representative on all board appointments might possibly result in 
some different board recruitment patterns than is the case when board 
appointments are delegated to the respective ministries.  
As for the guidelines pertaining to specific governance mechanisms, 
these are likely to have profound effects on corporate governance insofar as 
they provide more or less explicit indications regarding what governance 
decisions should be made. Additionally, there are some important national 
differences related to these guidelines. For instance, there is reason to 
believe that the Swedish practice of including state representatives on SOC 
boards presumably enforces the government-owner to take responsibility for 
its priorities. Accordingly, we might also presume that Swedish SOCs would 
be more attentive to, say, compensation guidelines than is the case for 
Norwegian SOC boards.  
Finally, we should note that the extent to which these institutional 
features have an actual impact on corporate governance hinges on both the 
motivation of decision-makers and the strength of institutional constraints. 
Considering the example of politicians who are only capable of pleasing the 
voters if they deliberately ignore institutional constraints, it would of course 
be easier for the government-owner to go along with such behaviour if this 
means that politicians only have to disregard their own codes of conducts 
than if they have to disobey the legal duty to respect the interests of co-
investors. Accordingly, we might expect that the Companies Act is more 
likely than non-legal institutional features to restrain political influences on 
corporate governance.  
 
 
3.2 Firm Characteristics 
State ownership portfolios are often very heterogeneous, which means that 
SOCs display a range of different firm characteristics. Importantly, such firm 
characteristics are likely to have a profound impact on corporate governance 
for two reasons. First, some firm characteristics, like the presence of large 
co-investors or debtholders, might effectively constrain what types of 
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governance decisions can be made. Second, some firm characteristics might 
have an effect on corporate governance simply because the government-
owner and corporate directors might perceive different governance decisions 
to be optimal for different types of SOCs. This section turns the focus to 
some of the firm characteristics which are likely to influence upon corporate 
governance. More specifically, I will discuss how SOCs differ in terms of 
their (i) corporate objective, (ii) ownership structure, (iii) other types of 
control structures, and (iv) societal and economic importance. Certainly, 
there are numerous other firm characteristics which may also have an impact 
on corporate governance (some will be discussed in connection with specific 
governance mechanism) – but these are chosen as they seem to be relevant 
predictors of more than one type of governance decisions. To empirically 
illustrate the issue of SOC heterogeneity I also provide descriptive accounts 
of the state ownership portfolios in Norway and Sweden.   
 
3.2.1 What kinds of objectives do SOCs pursue? 
In general, the rationale for state involvement in the production of goods and 
services falls into two main parts: On the one hand, SOCs are instruments 
for achieving societal objectives, such as distributional justice, national 
interest protection, and the creation of employment. On the other, SOCs are 
instruments for generating profit for the state, which may then be spent for 
welfare purposes, like social insurances. While most SOCs are continuously 
required to balance business considerations against their broader societal 
role, it seems reasonable to say that some SOCs are engaged in commercial 
activities, others, in non-commercial activities.36  
The deeper question is how SOC corporate objectives come to be 
identified in the first place, if we also recognise that SOCs are basically the 
ultimate stakeholder-society organisations being instructed to balance the 
welfare of many different interest groups (Tirole, 2001, p. 28).37 In principle, 
this would imply that SOCs should strive to internalise the wellbeing of all 
stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, 
debtholders, local communities where the firm’s plant is located, and so 
forth. In reality, however, there is a major shortcoming to this argument 
                                                 
36 It should also be noted that the reasons why governments initially engaged in production 
activities might be quite different from today’s corporate objective. For instance, 
technological developments in infrastructure-based sectors, like telecommunications and 
energy, eventually led to an opening-up of markets in sectors that were previously considered 
to be natural monopolies. The implication is that some of those SOCs that were formerly 
perceived to be societal instruments should now fight for market shares and provide an 
acceptable rate of return to the government-owner. 
 
37 Tirole uses this argument to describe the government itself, but the same notion clearly 
applies to SOCs.   
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insofar as unless different stakeholders have almost identical preferences, 
which are highly unlikely, it would be extremely difficult (if not to say 
impossible) to aggregate preferences into a consistent welfare function 
(Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987). But, of course, this problem is not very 
different from other policy decisions within the realm of politics. In fact, to 
make qualified decisions about which interests should be favoured is the 
very essence of politics. Thus, it is ultimately the responsibility of elected 
politicians to decide on which objectives the SOCs should pursue. Whereas 
this goal-formulation might certainly hinge on political motivation (e.g., 
politicians who worry about their re-election prospects might be concerned 
that certain stakeholders, like SOC employees, would oppose a business 
orientation of the firm), it actually seems that the formal objectives of SOCs 
are broadly agreed upon across party-political lines and over time. For all 
practical purposes, therefore, we might conceive of the corporate objectives 
of SOCs as exogenously given within the sample period. 
Looking at the state ownership portfolios in Norway and Sweden, 
the SOCs are broadly classified as commercial or non-commercial.38 While 
commercial SOCs operate under market conditions and requirements, non-
commercial SOCs primarily have special societal interests to fulfil. Table 3.2 
shows the fraction of SOCs which are oriented towards commercial and non-
commercial objectives in the two countries. From this table, we note that, in 
Norway, there is a larger portion of non-commercial SOCs than commercial 
SOCs, whereas, in Sweden, there is an opposite pattern (also note that the 
number of yearly observations differ due to winding-ups, state sell-outs, and 
founding of new firms, amongst others). By and large, however, there is a 
reasonably good mix between SOCs that engage in business versus societal 
activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Cf. The State Ownership Reports from the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
2003-2005, and Swedish Government Offices’ Annual Reports on State-Owned Companies, 
2000-2005. 
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Table 3.2. Corporate objective. 
 
  Norway Sweden 
Year Commercial Non-commercial n Commercial Non-commercial n 
2000 44 56 34 50 50 36 
2001 41 59 39 54 46 39 
2002 37 63 46 57 43 40 
2003 38 62 53 60 40 40 
2004 37 63 54 60 40 40 
2005 35 65 51 62 38 39 
 
Total 
 
38 62 277 57 43
 
234 
 
Note: The table shows, for every sample year, the fraction of SOCs which are commercially versus non-
commercially oriented in Norway and Sweden, respectively. n is the number of observations. 
 
Moreover, among those SOCs which are commercially oriented (and which 
are partly owned by the state), some are listed on national and international 
stock exchanges. In general, the stock market promotes reliance on share 
prices and shareholder return as bases for more competitive product, labour 
and takeover markets. Also, the listing of SOCs raises stock liquidity on the 
part of co-investors as the firm’s shares are easily bought and sold. By 
contrast, state shareholdings in listed firms are normally rather persistent 
over years, since the sale of (large fractions of) state shares is a long-term 
political process. Table 3.3 shows the fraction of listed versus non-listed 
firms under partial state control. 
 
 
Table 3.3. Stock market listing. 
 
 Norway Sweden 
Year Listed Non-listed n Listed Non-listed n 
2000 13 87 15 33 67 9 
2001 20 80 20 40 60 10 
2002 18 82 22 40 60 10 
2003 17 83 24 44 56 9 
2004 26 74 23 44 56 9 
2005 27 73 22 44 56 9 
 
Total 
 
21 
 
79 126 41 59
 
56 
 
Note: The table shows, for every sample year, the fraction of listed versus non-listed firms under partial 
state control in Norway and Sweden, respectively. n is the number of observations. 
 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the distinction between commercial and non-
commercial SOCs is very intuitive, the objective function of SOCs certainly 
stretches beyond our simple classification. Because of this very 
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heterogeneity, however, it seems difficult to provide a meaningful 
breakdown of SOCs into homogeneous sector groups. Yet, if we were to 
conduct an informal sector classification, it seems from Table 3.4 that the 
activities of SOCs are mainly industrial.39 This is not surprising, since one 
major rationale behind state involvement has traditionally been to establish 
and control industries which are deemed to be of strategic and economic 
importance to the country, like defence, steel and transportation. Moreover, 
another fairly large group of SOCs is classified into the sector of consumer 
discretionary, which includes cultural institutions like theatres and speciality 
retailing like distribution of wine and liquor. The most striking difference 
between Norway and Sweden concerns state involvement in the health care 
sector, which is due to the 2001 Norwegian Health Authority Reform. The 
major result of this reform, which was achieved by establishing five 
Regional Health Authorities, was the transfer of publicly owned hospitals 
from the county level to the state level. By contrast, Swedish hospitals are 
owned by the counties. Also, we note that, when compared to Norway, there 
is a larger proportion of Swedish SOCs in the financial sector, which is due 
to a great number of specialised financial services. Among the other sectors, 
there are only minor differences between the two countries. 
 
 
Table 3.4. Sector classification. 
 
 Norway Sweden 
Sector Percent n Percent n 
Energy 5 12 0 0 
Materials 3 8 4 10 
Industrials 25 70 37 87 
Consumer discretionary 18 50 13 30 
Consumer staples 4 10 5 12 
Health care 11 31 0 0 
Financials 10 29 30 71 
Information technology 4 12 0 0 
Telecommunication services 3 9 5 12 
Utilities 6 16 3 6 
n/a 11 30 3 6 
 
Total 100 277 100
 
234 
 
Note: The table shows the fraction of SOCs by sector according to sector classification by Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS). n/a indicates that information is not applicable in the sense that the firm 
does not belong to any of the sectors in the table. n is the number of firm-year observations.  
                                                 
39 The classification is made according to the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS), 
which is perceived as a widely recognised data interchange standard for the identification of 
industry sectors. 
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As regards the broader implications for corporate governance which relate to 
the corporate objective of SOCs, it seems reasonable to believe that this firm 
characteristic would be emphasised mainly by politicians and corporate 
directors who care about acting in the best interest of the firm, and less by 
those who are motivated by other concerns. This reasoning complies with 
the aforementioned argument that when politicians and corporate directors 
pursue other motivations than reputation-building, they might benefit from 
making governance decisions that overrule the public interest.    
 
3.2.2 Who owns the SOCs? 
Previously, we have established that the government is the factual owner of 
SOCs, although the ultimate ownership rests with the taxpayers. Yet, there 
are also other important aspects of the state ownership structure that might 
have an effect on corporate governance. More precisely, we should ask: Is 
the state typically the single shareholder in SOCs? Moreover, when co-
investing with others, does the state normally holds dominant ownership 
stakes? Are co-investors’ shareholdings concentrated or dispersed? What 
types of owners are likely to co-invest with the state? From a research 
perspective, the state ownership structure is by far the most explored among 
the firm characteristic pertaining to SOCs. Evidently, this rests on the idea 
that co-investors have profound influence on the corporate governance of 
SOCs, which, in turn, might lead to significant differences between firms 
under full state control and firms under partial state control, but also within 
the group of partly state-owned firms.  
Regarding the more specific role of co-investors in influencing 
corporate governance, we have already learned that the Companies Act 
prohibits any large owner exploiting the interests of its co-investors. In the 
case of state ownership, this means that political influences on corporate 
governance are constrained by law. Therefore, to the extent that politicians 
and co-investors pursue different goals, it is expected that governance 
decisions will differ between partly state-owned firms and those firms that 
are fully owned by the state. But the legal right of co-investors is only one 
part of the story. More importantly, we need to ask whether co-investors will 
actually defend their ownership rights vis-à-vis the government-owner. That 
is, are all co-investors owners willing to spend the necessary efforts in 
pursuing their goals?  
In general, shareholders’ eagerness to have their interests fulfilled 
lies in the size of their ownership (the stock-size argument is vividly 
discussed in the literature; see, for example, Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
With dispersed non-governmental ownership, we might expect that no single 
co-investor has incentives to effectively defend their ownership rights, thus 
leaving considerable scope for government-owner to exert influence upon 
corporate governance. By contrast, a concentrated non-governmental 
  48
ownership often means that major financial values are at stake. Any large co-
investor has therefore strong incentives to oppose those kinds of governance 
decisions that might harm shareholder value. Moreover, a concentration of 
non-governmental shareholding also creates the opportunity for concerted 
action by major co-investors, which delimits political influences upon 
governance decisions. From the government-owner’s point of view, the very 
same arguments imply that large state ownership stakes make it both more 
important and easier for politicians to have an impact on corporate 
governance. By comparison, small state ownership stakes indicate that the 
government-owner might both have weaker incentives and less power to 
affect governance decisions.  
The ownership issue is made even more complicated if we also 
recognise that different types of co-investors might actually be differently 
inclined to protect their interests (for reasons of simplicity, the latter are 
assumed to match the corporate objective of SOCs). Most importantly, we 
would expect that private shareholders (e.g., institutional investors) are more 
concerned about securing influence upon corporate governance vis-à-vis the 
government-owner than is the case for public shareholders (e.g., 
local/regional authorities or non-profit organisations). For one thing, this is 
due to the belief that many types of private shareholders are more 
professional monitors of the firms in which they invest than the average 
public shareholder (see, for instance, Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Bøhren 
and Ødegaard, 2001). For another, we expect that public co-investors are 
more likely than private co-investors to accept the possibility that the 
government-owner pursue other objectives than the corporate objective. This 
is so because public owners might draw special benefits from co-investing 
with the state, like in the case when regional authorities cannot attract 
enough private capital to provide cultural services. Additionally, it might be 
the case that public owners are more accustomed to the political game than 
are private shareholders.  
Focusing our attention on how the state ownership structure looks in 
practice, Table 3.5 shows, for every sample year, the fraction of firms which 
are fully versus partly owned by the Norwegian and Swedish state, 
respectively. As the table reveals, both states tend to hold full control of 
SOCs. But we also note that the Norwegian state is more likely to co-invest 
with others insofar as it holds partial ownership in 45% of the total cases. By 
contrast, the Swedish state co-invests with others in 24% of the total cases.   
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Table 3.5. Full versus partial state control with SOCs. 
 
 Norway Sweden 
Year Fully  
state-owned 
Partly 
state-owned 
n Fully 
state-owned 
Partly 
state-owned 
n 
2000 56 44 34 75 25 36 
2001 49 51 39 74 26 39 
2002 52 48 46 75 25 40 
2003 55 45 53 77 23 40 
2004 57 43 54 77 23 40 
2005 57 43 51 77 23 39 
 
Total 
 
55 45 277 76 24
 
234 
 
Note: The table shows, for every sample year, the fraction of SOCs which are fully versus partly owned 
by the Norwegian and Swedish state, respectively. n is the number of observations. 
 
Concentrating on those firms which are partly owned by the state, Table 3.6 
displays that there is cross-country variation as regards the legal aspects of 
state power. Noticeably, the Norwegian state tend to hold very dominant 
ownership positions as it retains a super-majority of the voting rights when 
selling state shares or when establishing new firms with co-investors. By 
contrast, the Swedish state seems apparently content with holding simple 
majority stakes. Moreover, the Norwegian state holds somewhat more 
negative control positions than minority posts, which gives the government-
owner the legal right to oppose several important corporate decisions. By 
contrast, the Swedish state holds roughly as many minority positions as 
negative control posts. Overall, however, we note that, in a single year, there 
are only a small number of firms within each category, which prevents us 
from drawing firm conclusions on the state’s likelihood to hold certain 
ownership positions.  
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Table 3.6. State control in partly state-owned firms.  
 
                         Norway                         Sweden 
 _______ State control _______  _______ State control _______   
Year Super 
maj. 
Simple  
maj. 
Neg. 
cont. 
Min. 
post 
Mean 
 
n Super 
maj. 
Simple 
maj. 
Neg. 
cont. 
Min. 
post 
Mean n 
2000 40 7 33 20 55 15 11 33 23 33 42 9 
2001 45 5 30 20 55 20 10 30 30 30 43 10 
2002 41 9 32 18 55 22 0 40 30 30 43 10 
2003 41 17 25 17 56 24 0 33 33 33 40 9 
2004 40 17 26 17 54 23 0 33 33 33 39 9 
2005 36 14 32 18 53 22 0 33 33 33 39 9 
 
Total 
 
41 
 
12 
 
29 
 
18
 
55
 
126
 
4
 
34
 
30
 
32
 
41 
 
56 
 
Note: The table shows, for every sample year, the fraction of partly state-owned firms in which the state 
holds super-majority (i.e., the state ownership stake is < 100% and ≥ 66.67%), simple majority (i.e., the 
state ownership stake is < 66.67% and > 50%), negative control (i.e., the state ownership stake is ≤ 50% 
and > 33.33%), or minority posts (i.e., the state ownership stake is ≤ 33.33%) in Norway and Sweden, 
respectively. The table also shows the mean state equity fraction and the number of observations (n).  
 
Turning to the non-governmental ownership structure, we start by looking at 
whether co-investors’ shareholding is dispersed or concentrated. Table 3.7 
presents summary statistics of the shareholding pertaining to the largest co-
investor. From this table, we note two striking patterns. First, co-investors’ 
shareholding is highly concentrated. In fact, the largest co-investor holds, on 
average, 24% and 29% of the stock in Norway and Sweden, respectively. 
However, there is great variation in co-investors’ ownership concentration, 
ranging from 0% (<0.0) to 66% in Norway, and from 2% to 90% in Sweden.  
 
 
Table 3.7. Co-investors’ ownership concentration. 
 
 Norway Sweden 
 Co-investor 
________ ownership concentration ________ 
Co-investor 
________ ownership concentration _______ 
 
Year 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Min. 
 
Max. 
 
Std. 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Min. 
 
Max. 
 
Std. 
2000 22.7 25.5 0.0 51 15.4 31.2 25.0 2.5 90 27.7 
2001 22.8 22.6 0.0 66 17.7 29.1 21.1 2.8 90 27.0 
2002 25.3 25.4 0.0 66 18.5 28.9 21.1 2.3 90 27.2 
2003 26.3 26.2 0.0 66 19.6 27.5 12.0 2.8 90 29.1 
2004 23.6 20.0 0.0 54.1 18.0 27.5 12.0 2.3 90 29.2 
2005 21.6 17.3 0.0 54.1 17.4 27.4 12.0 2.5 90 29.2 
 
Total 23.8
 
22.6 
 
0.0 66 17.7 28.6 17.1 2.3
 
90 
 
26.9 
 
Note: The table provides, for every sample year, statistics of co-investors’ ownership concentration in 
Norway and Sweden, respectively. The columns show the mean, median, minimum and maximum equity 
fraction held by the largest co-investor. Also shown is the standard deviation. All numbers in percent. The 
number of observations (n) equals that of Table 3.6.   
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The fact that co-investors’ shareholding is highly concentrated points to an 
interesting conjecture; namely, that the number of co-investors are fairly 
small. Table 3.8 confirms this expectation as it shows that the state often co-
invests with a single investor or with a small number of co-investors (2-10 
co-investors). Moreover, as would be expected, there is a negative 
correlation between the equity fraction held by the n’th largest co-investor 
and the number of co-investors, with the lowest equity fractions being held 
by co-investors in publicly traded SOCs (i.e., the number of co-investors > 
100). 
 
 
Table 3.8. The number of co-investors and the 
average equity fraction of the n’th largest co-investor. 
 
 Norway Sweden 
 
 
 
Average equity fraction held by 
___ the n’th largest co-investors __
 
 
n
 
Average equity fraction held by 
___ the n’th largest co-investors __ 
 
 
n 
Number of  
co-investors 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
1 36.1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 32 57.9 n/a n/a n/a n/a 21 
2-10 29.0 20.2 9.3 5.5 2.5 51 18.5 18.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 12 
11-100 13.8 8.2 6.1 2.5 0.6 16 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
>100 5.4 3.6 2.8 2.3 1.8 27 7.2 3.9 3.0 2.6 2.2 23 
 
All 
 
23.8 
 
13.1 
 
5.4 
 
3.3
 
1.7
 
126
 
28.6
 
8.9
 
3.4
 
3.1
 
2.8 
 
56 
 
Note: The table shows the average equity fraction held by the n’th largest co-investor in firms under 
partial state control (n = 1,…,5), when controlling for the number of co-investors. Data is drawn from all 
sample firms over the period 2000-2005 in Norway and Sweden, respectively. n is the number of 
firm/year observations.   
 
 
 
To further explore the ownership structure of partly state-owned firms, Table 
3.9 cross-tabulates the number of co-investors with the identity of the largest 
co-investor. According to this table, public owners dominate in SOCs with a 
single or only few co-investors, while financial and international owners 
typically hold ownership positions in listed SOCs. Corporate owners co-
invest just as well with the state alone as together with others. Overall, 
public owners are by far the most dominant co-investors in Norway, while 
corporations are the investor type most likely to co-invest with the Swedish 
state. In addition, we note that international owners rarely hold large 
ownership positions in Swedish SOCs, but are somewhat more likely to do 
so in Norway. 
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Table 3.9. The identity of the largest co-investor and the number of co-investors. 
 
 Norway Sweden 
 _____ Number of co-investors ____ _____ Number of co-investors ____ 
Largest  
co-investor 1 2-10 11-100 >100 n 1 2-10 11-100 >100 n 
Financial 0 0 33 67 15 0 0 0 100 16 
Corporate 44 24 24 8 25 58 23 0 19 26 
International 0 29 0 71 21 0 0 0 100 2 
Public 32 60 8 0 65 50 50 0 0 12 
 
Total 
 
25 
 
40 13 21 126 38 21 0
 
41 
 
56 
 
Note: The table shows the frequency (in percent) by which different types of shareholders are the largest 
co-investor, when also controlling for the number of co-investors. Data is drawn from all sample firms 
over the period 2000-2005 in Norway and Sweden, respectively. n is the number of firm/year 
observations.   
 
In sum, the above discussion suggests that there are important differences 
between fully and partly state-owned firms as regards the effects on 
corporate governance. Additionally, the ownership structure of partly state-
owned firms indicates that corporate governance may differ according to co-
investors’ ownership concentration and co-investor identity. Primarily, the 
ownership structure of SOCs is a factor which provides scope for political 
influence. Conversely, the ownership structure also puts some constrains on 
the scope for politicians and corporate directors to pursue other objectives 
than the corporate objective. Yet, the ownership structure of SOCs might 
also be deemed important based on the argument that different firms have 
different needs. Most importantly, it may provide important guidance to 
decide upon which governance decisions are in the best interest of the firm. 
All in all, therefore, ownership characteristics might possibly have an impact 
on governance decisions regardless of what is the primary motivation of 
decision-makers. 
 
3.2.3 Who else control the SOCs? 
Eventually, state control rights to SOCs rest with the government-owner. In 
practice, however, most ownership issues are handled by state bureaucrats in 
the sponsor ministries of SOCs, who provide politicians with the information 
and advice necessary to make governance decisions.40 Given this ability to 
interfere in corporate governance, it seems that the sponsor ministry itself 
might have an impact on what governance decisions are made by politicians. 
                                                 
40 On many occasions, state bureaucrats are also delegated the authority to engage in 
governance decision-making, like when they are given the mandate to vote on the general 
assembly in partly state-owned firms.  
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The question then arises whether different sponsor ministries might have 
different effects on corporate governance? In answering this question we 
note that, traditionally, the ownership of SOCs has been distributed among a 
number of ministries. During the past decade, however, governments have 
begun to transfer SOCs from sectoral ministries to one particular ‘ownership 
ministry’. While this reorganisation is partly seen as a necessary device to 
separate the state’s regulatory tasks from its ownership function, it might 
also be interpreted as an attempt to improve the state’s management of its 
ownership portfolio. One important consequence of this increasing 
specialisation in the management of state ownership is the rise in the 
ownership ministry’s competence and power. More specifically, we would 
expect the ownership ministry to take a leading position in the process 
towards increased ‘professionalism’ of corporate governance – for instance, 
by taking part in national and international collaboration on this very issue. 
Thus, as issues of corporate governance increasingly gain political priority 
and popular attention, this will also be reflected in the regular activities of 
the ownership ministry. Also, the aggregate equity holdings of the ownership 
ministry suggest that it gains power from coordinated action to influence 
upon corporate governance. Overall, therefore, it seems reasonable to expect 
that, in contrast to sectoral ministries with smaller ownership portfolios to 
administer, the ownership ministry will more likely subscribe to issues of 
‘good corporate governance’ in terms of codes of conduct and the more 
specific guidelines for corporate governance.  
Looking at state ownership administration in Norway and Sweden, 
Table 3.10 documents the trend toward transferring ownership of SOCs from 
sectoral ministries to the ownership ministry. The numbers show, however, 
that this specialisation is much more prevalent in Sweden than in Norway. In 
fact, by year-end 2005, the Swedish ownership ministry administers as much 
as 72% of the SOCs, whereas its Norwegian counterpart administers 35% of 
the SOCs (for the sample period as a whole, the overall numbers amount to 
63% and 32%, respectively).   
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Table 3.10. Sponsor ministry. 
 
 Norway Sweden 
Year Ownership 
ministry 
Sectoral 
ministries 
n Ownership 
ministry 
Sectoral 
ministries 
n 
2000 24 76 34 42 58 36 
2001 28 72 39 46 54 39 
2002 35 65 46 70 30 40 
2003 32 68 53 72 28 40 
2004 35 65 54 72 28 40 
2005 35 65 51 72 28 39 
 
Total 
 
32 68 277 63 37
 
234 
 
Note: The table shows, for every sample year, the fraction of SOCs which are administered by the 
‘ownership’ ministry versus sectoral ministries in Norway and Sweden, respectively. n is the number of 
observations. 
 
Another controlling force of SOCs is that of debtholders. In general, debt 
financing increases monitoring by the capital markets (Jensen, 1986) insofar 
as the defining feature of debt is the ability of debtholders to exercise control 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In principle, the role of debtholders resembles 
that of shareholders, since both have investments in the firm and want to get 
a return on their money (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Unlike shareholders, 
however, debtholders are taking on risk without the compensatory returns 
from corporate success (Short, 1994). As to the implications for corporate 
governance, we might therefore expect that debtholders strictly focus on the 
debt-paying ability of SOCs rather than the fulfilment of their corporate 
objective. While the mere presence of debtholders is a very rough (and some 
would say inadequate) proxy for external influences, consideration should 
also be given to the type of debt and to the concentration and identity of 
debtholders. As to the latter issues, the argument is that there are different 
incentives attached to the control function of debtholders depending on 
whether debtholding is short-term or long-term, dispersed or concentrated, 
bank-owned or not (Short, 1994; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
Unfortunately, the data used in this thesis does not cover detailed 
information about the debt structure of SOCs. Though, we might rely on the 
debt ratio to proxy for the influence of debtholders on corporate governance, 
since the proportion of a SOC’s assets that is financed with debt gives an 
indication of the likelihood that the firm is closely monitored by outside 
parties. The summary statistics pertaining to SOC debt ratio is displayed in 
Table 3.11. According to this table, the average debt ratio for Norwegian and 
Swedish SOCs is 61% and 58%, respectively. In a comparative view, these 
numbers are fairly similar to those of listed Norwegian firms, for which is 
reported an average debt ratio of 57% (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2001). 
Moreover, as the debt ratio varies considerably across SOCs (as shown by 
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the quartile numbers and the standard deviation) there are strong reasons to 
expect that the external influences on corporate governance might also vary. 
Finally, it might be interesting to know whether the debt ratio correlates with 
other firm characteristics, like corporate objective and state ownership 
structure. According to subsample statistics there are no major differences 
between the subgroups, except for the fact that the average debt ratio is 
somewhat higher for commercial SOCs and partly state-owned firms than 
for non-commercial SOCs and fully state-owned firms, respectively.  
 
 
Table 3.11. Debt ratio. 
 
 Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 Std.dev. n 
Nationality subsample       
Norway 61.2 49 61 77 23.9 276 
Sweden 58.3 38 62.5 78 27.7 234 
Corporate objective subsample       
Commercial SOCs 62.5 50 65 79 25.5 240 
Non-commercial SOCs 57.6 41 58 76 25.7 270 
State ownership structure 
subsample 
      
Fully state-owned firms 56.5 35.3 61 77 26.8 328 
Partly state-owned firms  66.0 53 63 80 22.3 182 
 
Note: The table shows the SOC debt ratio (debt to total assets) for three subsamples: nationality, corporate 
objective and state ownership structure. The columns show the mean, quartiles, and the standard deviation 
of the debt ratio. Q1, Q2 (median) and Q3 refer to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile, respectively. n is the 
number of firm/year observations. 
 
There are therefore sound reasons to believe that non-owners might 
influence upon corporate governance as they can effectively constrain the 
discretion of the government-owner and the board of directors. More 
precisely, it seems that in those cases which SOCs are administered by the 
ownership ministry and/or being controlled by debtholders, politicians and 
corporate directors might be constrained from taking actions that are not in 
the best interest of the firm in general and debtholders in particular. But not 
only does debt financing limits the scope for political influences, it might 
also be the case that politicians and corporate directors who care about their 
reputation believe that firms with a high debt ratio will have different needs 
than firms with a low debt ratio.  
 
3.2.4 The societal and economic importance of SOCs 
Obviously, SOCs differ in their societal and economic importance to the 
country, although the importance of firms might have different magnitudes 
and mean different things for various stakeholders (Aharoni, 1986, p. 16). 
  56
One ingredient of importance is the physical area in which the SOC operates. 
A firm which is located in district areas might attract stakeholders’ attention 
differently from a firm which is located in the capital city: for instance, if the 
former is a cornerstone company in the local community. Another point of 
importance is the size of the SOC. The larger the firm, the greater the 
likelihood that it represents a substantial part of the country’s employment, 
capital, and economic performance. Besides the fact that large SOCs are 
often more visible to the voters than small SOCs (e.g., because they serve 
many customers, like the postal services), they also signify that substantial 
values are at stake.  
Table 3.12 presents summary statistics pertaining to four variables 
which signify SOCs’ societal and economic importance to the country. From 
this table, we note that, in Norway, 55% of the SOCs are located in district 
areas, which means they employ a regional workforce (note, however, that 
the headquarters are often located in the capital city). The similar number for 
Swedish SOCs amounts to 63%. Moreover, we note that, in both countries, 
there are significant skewness in the firm size variables (including number of 
employees, book value of equity, and total assets), with standard deviations 
significantly exceeding the mean values. Again, therefore, there is strong 
empirical evidence that state ownership portfolios are very heterogeneous.  
 
 
Table 3.12. Regional presence and firm size. 
 
 Norway Sweden 
 Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 Std. n Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 Std. n 
Regional 
employment 
0.55 0 1 1 0.50 277 0.63 0 1 1 0.48 234 
Number  
of employees 
4634 63 232 3072 9260 277 5530 83 571 3153 10853 234 
Book value  
of equity 
6822 20 520 3054 17184 277 8335 162 1190 4145 21997 234 
Total assets 27066 70 1472 11876 91331 277 79313 463 4274 15012 348118 234 
 
Note: The table provides summary statistics of four variables which signify SOCs’ societal and economic 
importance to the country. Regional employment is a dummy variable equal to one if the SOC employs a 
regional workforce, zero otherwise. The number of employees is reported in absolute numbers. The book 
value of equity and total assets are expressed in 2005 million NOK and adjusted for Consumers’ Price 
Indexes. The columns show the mean, quartiles, and the standard deviation of these variables. Q1, Q2 
(median) and Q3 refer to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile, respectively. n is the number of firm/year 
observations. 
 
Regardless of what motivates politicians and corporate directors, it seems 
reasonable to expect that the above factors have implications for corporate 
governance. For instance, in the case which politicians and corporate 
directors attempt to impress their superiors, they are more likely to focus 
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their attention on large SOCs (which possibly also employs a regional 
workforce) than on small ones – perhaps because larger firms are more 
visible or perhaps because they generate more money. Accordingly, this 
means they would recognise that different governance decisions are optimal 
for different types of SOCs. But also, degree of importance signifies that 
SOCs face different challenges, which suggests that SOCs’ societal and 
economic influences are also important indicators as to which governance 
decisions are right for the public in general and the firm in particular.   
 
 
3.3 Summary 
In this chapter, I have directed attention to the institutional framework 
governing state ownership and to some of the firm characteristics by which 
SOCs differ. As to the institutional aspects, they differ in terms of their 
ability to constrain political influences on corporate governance. For 
instance, we should expect that company legislation would have more 
influence on what governance decisions are made than codes of conducts, 
since the latter are merely advisory. Importantly, this suggests that legal 
aspects might effectively constrain politicians and corporate directors from 
taking actions that are not in the best interest of the firm. As regards firm 
characteristics, I have suggested that corporate governance might vary as a 
function of corporate objective, the state ownership structure, other control 
structures (i.e., sponsor ministry and debtholders), and the societal and 
economic importance of SOCs. Besides, there are of course several other 
factors which are likely to have an impact on specific governance decisions. 
While this chapter has provided only some rough guidance to the question of 
how institutional features and firm characteristics interact with the 
motivation of decision-makers, this issue is explicitly dealt with in the next 
chapter where I discuss what factors might explain particular governance 
decisions. 
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Chapter 4  
 
How to Explain Governance Decisions?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Any attempts to describe the essence of corporate governance ultimately 
come down to the question of how to deal with the possible conflicts of 
interest that arise from the separation of ownership and management. In this 
chapter, I take a closer look at the governance mechanisms suitable for this 
purpose, and the factors that might affect their usage. As shown in the 
previous chapters, the motivational concerns of politicians and corporate 
directors represent one key factor to explain corporate governance. 
Moreover, there are various institutional features and firm characteristics 
that are likely to have an effect on corporate governance. Taking stock of 
this insight, it is now time to be more specific about what governance 
decisions we expect to be made. Accordingly, I proceed to discuss questions 
like: If politicians are primarily motivated to stay in office, and they pander 
to public opinion, what kind of corporate directors would they like to chair 
the SOC boards? Are private co-investors capable of dampening political 
influences on board appointments? If corporate directors care about their 
reputation, how would they design managerial compensation packages so as 
to signal their competence to professional peers? What are the effects on 
dividend payments following from the legal right of the Norwegian 
government-owner to intervene on this issue? Making qualified predictions 
about these and other empirical questions ultimately result in a set of specific 
hypotheses about governance decisions.  
 The chapter is organised as follows: Sections 4.1 – 4.3 discuss board 
appointments, CEO compensation contracts, and dividend payments, 
respectively. In each section, I first look into the research on the specific 
governance mechanism which is deemed relevant in the context of state 
ownership. Then, for each governance mechanisms I apply the baseline 
governance models that describe the motivational concerns of decision-
makers. Concurrently, I discuss the influences of institutional aspects and 
firm characteristics. Section 4.4 summarises the discussion.  
 
4.1 Board Appointments 
Following corporate governance theory, the primary check on corporate 
managers is provided by the board of directors. Who is elected to sit on the 
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boards thus represents one key governance decision made by the 
shareholders. As regards the board composition of SOCs, there is today 
considerable public debate about what kind of corporate directors should be 
appointed by the government-owner. A particular source of contention is the 
appointment of current or former politicians as board members. Even if the 
government-owner is acting completely within its legal rights when doing 
so, critics have pointed out that boards with political representatives are 
more likely exposed to undue political interference in their decision-making. 
For one thing, this makes it difficult to hold the board accountable for its 
actions. For another, the fact that some corporate directors are (rightfully or 
not) perceived as political representatives might lead co-investors raise the 
question if such directors are likely to make decisions which benefit the 
government-owner at the their expense. From this view, there are sound 
reasons why the government-owner should abstain from appointing political 
representatives to sit on the SOC boards. A counter-argument to this critique 
says that (at least) in firms where the state holds 100% of the shares, the 
government-owner has an obligation to its voters to maximise its impact on 
public policy. Thus, it is not necessarily so that political representatives on 
the SOC boards are bad for practice.   
Despite the above concerns, the issue of SOC board composition has 
received only limited research attention. It is interesting, though, that the few 
studies that look into SOC boards their observations differ as regards who 
are most likely to be recruited as corporate directors. Whereas descriptive 
accounts of Danish SOCs indicate that corporate directors are increasingly 
recruited among business executives (Grønnegård Christensen and Pallesen, 
2001), prior observations from Norwegian SOCs suggest that there does not 
seem to be a clear-cut trend towards bringing in business executives from the 
private sector to SOC board positions (Statskonsult, 1998).41 Moreover, the 
Danish case reveals that current or former politicians rarely chair the SOC 
boards. By contrast, Norwegian SOC boards are often headed by people with 
political experience.  
Data about board appointments becomes, however, even more 
interesting if attempts are also made to explain the observed recruitment 
patterns. But so far, little is known empirically about how corporate directors 
actually get selected. Yet, this is not surprising, given the thin formal 
literature on boards in general (Becht et al., 2003; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003) and SOC boards in particular. Specifically, the selection process of 
corporate directors is largely an unexplored issue (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
                                                 
41 The Danish study uses data from 1975, 1985, and 1995. The Norwegian study describes 
some broader trends pertaining to some of the major SOCs in the late 1990s.   
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1998).42 Attempting to fill this void in the literature, this thesis looks at the 
professional background of corporate directors and the factors that might 
explain board appointments.  
To empirically investigate this issue, I focus on who gets selected as 
the chairman of SOC boards. The reasons for not also including the general 
composition of SOC boards are two-fold. First, it proved difficult to obtain 
relevant information on all SOC board members concerning the empirical 
proxies described below. Second, the chairman is deemed the most 
important person at the board. In fact, critical decisions are rarely made 
without the consent of the chairman. For instance, the chairman normally 
heads the compensation committee, whose task is to propose how the CEO 
should be compensated. Also, anecdotal evidence shows that conflicts about 
who is appointed to sit on the SOC boards mainly concern the chairman 
position. With these qualifications, the thesis looks at two aspects related to 
the chairman’s professional background. First, is the chairman a current or 
former political representative? Second, is the chairman employed in the 
private or public sector at the time of appointment?43 Naturally, the two 
aspects are not independent of each other in the sense that both private and 
public sector employees might have political experience or not (note that 
current politicians per definition belong to the public sector). Attempting to 
keep the discussion at an intuitive level, however, the aspects of political 
experience and sector affiliation are treated separately. 
The professional background of chairmen indicates what type of 
competence they can offer the firm. Moreover, it is a strong possibility that 
chairmen’s professional background may signal their motivational concerns. 
The question is then what kind of people the government-owner prefers to 
hold the chairman position. In line with the basic ideas of this thesis, the 
answer to this question hinges on the motivation of politicians. To develop 
hypotheses about board appointments I therefore start by assuming that 
politicians are only preoccupied with reputational concerns. I then move on 
to discuss how the selection of chairmen would be like if politicians instead 
care about winning the upcoming election. Thereafter, I ask who are most 
likely to get selected as chairmen in the case which politicians pursue party-
political goals. In discussing these motivational concerns, I concurrently 
                                                 
42 Among the few studies which have examined board appointments, the focus is on board 
independence; that is the appointment of inside versus outside board members and CEO 
involvement in board selection processes (see, for instance, Zajac and Westphal, 1996; 
Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999), where insiders are broadly defined as corporate directors 
who have personal ties to the firm or to the executive managers. More generally, the board 
composition issue has been dealt with in relation to its effect on governance decisions (e.g., 
CEO compensation contracts) and firm performance (see, for instance, Weisbach, 1988; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Core et al., 1999; Randøy and Jenssen, 2004).  
 
43 In the public sector is included the government ministries, subordinate agencies, and SOCs.  
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include the impact of institutional features and firm characteristics. In 
addition, I look at some possible moderating effects due to interactions 
between the different governance models. Lastly, I consider some potential 
effects on board appointments following from nation-specific arrangements. 
 
4.1.1 Politicians care about their professional reputation  
Imagine that politicians care about their reputation for being competent – for 
instance, as a means to increase their outside career prospects. For politicians 
who seek to act in the public interest, the fundamental prerequisite of board 
composition is to make sure that the SOC boards have the necessary 
competencies to carry out their function. Thus, politicians need to emphasise 
what type of board competence is right for the firm. Aside from the 
possibility that such board selection processes might signal competence, they 
are likely to offer politicians the additional benefit of building relations with 
future employers in both the public and the private sector.  
Generally, each particular firm faces some specific challenges that 
require the SOC board to constitute a body of expertise pertinent to these 
conditions. As a proxy, however, the corporate objective of SOCs provides 
some useful guidance to what kind of competence that is deemed suitable for 
different groups of SOCs. In particular, it is possible to distinguish firms for 
which the state makes market requirements for earnings and return, from 
firms that are primarily set up to fulfil societal objectives. From the point of 
view of commercially oriented SOCs, the expectation is simply that business 
(private sector) experience would be a more important qualification than 
political and/or public sector experiences. Conversely, we might think of 
politically experienced persons and public sector employees as being more 
appropriate candidates to the chairman position in SOCs which are 
instructed to pursue objectives that are distinct from profit-maximisation. 
Conceivably, this reasoning makes sense as political representatives and 
public sector employees are typically more disposed than non-politicians and 
private business people to balance the welfare of different stakeholders. Yet, 
we should not interpret these suppositions as saying that the boards in 
commercial (non-commercial) SOCs might not benefit from the skills and 
information provision of political representatives and/or public sector 
employees (non-politicians and/or private sector employees). Instead, the 
idea is simply to highlight what kind of competence is perceived to be the 
most relevant for the SOC’s fulfilment of its objectives. Accordingly, our 
first hypothesis suggests that:   
 
Hypothesis 1: Political representatives and/or public sector 
employees are more likely to chair the boards in non-commercial 
SOCs than in commercial SOCs. 
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Among those SOCs that are commercially oriented, some are also listed on 
the stock exchange. As to the effect of stock market listing on board 
appointments, it is undeniably so that the immense attention from the capital 
market promotes reliance on highly developed business skills on the part of 
corporate directors in general and chairmen in particular. As a shareholder in 
publicly traded firms, the government-owner therefore has considerable 
interest in appointing chairmen who possess extensive knowledge about 
business strategy and market structures, while devaluing political experience 
and public sector occupation. For this reason, hypothesis 2 states that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Political representatives and/or public sector 
employees are less likely to chair the boards in listed SOCs than in 
non-listed SOCs. 
 
Naturally, several more firm-specific features would normally be considered 
in any real-life board selection process, such as the firm’s financial 
performance, the existence of any personal ties between the chairman and 
the CEO, and the board composition as a whole. However, as the aim is here 
to trace whether politicians seek to act in accordance with their own ‘codes 
of conduct’, attention is exclusively paid to those variables which prescribe 
focus on the type of activity preformed by the SOCs.  
 
4.1.2 Politicians seek to stay in office 
Think instead of politicians whose primary motivation is to stay in office. 
What type of people would such politicians appoint to the SOC chairman 
position? To answer this question, first note that most voters are unlikely to 
have any strong preferences about who is appointed to sit on the SOC 
boards. On the other hand, voters surely have views about some of the major 
decisions that are made by these boards – for instance, on issues like down-
sizing and closure of businesses. For that reason, politicians need to ensure 
that the chairmen will be attentive to voters’ interests, since the electorate is 
eligible to hold only the government-owner responsible for unpopular board 
decisions. 
Obviously, politicians currently in office are most likely to get what 
they want by chairing the SOC boards themselves – or by appointing as 
chairmen some of their party-members in the Parliament. If, for some 
reasons, current politicians are prohibited from taking board positions (like 
in Norway), we might instead expect them to appoint former political 
affiliates. However, politicians might also benefit from appointing current or 
former politicians who sympathise with rival political parties, which helps 
the government-owner escape the critique of political opposition for 
appointing its ‘own’ representatives. In any case, the reason why politicians 
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concerned with their re-election prospects would prefer current or former 
politicians to chair the SOC boards is simple: By choosing to be attentive to 
political matters, chairmen of this type might achieve personal benefits, 
including the opportunity to become re-elected and to foster or hold on to a 
political career. Additionally, these chairmen might consider their chances of 
being recruited to other directorships in the private sector as being fairly 
small. For these reasons, we might assume that politically experienced 
people are more concerned about their chances of staying in the SOC 
chairman position than about their professional reputation. Accordingly, they 
will loyally pursue the interests of the government-owner.   
While political experience is perhaps the main indicator of whether 
the chairman would be loyal to the government-owner, it seems reasonable 
to also account for the chairman’s sector affiliation. Irrespective of any 
political experience, we might expect public sector employees to have a 
better understanding of the political game and to be more sensitive to 
political signals than is the case for private sector employees. Clearly, civil 
servants in the state bureaucracy represent a special case, since they are in 
principle the loyal representatives of their ministers. Yet, it seems generally 
reasonable to assume that most public sector employees will be loyal to the 
government-owner out of concern for their own employment opportunities, 
which include both re-appointments to the chairman position as well as other 
vacancies in the state sector. By contrast, those chairmen employed in the 
private sector with no political experience are likely more concerned about 
their professional reputation in the private job market. While they certainly 
might want to stay in the SOC board position, the most important is for them 
to signal their competence to business peers, even if this means they might 
act against the government-owner’s interests.  
There are several reasons, however, why we should not expect every 
SOC board to be chaired by political representatives and/or public sector 
employees. Most importantly, the state ownership structure might prohibit 
political influences on board appointments insofar as potential co-investors 
have the legal right to protect their interests. From this it follows that co-
investors will refuse to accept any political appointments if they believe their 
interests might be exploited. In this respect, we should also take into account 
that higher state ownership stakes might bring successively stronger political 
influences on board appointments. For reason of simplicity, hypothesis 3 
only states the effect of full versus partial state control: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Political representatives and/or public sector 
employees are more likely to chair the boards in fully state-owned 
companies than in firms under partial state control.  
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In the same vein as we expect political influences to increase with higher 
state ownership stakes, we would also expect that co-investors’ influences 
are likely to increase with their ownership share. Thus, the mere presence of 
co-investors might not sufficiently secure control over who gets appointed to 
chair the SOC boards. In fact, we might expect that only large co-investors 
can exert some influence over board appointments, and thereby act as a 
corrective to government control. More generally, the argument is that 
higher co-investment concentrations bring successively stronger influence on 
who gets appointed as board chairmen. Hypothesis 4 therefore suggests that 
for firms under partial state control: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Political representatives and/or public sector 
employees are less likely to chair the boards in SOCs with a high 
non-governmental ownership concentration than in SOCs with a 
dispersed non-governmental ownership structure. 
 
However, co-investors are not all alike. If we accept the notion that different 
types of shareholders pursue different goals, this leads us to expect that 
private co-investors are more likely than public co-investors to oppose 
political appointments. The expectation is therefore that in those SOCs 
where private co-investors represent the major non-governmental owner, 
they would likely employ their influence to encourage the appointment of 
more non-politicians and private sector employees to the SOC boards. Given 
the prospect of a weak relationship between private co-investment and 
political and/or public sector representation on the board, hypothesis 5 
suggests that for firms under partial state control: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Political representatives and/or public sector 
employees are less likely to chair the boards in those SOCs which 
private investors represent the major non-governmental owner than 
in SOCs which public co-investors dominate. 
 
But the state ownership structure is not the only factor which may delimit 
political control of board appointments. Additionally, we should account for 
the fact that politically experienced people (and perhaps also public sector 
employees) who also posit some board competence represent a scarce 
resource. Thus, there are simply too few people in the pool of candidates for 
political appointments. Given this restriction, we are led to ask whether it is 
more important to secure political control of some SOCs than others. For 
instance, there is reason to believe that political influences is more 
pronounced in large firms, since larger firms tend to be more visible and 
closely scrutinized than smaller firms (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a). Also, it 
seems likely that politicians will pay particular attention to SOCs that 
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employ a regional workforce, because their presence might have substantial 
effects on the wellbeing of local communities and thereby attract a great deal 
of public interest. Consequently, I suggest that politicians would be more 
concerned about board appointments in those SOCs that are most visible to 
the voters (in terms of firm size and regional presence) than in fairly small 
SOCs. The argument is set forth in hypothesis 6:  
 
Hypothesis 6: Political representatives and/or public sector 
employees are more likely to chair the boards in SOCs which are 
considered highly visible to the voters than in less visible SOCs. 
 
Yet another limitation on the possibility for exercising political influences 
has to do with the fact that political appointments are usually not considered 
as ‘good corporate governance’. As an illustration, leading proponents of 
corporate governance reforms, like the OECD, has strongly recommended 
that board members should not be guided by any political concerns. The 
question is then whether we might reasonably believe that politicians are 
likely to accept any self-binding commitments to such corporate governance 
principles. Interpreting the transfer of state ownership rights from sectoral 
ministries to ownership ministries as one major attempt to increase 
professionalism in corporate governance, we might generally expect the 
ownership ministry to be more attentive towards principles of good 
corporate governance than other sponsor ministries. In other words, we 
might suggest that the ownership ministry would be more inclined than other 
ministries to appoint non-politicians and private sector employees to SOC 
boards. In formal terms, hypothesis 7 thus states that: 
 
Hypothesis 7: Political representatives and/or public sector 
employees are less likely to chair the boards in SOCs which are 
administered by the ownership ministry than in those SOCs 
administered by other sponsor ministries.  
 
Finally, it might also be the case that debtholders might restrain politicians 
from taking actions that do not support the debt-paying ability of SOCs. 
Using the debt ratio as a proxy for debtholders’ influences on board 
appointments, it seems reasonable to expect that lenders might insist on the 
boards being headed by business people in highly leveraged SOCs. Bearing 
a resemblance to prior arguments, the idea is simply that business persons 
(private sector employees) are more capable to deal with financial policy 
issues than are political representatives and public sector employees. Thus, 
hypothesis 8 proposes that:   
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Hypothesis 8: Political representatives and/or public sector 
employees are less likely to chair the boards in SOCs with a high 
debt ratio than in SOCs with a low debt ratio.  
 
4.1.3 Politicians pursue ideological goals 
Consider then politicians who care about implementing their preferred party-
policy. Certainly, this means that politicians would seek to ensure that board 
recruitment patterns support partisan profiles. As to left-wing governments, 
we expect them to prefer political or public control with SOCs. By contrast, 
right-wing governments are likely to prefer less political control and more 
business competence to SOCs. Hypothesis 9 therefore says that: 
 
Hypothesis 9: Left-wing governments are more likely than right-
wing governments to appoint chairmen who are politically 
experienced and/or employed in the public sector. 
 
From this it follows that ideology-oriented politicians in leftist government 
parties basically pursue the same selection strategy as politicians who are 
primarily concerned with their re-election prospects – but for quite different 
reasons. More specifically, the aim of ideology-oriented leftist politicians is 
not to instruct political representatives and/or public sector employees to 
think about voter reactions when making board decisions. Instead, they 
would be concerned about securing that the SOC boards pay more attention 
to social and distributional effects than to economic aspects alone.  
 
4.1.4 Interaction effects 
The three governance models are portrayed as three alternative approaches 
to understanding board appointments. Noticeably, this means that for any 
single governance model to gain empirical support, its corresponding 
hypotheses need to be corroborated. Yet, there might also be some more 
complex relationships between the independent variables that are attached to 
different governance models. In particular, it seems reasonable to expect that 
the importance of both reputation criteria and some of the constraining 
forces of the re-election model could differ as a function of state control. As 
to the impact of corporate objectives on political appointments, we should 
expect that the negative commercialisation effect is presumably stronger 
within the group of partly state-owned firms than within the group of firms 
under full state control. Due to the auxiliary pressure of co-investors, we 
might also think that the constraining effect of debt would be even stronger 
for firms under partial state control than among fully state-owned firms. To 
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explore these issues, I therefore perform subsample analysis to test whether 
the impact of independent variables differ according to state control.  
Additionally, there might be some intricate relationships due to the 
ideology model. To explain why, we recall that leftist politicians would 
likely prefer the same kinds of board chairmen as politicians who care about 
their re-election prospects. But also, we should expect that ideology-oriented 
politicians are subject to the same constraints as politicians who seek to stay 
in office for its own sake. As a result, the independent variables described in 
hypotheses 3–8 might behave differently as a function of government-party, 
and actually show up as significant predictors within the sub-sample of left-
wing governments. At the same time, a stronger test of hypothesis 9 would 
imply that the very same independent variables should have no effects within 
the sub-sample of right-wing governments. The reason is that not only 
should we expect right-wing government-owners to appoint non-politicians 
and/or private sector employees to the chairman position, but they do so out 
of self-interest, not due to the constraining forces of the re-election model.  
 
4.1.5 How do nation-specific characteristics affect board appointments? 
The fact that our analysis includes SOCs from two countries suggests that 
we consider the effect of nation-specific institutional aspects. In particular, I 
focus on the issue of whether state representatives are allowed to sit on the 
SOC boards. While current politicians and state bureaucrats are prohibited 
from taking board positions in Norwegian SOCs, the Swedish state might be 
represented on the SOC boards by politicians themselves or by civil 
servants. Interestingly, the presence of Swedish state representatives on the 
SOC boards leads us to ask whether the Swedish government-owner 
(irrespective of political motivation) would be less eager than the Norwegian 
government-owner to appoint politically experienced persons and/or public 
sector employees as chairmen. After all, the Swedish state is entitled to be 
represented on every SOC board, while no such requirement applies to the 
Norwegian state. On the other hand, when also taking into account that the 
Norwegian state is given some special privileges in SOCs that are fully 
owned by the state, this leads to the expectation that Norwegian politicians 
(if concerned with re-election or ideology) might be less concerned about the 
chairman position than their Swedish counterparts. All in all, therefore, this 
suggests we leave the question of nationality effects open for empirical 
inquiry.   
 
4.1.6 Final remarks 
In the board literature, a common claim is that corporate directors are not 
selected by shareholders but rather by the very managers they are supposed 
to oversee (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; see also Mace, 1971). The scope 
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for managerial influences on board selection processes are particularly 
stressed in American research, since top managers themselves often hold 
board seats in US firms. By contrast, CEOs in Norwegian firms are not 
allowed to sit on the board in the firms they hold managerial positions, 
which suggests there is less scope for managerial influences on board 
appointments in the present context. However, at the end of the day, the 
question of CEOs’ impact on board appointments can only be answered by 
empirical evidence. The lack of data available for this purpose means that 
managerial influences on board appointments cannot be further investigated 
in this study. 
 
 
4.2 CEO Compensation Contracts 
Compared to board monitoring, the design of CEO compensation contracts 
represents a more direct mechanism to align the interests of shareholders and 
corporate managers. If politicians were to follow the ideas of standard 
economic theory, their compensation strategy would basically be to make 
sure that the SOC boards are offering top managers a market-clearing pay 
(which makes it possible to attract managerial talents) and explicit incentives 
(which induces self-interested CEOs to act in accordance with shareholder 
interests). Additionally, they would put pressure on the boards to avoid the 
use of management perquisites, like golden parachute agreements, if such 
measures are not explicitly invoked on business ground (otherwise, they 
would only represent an inefficient control cost).  
But why, then, do we tend to observe that compensation packages 
substantially differ from such ideas? As to the argument that firms which are 
willing to pay more will, in general, attract more highly talented managers, 
the problem is that managerial compensation contracts are not a private 
matter between the board and the CEO (Jensen and Murphy, 1990b). 
Instead, the public disclosure of executive pay virtually guarantees that third 
parties, such as rank-and-file employees, labour unions, the Parliament, and 
the media affect the type of contracts written between management and the 
board of directors, which eventually makes the level of CEO compensation a 
populist issue (Jensen and Murphy, 1990b; Murphy, 1999). Thus, to the 
worse or better of shareholder interests, managerial pay levels are likely 
dampened by public attention.    
As regards the use of incentive schemes, their primary advantage is 
that top managers are rewarded based on their performance. In addition, the 
use of incentives would perhaps make it easier to attract the most competent 
CEOs, since we might assume that talented, self-confident people prefer to 
be rewarded based on performance rather than independently of it (Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990b). Yet, the use of incentive schemes is not without 
caveats. First, there is the case in which the incentive plans reward (or 
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actually punish) managers for factors they cannot control, like when stock 
options are not indexed to the overall market (Oyer, 2004). Second, it is 
possible that top managers attempt to manipulate the measures used as 
incentive criteria so as to increase the value of bonuses, stock options and 
the like (Healy, 1985; Zhang et al., 2008).44 Third, there is the problem that, 
when introduced, incentive pay is simply added to the CEO’s fixed salary. 
The CEO might therefore avoid that incentive pay is substituted for fixed 
salary, which implies that there are only upsides related to the introduction 
of incentives. In sum, therefore, some types of incentive schemes might 
actually lead to misalignment between the interests of shareholder and 
corporate managers.45  
Finally, as to the adoption of golden parachutes, it is not necessarily 
so that such kind of contractual agreement cannot possibly align the interests 
of shareholders and corporate managers. By contrast, golden parachutes 
might serve both specific and broader purposes (Greve, 1997). The narrowly 
specified contract reflects the corporate governance rationale for the 
adoption of golden parachutes: To ensure that the CEO will not resist a 
takeover bid, the contract is adopted expressly to cover management’s 
interests in the hypothetical event of a takeover (Singh and Harianto, 1989). 
Golden parachutes are thus seen as insurances against takeovers, because 
they involve a negotiation by top managers with the board for the inclusion 
of sizeable payments should a change in ownership control occur which 
increases the risk of management replacement (Singh and Harianto, 1989). 
In contrast, the broadly specified golden parachute contract is included in the 
compensation package to compensate the CEO not only in case of hostile 
takeovers, but also in the more general case of dismissal. In particular, the 
latter might prove relevant if shareholders need to ease the process of CEO 
dismissal. Broadly speaking, therefore, we might expect there to be valid 
reasons for including golden parachutes in the CEO compensation contract. 
Now, the key question is how these ideas about CEO compensation 
contracts apply in the case of state ownership. Consistent with many of the 
above arguments, anecdotal evidence indicates that certain elements of 
executive compensation design are controversial when applied to SOCs. For 
instance, the Norwegian government-owner has recently claimed that many 
top managers in SOCs are being paid too much, which, in turn, prompted 
                                                 
44 In practice, the Enron case represents a well-known example that incentive schemes might 
provide perverse managerial incentives; for instance, to engage in irregular accounting 
procedures.  
 
45 While we cannot conclude from these arguments that all incentive schemes are potentially 
dysfunctional, they certainly makes the case for the board being attentive to possible pitfalls 
in the design of incentive contracts. For instance, the board should attempt to eliminate any 
external effects on the incentive criteria employed in the contract, and the incentive plans 
should be capped so as to establish an upper limit on the possible pay. 
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government prohibition on the use of stock-option contracts. Likewise, in 
Sweden, the government-owner has strongly recommended that incentive 
schemes directed at the CEO should be avoided, thus reflecting a view upon 
performance-based pay as being a curse rather than a blessing. Importantly, 
empirical research suggests that political attacks on CEO pay take the form 
not only of rhetoric, but is actually translated into practice whenever 
politicians have the necessary power to enforce their preferred compensation 
design. In fact, top managers in firms under full state control are found to be 
lower-paid and less incentivised than CEOs in firms under partial state 
control and privately owned firms (Greve, 1997; Wolfram, 1998; Cragg and 
Dyck, 2003). On the other hand, prior research also shows that golden 
parachutes are more commonly applied among fully state-owned firms than 
among partly privatised ones (Greve, 1997), which indicates that politicians 
are not equally concerned with limiting every aspect of the compensation 
package. 
Although the empirical findings on top managerial pay in SOCs are 
intriguing, it is important to note that research on this issue is extremely 
limited (D’Souza et al., 2000).46 Thus, we need more systematic empirical 
examination of the design of executive compensation contracts under state 
ownership. Attempting here to provide some theoretical guidance to this 
issue, I start by asking what kind of compensation design that would satisfy 
the government-owner, which answer to this question naturally hinges on the 
motivational concerns of politicians. Then, I describe the channels through 
which politicians might affect CEO compensation contracts and suggest that 
the government-owner might have some bearing on this issue via board 
appointments or by way of exercising direct shareholder pressures. However, 
as this discussion suggest that politicians’ preferences about the design of 
CEO compensation contracts might not support the firms’ interest, I also 
explore what these contracts would look like if corporate directors were to 
act independently of political pressures, caring only about their reputation 
for being competent. Additionally, I consider some possible moderating 
effects due to interactions between different governance models. Following 
prior research on executive compensation, I then consider the possibility that 
self-dealing managers can exert some influence on the pay-setting process. 
                                                 
46 While this thesis focuses exclusively on SOCs, the ‘politics of pay’ has been more widely 
explored among firms subject to other ownership arrangements. For a large part, empirical 
research has concentrated on how political influences are channelled through firms’ 
regulatory environment. One important finding is that firms subject to economic regulation 
pay their CEOs significantly less than unregulated firms. These studies, which are reviewed in 
Murphy (1999), include DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1991); Joskow et al. (1993, 1996); Dial 
and Murphy (1995); Murphy (1996); Rose and Wolfram (2002) (see also Jensen and Murphy, 
1990a, 1990b). 
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Finally, I look at some possible effects of nation-specific characteristics on 
the design of CEO compensation packages.  
As concerns the different components of executive compensation 
contracts, the broader literature has mostly dealt with one or, more seldom, 
two parameters of CEO compensation. By contrast, this thesis examines all 
of the above-mentioned components of the CEO compensation package, 
including the total compensation level, the use of incentive schemes, and the 
adoption of golden parachutes. The inclusion of different aspects of the CEO 
compensation contracts is important not only because their determinants may 
differ (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; David et. al., 1998; Finkelstein and 
Boyd, 1998), but also because it is important to explore if and how they 
relate to each other.  
 
4.2.1 What kinds of CEO compensation contracts do politicians prefer? 
As noted above, the answer to this question naturally depends on political 
motivation. Therefore, I start by providing some theoretical ideas about the 
kinds of compensation contracts that are likely preferred by politicians who 
care about their reputation, re-election prospects, or ideology, respectively. 
As will be clear from this discussion, there are sound reasons why politicians 
of all types seek to keep compensation levels, incentive schemes and 
(possibly) golden parachutes in check.  
Probing the literature on political influences on CEO pay, most 
attention has been drawn to the reasons why politicians who are concerned 
with their re-election prospects might seek to put constraints on the level and 
structure of CEO compensation packages. Most obviously, executive pay 
levels might be suppressed due to the strong negative reactions of the wider 
public to ‘excessive wages’ (Joskow et al., 1996). Politicians’ sensitivity to 
voter reactions thus implies that high-level salaries, large bonuses, golden 
parachutes, and the like, are most likely turned down by the government-
owner. Moreover, politicians might be unwilling to apply incentive schemes, 
since this means they have to reveal their underlying political objectives 
(Vickers and Yarrow, 1991; see also Cragg and Dyck, 2003). For instance, 
the government-owner might seek to keep employment above efficient levels 
in order to retain support from public sector employees (see, for example, 
Boycko et al., 1996). But, since the visibility of such political objectives will 
draw taxpayers’ attention to the benefits from efficiency improvements that 
they would have to sacrifice, this leads us to expect that politicians seek to 
avoid the use of incentive schemes.  
Interestingly, however, we might argue that politicians would opt for 
the same compensation strategy if caring about their reputation as being 
competent. Yet, in this case, the reason for politicians being restrictive on the 
compensation issue is more subtle. The crucial point is that politicians need 
to consider the possibility that doing the right thing from the point of view of 
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the firm may not coincide with doing the right thing from the perspective of 
society at large. Also, we make the assumption that future employers in the 
public or private sector are well aware of the fact that politicians cannot be 
held responsible for board decisions about top managerial pay. Politicians 
are, however, held responsible for the aggregated effects of CEO pay levels 
on society at large – an issue which is deemed very important for most 
employers. More precisely, the state’s role in the wage settlement process 
suggests that politicians should pay more attention to the broader societal 
effects that follow from compensation practices in SOCs than to firm-
specific compensation issues (Cragg and Dyck, 2003). In fact, politicians 
should consider the possibility that excessive salaries, incentive pay, and 
golden parachutes on the top management level in SOCs might spur wage 
increases in other parts of the economy, with subsequent detrimental effects 
on prices, inflation, and interest rates.47 As regards incentive schemes, there 
is also the problem that high-powered incentives may induce CEOs to pursue 
more risky strategies than responsible politicians would find acceptable. 
After all, politicians do not invest their own money, but those of the 
taxpayers and, unlike professional investors, politicians cannot diversify 
their ownership portfolios as they like (which would have offered the 
possibility of reducing total risk). Thus, while recognising the benefits of 
incentive schemes, it is likely that politicians who are concerned about their 
reputation would prefer low-powered incentives to high-powered ones. In 
sum, therefore, these arguments suggest that politicians may in fact behave 
quite rationally when putting restrictions on the level and structure of 
executive compensation contracts.  
Finally, the above outcome would not be altered if we assume that 
politicians are motivated by ideological concerns, although we might expect 
left-wing and right-wing government-owners to argue differently about why 
there should be some constraints on the CEO compensation packages. As 
regards leftist politicians, they are primarily expected to be concerned about 
the distributional effects and moral aspects related to high salaries and the 
possibility for managers to earn large bonuses and/or favourable stock 
options. By contrast, politicians at the right are more likely concerned about 
the macro-economic effects of excessive salaries in terms of their 
inflationary effects. Regardless of ideological orientation, politicians would 
thus like to see some restrictions on managerial pay arrangements.  
 
 
                                                 
47 Such effects on the economy would also be the concern of politicians who are primarily 
motivated by their re-election prospects. However, politicians who are concerned about their 
chances of staying in office do not worry about the effects of excessive salaries on the 
economy per se, but only about the anticipated voter reactions to such compensation 
practices. The inflation argument is therefore discussed in relation to the reputation motive.   
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4.2.2 Political influences on CEO compensation contracts 
The above discussion leads to the simple suggestion that politics matters to 
executive compensation design, albeit it seems that politicians would like to 
constrain the level and structure of CEO compensation contracts for very 
different reasons. While this makes it difficult to identify politicians’ 
ultimate motivation, it should also be easier to recognise what seem to be 
‘political-friendly’ compensation packages. The question is now what the 
chances are that politicians can have their interests fulfilled when, after all, 
the compensation issue lies under the authority of corporate directors? 
Clearly, two channels for political influences seem to be of particular 
importance; that is, the board of directors and the state ownership structure. 
Thus, I expect that politicians may affect decisions about CEO compensation 
design by appointing corporate directors who will be attentive to political 
interests or by way of their sheer ownership stake. Noticeably, the two 
channels may be related, as we have already discussed how board 
appointments are likely influenced by state control (cf. Section 4.1). For 
reasons of simplicity, however, I will treat the two as separate channels for 
political influences, thereby providing distinct arguments as to why they 
matter to the setting of CEO compensation contracts. 
In terms of their decision-making authority, it is evidently so that the 
SOC boards represent the primary mechanisms by which political influences 
are translated into compensation practices (Wolfram, 1998).48 To evaluate 
the role of the SOC boards in the pay setting process, we therefore focus on 
the inclination of corporate directors to please the government-owner. Thus, 
I ask whether we might plausibly assume that some corporate directors are 
more concerned than others about keeping their SOC board positions. In line 
with our prior discussion about board appointments, I posit that politically 
experienced directors would be more receptive to political signals about 
CEO compensation than non-political directors, since we might expect the 
former are mostly concerned about their re-election prospects (e.g., due to 
fewer outside career offerings). By contrast, I suggest that non-political 
directors are likely more concerned about their reputation, because such 
behaviour may signal their competence and so increase their chances of 
gaining other directorships in the private sector. Accordingly, they would 
choose those compensation packages that are perceived right for the firm. In 
a similar manner, we might expect that corporate directors who are 
employed in the public sector would be more inclined to please the 
government-owner than those directors employed in the private sector, 
which is due to the assumption that public employees are more concerned 
                                                 
48 Recall that, in the sample period, shareholders have no advisory or binding vote on 
executive compensation in Norway and Sweden – a right which is today implemented in 
company law. 
 
  74
about keeping their current board positions than about their chances of being 
recruited to board positions in the private sector, and vice versa. Sticking to 
our perception that politicians seek to keep both pay levels and the use of 
other compensation elements (i.e., incentive schemes and golden parachutes) 
in check, our first set of hypotheses simply state that:   
 
Hypothesis 1a: The level of CEO compensation is higher among 
SOCs chaired by non-politicians (private sector employees) than 
among SOCs chaired by political representatives (public sector 
employees).  
 
Hypothesis 1b: Incentive schemes are more likely used among SOCs 
chaired by non-politicians (private sector employees) than among 
SOCs chaired by political representatives (public sector employees). 
  
Hypothesis 1c: Golden parachutes are more likely adopted among 
SOCs chaired by non-politicians (private sector employees) than 
among SOCs chaired by political representatives (public sector 
employees). 
 
Yet, while the board of directors represents the key important channel for 
influencing executive compensation, the state ownership structure provides 
the fundamental context in which CEO pay decisions are made. As to the 
issue of state control, I have previously argued that in cases where the state 
co-invests with others, the shareholder electorate might in fact pursue 
different interests. For instance, the government-owner might be concerned 
about public reactions or inflationary effects related to excessive 
compensation levels whereas co-investors are disposed to spend some more 
money to attract high-quality managers. Moreover, we would expect that co-
investors are more likely than the government-owner to accept some more 
risk related to the use of incentives schemes. Also, co-investors might be 
more willing than the government-owner to adopt golden parachutes, since 
this can reduce the risk that CEOs oppose the potential sale of co-investor 
shareholdings. As to the question of which of these interests will be pursued, 
it seems clear that corporate directors who seek to retain their positions 
would be more attentive to the interests of co-investors in firms under weak 
state control. By contrast, in cases where the state is the single or dominant 
shareholder, corporate directors will pay more attention to political interests 
than to the interests of co-investors. Thus, while politicians have no direct 
say on the design of CEO compensation contracts, they may surely affect the 
board’s pay decisions through their sheer ownership share. In support of this 
view, I suggest that political influences on the pay setting process are likely 
stronger when state ownership stakes are higher. Briefly, the second set of 
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hypotheses thus suggests that if corporate directors care about keeping their 
positions:     
  
Hypothesis 2a: The level of CEO compensation is higher among 
firms under partial state control than in fully state-owned firms.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: Incentive schemes are more likely used among firms 
under partial state control than among fully state-owned firms.  
 
Hypothesis 2c: Golden parachutes are more likely adopted among 
firms under partial state control than among fully state-owned firms.  
 
4.2.3 Corporate directors care about their reputation  
Now, let us assume instead that corporate directors are concerned about their 
reputation – due to future employment opportunities or for its own sake. In 
principle, this would lead us to expect that chairmen seek to design ‘optimal’ 
compensation contracts, when also taking into account that the very nature 
of state ownership might induce a different compensation design than is 
prescribed by economic theory (with the accompanying qualifications of the 
latter).49 While the optimal compensation strategy depends on a wide range 
of factors, some of which are industry-specific, the aim of this thesis is less 
ambitious as I make no attempts to discuss what might be appropriate levels 
of CEO compensation and golden parachutes, or whether the chosen 
incentive schemes might actually induce performance improvements. 
Instead, the aim is simply to make some convincing arguments about the 
factors that may explain variation in CEO compensation contracts across the 
state ownership portfolio. Thus, I ask: Are there any legitimate reasons why 
some SOC managers would be paid more than others? Is it likely that 
incentive schemes and golden parachutes are more appropriate in some 
SOCs than in others?  
As to the firm characteristics that may affect executive compensation 
contracts, the corporate objective of SOCs stands out as one obvious 
candidate if not only for the reason that commercial SOCs are exposed to 
market forces, which may put upward pressure on CEO pay. The argument 
is then simply that the price for attracting managerial talents is higher among 
commercially oriented SOCs than among SOCs with entirely different 
                                                 
49 Naturally, the competence of corporate directors is assessed on the basis of several other 
dimensions than their ability to decide on an optimal compensation strategy. That being said, 
the compensation issue is one of the most visible tasks which lies under board authority. 
Therefore, we might safely assume that corporate directors who are motivated by reputational 
concerns would seek to design compensation packages that are in line with predominant 
economic ideas.  
 
  76
conceptions. Moreover, the literature suggests that the corporate objective of 
SOCs is likely to have a significant effect on the use of incentive schemes. 
As regards societal-oriented SOCs, they are generally instructed to balance 
the welfare of many different stakeholders. Obviously, such multi-tasking 
implies that it will be difficult to incorporate incentive schemes in the 
compensation contract, since performance measures are difficult to establish 
and evaluate ex post (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991; Tirole, 2001; Dixit, 
2002; Burgess and Ratto, 2003). In fact, the blurring of political and business 
objectives suggests that the goals of these firms are best promoted through 
flat managerial compensation contracts (Tirole, 2001, pp. 25-26). By 
contrast, the focus of commercially oriented SOCs on a specific task (i.e., 
profit-maximisation) implies that incentive contracts could more easily be 
designed ex ante to align CEOs’ and shareholders’ interests (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997).  
As regard the effect of corporate objective on the adoption of golden 
parachutes, the argument is more complicated. At first glance, we might 
accept the notion that top managers in commercial SOCs incur a higher risk 
related to job security than CEOs in non-commercial SOCs, since corporate 
or managerial failures are more easily verified in the former type of firms (in 
terms of significant reductions in earnings and/or drops in stock value). If 
attempting to compensate the CEO for the risk of dismissal, the idea is 
therefore that market exposure positively affects the adoption of golden 
parachutes. However, if we recognise that the bare risk of dismissal is not a 
very weighty argument, there might actually be more legitimate reasons for 
adopting golden parachutes among non-commercial SOCs. The argument is 
that the case for CEO dismissal is more difficult to prove for SOCs with 
multiple objectives to fulfil, since managerial performance becomes noisier 
to evaluate when the manager pursues multiple tasks. To avoid spending 
time and money on court trials in the case of CEO dismissal, the board might 
therefore decide to solve this potential problem by adopting golden 
parachutes. In line with this reasoning, I thus expect that SOCs with societal 
interests to be fulfilled are actually more likely to adopt golden parachute 
contracts than SOCs operating under market conditions, which also suggests 
that the absence of ‘focus’ on a specific task is costly (Tirole, 2001). Based 
on the preceding arguments, we have the following set of hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: The level of CEO compensation is higher among 
commercial SOCs than among non-commercial SOCs. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Incentive schemes are more likely used among 
commercial SOCs than among non-commercial SOCs. 
 
Hypothesis 3c: Golden parachutes are less likely adopted among 
commercial SOCs than among non-commercial SOCs. 
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Importantly, some of the above arguments are considered to be even stronger 
among those commercially oriented SOCs which are publicly traded. In 
general, stock market listing leads to increased attention from the capital 
market, which may trigger a homogenisation of CEO pay in line with 
industry tendencies as information on executive compensation becomes 
more transparent. More precisely, increased transparency may put upward 
pressure on the level of CEO compensation, which leads to the expectation 
that, in order for SOCs to attract high-quality CEOs, they need to pay top 
managers in listed SOCs higher levels of compensation than CEOs in non-
listed SOCs. Also, the stock market promotes reliance on share prices and 
shareholder return as bases for performance-based pay systems, which 
suggests that incentive schemes are more likely to be used among listed 
SOCs than among non-listed ones. Finally, as regards the adoption of golden 
parachutes, stock market listing certainly strengthens the possibility for such 
adoption in that publicly traded firms are exposed to the threat of takeovers. 
However, this argument hinges on whether we are willing to perceive the 
takeover threat as realistic in the case of state ownership – which in many 
cases is most unlikely, since politicians have agreed to the notion that state 
shareholdings should be rather persistent. Nevertheless, as stock liquidity 
rises with stock market listing, the implication is (at least in principle) that 
publicly traded SOCs run the risk of being divested to hostile bidders, which 
suggests that golden parachutes are more likely adopted among listed SOCs 
than among non-listed SOCs. Our next set of hypotheses therefore state that: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: The level of CEO compensation is higher among 
listed SOCs than among non-listed SOCs. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: Incentive schemes are more likely used among listed 
SOCs than among non-listed SOCs. 
 
Hypothesis 4c: Golden parachutes are more likely adopted among 
listed SOCs than among non-listed SOCs. 
 
In the literature, firm size is cited as another key economic determinant of 
CEO compensation contracts. The presumption of a positive correlation 
between firm size and executive pay may be explained by the observation 
that, in large firms, CEOs tend to have a larger span-of-control (Blau, 1970) 
and more resources to oversee (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989) than in 
small firms.50 However, while firm size is likely to have a positive impact on 
the level of CEO pay, size might actually suppress the use of incentive 
                                                 
50 Additionally, large firms are normally financially capable of paying their CEOs more than 
small firms. 
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schemes. The reason is that large firms normally perform several tasks, 
among which outputs are observable with different degrees of precision 
(Williamson, 1985). When considering these tasks together, giving a more 
powerful incentive to one task might draw effort away from other tasks; 
therefore the existence of several tasks pulls down the power of incentives 
for all tasks (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991; Dixit, 1997). Moreover, firm 
size is also likely to repress the adoption of golden parachutes. The argument 
is that large firms are considered to be less likely takeover targets than small 
ones, since their size make them more expensive to acquire (Cochran et al., 
1985; Knoeber, 1986; Wade et al., 1990). Our fifth set of hypotheses thus 
suggests that: 
 
Hypothesis 5a: There is a positive relationship between firm size 
and the level of CEO compensation.  
 
Hypothesis 5b: There is a negative relationship between firm size 
and the use of incentive schemes.  
 
Hypothesis 5b: There is a negative relationship between firm size 
and the adoption of golden parachutes. 
 
Finally, while I have already discussed how the prices to attract managerial 
talents differ mainly as a function of corporate objective and stock market 
listing, it seems plausible that the demand for competent CEOs might also 
enforce SOC boards to reward top managers based on their previous 
occupations.51 More precisely, I expect this will the case for CEOs who are 
recruited from the private sector, because of the historically large wage 
differentials between the private and public sector. Thus, all else equal, the 
entry price of private sector executives is presumably higher than that of 
their public sector counterparts and of those executives who are internally 
recruited. Hypothesis 6 therefore suggests that: 
 
Hypothesis 6: The level of CEO compensation is higher among 
SOCs which have recruited their CEOs from the private sector than 
among SOCs which have recruited their CEOs from the public 
sector or from within the firm.  
                                                 
51 Prior research has demonstrated that other human capital investments, like education level 
and job tenure, have little explanatory power for CEO compensation (Core et al., 1999). 
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4.2.4 Moderating effects 
The above arguments suggest that political influences are channelled through 
the state ownership structure and via board appointments.52 Yet, it might also 
be the case that these factors work in more subtle ways than to have a direct 
impact on CEO compensation contracts. To elaborate on this issue, we have 
already established that non-political (private sector employees) directors are 
more likely than political representatives (public sector employees) to care 
about their reputation, which means they would pay attention to economic 
criteria when designing CEO compensation contracts. Also, we note from 
the above discussion that, even those corporate directors who care about 
their re-election prospects might be inclined to defy political interests, if they 
serve on boards in firms under partial state control. In fact, they might 
attempt to decide on compensation packages that are closely in line with 
economic criteria, since that is likely what (private) co-investors prefer. 
Therefore, in those SOCs which the state holds partial control, corporate 
directors’ concern for their current positions might lead to almost the same 
governance decisions than if corporate directors were concerned about their 
reputation.  
The upshot of this is that the importance of economic criteria would 
differ as a function of both the chairmen’s professional background and state 
control. To reveal such patterns, I conduct sub-sample analysis to test first, 
whether non-political corporate directors (private sector employees) stress 
the importance of economic criteria and, conversely, whether political 
(public sector) representation on SOC boards strengthens political influences 
on CEO compensation design in terms of repressing the role of economic 
factors. Second, and related, I will test whether partial state control indicates 
a strong focus on economic criteria and, contrary, whether full state control 
provides little role for economic reasoning. More precisely, the latter case 
suggests that corporate directors seek to suppress contractual differences 
between SOCs in an attempt not to provoke the government-owner. 
                                                 
52 Apparently, though, this leaves us with the following puzzle: Why would politicians who 
are concerned about their reputation appoint non-politicians (private sector employees) to the 
SOC boards, if they risk that such corporate directors would not pay sufficient attention to the 
interest of the government-owner? To answer this question, we recall the assumption that 
politicians who are concerned with their reputation would strictly emphasise the competence 
requirements of particular SOCs. This also implies that politicians need to consider the simple 
fact that the board performs several important functions other than making decisions about the 
CEO compensation package, including major investment and strategy decisions. Since 
politicians presumably think that non-politicians (private sector employees) are better 
qualified than political representatives to perform these functions (at least) in some types of 
SOCs (including commercially oriented and listed SOCs), they opt for the former – while at 
the same time urging corporate directors to keep an eye on government-owner’s concern for 
the economy as a whole. In a similar vein, right-wing politicians who prefer less political 
control with SOC boards will urge the boards to consider a cautious approach in the design of 
CEO compensation contracts.   
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Importantly, such analysis also makes it possible to discriminate among 
motivational concerns, since state control should not be considered a 
moderating factor in the case where corporate directors solely care about 
their reputation, but only if they were concerned about their chances of being 
re-elected.  
 
4.2.5 Managerial influences on executive compensation contracts 
So far, I have traced the level and structure of CEO compensation contracts 
to economic determinants and to the strength of political influences. 
However, the literature on CEO compensation also stresses the scope for 
managerial influences on the pay setting process (see, for example, Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2003). If we stick to the notion of top managers as being selfish, 
this leads us to expect that CEOs attempt to put upward pressures on pay 
levels and management perquisites. In particular, the literature on executive 
compensation suggests that CEOs will normally prefer to receive high levels 
of fixed salary and to face weak links between pay and performance, since 
such compensation packages reduce executives’ risk exposure (Barkema and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998). This notion rests, however, on the assumption that the 
incentive pay component fully substitutes for non-contingent compensation 
(fixed salary). But, to the extent that incentive pay is only marginally 
substituted for fixed salary, there are mostly beneficial effects related to the 
use of incentive schemes. In view of this possibility, I abstain from making 
predictions about CEOs’ preferences about incentive schemes, focusing 
instead on the total compensation level and the adoption of golden 
parachutes.  
One of the factors most frequently included in prior research is board 
size. The argument is that the complexity in decision-making processes 
increases with board size, which suggests that large boards are less likely 
than small boards to function effectively (Pfeffer, 1973; Jensen, 1993; 
Yermack, 1996). In support of this view, CEOs have been found to be more 
successful in influencing executive pay in firms with large boards than in 
firms with small boards (see, for example, Greve, 1997; Randøy and 
Nielsen, 2002).53 Therefore, hypotheses 7a and 7b state that: 
 
Hypothesis 7a: There is a positive relationship between board size 
and the level of CEO compensation.  
 
                                                 
53 On the other hand, we note that prior research also carries a different interpretation of the 
impact of board size. The argument is that in firms with large boards, CEOs would have 
greater difficulty in influencing all board members to agree on critical decisions than they 
would in firms with small boards (Singh and Harianto, 1989).  
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Hypothesis 7b: There is a positive relationship between board size 
and the adoption of golden parachutes. 
 
To facilitate the decision-making process of the board, firms frequently tend 
to establish compensation committees (Singh and Harianto 1989) – a trend 
which is also observed for SOCs. The task of such board committees, which 
normally consist largely of outside members of the board, is to develop 
proposals for the design of CEO compensation packages (Barkema and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Although the proposals have to be approved by the full 
board, the presence of compensation committees is thus predicted to increase 
board control at the expense of manager influence. Accordingly, hypotheses 
8a and 8b suggest that: 
 
Hypothesis 8a: There is a negative relationship between the 
presence of compensation committees and the level of CEO 
compensation.  
 
Hypothesis 8b: There is a negative relationship between the 
presence of compensation committees and the adoption of golden 
parachutes.  
 
Besides the importance of board characteristics, the balance of power 
between the board and the CEO is often described in terms of managerial 
tenure. The argument is that the top manager’s time in office increases his or 
her bargaining position vis-à-vis the board as the CEO has an opportunity to 
accumulate a track record and to establish initiatives which may be seen to 
require the executive’s continued service (Hambrick and Finkelstein 1995). 
Thus, with the passage of time, CEOs are hypothesised to influence boards’ 
decisions in line with their preferences. The arguments are summarised in 
hypotheses 9a and 9b:  
 
Hypothesis 9a: There is a positive relationship between CEO tenure 
and the level of CEO compensation.  
 
Hypothesis 9b: There is a positive relationship between CEO tenure 
and the adoption of golden parachutes. 
 
Finally, we should consider the option that corporate directors themselves 
might indirectly obtain pecuniary benefits from granting ‘CEO-friendly’ 
compensation packages. This is particularly the case when chairmen hold a 
CEO position. The general argument is that other firms’ CEOs are expected 
to be bad monitors because they have the same role in the principal-agent 
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setting as the CEO they are supposed to monitor (Gilson and Kraakman, 
1991). More specifically, it may be that a social comparison process is 
operating, with the focal CEO’s compensation being determined, in part, 
through a comparison process by the chairman (O’Reilly et al., 1988). For 
instance, the top manager in a firm who is the chairman on another firm’s 
board might put upward pressure on the level of executive pay as he or she 
expects there to be a mimetic effect of these pay rises across firms (Hallock, 
1997). Thus, hypotheses 10a and 10b suggest that: 
 
Hypothesis 10a: The level of CEO compensation is higher among 
SOCs chaired by a CEO than among SOCs chaired by a non-CEO. 
 
Hypothesis 10b: Golden parachutes are more likely adopted among 
SOCs chaired by a CEO than among SOCs chaired by a non-CEO.  
 
4.2.6 How do nation-specific characteristics affect CEO compensation? 
Generally, it seems reasonable to expect that national differences in board 
composition may influence on the level and structure of CEO compensation 
contracts. Particularly, the fact that Swedish politicians and state bureaucrats 
are allowed to serve on the SOC boards indicate they have hands-on 
influence on the design of executive pay. To investigate this issue, I will run 
a nationality sub-sample analysis to explore if political representation (public 
sector employees) on the board has a stronger impact among Swedish SOCs 
than among Norwegian SOCs. Additionally, I expect that incentive schemes 
will be less frequently employed among Swedish SOCs than among their 
Norwegian counterparts from 2003 onwards, due to the Swedish 
government-owner’s proposal to avoid performance-based pay components 
directed at the CEO. 
 
 
4.3 Dividend Payments 
Yet another means for shareholders to discipline corporate managers is to 
extract money (dividends) from the firm. The argument is that unless profits 
are extracted from the firm, they might be diverted by corporate managers 
for personal use or committed to unprofitable projects that provide private 
benefits (see, for example, Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; 
La Porta et al., 2000). Additionally, high dividend payments force firms to 
go to the capital markets, which mean they incur the monitoring of external 
capital providers (Jensen, 1986). For these reasons, dividend payments are 
seen as a viable governance mechanism to reduce any conflicts of interests 
between shareholders and self-seeking managers.  
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Clearly, the dividend argument is equally valid in the case of state 
ownership. Although SOCs often pursue a variety of objectives other than 
profit maximisation alone, they might potentially generate large profits. Like 
private shareholders, government-owners therefore need to decide upon 
whether or not they should force SOCs to disgorge their earnings. Since 
there might be significant values at stake, the dividend decision is a non-
trivial issue.54 Therefore, it seems surprising that SOC dividends have been 
left almost unexplored in previous research insofar as “no strong theoretical 
or political arguments concerning expected dividend payments [from SOCs] 
have been put forward” (Megginson et al., 1994, p. 421).  
One possible reason why the dividend issue has received little 
attention is that it has been viewed as only of secondary interest to most 
government-owners. For instance, this might be the case if viewing SOCs as 
being tools for the distribution of existing wealth. Accordingly, SOCs are 
seen as investment vehicles through which to channel cash rather than as 
financial assets expected to generate a monetary return (Megginson et al., 
1994). From this view, we might expect that politicians are inclined to let 
SOCs keep their earnings. Such reasoning is reinforced by the fact that fully 
state-owned firms cannot turn to the capital market to float new securities, 
which means that politicians might have to compensate for any high 
dividend payments today by making additional grants to the same firms in 
the nearby future (if holding the debt-level fixed). In support of these claims, 
empirical research has documented significant increases in dividend 
payments after privatisation (Megginson et al., 1994; Boubakri and Cosset, 
1998; D’Souza et al., 2000). However, we might also interpret these findings 
quite differently. In fact, rather than explaining dividend increases following 
government sell-outs in terms that politicians having a weaker preference for 
dividends than do private shareholders, such increases can be seen as an 
attempt to send signals about the earning prospects of privatised SOCs.55  
Yet, public sector developments in the area of corporate governance 
challenge the notion that politicians are inattentive to dividend payments. 
Instead, some government-owners have embarked on extremely deliberate 
dividend policies. For instance, in Sweden, the government-owner publicly 
announces its dividend policies for all SOCs and reports the actual dividend 
payments. Moreover, government-owners often derive dividend policies as 
                                                 
54 In Norway, listed companies in which the state holds a dominant ownership stake generated 
a total annual profit of 69 000 NOK millions for the year 2005, whereas the largest company 
under full state control made an annual profit of nearly 6 000 million NOK (1 NOK = 7.97 
EUR and 6.73 US$). Source: The State’s Ownership Report 2005.  
 
55 This argument is derived from the dividend-as-signal theory due to Bhattacharya (1979). 
See also, amongst others, Kose and Williams (1985); Miller and Rock (1985); Ambarish et al. 
(1987).  
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part of a broader discussion on the financing instruments of SOCs. There are 
thus clear indications that politicians take an active stance on the dividend 
issue – although we know little about the factual political motivation for 
extracting SOC dividends.  
In a similar manner to that of CEO compensation, there is need for 
improved knowledge about the channels through which politicians might 
affect dividend payments. While the dividend decision is normally the 
responsibility of the board of directors, shareholders can exert some 
influence on this issue by virtue of their right to decide on a lower dividend 
than the board proposes. But there is also the interesting case that, in 
Norway, the government-owner is not legally bound by the board’s dividend 
proposal. In any case, we need to discuss how politicians’ preferences about 
dividend payments hinge on their motivational concerns and how political 
influences interact with the motivation of corporate directors. Also, we need 
to consider the effects of nation-specific characteristics on dividends.  
 
4.3.1 Do politicians prefer dividends over retained earnings? 
Should we expect politicians to have a preference for dividends over retained 
earnings? To answer this question, we first look at the dividend preferences 
of politicians who are concerned about reputation-building. In general, it is 
expected that such politicians consider the disciplinary effects of dividend 
payments. In the attempt to control self-serving managers, politicians would 
thus prefer that earnings are paid out as dividends, which also oblige SOCs 
to go the capital markets for financial support. But, in their efforts to do what 
is right for the firm, politicians would also emphasise other criteria (recalling 
from Chapter 3, such criteria might include SOCs’ growth opportunities and 
developments in rate of return), which might perhaps modify the request for 
dividend payments. In the literature attention has been directed particularly 
to firms’ growth opportunities and capital structure. With regard to growth 
opportunities, the argument is that dividend payment ratios would be lower 
in firms with good growth prospects, since shareholders are normally willing 
to wait for a firm’s investments to pay off (Ambarish et al., 1987; La Porta et 
al., 2000). Such behaviour would also benefit the long-term public interest, 
since firms with good growth prospects might be capable of paying higher 
dividends in the future than today. As to the capital structure, the idea is that 
shareholders might use a high debt ratio as a substitute control mechanism to 
dividend payments, since highly-leveraged firms are normally more closely 
monitored than all-equity firms (Short, 1994).  
That being said, there are weighty reasons why reputation-building 
politicians might actually prefer SOCs to retain some more of their earnings 
than is prescribed on standard economic grounds. To understand why, we 
note that in those cases which the government is the single owner of SOCs, 
the state is also the single provider of capital to the firm (if holding the debt-
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level fixed). Unfortunately, though, the reliance on state funding carries the 
implication that capital infusions are likely to become highly unpredictable 
(Johnsen, 2004). This might be due to the long-term process of raising state 
capital through budgetary procedures and/or the fact that SOCs’ request for 
additional capital have to compete with other spending areas.56 In any case, 
SOCs run the risk that profitable investment opportunities are lost. Thus, we 
might expect that even politicians who seek to appear competent will prefer 
lower dividend payment ratios than would have been claimed by the average 
investor. 
Assuming instead that politicians care about keeping their positions, 
we need to ask whether the government-owner can use dividends to attract 
or hold on to voters’ loyalty. One answer to this question would be as 
follows: Since the voters have no cash flow rights, we cannot expect the 
average citizen to have any special preference for dividends. Still, it might 
be the case that some interest groups (SOC employees and their trade 
unions) prefer less dividends if they can benefit from the retained earnings; 
for instance, in terms of the firm being financially capable of avoiding 
dismissals or salary cuts. To please these interest groups, the government-
owner may thus agree on low dividend payment ratios from SOCs. More 
generally, politicians might seek to refrain from dividend payments so as to 
make SOCs financially capable of implementing whichever government 
policy that might benefit the electorate (e.g., to cut prices, improve upon 
service quality, and keep employment up). The problem is, however, that 
politicians might not believe that SOC managers will pay sufficient attention 
to such political interests. Instead, politicians worry that corporate managers 
might spend the retained earnings to pursue their own interests at 
government-owner’s expense (e.g., expansion of businesses abroad rather 
than in the domestic market). In fact, this leads back to the very reason why 
corporate managers need to be financially disciplined in the first place. 
The above arguments thus suggest that politicians who seek to stay 
in office might in fact have little to gain from low dividend payment ratios. 
But, can they possibly benefit more – in terms of voter support – by 
extracting high dividends from SOCs? Obviously, this might be the case if 
politicians think that dividend payments suffice to convince citizens that the 
SOCs are performing well (Gugler, 2003). Though, it seems even more 
important that politicians might use dividend payments to invest in voter 
welfare. This argument makes even more sense when recognising that 
politicians act under short-run political pressure, which suggests that they 
                                                 
56 We should also note that the reliance on state funding might carry the equally severe 
implication that a financially healthy state might provide SOCs with capital on terms that 
barely would have been acceptable to a private investor (provided that the Parliament keeps in 
line with the market investor principle). 
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need liquidity to spend on ‘voter-friendly’ purposes which yield immediate 
benefits. Accordingly, politicians will not be willing to wait for retained 
earnings to materialise as future dividends. In addition, we should note that 
politicians’ preference for liquidity can actually only be met by high 
dividend payments, which is due to the fact that the state is constrained in its 
exit options. The only short-term opportunity of getting a return on 
investments is thus for politicians to extract high dividends from SOCs 
(Gjesdal and Johnsen, 1995). While such dividend practices might not be 
efficient from a finance-based point of view (because it implies that 
politicians are willing to forego future capital gains), it is a valid argument 
for politicians who otherwise cannot meet their need for money by selling a 
proportion of their ownership portfolios. Given this, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that politicians who care about voter popularity will not be 
indifferent between liquid funds and retained earnings.57  
Finally, we ask what happens to the dividend payment decision if 
politicians pursue ideological goals. Sticking to the general assumption that 
left-wing governments prefer more spending than right-wing governments 
(Persson and Svensson, 1989), this leads to the expectation that left-wing 
politicians would prefer higher dividends than right-wing politicians. This 
argument is refined by saying that leftist politicians prefer more government 
spending because they are more concerned with unemployment and growth 
and relatively less concerned with inflation, while the opposite holds for 
politicians at the right (Hibbs, 1977; Alesina et al., 1999). However, there is 
also an alternative view of the impact of political ideology, which offers the 
opposite prediction of dividend payments. The argument is that since left-
wing governments favour employees over shareholders, and lower dividends 
might benefit the former, leftist politicians will have a bias against dividends 
(Bank et al., 2004; see also Roe, 2003). Although we have already raised the 
objection that retained earnings are not automatically transformed into 
employee welfare (due to conflicts with the private interests of corporate 
managers), it seems yet reasonable that the partisan profile of left-wing 
governments may equally well support the idea of low dividend payments. 
Thus, we leave as an open question whether left-wing or right-wing 
governments should be associated with the largest dividend payments.  
Taken together, the above discussion suggests that politicians are 
likely to have strong opinions on the issue of dividend payments, although 
some implications are open-ended. Certainly, in Norway, politics directly 
affects dividend payments as the government-owner has the right to set the 
dividends for fully state-owned firms. More generally, we expect that 
                                                 
57 Anecdotal evidence supports the notion that politicians may use the dividend to balance the 
state budget, paying no heed to the written dividend policy. In Norway, the Parliament has on 
a number of occasions raised dividend payments contrary to the recommendations of the 
corporate boards.  
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politicians might affect the dividend decision by way of their sheer 
ownership stake and via the board of directors. To explore these issues, I 
start by looking at the case in which both politicians and corporate directors 
care about their reputation for being competent, and therefore seek to decide 
on dividend payments in line with economic criteria. Thereafter, I discuss 
what happens to dividend payments in the case which both politicians and 
corporate directors care about their re-election prospects. Since there is 
theoretical ambiguity on the issue of political ideology, I abstain from 
making any à priori hypotheses about the effect of government party on 
dividends. Additionally, I look at some moderating effects which relate to 
interactions between different governance models. 
 
4.3.2 Politicians and corporate directors care about their reputation 
What if both politicians and corporate directors seek to act as competent 
representatives of shareholder welfare? As already noted, this concern would 
basically lead them to extract enough dividends so as to discipline corporate 
managers. However, we cannot simply interpret this control argument in 
terms that politicians and corporate directors want the SOCs to give up their 
entire profit. Instead, they are likely to stress both the growth opportunities 
and capital structure of SOCs (amongst other factors) when deciding on the 
appropriate level of dividend payments. Since the government-owner should 
be particularly prone to consider its investments in a long-term perspective, 
the implication is that politicians and corporate directors who care about the 
firm’s best interest would be willing to wait for shareholder investments to 
materialise in terms of future dividends. Accordingly, we might expect that 
firms with good growth opportunities, and thereby high profit and dividend 
prospects, will experience lower dividend payment ratios than low-growth 
firms. Our first hypothesis thus suggests that:    
 
Hypothesis 1: The dividend payment ratios are higher among SOCs 
with poor growth opportunities than among SOCs with good growth 
opportunities.  
 
The capital structure of SOCs represents another factor which is likely to 
modify the request for dividend payments, since debt is a potential substitute 
control mechanism to dividends. More precisely, higher leverage increases 
monitoring by the capital markets as debtholders seek to ensure themselves 
of getting a return on their investments, which, in turn, makes dividend 
payments less needed. In practice, therefore, debt and dividends are seen as 
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two related aspects of financial policy decisions.58 Our next hypothesis 
makes this notion explicit as it states the effect on dividend payments for any 
given level of debt:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The dividend payment ratios are higher among SOCs 
with a low debt ratio than among SOCs with a high debt ratio.  
 
Finally, we should expect that the corporate objective of SOCs indicate their 
main financial concern. More precisely, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
the nature of activity of non-commercial SOCs implies that politicians’ 
interests in such firms are not primarily tied to financial issues. Another 
reason relates to the fact that firms which are set up to fulfil societal goals 
often have close financial ties to the government-owner – in terms of 
receiving grants over the state budget or being instructed to offer their 
services at some politically determined price levels. Since this might reflect 
concerns for distributional fairness and service quality rather than profit-
maximisation, we should expect the dividend payment ratios would be lower 
among non-commercial SOCs than among profit-oriented SOCs. Thus, all 
else equal, hypothesis 3 states that:  
 
Hypothesis 3: The dividend payment ratios are higher among 
commercial SOCs than among non-commercial SOCs.  
 
4.3.3 Political influences on dividend payments 
Now, assume instead that both politicians and corporate directors care about 
their re-election prospects. In general, this means that the government-owner 
would use dividends to attract voter support – and corporate directors would 
loyally pursue the shareholder interests. More specifically, it is expected that 
politicians will use SOCs as financial drains, because they want to reallocate 
profits from SOCs to other policy areas. Thus, dividend payments are seen 
as an instrumental tool for politicians to fulfil their electoral promises and, 
thereby, balance the state budget. However, the government-owner might 
not find it wanted to extract high dividends from all SOCs. Instead, we might 
expect that politicians would like to see higher dividend ratios among SOCs 
that generate large amounts of cash (e.g., in terms of absolute income value) 
than among low-income SOCs, since this implies that politicians can spend 
                                                 
58 In fact, debt and dividends can also be seen as simultaneously determined (Jensen et al., 
1992). Thus, just as we expect that firms’ debt ratio contributes to explaining how much 
dividends are extracted, high dividend payments might enforce capital market lending by 
SOCs. Also, there is the problem that, if access to external finance is very costly, firms might 
choose a lower debt ratio and use high dividend payments to substitute for capital market 
control.  
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more money on highly visible welfare purposes. Hypothesis 4 therefore 
states the effect of income level on dividend payments: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The dividend payment ratios are higher among high-
income SOCs than among low-income SOCs.  
 
To evaluate the scope for political influence, we assume once again that the 
state ownership structure and the board of directors represent the major 
channels through which politicians are likely to have their interests fulfilled. 
Moreover, we continue to explore their effects separately, even though the 
two aspects might be related. As regards the effect of state control on 
dividend payments, the expectation is that the government-owner and co-
investors have different views upon the dividend decision. While we believe 
that politicians generally prefer higher dividend payments ratios to lower 
ones, co-investors are likely to prefer a dividend profile in line with the 
reputation model described above. As the latter criteria presumably bring 
about more flexible dividend payments than is sought by liquidity-preferring 
politicians, this suggests that state control is an important determinant of 
dividend payments. Clearly, this argument holds irrespective of whether the 
dividend payments are set by politicians themselves or by corporate directors 
– provided that both are motivated by their re-election prospects. Following 
the notion that political influences are probably weaker in firms under partial 
state control, hypothesis 5 thus proposes that: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The dividend payment ratios are higher among fully 
state-owned firms than among firms under partial state control.  
 
Apart from exercising influences on dividend decisions by way of their 
ownership stakes, shareholders might also force SOCs to disgorge cash by 
voting for corporate directors who offer beneficial dividend payments (La 
Porta et al., 2000). Accordingly, the government-owner might use its power 
to appoint chairmen who are likely to offer high dividends. In brief, I suggest 
that politically experienced directors would be more attentive to political 
signals about dividend payments than non-political directors, since political 
representatives are presumably most concerned about their re-election 
prospects. By contrast, non-political directors are more likely to care about 
their reputation, which means they would decide on a level of dividend 
payment which is perceived right for the firm. Additionally, we might expect 
that corporate directors who are employed in the public sector would be 
more inclined to please the government-owner than is the case for private 
sector employees. Therefore, hypothesis 6 states that:   
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Hypothesis 6: The dividend payment ratios are higher among SOCs 
chaired by political representatives (public sector employees) than 
among SOCs chaired by non-politicians (private sector employees).  
 
Finally, it seems reasonable to expect that the scope for political influences 
on dividend payments vary according to which is the sponsor ministry of the 
SOCs. Following the notion that the ownership ministry is probably a more 
professional administrator of SOCs than are sectoral ministries, we might 
expect that the former puts pressure on the minister to abide with economic 
criteria in the dividend setting process. By contrast, sectoral ministries are 
less likely to defy political pressure to raise dividend payments, since they 
are probably less experienced with financial policy issues. Everything else 
equal, Hypothesis 7 thus proposes that:  
 
Hypothesis 7: The dividend payment ratios are lower among SOCs 
which are administered by the ownership ministry than in those 
SOCs administered by other sponsor ministries.  
 
4.3.4 Moderating effects 
Yet, like in our prior discussions, we should recognise that there might be 
more complex relationships between the independent variables under 
different governance models. To explain why, we first look at the case in 
which both politicians and corporate directors care about their reputation, 
and thereby consider firms’ growth opportunities (amongst other factors) 
when deciding on dividend payments. Because we might assume that non-
governmental shareholders would agree to such decision-making, there are 
presumably no conflicts of interests between the government-owner and 
potential co-investors on the dividend issue. However, we have also noted 
that the effect of firms’ growth opportunities (when controlling for the debt-
level) might differ as a function of state control. That is, the need to account 
for the growth opportunities of fully state-owned firms is exacerbated by the 
fact that Parliamentary decisions about capital contributions are long-term 
processes, which might have severe implications for the investment decision. 
To ease SOCs’ demand for additional capital, politicians might therefore 
prefer fully state-owned firms to retain some more of their earnings than is 
rational from a finance-based position. To evaluate this proposition, I will 
run sub-sample analysis to test whether the relationship between growth 
opportunities and dividend payment ratios are even more strongly negative 
among firms under full state control than among partly state-owned firms.  
In addition, I would like to test the notion that, under the re-election 
model, the importance of economic criteria might differ as a function of both 
state control and the professional background of chairmen corporate 
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directors. The state control argument is that corporate directors who seek to 
become re-elected would also be attentive to the dividend preferences of co-
investors in firms with less than full state control. For this purpose, I conduct 
sub-sample analysis to test whether partial state control indicates a strong 
focus on economic criteria. By contrast, full state control should not provide 
any role for these criteria, only that of the SOC income level. Again, such 
analysis also makes it possible to discriminate among motivational concerns, 
since state control should not be considered a moderating factor in the case 
which corporate directors solely care about their reputation, but only if they 
were concerned about their chances of being re-elected. Moreover, I will test 
whether non-political corporate directors (private sector employees) stress 
the importance of economic determinants, whereas political (public sector) 
representatives are likely to pay more attention to the SOC income level.  
 
4.3.5 How do nation-specific characteristics affect dividends? 
To further explore the moderating effect of state control on dividend 
payments under the reputation model, we should also take into consideration 
that company legislation differs between Norway and Sweden on the issue of 
political intervention. In Norway, politicians might directly affects dividend 
payments as the government-owner (or, in fact, the Parliament majority) has 
the right to set the dividends for fully state-owned firms. By contrast, in 
Sweden, the board of directors set the dividends for all SOCs. In seeking to 
understand the effects of these institutional differences on dividend 
payments, we draw on the argument that legally protected shareholders are 
willing to accept low dividend payments today in exchange for high 
reinvestment rates in future periods (La Porta et al., 2000). Following this 
notion, it seems reasonable to expect that the scope for political interference 
might actually have a positive effect on government-owners’ willingness to 
wait for their dividends when growth prospects are good. In other words, 
Norwegian politicians should be more willing to wait for future dividends 
than Swedish politicians, because the former can be sure of extracting future 
dividends as soon as the earnings materialise in fully state-owned 
companies. By contrast, Swedish politicians need to rely on the SOC board 
of directors to get their dividends. As a result, with good shareholder 
protection, we might test the proposition that high-growth Norwegian firms 
under full state control should have lower dividend payment ratios than their 
Swedish counterparts.   
Interestingly, the situation is reversed if we assume that politicians 
care about re-election or ideology instead of their reputation. In these cases, 
politicians might seek to exploit their legal protection by getting what they 
want immediately, regardless of any economic criteria. Thus, the proposition 
is now that Norwegian politicians would use their intervention rights to 
pursue a more aggressive dividend profile for fully state-owned firms than 
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what is possible to do for Swedish politicians. Overall, therefore, nation-
specific arrangements might result in very different dividend profiles 
depending on the motivation of politicians. 
 
4.3.6 Final remarks 
In a similar manner to that of other governance decisions, we should note the 
possibility that corporate managers may succeed in influencing dividend 
payments. In particular, this might be the case if SOC managers, when 
experiencing that most of the firm’s earnings are extracted by shareholders, 
take actions to avoid this from happening in the future. To this end, they may 
engage in activities that decrease profits; for instance, by committing the 
firm to less profitable projects than would otherwise be seen as economically 
rational. But also, corporate managers may engage in income and dividend 
smoothing, which means they seek to manipulate the time profile of earnings 
to make the reported income stream (and thereby also the dividend stream) 
less variable (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995; Gugler, 2003). In any case, such 
strategic behaviour suggests that managerial influence might severely affect 
the amount of dividend paid. However, it might also affect the dividend 
payment ratio, since any attempt to manipulate income might also have an 
effect on accounting-based figures, such as the firm’s growth opportunities. 
Consequently, some independent variables might suffer from an accounting 
bias. While recognising this limitation of the study, we also note that this 
issue is not easily resolved as it is highly unlikely that firms would be 
willing to divulge information about this kind of strategic behaviour by 
corporate managers. 
Finally, we should note that tax issues are normally an integrated 
part of dividend discussions, since shareholders’ preferences for dividends 
over retained earnings might certainly depend on whether dividend payments 
are taxed more heavily than capital gains (see, for example, La Porta et al., 
2000). The reasons why tax issues are not included here relate primarily to 
the facts that both taxes and SOC dividends are at the hands of the state, and 
that the very low liquidity of SOC shares makes capital gains less attainable.  
 
 
4.4. Summary 
By combining theoretical and practical insights on the subject matter, the 
broad aim of this chapter has been to show that governance decisions are 
likely to be shaped in the intersection between motivational concerns, 
institutional aspects, and firm characteristics. Moreover, I have sought to 
transform some more general arguments within the field of state ownership 
and corporate governance into a set of specific hypotheses about what kinds 
of governance decisions will be made by politicians and corporate directors 
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in the areas of board appointments, CEO compensation contracts, and 
dividend payments. While some might want object that the governance 
models are overly stylistic, the empirical chapters seeks to cope with this 
challenge by exploring some possible interactions between the models.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Data and Methods  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now that we have derived from theory a set of testable predictions about 
governance decisions, this chapter proceeds to present the data and methods 
which are used in the empirical analysis. The key questions that will be dealt 
with are: Why are the two Scandinavian countries of Norway and Sweden 
considered as appropriate testing grounds to examine the topic of state 
ownership and corporate governance? Which sampling approach is used to 
identify the SOCs? How to make operational the three types of governance 
mechanisms and their determinants? Why using panel data and how to 
analyse them? How to deal with the endogeneity problems inherent in the 
governance functions? What models are appropriate in dealing with binary 
dependent variables? In short, the chapter thus revolves around three major 
issues: (i) National context; (ii) sample construction, variable definitions, 
and data collection; (iii) governance functions and econometric methods. 
While the details on the first two issues are spelled out in Sections 5.1 and 
5.2, respectively, the third issue is dealt with in Sections 5.3–5.5. Some final 
comments on the interpretation of statistical results are provided in Section 
5.6. 
 
 
5.1 National Context 
As the empirical analysis includes observations from two different countries, 
we need to ensure that the analysis is not affected by any serious country-
specific ‘noise’. In practice, this means that both the state ownership 
portfolio itself and the administration thereof must be highly comparable. 
But also, a two-country study provides the opportunity to test other 
hypotheses than would have been possible if only using single-country data. 
Therefore, I also look for cross-country variation on some relevant aspects.    
From this perspective, there are several reasons why Norway and 
Sweden represent a rich environment for studying corporate governance. 
First, both countries have fairly extensive and comparable state ownership 
portfolios insofar as the Norwegian and Swedish governments are the single 
or dominant owner in sectors whose performance is of great importance to 
economic and social welfare, such as energy, telecommunications, transport, 
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and banking (OECD, 2005).59 Moreover, co-investments with private 
shareholders have resulted in significant state shareholdings on the national 
stock exchanges. As shareholders in some of the largest firms in the country, 
both the Norwegian and Swedish governments are also major employers of 
national workforce. In short, therefore, there are considerable values at stake 
in terms of Norwegian and Swedish SOCs representing a substantial part of 
gross domestic product, welfare services, market capitalisation, and 
employment (OECD, 2005).  
Second, the alleged failures of corporate governance under both state 
and private ownership have led both Norwegian and Swedish governments 
to focus more systematically on how to improve their ownership function. 
Above, we have seen that such corporate governance reforms include the 
establishment of national guidelines for ‘good corporate governance’ and the 
reassignment of state ownership rights from sectoral ministries to a more 
professional ownership ministry. While a binding commitment to corporate 
governance principles may help to increase politicians’ credibility on 
ownership matters, one major purpose of bureaucratic specialisation in the 
management of state ownership is to ensure compliance with corporate 
governance principles. Other corporate governance reforms have encouraged 
politicians to draw a sharper distinction between commercially and non-
commercially oriented SOCs, and to gradually replace political control with 
private control through a partial privatisation of state ownership rights. A 
clarification of the corporate objective is clearly helpful to the extent that we 
assume different governance decisions are optimal for different types of 
firms. As to the gradual transfer of state ownership rights to private 
investors, this provides in itself an impetus for changes in corporate 
governance, since it is of vital importance that co-investors have confidence 
in governance decisions are being made on efficiency grounds. Which, if 
any, effects can be associated with such governance reforms is the empirical 
question that triggers our attention. 
Third, on the political level, both Norway and Sweden have been 
ruled by Social Democratic governments for several decades in the post-war 
period, which suggests there are strong cultural norms in both countries that 
value equity and fairness (Randøy and Nielsen, 2002). In Sweden, a Social 
Democratic government held power also in the sample period.60 By contrast, 
there were some changes to the Norwegian government position over the six 
year-period covered by this study. While a Social Democratic government 
held position in the period March 2000–September 2001, a bourgeois 
                                                 
59 Recalling from Chapter 3, the major difference between the two countries as regards which 
sectors are represented at the state level concerns the health sector. 
  
60 The Persson-government held power in the period 1996-2006. 
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Coalition government held power in the period October 2001–October 
2005.61 Generally speaking, this suggests that we might test hypotheses 
about the effect of political ideology on corporate governance – by means of 
intra-country comparison as well as cross-country comparison.  
Finally, I have already confirmed there to be some important within- 
and between-country differences as regards the legal regimes and policy 
practices defining government-owners’ right to intervene in governance 
decision-making. Clearly, such institutional variety makes it possible to test, 
and even discriminate among, some of our hypotheses. In sum, therefore, it 
seems that a two-country study including Norwegian and Swedish SOCs will 
enrich our possibility for detecting interesting empirical patterns. 
 
 
5.2 Sample, Variables and Data Sources 
Previously, the availability of information about corporate governance in the 
context of state ownership has been scarce. One major problem, as Cragg 
and Dyck (2003, p. 177) note, has thus been “...assembling information from 
various sources, with no single repository of such information and no 
commercial vendors seeing value in collecting such information”. During the 
past decade, however, the general public in Norway and Sweden has 
experienced higher transparency on state ownership and governance issues. 
Partly, this is due to improved reporting from the governments in terms of 
issuing annual ownership reports. But it is also due to more intensive media 
coverage on corporate governance matters (e.g., CEO compensation levels) 
as well as a more inclusive and consistent reporting of corporate governance 
in the company annual reports. Yet, there are still large differences among 
SOCs as regards what kind of information is disclosed, which means that for 
some SOCs I simply lack the information needed to include them in the 
analysis of particular governance decisions. Additionally, I had to renounce 
on some more fine-grained data about governance decisions, including some 
aspects of board appointments. With this caveat in mind, the thesis gives but 
a fairly comprehensive and rich descriptive account of state ownership and 
corporate governance in Norway and Sweden.  
 
5.2.1 Sampling approach 
The sample consists of every Norwegian and Swedish firm (for which data 
were available) in which the state holds a direct equity fraction over the 
period 2000-2005. The sample period was chosen because prior to year 2000 
                                                 
61 The Stoltenberg I-government replaced the Bondevik I-government in March 2000. 
Following the Parliamentary election in autumn 2001, the Bondevik-II government was 
established in October 2001 (replaced by the Stoltenberg II-government in October 2005).  
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there were too many missing key variables. To construct the database the 
first step was to identify all SOCs which had been in existence during the 
six-year period. To identify Norwegian SOCs government sources were 
used: Ownership reports, White Papers, and annual reports from the Office 
of the Auditor General of Norway (Riksrevisjonen). Swedish SOCs were 
identified from the government offices’ annual ownership reports.62 A 
number of companies were then excluded from this target group: Companies 
in which the state holds only indirect ownership stakes (e.g., SOC 
subsidiaries and companies owned by subordinate ministerial agencies); 
companies for which annual reports not longer were available due to 
mergers, acquisitions or winding up of businesses; companies which share 
administrative resources with another SOC; foreign registered companies; 
companies which have been under state ownership for less than one year; 
companies with irregular reporting routines; companies subject to special 
governance rules (e.g., particular groups are represented on the board or the 
CEO compensation issue is under Parliament authority); companies which 
do not reply upon request or whose annual reports are not longer available; 
and finally, companies for which no public information were available (only 
possible to identify by name). Table 5.1, Panel A summarises the 
construction of the Norwegian and Swedish samples, while Panel B lists the 
sample SOCs by name and corporate objective (commercial versus non-
commercial).63  
                                                 
62 First published by the Swedish government in 1999, the annual reports on state ownership 
include a thorough description of every SOC in Sweden. By contrast, the Norwegian 
government issued its first ownership report in 2003 and includes only a sub-sample of SOCs. 
Therefore, a complete overview of the Norwegian SOC population could only be achieved by 
consulting other official sources.  
 
63 The selection of corporate objective as identification criterion corresponds to the type of 
classification of SOCs that is reported in the governments’ annual ownership reports.  
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Table 5.1. List of state-owned companies in the sample. 
 
NORWAY SWEDEN 
Panel A: Construction of the sample 
 
  121     Number of companies identified from government sources 
-  27      Indirect state ownership  
-  10      Annual reports not longer available due to mergers, acquisitions or  
              winding up of businesses 
-   3       Shared administrative resources with another SOC  
-   1       Foreign registered company 
-   1       The company has been state-owned for less than one year 
-   4       Companies subject to special governance rules 
- 13       Do not reply upon request/annual reports not available 
-   6       No information available about the company 
___ 
56 Basic sample 
Panel A: Construction of the sample 
 
  61       Number of companies identified from government sources 
-  4        Indirect state ownership  
-  5        Annual reports not longer available due to mergers, acquisitions or            
              winding up of businesses 
-  1        Shared administrative resources with another SOC  
-  1        Irregular reporting routines 
-  2        Foreign registered companies 
-  5        Do not reply upon request/annual reports not available 
-  3        No information available about the company 
___ 
  40        Basic sample 
 
 
Panel B: SOCs in the sample 
 
Commercial SOCs  
 
Arcus AS 
Argentum Fondsinvesteringer AS 
Bane Tele AS 
Cermaq ASA 
DNB NOR ASA 
Eksportfinans AS 
Electronic Chart Centre AS 
Entra Eiendom AS 
Flytoget AS 
Grødegaard AS 
Kommunalbanken AS 
Kongsberg Gruppen ASA  
Mesta AS 
 
 
 
Non-commercial SOCs 
 
Akvaforsk AS 
Avinor AS 
Carte Blanche AS 
Den Norske Opera AS 
Enova SF 
Gassco AS 
Industritjeneste AS 
Innovasjon Norge 
Kings Bay AS  
KITH AS 
Nationaltheatret AS 
NORFUND  
Norges Statsbaner AS (NSB) 
 
Panel B: SOCs in the sample 
 
Commercial SOCs  
 
Akademiska Hus AB 
Green Cargo AB 
Imego AB 
Lernia AB 
Luossavaara Kirunavaara AB (LKAB) 
Nordea Bank AB 
OMX AB 
Posten AB 
Rymdbolaget 
SAS AB 
SJ AB 
Specialfastigheter Sverige AB 
Sveriges 
 
 
 
Non-commercial SOCs  
 
ALMI Företagspartner AB 
Apoteket AB 
Göta kanalbolag AB 
IRECO Holding AB 
Kungliga Dramatiska Teatern AB 
(Dramaten)  
Kungliga Operan AB 
Samhall AB 
SIS Miljömärkning AB 
SOS Alarm Sverige AB 
Statens Väg- och Baninvest AB 
Svensk Bilprovning AB 
Svenska Spel AB 
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Nammo AS 
NOAH Holding AS 
Norsk Hydro ASA 
Statkraft SF 
Statoil ASA 
Store Norske Spitsbergen  
Kulkompani AS 
Telenor ASA 
Veterinærmedisinsk oppdragssenter AS 
(VESO) 
Yara International ASA 
Norsk Eiendomsinformasjon AS 
Norsk institutt for fiskeri- og 
havbruksforskning AS 
(Fiskeriforskning) 
Norsk Rikskringkasting AS (NRK) 
Norsk Tipping AS 
NORUT Gruppen AS 
Petoro AS  
Posten Norge AS 
Helse Midt-Norge RHF 
Helse Nord RHF 
Helse Sør RHF 
Helse Vest RHF 
Helse Øst RHF 
Rogaland Teater AS 
Simula Research Laboratory AS 
SIVA SF 
Statnett SF 
Statskog SF 
Stor-Oslo Lokaltrafikk AS (SL) 
UNINETT AS 
A/S Vinmonopolet 
Universitetssenteret på Svalbard AS 
(UNIS)
Bostadsfinansieringsaktiebolag (SBAB) 
Sveaskog AB 
Svensk Exportkredit AB (SEK) 
Svenska Skeppshypotekskassan 
Swedesurvey AB 
TeliaSonera AB 
Teracom AB 
Vasakronan AB 
Vasallen AB 
Vattenfall AB 
Venantius AB 
Vin & Sprit AB (V&S) 
 
Sveriges Provnings- och 
Forskningsinstitut AB (SP) 
Sveriges Rese- och Turistråd AB 
Swedfund International AB 
Systembolaget AB 
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5.2.2 Variable definitions and data sources 
As regards the empirical measures, it goes without saying that they should be 
chosen to correspond as closely as possible to theoretical constructs. 
Moreover, in order to make our findings comparable with those of other 
studies, the measures used should (if possible) be consistent with the ones 
employed in previous research. That being said, I also search for 
opportunities of gaining richer data about state ownership and corporate 
governance beyond what is already known from prior research. In what 
follows, I describe empirical proxies for the variables used in the empirical 
analyses. The dependent variables include different aspects of board 
appointments, CEO compensation contracts, and dividend payments. The 
independent variables comprise various institutional features and firm 
characteristics. Appendix 1 provides an exhaustive summary of the variable 
construction, which also includes definitions of variables that are used only 
for descriptive purposes and background variables from which the final 
variables are constructed.  
 
Dependent variables 
Board appointments. Focusing on who gets selected as the chairman of SOC 
boards, the thesis uses two empirical proxies for the chairman’s professional 
background – broadly corresponding to that of prior research (Grønnegård 
Christensen and Pallesen, 2001). First, to measure whether the chairman is 
perceived as being a political representative, a dummy variable is equal to 
one if the chairman is a current or former Parliamentary and/or government 
representatives, and zero otherwise.64 The second proxy concerns the sector 
affiliation of the chairman at the time of appointment, and a dummy variable 
is set to one if the chairman was employed in the public sector, and to zero 
for the private sector.  
 
CEO compensation contracts. The thesis looks at three different aspects of 
the CEO compensation package, which include the level of total cash 
compensation, the use of incentive schemes, and the adoption of a golden 
parachute. As previously noted, the inclusion of several compensation 
components extends the insights of prior research which has mostly dealt 
with single aspects of CEO pay. To further specify, the level of CEO cash 
compensation for a given year is the sum of fixed salary, miscellaneous 
                                                 
64 Members of the Parliament include Parliamentary deputies, committee and party 
secretaries. Members of the government include ministers, states secretaries, and political 
advisers. 
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benefits, and annual bonuses.65 As to incentive schemes, they refer to 
performance-based (contingent) pay systems which are tied to either short-
term goals (annual bonuses) or long-term goals (stock options and 
shareholdings), or both. To account for the presence of incentive schemes, a 
dummy variable is set to one if the CEO compensation package includes 
performance-based pay components, and to zero otherwise. A golden 
parachute is defined as any contractual agreement that will potentially 
provide the CEO with a payment in the case of dismissal, and which exceeds 
the required notice of termination.66 A dummy variable is set equal to one if 
the CEO is granted a golden parachute, zero otherwise.  
 
Dividend payment ratio. In line with both practice and theory, dividend 
payment ratios are commonly computed as a percentage of annual earnings 
(dividend-to-earnings). However, since the thesis deals with accounting data 
for firms which operate in two different countries and in several different 
industries, I compute some additional sensitivity measures of the dividend 
payment ratio. Following prior research, these measures include dividend-to-
sales and dividend-to-cash-flows from operational activities (La Porta et al., 
2000).  
 
Independent variables 
Time trend. To account for time effects I use a continuous variable ranging 
from 1-6, where the value 1 corresponds to the sample year 2000, and so 
forth (6 = year 2005).  
 
Nationality. Nationality is a dummy variable equal to one for Swedish SOCs 
and to zero for Norwegian SOCs.  
 
Government party. Government party is a dummy variable set to one if the 
governance decision is being made under a right-wing government, and to 
zero if the government is left-wing. 
                                                 
65 Since CEOs in firms under full state control are excluded from taking part in any long-term 
incentive programmes based on share value, the value of shareholdings and stock options is 
not included in the compensation measure. Additionally, the company annual reports in the 
sample rarely provide the kind of specific information which is needed to calculate stock 
option values.  
 
66 Even more precisely, a golden parachute contract is present if the net notice period plus the 
number of months with severance pay is larger than zero. Net notice period is defined as the 
number of months of which the notice period in the event of employer termination exceeds 
that of employee termination. Severance pay refers to the number of months of which 
compensation is paid to the CEO who has his or her employment ‘severed’ and which does 
not include the required notice of termination on any parts.  
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Corporate objective. To indicate the corporate objective pursued by different 
SOCs, they are divided into two groups. One group of firms operate under 
market conditions and requirements (commercial SOCs), while another 
group of firms primarily have special societal interests to fulfil (non-
commercial SOCs).67 Corporate objective is a dummy variable set to one if 
the firm is commercial and to zero if the firm is non-commercial.  
 
Stock market listing. To account for stock market listing I use a dummy 
variable approach to distinguish between partly state-owned firms which are 
listed on the national stock exchange (i.e., publicly traded) versus those non-
listed, with state ownership stake = 100% as the benchmark category.  
 
State control. Three alternative measures of state control are employed. First, 
I use a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is partly owned by the state, 
and to zero if the state is the single owner. Second, I use the equity fraction 
held by the state to specify a linear relationship between state control and 
governance decisions. From a theoretical point of view, however, it seems 
even more interesting to include some measures that identify the relevant 
voting thresholds being specified in the Companies Act. In view of that, I 
extend the non-linear relationship of the dummy variable approach to 
distinguish between those SOCs in which the state holds super-majority (< 
100% and ≥ 66.66%), simple majority (< 66.6% and > 50%), negative 
control (≤ 50% and > 33.33%), or minority posts (≤ 33.33%), with state 
ownership stake = 100% as the benchmark category. The cut-off points thus 
serve to classify SOCs into mutually exclusive categories of state control. 
 
Co-investment characteristics. One aspect of co-investments relates to non-
governmental ownership concentration and two alternative measures are 
employed. First, I use the equity fraction held by the largest co-investor to 
specify a linear functional form between ownership concentration and 
governance decisions.68 Second, I use a dummy variable approach to 
investigate whether co-investor control occurs at a threshold, distinguishing 
                                                 
67 In line with the Swedish government’s reporting on state ownership, companies operating 
under market conditions are characterised by one or both of the following criteria: (1) they 
operate in a fully competitive market, and (2) the owner, the state, makes market requirements 
for earnings and return based on the risk profile. By contrast, companies with special societal 
interests are characterised by one or both of the following criteria: (1) the owner, the state, 
controls the activity in a tangible, direct way, and (2) they operate on a market with special 
conditions. Source: The Swedish Government Offices’ Annual Reports on State-Owned 
Companies for the years 2000-2005. 
 
68 As shown by the descriptive statistics in Chapter 3, it is fairly common that the state share 
its ownership with one investor only. To account for this empirical fact, only the equity 
fraction of the largest co-investor is included in the analysis.  
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between those SOCs in which the largest co-investor holds simple majority 
(< 100% and > 50%) and negative control (≤ 50% and > 33.33%).69 Along 
the lines of previous research, I also include a conventional cut-off point of 
5% (see, for example, Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 
1989; Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995). The last two dummy variables thus 
refer to 5% co-investor control (≤ 33.33% and ≥ 5%) and less than 5% co-
investor control (< 5%). As before, state ownership stake = 100% serves as 
the benchmark category. Another aspect of co-investments relates to the 
identity of co-investors. Once again, I use a dummy variable approach to 
distinguish between those partly state-owned firms in which the largest co-
investor is public versus non-public, with state ownership stake = 100% as 
the benchmark category.  
 
Sponsor ministry. Sponsor ministry is a dummy variable set to one for SOCs 
under the control of the ‘ownership ministry’, and to zero otherwise. In the 
period covered by this study, the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry 
and the Swedish Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications are 
designated the role as ownership ministries.  
 
Debt ratio. Debt ratio is measured by the SOC’s debt to assets, defined as 
the firm’s book value of total liabilities and commitments divided by book 
value of total assets.  
 
Firm size. Because the state ownership portfolio spans several industries and 
includes both commercial and non-commercial companies, this makes it 
difficult to identify a uniform proxy for firm size. For instance, sales revenue 
is considered to be an invalid size-measure for many non-commercial SOCs. 
Validity is sought to be increased by using three alternative measures of firm 
size, including book value of equity, total assets, and number of employees.  
 
Regional presence. Regional presence is a dummy variable set to one if the 
firm employs a regional workforce, and to zero otherwise.  
 
Board size. Board size is measured as the number of corporate directors on 
the board, including employee representatives.  
 
Compensation committee. Compensation committee is a dummy variable set 
to one if the board of directors has appointed a compensation committee, and 
to zero otherwise.  
 
                                                 
69 The super-majority category is not included here as it rarely happens that co-investors are 
so dominant.  
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Chairman is CEO. To measure whether the chairman is a CEO a dummy 
variable equals one if the chairman is the top manager in another firm, zero 
otherwise. 
 
CEO recruitment channel. To identify the recruitment channel a dummy 
variable equals one if the CEO is recruited from the private sector and zero if 
the CEO is recruited from the public sector or from within the firm.  
 
CEO tenure. CEO tenure is measured by the top manager’s number of years 
in position. Moreover, to evaluate the CEO’s influences on the board, I use 
two measures of board independence (Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001; 
Bøhren and Strøm, 2005). One measure uses the tenure of the chairman 
(years in the chairman position) minus the tenure of the CEO. Another 
measure uses the tenure of the chairman (years in rank-and-file position 
included) minus the tenure of the CEO.  
 
Growth opportunities. In line with prior studies, and to increase robustness, 
several proxies are used to capture firms’ growth opportunities, including 
annual real growth rates of sales, earnings, fixed assets, total assets, and total 
cash flow (see, for example, La Porta et al., 2000).  
 
Income level. Income level is measured by the firm’s operating revenue 
(accounting income).  
 
5.2.3 Data adjustments  
At this point, a few questions concerning the measurement of variables still 
remain. First, can all continuous measures be held in raw form? Second, at 
what point in time should the different variables be measured in order to 
establish meaningful relationships between independent and dependent 
variables? As to the first question, it seems obvious that the financial data 
should be adjusted so as to account for year- and country-effects. Thus, all 
accounting figures are expressed in 2005 million NOK and adjusted for 
consumer price index (CPI) inflation.70 Another issue relates to the fact that 
some continuous measures – like CEO pay levels, firm size, and income 
level – reveal substantial distributional skewness. But, since non-normal 
distribution is possibly a source of heteroscedasticity, a log-transformation is 
used to compress the scale in which the variables are measured (Gujarati, 
2003, p. 421).   
                                                 
70 Exchange rates are drawn from the Central Bank of Norway (source: http://www.norges-
bank.no), whereas CPI numbers are drawn from Statistics Norway and Statistics Sweden 
(where the base year is set to 1998 (= 100) for Norway and to 1980 (=100) for Sweden) 
(sources: http://www.ssb.no and http://www.scb.se) 
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The second question concerns time-matching of variables. That is, 
we need to make sure that the independent variables are measured at such 
points in time so that they might actually have an impact on the dependent 
variables. In general, this suggests that some independent variables need to 
be lagged. This might be the case for financial data, which are normally 
revealed at year-end. Thus, in order for such figures to have an actual impact 
on those governance decisions that are made in the present year, financial 
data are lagged by one year. For instance, seeking to examine whether firm 
size measures (like equity) might have an influence on the CEO pay levels 
being observed in year 2005, we should use financial data from the 
preceding year (2004). However, since for many SOCs there is a problem of 
data unavailability prior to year 2000, some analyses are performed using 
both lagged and non-lagged independent variables. If the results are not 
altered by using non-lagged data, I thereby avoid missing the 2000-
observations on the dependent variables. A more detailed discussion on the 
issue of time-matching of variables will be provided within the context of 
specific governance decisions.  
 
5.2.4 Data sources 
In collecting data about the aforementioned variables, several sources were 
consulted, including company annual reports, government ownership reports 
and White Papers, reports from the Norwegian Riksrevisjonen, on-line 
registers, Internet search engines, and, to a lesser extent, telephone/e-mail-
interviews. More specifically, information concerning the board chairman 
variables was mainly collected from company annual reports and 
government ownership reports. Besides stating the name of the board 
chairman, these sources often provide information about the chairman’s 
professional background as well as the time of appointment to the chairman 
position. In the Norwegian case, board chairman data were also obtained 
from the publicly available biographies of Parliamentary members and the 
registers of government deputies (both data sources cover extensive time 
periods).71 If not available from secondary sources, board chairman data 
were identified by telephone/e-mail-interviews or by search on the Internet 
for the chairman’s personal record. Data on CEO compensation packages 
were primarily collected from company annual reports. In those cases which 
compensation data were difficult to extract from annual reports, I consulted 
the Norwegian government’s White Papers on the ministries’ annual 
budgetary proposals (St.prp. no. 1), which provide information about CEO 
compensation in firms under full state control. Data on dividend payments 
were collected from company annual reports and cross-checked with 
government ownership reports and Riksrevisjonen’s annual reports to reveal 
                                                 
71 See http://www.stortinget.no and http://www.regjeringen.no, respectively.  
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any inconsistency in data reporting (which, in some rare cases, might be due 
to differences in measurement). As regards the independent variables, data 
were mostly obtained from company annual reports and government 
ownership reports. However, since the Norwegian government only report 
data pertaining to a sub-sample of SOCs, secondary sources could not be 
used to classify every SOC in sample according to their corporate objective. 
To obtain complete information on this issue, I therefore asked for key 
informants in the sponsor ministries to complete the corporate classification.  
 
 
5.3 Governance Equations  
To identify the empirical strategy of this study, I first specify the governance 
functions that follow from the theoretical discussions in Chapter 4. As we 
recall from this discussion, some variables are posited to have an effect of 
more than one governance decision. But, surely, there are also some unique 
predictors to all three governance decisions. For expositional reasons, all 
equations are here written on general form. Moreover, at this stage, the 
equations are presented as if all observations were to be pooled, or 
combined, in ordinary least-square (OLS) regressions. Since the number of 
observations differs among sample companies, the data set is an unbalanced 
panel. As a matter of convention, i denotes the ith cross-sectional unit (firm) 
(i = 1,…, N) and t the tth time period (year) (t = 1,…,Ti) (note that Ti is used 
instead of T to allow for unbalanced data). Given this, the board 
appointment equation can be written as: 
 
Equation (1) Y1it = αit + βX1it + γX2it + δX3it + ωX4it + εit 
 
In this equation, the dependent variable Y1 describes the board chairman’s 
professional background. In line with the variable definition above, Y1 is 
measured both in terms of the chairman’s political experience and his/her 
sector affiliation at the time of appointment. At the right-hand side of the 
equation, X1, X2, X3, and X4 are vectors of observed variables influencing the 
choice of a board chairman. Members of X1 include variables relevant to the 
reputation model, such as corporate objective and stock market listing. The 
vector X2 contains variables relevant to the re-election model, like state 
control and firm size. Moreover, the vector X3 includes the government party 
variable, which describes the ideology model. Lastly, the vector X4 includes 
the nationality variable, while all unobserved (and some even consciously 
omitted) variables influencing board appointments are summarised by the 
error term ε. Turning to the CEO compensation equation, it takes the form: 
 
Equation (2) Y2it = αit + βZ1it + δZ2it + γY1it + ωZ3it + ϖZ4it +ηit 
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According to this equation, Y2 denotes the dependent variable, which is 
described by different aspects of the CEO compensation contract, including 
total compensation level, the use of incentive schemes, and the adoption of 
golden parachutes. Z1, Y1, Z2, Z3, and Z4 are vectors of observed variables 
affecting the level and structure of CEO pay arrangements. In line with the 
hypotheses, members of Z1 represent those variables fitting the reputation-
model of corporate directors, including corporate objective and CEO 
recruitment channel. The vector Z2 contains the state control variable, which 
indicates political influences. In accordance with Equation (1), Y1 includes 
variables describing the board chairman’s professional background. While, 
according to theory, Y1 is a member of Z1, I refer to Y1 separately to indicate 
that this variable is suspected of being correlated with the error term η (in 
Section 5.5 below, I explain why this might be the case). The variables 
included in Z3 describe managerial influences on compensation packages, 
such as CEO tenure and the presence of a compensation committee. Finally, 
the vector Z4 includes the nationality variable, whereas η is an error term 
capturing the effects of unobserved and omitted variables. The third equation 
deals with those factors affecting dividend payments.  
 
Equation (3) Y3it = αit + βП1it + γ П2it + δ П3it + μit 
 
The dependent variable Y3, the dividend payment ratio, is measured in terms 
of dividend-to-earnings, dividends-to-sales, and dividend-to-cash-flow. П1, 
П2, and П3 are vectors of observed variables influencing dividend payments. 
Members of П1 involve variables relevant to the reputation model (which 
apply to both politicians and corporate directors), such as debt ratio and 
growth opportunities. To account for political influences, the vector П2 
contains variables relevant to the re-election model, such as income level 
and state control. As a final point, the vector П3 contains the nationality 
variable, while the error term μ captures all unobserved and omitted effects.  
 
 
5.4 Econometric Specifications72 
To estimate the above governance equations, the thesis relies on panel data; 
that is, a combination of cross-section and time series data. Like most panel 
data sets, the data set used in this thesis is more oriented toward cross-
section analyses than time series analyses in the sense that there are a large 
number of cross-sectional units and only a few time periods. More 
                                                 
72 The literature on panel data used in this section is drawn from Baltagi (2001); Greene 
(2003); Gujarati (2003, Chapter 16); Hsiao (2002); Kennedy, (2003, Chapter 17); Petersen 
(2004); and Wooldridge (2006, Chapters 13 and 14).  
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specifically, the data set follows a sample of SOCs over a six-year period 
(2000-2005), and thus provides multiple observations on each variable for 
each firm in the sample. In this section, I look at the benefits of using panel 
data in the present context. Moreover, I describe the statistical techniques 
available for analysing panel data and their corresponding modeling 
assumptions. I also discuss whether there are some special characteristics of 
the present data set which make some of these approaches more appropriate 
than others.   
 
5.4.1 Why use panel data? 
In general, there are mainly two reasons for using panel data. First, repeated 
observations on each unit (e.g., firm) make it possible to control for 
unobserved explanatory variables. Second, panel data allows us to analyse 
change over time. This latter reason is yet of less importance in the present 
context, since some of the key variables are largely time-invariant.73 At a 
more intuitive level, panel data are also used for the purposes of obtaining 
more information on the issues concerned and thereby also limiting the 
influence of any short-term irregularity inherent in annual data.  
To understand why we should care about controlling for omitted 
variables, it seems constructive to address the homoskedasticity assumption 
underlying the classical model for ordinary least square regression (OLS). 
According to this assumption, the error term should have the same variance 
given any value of the independent variables. Specifically, this means that 
the relationship between independent variables and the dependent variable is 
constant across different cross-sectional units and through time. Similarly, 
the intercept is constant across different cross-sectional units and through 
time. Subsequently, the process affecting the error term would be the same 
for all units and for all years. Clearly, this assumption might be violated if 
we take into account the individuality of each unit. For instance, if our 
interest is in the effect of growth opportunities on dividend payments, we 
might raise the question of whether the growth opportunities variable has the 
same effect in the cross-section as in the time-series; that is, whether the 
expected difference in dividend payment ratios between low growth and 
high growth firms is the same as the expected dividend change when SOCs 
change their status from low growth to high growth firms. In particular, this 
suggests that there are two kinds of variation, one between cross-sectional 
                                                 
73 The year-by-year descriptive statistics presented in Chapter 3 strongly suggests that some 
of the independent variables display little within variation. For instance, a manual inspection 
of the data shows that among the 96 SOCs in the full sample, only five firms were partly 
divested (from an original state ownership stake of 100%) in the sample period. Moreover, 
among the 10 firms that are publicly traded, only two were being listed on the national stock 
exchange during the sample period. 
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units and one within cross-sectional units (firm-specific effects). Moreover, 
the reason why firm-specific effects are possibly observed relates to the 
operation of excluded variables. For instance, all else equal, it might be that 
some firms have an historical record for being treated like political 
instruments, which affects their propensity to pay high dividends even when 
their growth opportunities improve. As will be further discussed below, one 
major advantage of panel data is that they help to control for such 
unobserved firm-specific effects.  
 
5.4.2 How to analyse panel data? 
In principle, panel data can be analysed by way of three models: Pooled 
OLS, the fixed-effects model, and the random-effects model. The pooling 
approach corresponds to what would be specified and estimated with cross-
sectional data, only with more observations. In fact, pooling of data implies 
that each observation is treated as a separate observation without reflecting 
that it may come from the same firm. Using our above example, this means 
that if we are interested in analysing the impact of growth opportunities on 
dividend payments, we must be willing to assume that the growth–dividend 
relation is the same for all firms. Thus, we do not care about the identity of 
SOCs, only their assigned value on the growth opportunities variable. While 
I have already questioned this assumption, in terms of drawing attention to 
firm-specific effects, the pooling approach also suffers from other 
deficiencies. Most importantly, pooled OLS rests on the assumption that the 
error terms are not correlated across time (assumption of no serial 
correlation). However, as the panel data structure implies that each firm is 
surveyed repeatedly over several years, we might easily see how the error 
term might be carried over from one year to the next. Because the pooled 
OLS standard errors ignore this correlation, they will be incorrect, as will the 
test statistics. In addition, with pooled OLS there is a possibility that the t-
values might be inflated, which eventually would lead to invalid inferences 
for marginal effects. This is particularly likely to occur in the case when 
there is little within variation in one or more of the independent variables 
and when the dependent variable remains fairly stable over time (like when 
only non-political chairmen are recruited to the board). In this case, the use 
of pooled data would imply that the ‘same’ observations are counted several 
times. But, since the standard errors will drop with an increasing number of 
observations, this means that pooled regression might incur inflated t-values.  
Fortunately, there are other techniques that might help to reduce the 
problems of pooling data. In particular, both the fixed-effects and the 
random-effects models account for the presence of firm-specific effects in 
that they separate the error term into one time-invariant and firm-specific 
component, and one idiosyncratic component which varies within and 
between firms. The fixed-effects model is particularly appealing as it allows 
   110
unobserved variables to be correlated with the error term, thus resolving the 
endogeneity problem which is often associated with omitted variables. 
However, as the interest of the fixed-effects model is in making intra-firm 
comparisons (i.e., the impact of moving from one state to another), it is 
perceived as less relevant to the present data set. The reason is, as already 
noted, that some of our key independent variables are characterised by a high 
degree of time-invariance.74  
Being interested in estimating the effects of largely time-invariant 
variables, the random-effects model becomes a more attractive alternative. 
Like the pooled OLS model, the random-effects model assumes that the 
independent variables are strictly uncorrelated with the error term. In 
addition, like pooled OLS, the random-effects model takes advantage of both 
cross-sectional and within-unit variation and it assumes that these effects are 
the same. Unlike the pooled OLS estimator, however, the random-effects 
estimator explicitly accounts for the fact that some observations pertain to 
the same firm. Specifically, this is achieved by computing a matrix-weighted 
average of the between and within estimators. While the between estimator 
makes comparisons between firms in their average outcomes (by taking the 
mean value of each variable for each firm across time), the within estimator 
uses the intra-firm variation (by subtracting from each variable its mean 
value over time for the firm). As to the question of how these computations 
are reflected in the random-effects equation, they affect both the intercept 
and the error term. More precisely, the intercept represents the mean value of 
all time-invariant and firm-specific intercepts, while the time-invariant and 
firm-specific component of the error term represents the random deviation of 
individual intercepts from this mean value (in addition, the error term 
comprises an idiosyncratic component).75 The random-effects model thus 
views the intercepts as being randomly drawn from a larger population – so 
they may be interpreted as random and treated as though they were part of 
the error term. Due to this decomposition of the error term, the random-
effects model is also capable of handling the problem of serial correlation. 
Specifically, it is now possible to use the generalized least squares estimator 
(GLS) as we have sufficient information about the form of the serial 
                                                 
74 Not only is the interest of the fixed-effects model in making within-estimates, but it carries 
the drawback of actually preventing estimation of time-invariant variables. 
 
75 Simply stated, this means that although proposing different firm-specific intercepts, the 
intercept for each cross-sectional unit is assumed to arise from a common intercept (which is 
the same for all firms and over time). Subsequently, this means that the sample is treated as a 
random sample from a larger population. This assumption seems reasonable insofar as the 
present sample is not finite across time and space. Instead of focusing strictly on the sample at 
hand I therefore lend myself towards inference to a wider underlying population of SOCs.    
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correlation.76 Finally, the averaging procedure of the random-effects model 
might help to reduce the potential problem of inflated t-values that are 
associated with time-invariant data. The reason is simple: Because the 
between estimator produces larger standard errors than pooled OLS (due to 
less efficient use of data, with only one observation per firm), this might in 
fact produce more reliable t-values.  
Does this mean that the random-effects model is always superior to 
pooled OLS? Clearly, the answer to this question hinges on whether SOC 
heterogeneity (random effects) is really displayed in the analysis. If the 
variance of the intercept component of the composite error term is (close to) 
zero, this implies that the intercepts are not different from one another. Thus, 
we might rely on the error term to contain only such unobservable variables 
that vary within and between SOCs (i.e., idiosyncratic errors). In this case, 
OLS on the pooled data would then be the preferred estimator. To evaluate 
whether the pooled OLS model or the random-effects model is the most 
appropriate alternative, I use the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
(for linear regression) and likelihood-ratio test (for logistic regression). In 
both cases, the random-effects model is run to test if the variance of the 
intercept component of the composite error term is zero.  
 
5.4.3 How to handle endogeneity problems? 
In both the pooled OLS and the random-effects models it is assumed that the 
independent variables are exogenous; that is, they are not correlated with 
the error term, because of an omitted variable, simultaneity, or both 
(assumption of no endogeneity).77 Yet, in the present context, there are three 
reasons why this assumption might not hold. First, in all three Equations 
there is possibly an omitted variable bias as the unobserved firm 
performance variable is likely confounded with the observed state control 
variable. Second, in Equation (1) there seems to be a problem of reverse 
causality (simultaneity) between state control (independent variable) and the 
chairman’s professional background (dependent variable). Third, there is the 
problem of isolating the effects of endogenous variables in Equation (2). 
While the first two problems are in fact resolved by the nature of data 
involved in the data set, the third problem possibly prompts the use of other 
methods. Below, I take a further look at each problem in turn.  
As previously discussed, the heterogeneous nature of the state 
ownership portfolio (both with respect to corporate objective and sector 
                                                 
76 Simply speaking, the GLS estimator transforms the original model to account for serial 
correlation patterns in the error terms.  
 
77 Also note that the assumption of no endogeneity is key to satisfy the assumptions of zero 
conditional mean, homodeskedasticity, and normality – all of which concern the error term.  
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affiliation) confines the type of empirical proxies that prove relevant for the 
sample as a whole. For this reason no performance measures are included 
among the independent variables, even though such measures are usually 
included in research on corporate governance. Yet, the primary concern is 
not related to the possibility that the explanatory power of the overall model 
is reduced. Instead, I worry about that firm performance is correlated with 
the independent variables – in particular, the state control variable.78 For 
instance, this happens to be the case when the government wants to make 
privatisation ‘look good’ by selling out the healthiest SOCs first (Megginson 
and Netter, 2001). Accordingly, the choice of state control is not 
exogenously determined, which means we are likely to experience problems 
of spurious relationships caused by firm performance. The problem of state 
control being an endogenous independent variable is exacerbated by the fact 
that, in Equation (1), there is possibly some reverse causality between the 
chairman’s professional background (in terms of competence) and firm 
performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991, 1998). In other words, it is 
expected that SOC performance is both a result of board competence and 
itself a factor that influences the choice of corporate directors. Moreover, 
there is also a possibility that the relationship between state control (and 
perhaps stock market listing) and the chairman’s professional background 
run both ways. For instance, anecdotal evidence would indicate that SOC 
boards being headed by private business executives could potentially drive 
the government’s decision to (partly) sell out state shareholding and have the 
firms listed on the stock exchange. 
At first glance, it seems that these problems can only be resolved to 
the extent that we continue looking for sound proxies of firm performance 
(or, alternatively, instrumental variables for the state control variable) to be 
included in the panel data models. In the context of the present data set, 
however, it seems that the problem of both omitted variables and reverse 
causality is somewhat alleviated by the simple fact that the state control 
variable is highly persistent over the sample period. More precisely, this 
means that any considerable changes in SOC performance over the sample 
period are not reflected in the state ownership structure (still, the question of 
whether performance changes are reflected in board appointment decisions 
goes unanswered). This argument is made even stronger as we take into 
account the fact that firm performance will not have an instant effect on the 
state divestment decision (which means that any correlation between state 
control and SOC performance need to involve lagged performance variable). 
As such, we might plausibly assume that the two variables are not correlated 
within the six-year period of study. Likewise, since the state control variable 
                                                 
78 Note that, even if the fixed-effects model was considered as an appropriate alternative for 
the present panel data estimation, it would not solve the problem of time-varying omitted 
variables (like firm performance) that are correlated with the independent variables.  
   113
is (largely) time-invariant, this suggests that there is no reverse causality 
between state control and the chairman’s professional background within the 
sample period. To conclude, we note that the time-invariance of the state 
control variable does not resolve the problems of omitted variables or 
reverse causality – it only helps to alleviate the bias in the random-effects 
estimator within the sample period. While the downside of this approach is 
that I also refrain from making statistical inference about causation, it still 
means that the chosen methods are defensible on econometric grounds. 
Thus, we are on safe ground for detecting empirical regularity between 
institutional features and firm characteristics on the one hand and 
governance decisions on the other.  
One final source of endogeneity stems from the problem of isolating 
the effects of the endogenous variable Y1, which appear in Equation (2). This 
type of endogeneity problem arises as (i) the dependent variable in Equation 
(1) (i.e., the chairman’s professional background) is included as an 
independent variable in Equation (2), and (ii) some, but not all, of the 
independent variables included in Equation (1) are also hypothesised to have 
a bearing on CEO compensation contracts. Due to the latter, the key problem 
is that if we were to regress Y1 on the observable variables in Equation (2), it 
means that Y1 would be correlated with the error term η.79 Even though this 
endogeneity problem can be resolved by using two-stage least square (2SLS) 
estimation, this method is not without caveats. In fact, due to large sample 
properties, the 2SLS estimates can have very large standard errors. 
Therefore, we should carefully consider whether 2SLS is even necessary.80   
 
 
5.5 Logit Model for Binary Dependent Variables 
Another special case of the present data set is that, in several cases, we 
would like to explain governance decisions with a binary outcome. For 
example, in the board appointment function, Y1 is defined to indicate 
whether or not the chairman is a political representative, and whether or not 
the chairman is employed in the public sector at the time of appointment. 
Moreover, in the CEO compensation contract function, Y2 indicates whether 
or not the CEO is offered incentive schemes, and whether or not the CEO is 
granted a golden parachute in case of dismissal (additionally, Y2 indicates 
the continuous measure of total cash compensation). The key point is that, 
                                                 
79 Note that there is not an identification problem, as the variables entering the different 
vectors in Equation (1) and (2) are not all the same. 
 
80 More specifically, we might compare OLS and 2SLS estimates to determine whether the 
difference is statistically significant. If not, we might simply stick to the former.Wooldridge 
(2006, pp. 532-533) describes this test procedure in some more detail.  
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because the dependent variable can take only two values, we cannot simply 
interpret any coefficient as the change in the dependent variable given a one-
unit increase in the independent variable, holding all other variables fixed 
(Wooldridge, 2006, p. 252). Instead, with a binary dependent variable, we 
want the coefficients to say something about the probability of observing a 
particular event; for instance, the probability of SOCs adopting incentives 
schemes or golden parachutes.  
From this view, using linear models to estimate the coefficients in 
models with binary outcomes would lead to systematic errors in the model 
and might produce unrealistic predicted outcomes that are greater than one 
(Wooldridge, 2006, pp. 260-261).81 To handle these problems, I use a 
logistic regression model (logit model), which is a non-linear function with 
probabilities between one and zero. On general form, the logit function is 
defined as L = log[P/(1-P)] = ∑bkXk, where L is the log odds, P is the 
probability of the dependent variable taking the value one, Xk’s are 
independent variables, and bk’s are slope coefficients (estimated effects).82 
For instance, P refers to the probability that SOCs will be chaired by a 
political representative, the Xk’s include various institutional and firm 
characteristics, and the bk’s are the estimated effects of such characteristics. 
What often complicates the logit model is that the interpretation of estimated 
effects is not very intuitive. In fact, the magnitude of the effects of the 
independent variables cannot be established simply by looking at the values 
of their coefficients. Yet, this problem is today easily resolved as many 
statistical programs (e.g., STATA) allow the computation of marginal effects 
on the probabilities of independent variables.  
 
 
5.6 Final Remarks 
The empirical strategy of the thesis is to establish appropriate econometric 
models that might help to investigate relationships between institutional 
features and firm characteristics on the one hand and governance decisions 
on the other. Although these relationships are sought to be derived from 
theory, we should note that the theory foundation in this field is rather 
scarce. For that reason, the empirical analysis does not involve any factual 
tests of theory with the aim of explaining as much variation as possible in 
                                                 
81 More specifically, since the probability depends on the value of the independent variables, 
there must be heteroskedasticity in a linear modell. As a result, the standard errors are invalid, 
and so are the test statistics.  
 
82 One classical reference to the derivation of the logit formula is Hanushek and Jackson 
(1977). Simply speaking, the log odds represent a way of comparing whether the probability 
of a certain event is the same for two groups. 
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the dependent variables. Instead, the aim is more modest in that I look for 
empirical regularities in the data, which is based on theoretical reasoning 
about possible determinants of various governance decisions that lie under 
state authority. 
As I discussed in this chapter, the cross-sectional nature of the panel 
data set suggests that data are estimated by using random-effects models (or, 
alternatively, pooled OLS). Moreover, while the time-invariance of key 
independent variables makes it possible to handle some of the endogeneity 
problems inherent in the model specifications, this also implies there is little 
possibility for making any statistical inferences about causation. For the 
present purpose, however, the analysis will likely provide us with a 
comprehensive understanding of the factors that drive governance decisions 
in the context of state ownership.  
As to the reporting of regression results, I pay emphasis to both the 
statistical and economic (or practical) importance of variables (Wooldridge, 
2002, pp. 142-145). Thus, I seek to reveal whether statistical significance is 
due to ‘large’ coefficients or small standard errors. In addition, I carefully 
discuss why some significant variables appear with an unexpected sign. 
Because the primary interest of the empirical analysis is in detecting 
empirical regularities, I run tests of multiple exclusion restrictions to see 
whether the independent variables are jointly significant. In random-effects 
models, these tests include the Wald statistic (for linear regression) and 
likelihood-ratio (for logistic regression) statistic. In pooled OLS models, the 
joint hypothesis test is conventionally performed by using the F statistic. In 
addition, the overall R-squared (i.e., the weighted average of the within- and 
between R-squared) is reported for linear random-effects models. Since there 
are no commonly accepted goodness-of-fit measures which apply to random-
effects logistic regression models, I report only the likelihood-ratio statistic. 
For linear pooled OLS regression, the standard R-squared applies. All results 
are obtained by using STATA 9.0.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Board Appointments: Empirical Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Who is appointed to serve as chairmen of SOC boards, and why? Despite of 
the great controversy that often follows in the wake of political appointments 
(and sometimes appointments from private business as well) to SOC board 
positions, prior research has not developed systematic evidence on the board 
selection issue. This task is important, however, as only thorough analysis 
can help to substantiate or reject some of the myths and anecdotal evidence 
surrounding SOC board appointments. For instance, is it really so that a new 
government, once in office, will replace political chairmen from rival parties 
with their own political representatives? Moreover, will co-investors 
constrain political influences on SOC board appointments? Or, is it in fact 
more likely that each board selection process follows its own distinct logic 
rather than board recruitment patterns being the results of any concerted 
strategy? The aim of this chapter is to shed light on these issues by, first, 
providing a year-by-year description of the professional background of SOC 
chairmen. Thereafter, I seek to investigate the factors most relevant for 
understanding the motives of politicians in the board selection process. More 
precisely, I contrast the reputation, re-election, and ideology model to 
examine the probability that the SOC chairman is a political representative, 
and that the chairman is employed in the public or private sector at the time 
of appointment.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.1 
picks up on the threads from previous chapters in providing a summary and 
specification of the theory, data and methods that are used to examine board 
appointments. Section 6.2 provides descriptive evidence about the political 
experience and principal occupation of SOC board chairmen. Section 6.3 
analyses the factors that are expected to affect board appointments, while 
Section 6.4 concludes with an interpretation of findings and implications for 
public policy.   
 
 
6.1 Theory, Data and Method: Recap and Specifications 
As we recall from previous chapters, the following model is used to examine 
board appointments:  
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Probability that the chairman is a political representative (public 
sector affiliate) = ƒ{corporate objective, stock market listing, state 
control, co-investors’ ownership concentration, co-investor identity, 
visibility, sponsor ministry, debt ratio, government party, nationality, 
time trend, error term}.  
 
In Chapter 4, I provided the theoretical arguments as to why these variables 
are considered to be important predictors of board appointments. To briefly 
recap the main ideas from this discussion, the reputation model starts from 
the assumption that politicians seek to appoint those types of board chairmen 
who seem the most qualified to handle the type of activity performed by the 
SOCs. To decide what type of competence is the most appropriate, it thus 
seems reasonable to look at the firm’s corporate objective and whether the 
firm is listed on the stock exchange. By contrast, the re-election model 
suggests that politicians seek to appoint as board chairmen those candidates 
who are the most attentive to political signals. Accordingly, the competence 
of chairmen is of less importance than their presumed loyalty to the 
government-owner. Yet, there are several reasons why political influences 
on board appointments can be weakened. Perhaps the most important is the 
legal right and request of (mainly private) co-investors to protect their 
interests from being exploited. But there is also the fact that there is a limited 
pool of candidates suitable for political appointments to the chairman 
position, which may force the government-owner to prioritise those SOCs 
which are deemed most important to the voters. Moreover, principles of 
good corporate governance assert that political influence on board 
appointments should be avoided, and we expect the ownership ministry 
would be the most eager to signify adherence to such prescriptions. 
Additionally, debtholders might oppose political actions that do not serve the 
debt-paying ability of SOCs. As a third competing view, the ideology model 
posits that politicians will consider board appointments in view of their 
partisan profiles, which suggests that government party is included as a key 
predictor in the board appointment model. Finally, due to nation-specific 
institutional arrangements and potential time trends, I control for nationality 
and time effects. Table 6.1 provides a summary of variable definitions 
together with the predicted sign of bivariate relations between independent 
variables and the two board appointment variables.  
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Table 6.1. Summary of variable definitions and theoretical predictions. 
 
Variables Predicted sign 
 
Dependent variables 
 
Chairman’s professional background 
Dummy variable: Political (=1) versus non-political (=0) representative 
Dummy variable: Public (=1) versus private (=0) sector employee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent variables 
 
Reputation model 
Corporate objective (hypothesis 1) 
Dummy variable: Commercial (=1) versus non-commercial (=0) objective 
 
Stock market listing (hypothesis 2) 
Dummy variables: Listed firms under partial state control versus non-listed firms under partial state control, with state ownership stake = 100% as benchmark category* 
 
 
 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
Re-election model 
State control (hypotheses 3) 
Dummy variable: Partial (=1) versus full (=0) state ownership 
 
Co-investors’ ownership concentration (hypothesis 4) 
Dummy variables: Conventional and voting threshold levels with three cut-off points (5%, 33.34%, and 50.01%), and with state ownership stake = 100% as benchmark category** 
 
Co-investor identity (hypothesis 5) 
Dummy variable: Non-public versus public co-investors, with state ownership stake = 100% as benchmark category*** 
 
Visibility (hypothesis 6) 
Continuous variable: Firm size (log equity) 
Dummy variable: Regional presence (=1) versus non-regional presence (=0)  
 
Sponsor ministry (hypothesis 7) 
Dummy variable: Ownership (=1) versus sectoral (=0) ministry 
 
Debt ratio (hypothesis 8) 
Continuous variable: Debt to total assets 
 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
+ 
+ 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
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Ideology model 
Government party (hypothesis 9) 
Dummy variable: Right-wing (=1) versus left-wing (=0) government 
 
 
 
– 
 
Controls 
Nationality  
Dummy variable: Norway (=0) versus Sweden (=1) 
 
Time trend 
Continuous variable ranging from 1-6 (2000,…,2005) 
 
 
 
+/– 
 
 
? 
 
Note: A plus (minus) sign in a column indicates that the independent variable is expected to have a positive (negative) effect on political (public sector) board appointments. A combined plus/minus 
sign indicates that the prospective impact on board appointments is uncertain (theoretical ambiguity). A question mark indicates no strong à priori expectation regarding the sign of the independent 
variable.  
 
* The predicted sign is valid when comparing listed and non-listed firms under partial state control to the benchmark category. In line with theory, however, I expect the major difference between the 
categories is found between listed SOCs and non-listed SOCs.  
** The predicted sign is valid when comparing voting threshold levels to the benchmark category. In line with theory, however, I expect a successively stronger negative relationship between voting 
threshold levels and political and/or public sector representation on the board. 
*** The predicted sign is valid when comparing non-public and public co-investors to the benchmark category. In line with theory, however, I expect the major difference between the categories is 
found between firms with non-public co-investors on the one hand and firms with public co-investors and fully state-owned firms on the other.  
 
To increase the robustness of analysis, I also test for some alternative measures. The state control variable also includes the equity fraction held by the state. Additionally, I use a set of dummy 
variables indicating voting threshold levels with three cut-off points (33.34%, 50.01% and 66.67%) and state ownership stake = 100% as benchmark category. In line with theory, I expect a 
successively stronger positive relationship between these voting threshold levels and political (public sector) representation on the board. Similarly, co-investors’ ownership concentration is also 
measured by the equity fraction held by the largest co-investor. The firm size variable includes the additional measures of total assets (log) and number of employees (log). The firm size variables and 
the debt ratio variables are used both non-lagged and with a one-year-lag. 
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To analyse the effects of independent variables on political (public sector) 
board appointments, it follows from Chapter 5 that data are drawn from the 
six-year SOC sample (2000-2005). Initially, I constructed this sample so as 
to cover data about chairmen’s political experience and sector affiliation on 
an annual basis. Naturally, such data reporting makes perfect sense if 
corporate directors are appointed for one year at a time. Such practice 
corresponds to the Swedish case, where board members stand for re-election 
on a yearly basis.83 If, however, corporate directors were to serve on the 
board for a period of more than one year, there would actually be no board 
appointments to register in the between-election years. This is the case in 
Norway, where company law prescribes that board members are elected for 
a period of two years.84 Accordingly, the chairman is eligible for election 
only every second year. One important implication of the Norwegian 
practice is that if we include in the data set information about a board 
chairman in year t+1 who was elected to the chairman position in year t, this 
would simply mean that we count the same governance decision once more 
(but, of course, yearly appointments might be observed in cases of voluntary 
or forced retirements from the chairman position). To avoid double counting 
of board appointments, which eventually would lead to inflated z-values, I 
therefore include only those years in which the chairman position actually 
stands for election.85  
To identify the election years in the Norwegian sample, I examined 
the company annual reports. In those cases which no such information was 
provided, I conducted searches on the Internet to look for government 
documents, press releases or media coverage that could verify the election 
years. As a result, it was possible to identify most of the election years. In 
the few remaining cases, I simply added one year to the chairman’s first 
known year in position (or, equivalently, one year was subtracted from the 
last known year in position). Following this procedure, the result was in a 
total number of 145 Norwegian board appointments in the sample period, of 
which 74 were classified as re-appointments and 71 as new appointments. In 
                                                 
83 According to Swedish company legislation in the sample period, board members can serve 
on the board for the time period set in the firm’s articles of associations, but for no longer 
than four year at a time (cf. Chapter 8, Article 10 of the Swedish Companies Act). As a rule, 
however, the Swedish state ownership policy states that board members are appointed for one 
year at a time, and should not belong to the same board for a longer period than eight years. 
Also note that, effective from 2006, the Swedish Companies Act makes the one-year 
appointment mandatory.  
 
84 Cf. Article 6-6 (Section 1) of the Norwegian Companies Act. Also note that this Article 
makes allowance for the mandatory period of board members to be set in the firm’s articles of 
associations. 
 
85 Note that, when using logit models, z-values are used instead of t-values.  
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Sweden, a total number of 232 appointments were made in the six-year 
period, including 196 re-appointments and 36 new appointments.86 Thus, the 
sample was reduced from an original set of 511 firm-year observations to 
377.  
Moreover, to obtain a proper test of the hypotheses, it is of crucial 
importance that data about board appointments are properly time-matched 
with the independent variables. While I have previously made the case for a 
one-year lagging of (possibly) time-variant independent variables, I now ask 
if it is possible to obtain even more precise measurements. For instance, 
since the chairman is elected at the general assembly (which meeting is 
normally held in the period April–June), this suggests that ownership 
variables are recorded at the time when the chairman is actually voted into 
office. This argument is particularly relevant if we recognise that any partial 
divestments of state ownership stakes which are formally agreed upon at the 
general assembly (and, as such, are not recorded at year-end t-1) would 
normally imply that co-investors are given influence in the board nomination 
process preceding the general assembly. Where possible, I therefore 
identified ownership stakes and the identity of co-investors at the time of the 
general assembly meeting. In cases with dispersed co-investments are used 
lagged ownership variables, since any more exact information about these 
variables is difficult to achieve without extensive efforts (and, most 
important, it would probably offer little or no additional explanatory power 
to the analysis). The same argument holds for the financial measures that 
include equity, total assets, and number of employees (firm size measures) as 
well as debt ratio. For all other variables, including localisation, sponsor 
ministry, government party, corporate objective and stock market listing, it 
was possible to identify their relevant value at the time of the general 
assembly meeting.87  
However, while there are strong arguments for using (some) lagged 
variables I also want to avoid shrinking the sample size (which is 
unavoidable, due to the difficulty of achieving lagged financial data). More 
specifically, to test the ideology model, it is important that the sample 
includes as many board appointments as possible made by the left-wing 
Norwegian government in year 2000. For that reason, I perform separate 
analyses for samples with non-lagged and lagged measures, where caution 
needs to be made in terms of evaluating the non-lagged measures. 
                                                 
86 Two firm-year observations were excluded from the Swedish sample due to missing data. 
 
87 Occasionally, it happens that a company is founded in year t-1, but is not recorded as fully 
operative before year t. While recording the chairman as being appointed in year t, the values 
of independent variables are set to correspond as far as possible to the time of election. In this 
way, I avoid to falsely assign any board appointment to, say, the ‘wrong’ government party.  
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To analyse the issue of board appointments, I use random-effects 
models, which allows the estimation of both cross-sectional effects and fixed 
company effects within the same equation. Also, I use logistic regression to 
account for the fact that the board appointment variables have binary 
outcomes, which means we test the probability that the chairman is a 
political representative (public sector employee).   
 
 
6.2 Who Chairs the SOC Boards? 
Our main interest is to find out whether the government, in its capacity as 
shareholder, is likely to appoint political representatives as chairmen of SOC 
boards.88 Recalling from the above, I define as political representatives those 
people who are current or former Parliamentary and/or government deputies. 
Importantly, we should note that this is a very conservative measure of the 
chairman’s political experience, which means that the analysis may in fact 
understate the political representation on SOC boards. For instance, I have 
not been able to systematically identify whether the chairman is a current or 
previous local government representative, or if the chairman perhaps is a key 
figure in party-politics but with no formal experience from national politics. 
Despite of this, Table 6.2 shows that the political representation on SOC 
boards is fairly strong. In Norway, 23% of the chairmen fall into the 
category of political representatives, while 77% of the chairmen have no 
political experience. Likewise, 30% of the chairmen in Swedish SOCs are 
current or former political deputies, while 70% are non-political. Moreover, 
these recruitment patterns are fairly stable over the six-year period (except 
for the year 2001 in the Norwegian sample). Thus, it does not seem that the 
nation-specific board practices (i.e., whether currently serving politicians are 
allowed to sit on SOC boards) have any significant impact on the tendency 
for political appointments.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
88 Appendix B provides an overview of the political affiliation of all board chairmen in 
Norwegian and Swedish SOCs over the sample period.  
   123
Table 6.2. Political representation on SOC boards. 
 
 Norway Sweden 
Year Political Non-political n Political Non-political n 
2000 24 76 17 31 69 35 
2001 14 86 21 29 71 38 
2002 27 73 22 35 65 40 
2003 27 73 33 28 72 40 
2004 24 76 25 30 70 40 
2005 19 81 27 28 72 39 
 
Total 
 
23 77 145 30 70
 
232 
 
Note: The table shows, for every sample year, the fraction of political versus non-political chairmen who 
are appointed to the SOC boards in Norway and Sweden, respectively. n is the number of observations. 
 
To gain an even richer understanding of the nature of political appointments, 
Table 6.3 describes whether political representatives are elected on party-
political ground; that is, if they are appointed by their ‘own’ government or 
by rival government parties.89 Interestingly, we note that while the fraction 
of political representatives on SOC boards is rather similar in Norway and 
Sweden, the two countries differ as regards the political affiliation of board 
chairmen. As shown in the table, the fraction of political chairmen who are 
appointed by their own government is significantly larger in Norway. In fact, 
the overall numbers tell us that, in Norway, 64% of the politically 
experienced chairmen are appointed by their political affiliates, while the 
similar number is Sweden is nearly 40%. Seeking to interpret this evidence, 
it is possibly easier to both identify and secure control with political rivals if 
they are currently holding Parliament seats. As to the more specific question 
of whether left-wing or right-wing governments are more inclined to appoint 
their own political representatives, the Norwegian data tells us that among 
the 25 political appointments made by the two right-wing governments, 14 
chairmen are classified as political affiliates. By contrast, the left-wing 
government made a total of 8 political appointments, of which 7 chairmen 
are categorised as political affiliates. In Sweden, all board appointments in 
the sample period were made by a left-wing government.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
89 Chairmen are elected by their ‘own’ government if they have served (or are currently 
serving) as political representatives for the governing political party or coalition of parties, or 
for any of the political parties from which the (minority) government gains Parliamentary 
support.  
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Table 6.3. The political affiliation of board chairmen. 
 
 Norway Sweden 
 
Year 
‘Own’ 
government 
Rival 
government 
 
n 
‘Own’ 
government 
Rival 
government 
 
n 
2000 75 25 4 27 73 11 
2001 100 0 3 27 73 11 
2002 67 33 6 29 71 14 
2003 44 56 9 45 55 11 
2004 67 33 6 50 50 12 
2005 60 40 5 55 45 11 
 
Total 
 
64 36 33 39 61
 
70 
 
Note: The table shows, for every sample year, the fraction of political chairmen who are appointed by 
their own versus rival governments in Norway and Sweden, respectively. n is the number of observations. 
 
Another proxy for the chairman’s professional background is given by sector 
affiliation; that is, we look at whether the chairman is recruited from the 
private or public sector at the time of appointment. According to Table 6.4, 
the most striking observation on this issue relates to the differing board 
recruitment pattern of Norway and Sweden. In Norway, 60% of the 
chairmen are recruited among private sector employees. By contrast, 70% of 
the chairmen in Swedish SOCs are recruited from the public sector. While 
this difference in recruitment pattern is non-trivial, one intuitive explanation 
is that the Norwegian state holds a larger fraction of partial ownership. 
Related to this, it should come as no surprise that when investing with others 
(private shareholders in particular) this might increase the possibility that 
chairmen are recruited from the private sector. But as we also know that the 
Norwegian state co-invests just as much with public investors as with private 
shareholders, this interpretation is not entirely satisfactory. From the point of 
view of Swedish SOCs, however, the public sector domination seems easier 
to explain, since the Swedish state is often represented on the SOC boards by 
currently serving politicians and/or state bureaucrats. Assuming that the 
government-owner seeks to exert profound influence over board decisions, it 
follows that state bureaucrats and political representatives are likely to serve 
as chairmen rather than as rank-and-file members of the boards. 
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Table 6.4. The board chairman’s principal occupation. 
 
 Norway Sweden 
Year Private sector Public sector n Private sector Public sector n 
2000 53 47 17 31 69 35 
2001 62 38 21 32 68 38 
2002 59 41 22 27 73 40 
2003 52 48 33 30 70 40 
2004 79 21 24 30 70 40 
2005 56 44 27 31 69 39 
 
Total 
 
60 40 144 30 70
 
232 
 
Note: The table shows, for every sample year, the fraction of board chairmen who are recruited from the 
private versus public sector. n is the number of observations (note that there is one missing value for 
sector affiliation in the Norwegian sample).  
 
Again, however, some caution is warranted regarding the interpretation of 
results. Most importantly, by looking only at chairmen’s sector affiliation at 
the time of appointment, we ignore the possibility that chairmen are 
considered as proper candidates due to their previous career track. In fact, 
the data might give a distorted picture of reality in those cases which 
chairmen have spend most of their career in the public sector but were 
recently employed in the private sector, or vice versa. Nevertheless, it seems 
reasonable to argue that chairmen’s sector affiliation at the time of board 
appointment is an important proxy for their current loyalty. On the other 
hand, we cannot ignore the possibility that chairmen’s former career track 
would have been a more suitable proxy for their competence requirements 
than their current position alone.   
Finally, we should take into account that the two aspects pertaining 
to chairmen’s professional background are not independent of each other. 
Instead, they partly overlap as both private and public sector employees are 
also classified as having political experience or not. Table 6.5 explores this 
issue and shows that, in Norway, chairmen with political experience are 
recruited both from the private and public sector, while non-politicians are 
more often recruited from the private sector. By contrast, all Swedish 
political representatives are recruited from the public sector, which reflects 
the fact that currently serving politicians are allowed to take seats on SOC 
boards. Among the non-political chairmen on Swedish boards, somewhat 
more are recruited from the public sector than the private sector.  
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Table 6.5. Political representation and sector affiliation on SOC boards. 
 
 Norway Sweden 
Year ___Political___ __Non-political__  ___Political___ __Non-political__  
 Private  Public  Private  Public  n Private Public Private  Public n 
2000 12 12 41 35 17 0 32 31 37 35 
2001 5 9 57 29 21 0 29 32 39 38 
2002 14 14 45 27 22 0 35 27 38 40 
2003 18 9 33 40 33 0 27 30 43 40 
2004 21 4 58 17 24 0 30 30 40 40 
2005 8 11 48 33 27 0 28 31 41 39 
 
Total 
 
13
 
10 
 
46 31 144 0 30 30
 
40 
 
232 
 
Note: The table shows, for every sample year, the fraction of board chairmen who are recruited from the 
private versus public sector according to political representation and nationality subsamples. n is the 
number of observations.  
 
Overall, the descriptive data provides evidence of sufficient variation in the 
professional background of SOC chairmen so as to make further statistical 
analysis highly appropriate. Although the latter table suggests that I could 
benefit from using even more fine-grained categories, defined by different 
combinations of political experience and sector affiliation, such results 
quickly become unwieldy to interpret. The two aspects of chairman 
demography are therefore included as separate measures in the model. 
 
 
6.3 Empirical Analysis 
As we are now acquainted with the board recruitment patterns, it is time to 
investigate what factors might explain political (public sector) representation 
on SOC boards. The descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) 
pertaining to the main variables are shown in Table 6.6. For ease of 
presentation, the table does not include any alternative measures, to which I 
return in the multivariate analysis. Except from the government party 
variable, all descriptive statistics are known from Chapter 3. Thus, no further 
comments upon these variables are needed (although, we should note that 
the present statistics might deviate somewhat from that of previous chapters, 
which is due some different measurement and sampling strategies). As 
regards which political party represents the government-owner, the table 
displays that, in the full sample, right-wing governments are responsible for 
29% of the board appointments. While this leaves left-wing governments 
with an election rate of 71%, the government party variable demonstrates 
major national skewness. In fact, whereas, in Norway, right-wing politicians 
are in charge of 75% of the board appointments, all Swedish board 
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appointments are made by leftist politicians. Clearly, this indicates that we 
need to be careful in not confusing ideology and nationality effects. 
 
 
Table 6.6. Descriptive statistics: Means and standard deviations. 
 
 
 
Variables 
All SOCs 
 
Mean    St.dev.     n 
Norwegian SOCs 
 
Mean    St.dev.     n 
Swedish SOCs 
 
Mean   St.dev.    n 
Political representation 
Public sector employee 
Corporate objective 
Non-listed SOCs  
Listed SOCs  
State control 
Largest co-investor simple majority 
Largest co-investor negative control 
Largest co-investor 5% control 
Largest co-investor less 5% control 
Largest co-investor non-public 
Largest co-investor public 
Equity (log) 
Regional presence 
Sponsor ministry 
Debt ratio 
Government party 
Nationality 
Time trend 
0.27 
0.59 
0.50 
0.23 
0.09 
0.31 
0.03 
0.07 
0.16 
0.04 
0.19 
0.12 
2.75 
0.60 
0.51 
59.1 
0.29 
0.62 
3.63 
0.45 
0.49 
0.50 
0.42 
0.28 
0.46 
0.18 
0.25 
0.37 
0.20 
0.39 
0.32 
1.23 
0.49 
0.50 
26.3 
0.45 
0.49 
1.66 
377 
376 
377 
377 
377 
377 
377 
377 
377 
377 
377 
377 
374 
377 
377 
377 
377 
377 
377 
0.23 
0.40 
0.37 
0.36 
0.08 
0.44 
0.05 
0.08 
0.25 
0.05 
0.21 
0.22 
2.49 
0.55 
0.32 
60.6 
0.75 
– 
3.74 
0.42 
0.49 
0.49 
0.48 
0.28 
0.50 
0.22 
0.27 
0.43 
0.22 
0.41 
0.42 
1.35 
0.50 
0.47 
23.7 
0.44 
– 
1.62 
145 
144 
145 
145 
145 
145 
145 
145 
145 
145 
145 
145 
143 
145
145 
145 
145 
– 
145 
0.30 
0.70 
0.57 
0.14 
0.09 
0.23 
0.03 
0.06 
0.10 
0.04 
0.17 
0.05 
2.90 
0.63 
0.63 
58.2 
0 
– 
3.56 
0.46 
0.46 
0.50 
0.35 
0.29 
0.42 
0.16 
0.25 
0.31 
0.19 
0.37 
0.22 
1.13 
0.48 
0.48 
27.7 
0 
– 
1.69 
232 
232 
232 
232 
232 
232 
232 
232 
232 
232 
232 
232 
231 
232 
232 
232 
232 
– 
232 
Note: The table shows means and standard deviations for all main variables in the sample. Due to some 
different measurement procedures and sample strategy, the descriptive statistics might deviate somewhat 
from the statistics reported for the full sample (cf. the descriptive statistics displayed in Chapter 3). 
 
 
An initial analysis of the relationships between all main variables is provided 
in Table 6.7, which shows bivariate correlations (Spearman’s rho).90 From 
the table, we note that some of the independent variables reflecting stock 
market listing, state control, and co-investment characteristics are highly 
correlated (variables 4–12 in the correlations matrix). This is not surprising, 
however, since these variables are all constructed from the same benchmark 
category; namely firms under full state control. The three variable groups 
thus reflect different ways of specifying the state ownership structure. To 
further explicate, a firm is basically under full or partial state control. But 
also, we might extract finer information about the characteristics of partly 
state-owned firms: The state ownership share might be high or low, the firms 
can be listed on the stock exchange or not, co-investments can be 
concentrated or dispersed, and co-investors might be private or public. 
Importantly, such information makes it possible to test some more advanced 
                                                 
90 The reason for using Spearman correlation is due to the fact that one or both of the 
correlated variables are non-normal and non-linear. 
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hypotheses about the effects of firm characteristics. But, to avoid running 
into severe multicollinearity problems, the variables pertaining to state 
control, stock market listing, and co-investment characteristics need to be 
separately included in the models.91 Additionally, we note from the table that 
the government party variable and the nationality variable display a strong 
positive correlation, which supports the descriptive statistics. The two 
variables are therefore separately analysed. Finally, to rule out the possibility 
that some of the other correlations between independent variables are 
causing estimation problems, I use the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test.92 
As the test shows no multicollinearity problems (all VIFs < 2.5), all of the 
remaining variables are included in the model.   
 
 
 
                                                 
91 Naturally, some of the other alternative measures (not shown in the table) are also strongly 
internally related; for instance, the three firm size measures display significant positive 
correlations.  
 
92 Since the VIF test is not readily applied within the framework of random-effect models, I 
follow the approach of Menard (2002) who suggests that tests of multicollinearity can be fully 
transferred from procedures in OLS-regression. The reason is that the concern of 
multicollinearity is with the relationship among the independent variables, which means that 
the functional form of the model is not relevant to the estimation of multicollinearity. 
Accordingly, Menard suggests that we might simply run an OLS regression and ignore the 
results, but use the information that pertains to multicollinearity. 
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Table 6.7. Correlations among variables. 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Political representation 
2. Public sector employee 
3. Corporate objective 
4. Non-listed SOCs  
5. Listed SOCs  
6. State control 
7. Co-investor simple majority 
8. Co-investor negative control 
9. Co-investor 5% control 
10. Co-investor less 5% control 
11. Largest co-investor non-public 
12. Largest co-investor public 
13. Equity (log) 
14. Regional presence 
15. Sponsor ministry 
16. Debt ratio 
17. Government party 
18. Nationality 
19. Time trend 
 
  0.28** 
–0.06 
–0.05 
–0.19** 
–0.18** 
–0.12* 
–0.10 
–0.05 
–0.13* 
–0.09 
–0.13* 
  0.03 
  0.06 
–0.01 
–0.06 
–0.05 
  0.07 
–0.02 
 
 
–0.07 
  0.04 
–0.10* 
–0.02 
  0.07 
–0.07 
  0.04 
–0.12* 
  0.00 
  0.00 
–0.12* 
–0.02 
  0.10 
–0.03 
–0.23** 
  0.28** 
–0.04 
 
 
 
–0.23** 
  0.31** 
–0.01 
–0.13* 
–0.12* 
  0.00 
  0.21** 
  0.16** 
–0.23** 
  0.48** 
  0.17** 
  0.45** 
  0.12* 
–0.17** 
  0.19** 
–0.01 
 
 
 
 
–0.14** 
  0.78** 
  0.36** 
  0.49** 
  0.50** 
–0.11* 
  0.33** 
  0.68** 
–0.43** 
–0.16** 
–0.10 
  0.03 
  0.22** 
–0.24** 
–0.00 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.46** 
–0.06 
–0.09 
  0.34** 
  0.63** 
  0.66** 
–0.11* 
  0.40** 
  0.14** 
  0.19** 
  0.09 
  0.01 
  0.01 
  0.06 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.28** 
  0.61** 
  0.44** 
  0.32** 
  0.70** 
  0.54** 
–0.15** 
–0.06 
  0.03 
  0.08 
  0.19** 
–0.21** 
  0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.05 
–0.08 
–0.04 
–0.01 
  0.43** 
–0.19** 
–0.09 
–0.14** 
–0.15** 
  0.04 
–0.06 
–0.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.12* 
–0.06 
  0.23** 
  0.23** 
–0.26** 
–0.12* 
–0.09 
  0.08 
  0.01 
–0.02 
–0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.09 
  0.47** 
  0.37** 
–0.09 
–0.02 
  0.09 
  0.09 
  0.19** 
–0.19** 
  0.03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.41** 
–0.08 
  0.32** 
  0.17** 
  0.10 
  0.04 
  0.01 
–0.02 
  0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.17** 
  0.10 
  0.05 
  0.22** 
  0.12* 
  0.06 
–0.04 
  0.03 
 
Note: The table shows Spearman correlation coefficients. * p < 0.05 (two-tailed); ** p < 0.01 (two-tailed).  
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Table 6.7. (Continued)   
 
Variables 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. Political representation 
2. Public sector employee 
3. Corporate objective 
4. Non-listed SOCs  
5. Listed SOCs  
6. State control 
7. Co-investor simple majority 
8. Co-investor negative control 
9. Co-investor 5% control 
10. Co-investor less 5% control 
11. Largest co-investor non-public 
12. Largest co-investor public 
13. Equity (log) 
14. Regional presence 
15. Sponsor ministry 
16. Debt ratio 
17. Government party 
18. Nationality 
19. Time trend 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.36** 
–0.13* 
–0.19** 
–0.07 
  0.23** 
–0.26** 
  0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.52** 
  0.25** 
–0.06 
–0.12* 
  0.15** 
  0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.20** 
–0.08 
–0.09 
  0.07 
–0.03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.06 
–0.22** 
  0.30** 
  0.12* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.03 
–0.02 
–0.06 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.80** 
  0.30** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.06 
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Turning to the dependent variables, we find a significant positive correlation 
between political representation and public sector affiliation, which is 
ascribed to the Swedish practice of appointing currently serving politicians 
to the SOC boards. As regards the effects of independent variables, the 
correlation matrix indicates that only some of the predicted relationships find 
empirical support. In particular, we note that there is a significant negative 
relationship between stock market listing and political representatives on the 
boards. In line with the theory, we also find that state control is significantly 
and negatively correlated with political appointments. Apparently, therefore, 
firms under partial state control are less likely than fully state-owned firms 
to be headed by persons with political experience. Interestingly, it seems that 
the mere presence of co-investors is more important than the level of co-
investor concentration as such, since both high and low concentration levels 
are negatively correlated with political representation. However, there is also 
the possibility that the effects of low (< 5%) co-investment concentration can 
mask the effects of listing, since the two measures are strongly correlated. 
Additionally, we find that political representation is negatively correlated 
with both non-public and public co-investors (note that only the latter is 
significant). None of the remaining variables are significantly correlated 
with political representation.  
As regards the chairman’s sector affiliation, the correlation analysis 
reveals a slightly different pattern. In this case, both government party and 
nationality are significantly related to public sector employment. While the 
latter finding supports the descriptive evidence that public sector employees 
on SOC boards are more common in Sweden than in Norway, the first result 
indicates that right-wing politicians are less likely than leftist politicians to 
appoint public sector employees as chairmen of SOC boards. Moreover, 
stock market listing, firm size, and the lowest level of co-investor ownership 
concentration all display significant negative correlations with public sector 
affiliation.  
While the size of all bivariate associations between independent 
variables and the two dependent variables are only modest, this suggests that 
the explanatory power of the model is fairly weak. The results from the 
random-effects logistic regression analyses (shown in Tables 6.8–6.12) 
mainly confirm this allegation as the likelihood-ratio statistics indicate that 
the independent variables are jointly insignificant (with some exceptions, 
due to model specifications and subsample analyses). Also, an inspection of 
the error term shows that a large proportion of the total error variance is due 
to firm-specific factors and not to cross-sectional differences (with nearly all 
rho in the full sample > 0.70). Correspondingly, test statistics show strong 
support for the random-effects model over pooled OLS, as given by the 
likelihood-ratio test for logistic regression (p < 0.000).  
With the aim of giving a thorough, yet reader-friendly, account of 
the multivariate regression results, I distinguish between full sample 
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analyses (Tables 6.8–6.9) and subsample analyses, where the latter is guided 
by the criteria of state control, government party, and nationality (Tables 
6.10–6.12, respectively). To formally test whether the regression coefficients 
are significantly different across these subgroups, I also perform moderated 
regression analyses, which include interactions between all independent 
variables and the relevant subsample variables. The moderated regressions 
results are shown in Appendix D, while the marginal effects pertaining to the 
logistic regression coefficients are displayed in Appendix E. In the 
following, I report and discuss these results in some more detail.  
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Table 6.8. Random-effects logistic regression analysis with political experience as dependent variable. Main effects, full sample. 
 
Independent variables               Model 1                          Model 2                              Model 3                           Model 4                           Model 5 
Intercept 
 
Reputation model 
Commercial objective 
 
Re-election model 
State control 
State ownership < 100% and ≥ 66.67% 
State ownership < 66.67% and > 50% 
State ownership ≤ 50% 
Largest co-investor < 100% and > 33.33% 
Largest co-investor ≤ 33.33 % 
Largest co-investor non-public 
Largest co-investor public 
Equity (log) 
Regional presence 
Ownership ministry 
Debt ratio 
 
Ideology model 
Government party 
 
Controls 
Nationality 
Time trend 
 
Number of firm/year observations 
Number of firms 
Rho 
LR chi2 
–2.088* 
 
 
–1.656* 
 
 
–1.309 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.702 
–0.700 
–0.371 
–0.004 
 
 
–0.285 
 
 
 
–0.013 
 
374 
96 
0.75 
10.51 
(1.545) 
 
 
(0.915) 
 
 
(0.863) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.448) 
(0.996) 
(0.702) 
(0.015) 
 
 
(0.686) 
 
 
 
(0.127) 
–2.454 
 
 
–1.702* 
 
 
–1.232 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.712 
–0.749 
–0.434 
–0.004 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.677 
–0.025 
 
374 
96 
0.76 
10.95 
(1.616) 
 
 
(0.927) 
 
 
(0.873) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.452) 
(1.005) 
(0.711) 
(0.015) 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.882) 
(0.117) 
 
 
–1.991 
 
 
–1.778* 
 
 
 
  0.813 
–1.144 
–2.962** 
 
 
 
 
  0.690 
–0.401 
–0.350 
–0.006 
 
 
–0.611 
 
 
 
–0.006 
 
374 
96 
0.74 
15.29 
(1.560) 
 
 
(0.924) 
 
 
 
(1.242) 
(1.661) 
(1.334) 
 
 
 
 
(0.448) 
(1.000) 
(0.703) 
(0.015) 
 
 
(0.718) 
 
 
 
(0.127) 
 
 
 
–1.941 
 
 
–1.682* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–1.438 
–1.375 
 
 
  0.662 
–0.640 
–0.378 
–0.004 
 
 
–0.285 
 
 
 
–0.009 
 
374 
96 
0.75 
11.39 
(1.587) 
 
 
(0.912) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1.430) 
(1.027) 
 
 
(0.453) 
(0.995) 
(0.701) 
(0.015) 
 
 
(0.693) 
 
 
 
(0.127) 
–2.179 
 
 
–1.683* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–1.326 
–0.975 
  0.717 
–0.675 
–0.337 
–0.004 
 
 
–0.286 
 
 
 
–0.012 
 
374 
96 
0.76 
10.12 
(1.594) 
 
 
(0.914) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1.509) 
(1.282) 
(0.458) 
(0.992) 
(0.709) 
(0.015) 
 
 
(0.688) 
 
 
 
(0.127) 
 
Note: The table reports unstandardised regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Rho denotes the proportion of total error variance contributed by the panel-
level error component. The LR chi2 (likelihood-ratio) statistics report whether the independent variables are jointly significant. * p < 0.10 (two-tailed); ** p < 0.05 (two-
tailed); *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed).  
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Table 6.9. Random-effects logistic regression analysis with sector affiliation as dependent variable. Main effects, full sample. 
 
Independent variables               Model 1                          Model 2                            Model 3                               Model 4                           Model 5 
Intercept 
 
Reputation model 
Commercial objective 
Non-listing 
Listing 
 
Re-election model 
State control 
State ownership < 100% and ≥ 66.67% 
State ownership < 66.67% and > 50% 
State ownership ≤ 50% and > 33.33% 
State ownership ≤ 33.33% 
Largest co-investor < 100% and > 50% 
Largest co-investor ≤ 50% and > 33.33% 
Largest co-investor ≤ 33.33% and ≥ 5% 
Largest co-investor < 5% 
Largest co-investor non-public 
Largest co-investor public 
Equity (log) 
Regional presence 
Ownership ministry 
Debt ratio 
 
Ideology model 
Government party 
 
Controls 
Nationality 
Time trend 
 
Number of firm/year observations 
Number of firms 
Rho 
  2.827* 
 
 
–1.093 
  0.304 
  0.853 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.527 
–0.158 
  0.266 
–0.006 
 
 
–1.621** 
 
 
 
  0.073 
 
373 
96 
0.76 
(1.559) 
 
 
(0.877) 
(0.907) 
(1.310) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.419) 
(0.935) 
(0.707) 
(0.014) 
 
 
(0.637) 
 
 
 
(0.124) 
  1.009 
 
 
–1.224 
 
 
 
 
  0.896 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.564 
–0.125 
–0.070 
–0.006 
 
 
 
 
 
  3.721*** 
–0.019 
 
373 
96 
0.76 
(1.488) 
 
 
(0.907) 
 
 
 
 
(0.782) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.400) 
(0.948) 
(0.735) 
(0.014) 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.898) 
(0.115) 
  2.665* 
 
 
–1.182 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.191 
–0.871 
  1.320 
  2.117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.514 
–0.145 
  0.360 
–0.006 
 
 
–1.597** 
 
 
 
  0.084 
 
373 
96 
0.75 
(1.436) 
 
 
(0.880) 
 
 
 
 
 
(1.211) 
(1.381) 
(1.306) 
(1.538) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.397) 
(0.964) 
(0.713) 
(0.014) 
 
 
(0.646) 
 
 
 
(0.125) 
  2.428 
 
 
–1.109 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1.639 
–0.433 
  1.246 
–0.533 
 
 
–0.408 
–0.212 
  0.324 
–0.005 
 
 
–1.671*** 
 
 
 
0.073 
 
373 
96 
0.75 
(1.477) 
 
 
(0.875) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2.072) 
(1.297) 
(1.014) 
(1.453) 
 
 
(0.401) 
(0.932) 
(0.706) 
(0.014) 
 
 
(0.641) 
  2.870* 
 
 
–1.133 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1.247 
  0.056 
–0.520 
–0.159 
  0.148 
–0.007 
 
 
–1.690*** 
 
 
 
  0.077 
 
373 
96 
0.76 
(1.506) 
 
 
(0.879) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.983) 
(1.141) 
(0.405) 
(0.938) 
(0.716) 
(0.014) 
 
 
(0.643) 
 
 
 
(0.125) 
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LR chi2 12.37 24.62*** 15.40 14.94 13.51 
 
Note: As to the notation, see the note in Table 6.8. 
 
 
Table 6.10. Random-effects logistic regression analysis by state control subsamples.  
 
Independent variables                      Political experience                                                   Sector affiliation 
      Full state control            Partial state control           Full state control              Partial state control 
Intercept 
 
Reputation model 
Commercial objective 
Non-listing 
Listing 
 
Re-election model 
Equity (log) 
Regional presence 
Ownership ministry 
Debt ratio 
 
Ideology model 
Government party 
 
Controls 
Time trend 
 
Number of firm/year observations 
Number of firms 
Rho 
LR chi2 
–1.831 
 
 
–1.871* 
 
 
 
 
  0.521 
  0.334 
–0.414 
–0.006 
 
 
–0.434 
 
 
–0.037 
 
258 
76 
0.74 
7.71 
(1.873) 
 
 
(0.982) 
 
 
 
 
(0.552) 
(1.204) 
(0.753) 
(0.017) 
 
 
(0.842) 
 
 
(0.139) 
–4.371 
 
 
–0.778 
 
 
 
 
–0.076 
–3.335* 
  2.552 
–0.004 
 
 
  0.366 
 
 
  0.352 
 
116 
36 
0.79 
5.96 
(3.177) 
 
 
(2.745) 
 
 
 
 
(1.015) 
(1.723) 
(2.003) 
(0.033) 
 
 
(1.466) 
 
 
(0.344) 
  4.175** 
 
 
–0.958 
 
 
 
 
–0.595 
–0.652 
–0.315 
–0.018 
 
 
–2.439*** 
 
 
  0.172 
 
257 
67 
0.75 
12.58* 
(1.819) 
 
 
(0.955) 
 
 
 
 
(0.525) 
(1.142) 
(0.799) 
(0.017) 
 
 
(0.886) 
 
 
(0.142) 
–1.392 
 
 
–7.885** 
  0.431 
–1.999 
 
 
  1.402 
  0.293 
  4.093** 
  0.034 
 
 
  0.637 
 
 
–0.599* 
 
116 
36 
0.78 
12.51 
(4.133) 
 
 
(3.255) 
(3.122) 
(3.290) 
 
 
(0.964) 
(1.677) 
(1.851) 
(0.029) 
 
 
(1.219) 
 
 
(0.345) 
 
 
 
Note: As to the notation, see the note in Table 6.8. 
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Table 6.11. Random-effects logistic regression analysis by government party subsamples.  
 
Independent variables                          Political experience                                                       Sector affiliation 
   Left-wing government      Right-wing government      Left-wing government       Right-wing government 
Intercept 
 
Reputation model 
Commercial objective 
Non-listing 
Listing 
 
Re-election model 
State control 
Equity (log) 
Regional presence 
Ownership ministry 
Debt ratio 
 
Controls 
Time trend 
 
Number of firm/year observations 
Number of firms 
Rho 
LR chi2 
–1.689 
 
 
–2.184** 
 
 
 
 
–2.189* 
  0.491 
  0.033 
  0.292 
–0.006 
 
 
–0.025 
 
267 
72 
0.75 
8.90 
(1.791) 
 
 
(1.050) 
 
 
 
 
(1.172) 
(0.543) 
(1.146) 
(0.782) 
(0.017) 
 
 
(0.139) 
–2.420 
 
 
0.677 
 
 
 
 
–0.751 
  1.582** 
–3.492* 
–3.670* 
–0.017 
 
 
–0.070 
 
107 
56 
0.74 
12.72* 
(3.009) 
 
 
(2.290) 
 
 
 
 
(1.570) 
(0.781) 
(1.832) 
(2.183) 
(0.029) 
 
 
(0.359) 
  2.307 
 
 
–1.492 
–0.101 
  0.501 
 
 
 
–0.718 
  0.398 
–0.202 
  0.012 
 
 
  0.226 
 
267 
72 
0.79 
9.53 
(2.039) 
 
 
(1.077) 
(1.335) 
(1.961) 
 
 
 
(0.542) 
(1.177) 
(0.849) 
(0.177) 
 
 
(0.149) 
  3.611 
 
 
–1.459 
  1.556 
  0.981 
 
 
 
  0.076 
–2.518* 
  1.584 
–0.039 
 
 
–0.422 
 
106 
56 
0.72 
10.41 
(2.650) 
 
 
(1.911) 
(1.287) 
(2.233) 
 
 
 
(0.615) 
(1.406) 
(1.714) 
(0.025) 
 
 
(0.308) 
 
Note: As to the notation, see the note in Table 6.8. 
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Table 6.12. Random-effects logistic regression analysis by nationality subsamples.  
 
Independent variables                      Political experience                                                   Sector affiliation 
            Norway                             Sweden                         Norway                             Sweden 
Intercept 
 
Reputation model 
Commercial objective 
Non-listing 
Listing 
 
Re-election model 
State control 
Equity (log) 
Regional presence 
Ownership ministry 
Debt ratio 
 
Ideology model 
Government party 
 
Controls 
Time trend 
 
Number of firm/year observations 
Number of firms 
Rho 
LR chi2 
–2.194 
 
 
–0.524 
 
 
 
 
–0.466 
  1.642** 
–3.973** 
–2.236 
–0.017 
 
 
  0.462 
 
 
–0.203 
 
143 
56 
0.72 
14.78* 
(2.414) 
 
 
(1.695) 
 
 
 
 
(1.197) 
(0.705) 
(1.690) 
(1.497) 
(0.024) 
 
 
(1.189) 
 
 
(0.335) 
–0.899 
 
 
–2.180* 
 
 
 
 
–3.512* 
–0.507 
  2.452 
–0.202 
  0.008 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.048 
 
231 
40 
0.76 
10.40 
(2.244) 
 
 
(1.255) 
 
 
 
 
(1.819) 
(0.739) 
(1.611) 
(0.879) 
(0.020) 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.149) 
  2.796 
 
 
–1.326 
  1.253 
  1.469 
 
 
 
  0.061 
–2.469* 
  1.027 
–0.029 
 
 
  0.759 
 
 
–0.467 
 
142 
56 
0.69 
13.13 
(2.103) 
 
 
(1.458) 
(1.038) 
(1.672) 
 
 
 
(0.520) 
(1.267) 
(1.253) 
(0.021) 
 
 
(1.008) 
 
 
(0.290) 
  5.419** 
 
 
–1.675 
–0.375 
  0.651 
 
 
 
–1.711** 
  3.025* 
–1.680* 
  0.016 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.295* 
 
231 
40 
0.81 
18.66** 
(2.689) 
 
 
(1.288) 
(2.131) 
(2.461) 
 
 
 
(0.773) 
(1.558) 
(1.001) 
(0.021) 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.165) 
 
Note: As to the notation, see the note in Table 6.8. 
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6.3.1 How to explain political board appointments? 
Focusing first on the probability that SOC boards are headed by political 
representatives, Table 6.8 shows the results from the multivariate analysis. 
Because some of the independent variables are alternative measures (which 
means that Hypotheses 2–5 need to be tested separately), the table displays a 
number of alternative specifications of the basic model. Before commenting 
on the results from this analysis, we note that stock market listing is 
excluded from the table. Interestingly, this is due to the fact no political 
representatives are actually observed in the chairman position among listed 
SOCs, which means that this dependent variable is completely determined 
by stock market listing (Hypothesis 2). By contrast, non-listed firms under 
partial state control are not found to differ significantly from fully state-
owned firms. Thus, there are strong indications that stock market listing 
rather than state control is the key factor to explain (non-)political board 
appointments. This notion is supported by the results from Model 1, in 
which the state control variable appears to be negative (consistent with 
theory), but insignificant. Accordingly, Hypothesis 3 is not supported. 
Neither is there corroboration for Hypotheses 6 through 9. In fact, the model 
estimates only lend some support to Hypothesis 1, but merely at the 10% 
level. Nonetheless, it seems that political representatives are less likely 
elected as chairmen in commercial SOCs than in non-commercial SOCs 
(coefficient of –1.656; p < 0.10). More precisely, compared to non-
commercial SOCs, the SOCs that subscribe to a commercial objective have a 
14% lower probability of being chaired by political representatives.93 Model 
2 produces similar results to that of Model 1, as the former only replaces the 
government party variable with that of nationality. Thus, neither political 
ideology nor nationality has any direct influence on political board 
appointments. We also note that the results in Model 1 and 2 are not 
significantly changed when using alternative measures of firm size, or when 
using lagged instead of non-lagged variables.  
Attempting to explore whether the state control dummy is perhaps 
too imprecise to capture the effect of partial state control, Model 3 includes 
the threshold levels of state influence. Interestingly, initial analysis revealed 
that no political representatives are observed among those SOCs in which 
the state holds minority posts (≤ 33.33%). To obtain a more relevant 
classification of the state control variable I therefore combined the minority 
                                                 
93 Using some finer specifications of the type of activity performed by SOCs, Appendix F 
illustrates how political appointments vary by sector classification. Overall, this descriptive 
evidence shows that political representatives are present in nearly all relevant sectors – with 
some between-group variations. Yet, the small number of firm/year observations within each 
sector makes it difficult to draw any sound conclusions on whether there exists any 
noteworthy board selection pattern across sectors.  
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post category with that of negative control. From this, it follows that firms in 
which the state holds less than simple majority are less likely chaired by 
political representatives than is the case for fully state-owned firms 
(coefficient of –2.962; p < 0.05; marginal effect of –12%).94 No significant 
effects are found for higher threshold levels of state ownership. The results 
thus provide no support for the expectation of a successively stronger 
positive relationship between threshold levels of state control and political 
representation on the board. Furthermore, in examining the effect of co-
investors’ ownership concentration, the results showed that there are no 
political representatives within the two categories which the largest co-
investor holds less than 5% control and simple majority. Therefore, I 
reconstructed the dummy variables describing co-investment concentration 
so as to distinguish between firms in which the largest co-investor holds (at 
least) negative control versus less than negative control. As shown by Model 
4, the two dummy variables have the expected negative effect, but are not 
significant. Interestingly, this indicate that there is a curvilinear (inverted U-
form) relationship between the ownership concentration of the largest co-
investor and political board appointments, which provides mixed support for 
Hypothesis 4.95 However, this result is not surprising, since we have already 
noted that a low level of co-investor ownership concentration is highly 
correlated with stock market listing (which is a perfect predictor of political 
board appointments). Finally, Model 5 tests the effect of co-investor identity 
and finds that both non-public and public co-investors are negatively related 
to the probability that SOC boards are headed by political representatives. 
Yet, these effects are not significant, which means that Hypothesis 5 is not 
confirmed.    
To examine whether the results from the full sample are sensitive to 
whether firms are fully or partly owned by the state, I use a split sample 
approach. By this means, Table 6.10 reports that the significant effect of 
corporate objective is valid only for the group of fully state-owned firms 
(coefficient of –1.871; p < 0.10; marginal effect of –23%). Thus, the before-
mentioned negative relationship between commercial SOCs and the 
probability that SOC boards are headed by political representatives pertains 
mainly to the group of firms that are 100% state-owned (the subgroup 
difference is, however, not significant), which provides even stronger 
support for the reputation model. A more puzzling result is that regional 
                                                 
94 Using the state equity fraction instead of threshold levels of state control, the former was 
found to be significantly related to the probability that firms are chaired by political 
representatives (coefficient of 0.045; p < 0.05; marginal effect of 0.003).  
 
95 Using the equity fraction of the largest co-investor instead of threshold levels of co-investor 
ownership concentration, the equity fraction was not found to have a significant effect on the 
probability that firms are chaired by political representatives. 
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presence has a significant and negative impact on political board 
appointments among partly state-owned firms (coefficient of –3.335; p < 
0.10; marginal effect of –8%), but has no significant effect among firms 
under full state control. Yet, it is possible to trace this subgroup difference 
(which is significant in terms of interaction effects) to co-investors’ concern 
that politicians will make strategic use of regionally present SOCs; for 
instance to secure a high level of employment.  
Seeking to find out whether these results are clarified by additional 
subsample analyses, Table 6.11 reveals that the negative impact of SOC 
commercial orientation on political board appointments is mainly due to left-
wing governments (coefficient of –2.184; p < 0.05; marginal effect of –
22%). However, as the results in Table 6.12 indicate that the corporate 
objective variable is only significant in the Swedish subsample (coefficient 
of –2.180; p < 0.10; marginal effect of –21%), this also suggests that there is 
a nationality rather than an ideology effect at work. Although none of these 
subgroup differences are significant, the results still indicate that corporate 
objective as a strategic indicator of political appointments is mainly due to 
the Swedish government-owner. Moreover, the results in Tables 6.11–6.12 
show that the effect of regional presence is significant only within the right-
wing government subsample (coefficient of –3.492; p < 0.10; marginal effect 
of –22%) and is accordingly subscribed to Norwegian SOCs (coefficient of –
3.973; p < 0.05; marginal effect of –32%). However, as only the nationality 
subgroup difference is significant, it seems that the scepticism towards 
political influences on regionally present SOCs is due to nationality rather 
than ideology. Interestingly, the impact of firm size follows the same pattern, 
but with the opposite sign: Equity has a significant and positive effect on 
political board appointments within the right-wing government subsample 
(coefficient of 1.582; p < 0.05; marginal effect of 7%) and also within the 
Norwegian subsample (coefficient of 1.642 p < 0.05; marginal effect of 8%). 
Thus, in Norway, ‘visibility’ has a dual impact in that firm size and regional 
presence work in opposite ways – a result which indicates mixed support for 
Hypothesis 6. 
From Table 6.11, we also note that, within the right-wing 
government subsample, there is a significant and negative effect pertaining 
to the ownership ministry on the probability that SOC boards will be chaired 
by political representatives (coefficient of –3.670; p < 0.10; marginal effect 
of –14%). Because the moderated regression results confirm that sponsor 
ministry significantly interact with government party, this provides some 
support for Hypothesis 7, but is inconsistent with the supposition that such 
commitment devices would be more dominant under leftist governments. 
Moreover, since ownership ministry has not a significant bearing on political 
appointments within the nationality subsample (yet, the sign is still negative 
within the Norwegian subsample), it thus seems that the sponsor ministry 
effect is mainly due to ideology rather than nationality effects.  
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Finally, it appears that state control has yet a significant effect on 
political board appointments, beyond that of stock market listing. In line 
with the results in Tables 6.11–6.12, there is a negative effect of partial state 
control that is associated with left-wing governments (coefficient of –2.189; 
p < 0.10; marginal effect of –13%) and Swedish firms (coefficient of –3.512; 
p < 0.10; marginal effect of –17%). However, while this suggests that the 
mere presence of co-investors might have a negative bearing on political 
board appointments, none of these subgroup differences are significant. 
 
6.3.2 How to explain chairmen’s sector affiliation? 
If we now look at the probability that SOC boards are headed by public 
sector (versus private sector) employees, the multivariate analyses display 
some slightly different results. While Table 6.9 shows that most of the 
hypothesised relationships are insignificant (meaning that Hypotheses 1–8 
are not confirmed), the government party and nationality variables appear as 
significant predictors of chairmen’s sector affiliation.96 More precisely, the 
results from Model 1 (as well as Model 3–5) show that right-wing 
governments are less likely than left-wing governments to recruit chairmen 
from the public sector (in Model 1 there is a coefficient of –1.621; p < 0.05; 
marginal effect of –38%). However, the findings also confirm the effect of 
nationality in that Model 2 (replacing government party with nationality) 
reveals a positive association between Swedish firms and the likelihood that 
public sector employees chair the SOC boards (coefficient of 3.721; p < 
0.01). In practical terms, there is in fact a 71% higher probability that public 
sector employees will be recruited to the chairman position in Sweden than 
in Norway. But, since there is also a strong positive relationship between 
government party and nationality, it is not possible to discern the two effects 
in the full sample. Seeking to disentangle ideology and nationality effects by 
means of nationality subsample analysis (Table 6.12), we note that there is 
no significant relationship between government party and the sector 
affiliation of chairmen. While this result suggests that Hypothesis 9 is not 
substantiated, it also provides evidence that the Norwegian practice of 
prohibiting currently serving politicians and state bureaucrats to serve on 
SOC boards certainly lead to fewer public sector employees in the chairman 
position. 
Although, in the full sample, there are no significant effects related 
to Hypotheses 1–8, some of these relationships actually turn up differently in 
                                                 
96 Also note that the results in Model 1 and 2 are not sensitive to alternative measures of firm 
size. When using lagged instead of non-lagged variables, the government party variable now 
appears to be significant only at the 10% level, which is probably to due to fewer 
observations. 
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the subsample analyses. Particularly, Table 6.10 indicates that there are some 
significant subgroup differences between firms under full and partial state 
control, which is confirmed by the moderated regression analysis. First, there 
is a negative and significant association between commercial orientation and 
the probability that SOC boards are chaired by public sector employees 
(coefficient of –7.885; p < 0.05) – but this effect is evident only within the 
group of partly state-owned firms. In fact, compared to non-commercial 
SOCs, there is a 96% lower probability that commercial SOCs are recruiting 
their chairmen from the public sector.97 Second, among partly state-owned 
firms, there is a positive and significant relationship between ownership 
ministry and the probability that SOC chairmen are public sector employees 
(coefficient of 4.093; p < 0.05; marginal effect of 76%), while no such 
relationship exists among fully state-owned firms. This result is, however, at 
odds with theoretical expectations, since it was expected that both partial 
state control and the fact that SOCs are being administered by the ownership 
ministry should have a negative effect on the probability that SOC boards 
will be headed by public sector employees. Thus, in contrast to Hypothesis 
7, it seems that the ownership ministry is far more eager than sectoral 
ministries to secure public influence on SOC boards, but that this effect is 
only valid in the group of firms under partial state control. Third, we note 
that the government party effect (which is actually a nationality effect) only 
appears within the group of fully state-owned firms (coefficient of –2.439; p 
< 0.01; marginal effect of –54%), which indicates that Swedish SOCs are 
less likely than their Norwegian counterparts to appoint public sector 
employees to the chairman position in firms under full state control. Fourth, 
there is a significant negative time trend effect within the group of firms 
under partial state control (coefficient of –0.599; p < 0.10); from one year to 
another there is a 14% lower probability that SOCs will be chaired by public 
sector employees. Taken together, therefore, there are different factors at 
work in the state control subsamples with regard to the probability that SOC 
chairmen are recruited from the public sector.  
Attempting to explore if the determinants of sector affiliation differ 
according to government party subsamples, the results in Table 6.11 largely 
refute this notion. The only exception is the result that, in the right-wing 
government subsample, regional presence is significantly and negatively 
related to public sector representation at the SOC boards.98 As the nationality 
                                                 
97 Again, we might ask if even better predictions could be made if breaking SOCs down into 
more specific sector groups. As in the case of political board appointments, the descriptive 
evidence in Appendix F shows that public sector employees are present in nearly all relevant 
sectors – with some variations across sectors and countries. 
 
98 While the moderated regression show that there are some significant subgroup differences 
with regard to firm size (equity) and time trend, none of these effects are significant within the 
subsamples.  
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subsample analysis (Table 6.12) and moderated regression results reveal, 
however, this visibility effect is due to nationality rather than ideology 
(coefficient of –2.469; p < 0.10; marginal effect of –49%). By contrast, in 
the Swedish subsample, there is both a positive effect of regional presence 
and a negative effect of firm size on the probability of recruiting public 
sector employees (coefficients of 3.025 and –1.711; p < 0.10 and 0.05; 
marginal effects of 37% and –14%, respectively). Again, the findings 
therefore indicate mixed support for the notion of visibility (Hypothesis 6). 
Moreover, in the Swedish case, the ownership ministry has a significant and 
negative impact on public sector representation on SOC boards (coefficient 
of –1.680; p < 0.10; marginal effect of –12%), which suggests that the 
above-noted positive effect pertaining to the ownership ministry among 
firms under partial state control is mainly due to Norwegian firms. This latter 
subsample difference is, however, not significant. Finally, within the 
Swedish subsample, there is a positive time trend effect on the probability of 
recruiting public sector employees to the chairman position (coefficient of 
0.295; p < 0.10; marginal effect of 2%). This subsample difference is also 
significant.   
 
 
6.4 Summary and Conclusions 
Given the results of this study, it seems that the theoretical ideas about SOC 
board appointments are weakly associated with actual practices. Despite of 
some significant partial effects, the models have all low explanatory power 
(as given by the likelihood ratio-statistics). Moreover, nearly all significant 
results are traced to nation-specificity, which render the governance models 
less applicable across national boundaries. Perhaps most interesting is the 
finding that the negative effect of commercial orientation on the probability 
that SOCs will be chaired by political representatives is mainly due to 
Swedish firms, although the subsample difference is not significant. Also 
noteworthy is the result that the visibility effect works differently both 
within and across national boundaries. In Norway, regional presence is 
negatively associated with both political and public sector appointments, 
while the opposite holds for firm size (although the effect upon sector 
affiliation is not significant). By contrast, the findings for the Swedish 
subsample show that while regional presence is positively related to both 
political and public sector appointments, the opposite holds for firm size 
(none of the effects upon political experience are yet significant). Whereas 
we can only speculate that these seemingly puzzled results are due to 
strategic considerations regarding the impact of political influences, they 
nevertheless provide some support for the notion that political influences are 
more pronounced in visible firms. Among the few significant results that are 
not nation-specific, there is a remarkably strong negative relationship 
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between commercial orientation and public sector recruitment within the 
group of partly state-owned firms.  
The general lack of significant results is though interesting per se, as 
it suggests that very few variables among the most obvious candidates are 
supported by empirical evidence. The questions yet remain how we should 
interpret the many insignificant effects and whether future research might 
produce some more insight into SOC board appointments. First, there is of 
course a chance that the results of this study pertain to the specific sample 
period and that the outcomes would have been altered if more years were 
included. For instance, the data set allowed no more than a weak test of the 
ideology model as it includes only one government change. Besides, there is 
the possibility of confounding nationality and ideology effects. Clearly, 
further studies covering more election periods and government changes 
would help discovering the validity of the present findings. Also, the 
inclusion of more election periods would allow the testing of some finer 
hypotheses about political strategies; for example, whether office-seeking 
politicians are more inclined to appoint politically affiliated chairmen at the 
end of the election period than at the beginning. As to why this should be the 
case, it seems that politicians have a greater opportunity for influencing SOC 
behaviour when in office than when in opposition, which means they might 
benefit more from having political affiliates in the chairman position when 
not longer themselves in government office. 
Second, there is the possibility that the dependent variables represent 
insufficient measures of chairmen’s professional background. Admittedly, 
the proxies used in this study might both be too conservative and too rough, 
which suggest that we should focus on some more specific attributes of 
chairmen’s professional life. In support of this idea, corporate governance 
activists have generally recommended that shareholders recruit corporate 
directors on the basis of their functional expertise, specialised knowledge, 
and links with certain stakeholders (Kosnik, 1990). From this view, we 
might hypothesise that, say, firms with a high debt ratio might not be 
associated with private sector employees as such, but rather with 
representatives from financial institutions – regardless of sector affiliation. 
Thus, one possible venue for future research is to look onto the broader 
career track of chairmen to achieve a better understanding of why they are 
deemed as proper candidates for the job.  
Third, the governance models might be inadequately specified to the 
extent that I have omitted some key explanatory factors. This possibility is 
already discussed as only a few criteria are included within the confines of 
the reputation model. Perhaps most important, firm performance is excluded 
from the model, which is otherwise claimed to be an important determinant 
of board appointments (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991, 1998). Additionally, 
I have excluded some more refined contingency explanations of board 
appointments, which suggest that shareholders use board appointments as a 
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vehicle for dealing with certain aspects of the external environment (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978). For instance, prior research has shown that shareholders 
might like to appoint chairmen with political power to obtain a favourable 
regulatory climate (Selznick, 1949; Pfeffer, 1972; Hillman, 2005). In line 
with this idea, future research could examine whether SOC board selection 
follows a pattern where politicians (and potential co-investors) attempt to 
match the personal attributes of chairmen (e.g., political experience) with the 
firm’s particular needs (e.g., the need for building alliances with foreign 
political institutions).   
Finally, the lack of robust results may be an indication that SOC 
board appointments follow other logics than those suggested in this thesis. 
Surely, I have already noted that most of the unexplained variance is firm-
specific, which means that board selection patterns are not easily uncovered 
by cross-sectional analysis. For example, it might be the case that some 
SOCs are – for historical, contextual, or national reasons – perceived as 
more ‘politicised’ than others. Moreover, we cannot ignore the possibility 
that because SOCs are so different, it is not possible to identify any ‘optimal’ 
board recruitment pattern across firms. Yet another option is that board 
appointments are partly a result of political exchanges, like when politicians 
representing those political parties that provide support for minority 
governments are appointed as chairmen. In future work, qualitative research 
(e.g., by case studies and interview evidence) into these mechanisms might 
help to clarify the outcomes of board appointments.  
While it is difficult to say ex ante which of these four interpretations 
is the most salient, the next two chapters will provide us with important 
information on this issue. Specifically, if the same independent variables are 
found to be equally weak predictors of CEO compensation contracts and 
dividend payments, this strongly suggests that the governance models are 
misspecified. If, however, the same variables turn out to be significant 
predictors, we might lend some support to the first and latter of the above 
interpretations. As it stands, the results have nonetheless implications for 
public policy as they provide support for the view that nation-specific 
institutional arrangements matter to board selection processes. In particular, 
when compared to the Swedish system, the Norwegian practice of excluding 
currently serving politicians and state bureaucrats from taking SOC board 
seats seems to result in fewer public sector employees being recruited to the 
chairman position. Moreover, the fraction of political chairmen who are 
appointed by their own government is significantly larger in Norway than in 
Sweden. This result is noteworthy, since it indicates that politicians possibly 
feel more comfortable with recruiting rival political representatives who are 
also members of the Parliament. For one thing, this might be due to the fact 
that both Parliamentary and government members are eventually 
accountable to the voters, which means they are likely to broadly agree on 
what kinds of governance decisions are politically legitimate. For another, 
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politicians in office might consider it easier to exert some influence on 
Parliamentary members than on prior political representatives. Also, it is 
probably easier to identify chairman candidates among those rival political 
representatives who are currently serving in Parliament. When also taking 
into account the need for role separation (e.g., ownership and regulation), 
public policy makers should therefore explore whether board diversity and 
board competence can actually be increased if state representatives were 
allowed to sit on SOC boards, because such practice would certainly lead to 
a larger pool of candidates being considered for SOC chairman positions. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Chief Executive Compensation Contracts:  
Empirical Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Over the past decade, CEO compensation contracts have come under major 
public scrutiny and populist attack. This results partly from the well-known 
corporate failures of firms like Enron and Skandia, which involved severe 
manipulations of accounting figures as a means to increase managerial 
bonuses and stock option values. But the attention to CEO pay is also a 
result of increased transparency on executive compensation data, with the 
accompanying effect that the financial press regularly reports instances of 
‘excessive’ compensation levels. The fact that CEO pay has now become a 
public issue has also brought politicians to the managerial bargaining table, 
where politicians urge that corporate directors curb top-level pay in the 
interest of social equity and statesmanship (Jensen and Murphy, 1990b). Of 
course, in those countries which the state holds direct ownership stakes, the 
government (in its capacity as owner) has a legitimate voice in the design of 
CEO compensation contracts. The questions remain, however, how political 
influences are channelled and whether political pressure results in more than 
symbolic sacrifices at the top managerial level. Seeking answers to these 
questions, this chapter offers a thorough analysis of the CEO compensation 
contracts that were used in Norwegian and Swedish SOCs over the sample 
period. More specifically, I examine the level and structure of compensation 
contracts and the factors that might explain how these pay packages come to 
be the way they are.  
The chapter progresses as follows: Section 7.1 gives an overview of 
the theory, data and method that are used to analyse CEO compensation 
contracts. Section 7.2 provides an in-depth empirical description of the basic 
compensation components, including pay levels, incentive schemes, and 
golden parachutes. Section 7.3 examines the factors that are hypothesised to 
have an impact on the level and structure of CEO compensation contracts. 
Section 7.4 concludes with a summary and discussion of the theoretical and 
empirical implications of the findings.  
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7.1 Theory, Data and Method: Recap and Specifications  
The following model is used to examine the level and structure of CEO 
compensation contracts:  
 
Total level of CEO cash compensation = ƒ{chairman’s professional 
background, state control, corporate objective, stock market listing, 
firm size, CEO recruitment channel, board size, compensation 
committee, CEO tenure, chairman CEO, nationality, time trend, 
error term}.99  
 
Previously, I have provided the theoretical justifications regarding the choice 
of these variables. To recap the main theoretical points, I start from the 
assumption that corporate directors are likely to care about their re-election 
prospects, which means they would design CEO compensation contracts so 
as to please the shareholder(s). More precisely, I suggest that the board of 
directors will be more attentive to political signals in those cases which state 
control is strong and the chairmen are political representatives (public sector 
employees) than in cases of partial state control and non-political (private 
sector employee) chairmen. Alternatively, we might assume that corporate 
directors care about their reputation, which suggests they attempt to signal 
competence by paying attention to the standard economic determinants of 
CEO compensation packages. In the case of state ownership, I propose that 
these economic determinants include corporate objective, stock market 
listing, firm size, and CEO recruitment channel. Finally, I recognise the 
possibility that top managers themselves might have a profound influence on 
the pay-setting process. In particular, the scope for managerial influences is 
likely to depend on aspects like board size, the presence of a compensation 
committee, CEO tenure, and the possibility that the chairman is also a CEO. 
Lastly, due to nation-specific institutional features and possible time trends, I 
control for nationality and time effects. Table 7.1 provides a summary of 
variable definitions and the predicted sign of bivariate relations between 
independent variables and the three compensation variables.  
                                                 
99 Additionally, two more dependent variables are included in the analysis as I seek to 
examine the probability that the CEO contract includes (i) an incentive scheme and (ii) a 
golden parachute.    
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Table 7.1. Summary of variable definitions and theoretical predictions. 
 
                                                                                     Dependent variables 
Independent variables             Total cash compensation 
 
Continuous variable: Sum of fixed salary,  
annual bonuses, and miscellaneous benefits  
in 2005-constant NOK (log) 
Incentive scheme 
 
Dummy variable: Incentive scheme 
adopted (=1) or not (=0) 
Golden parachute 
 
Dummy variable: Golden 
parachute adopted (=1) or not (=0) 
Re-election model (political influences) 
 
Chairman’s professional background (hypotheses 1a–1c) 
Dummy variable: Political (=1) versus non-political (=0) representative 
 
State control (hypotheses 2a–2c) 
Dummy variable: Partial (=1) versus full (=0) state ownership 
 
 
 
– 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
– 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
– 
 
 
+ 
Reputation model (economic citeria) 
 
Corporate objective (hypotheses 3a–3c) 
Dummy variable: Commercial (=1) versus non-commercial (=0) 
objective 
 
Stock market listing (hypotheses 4a–4c) 
Dummy variable: Listed firms under partial state control versus non-
listed firms under partial state control, with firms under full state 
control as benchmark category* 
 
Firm size (hypotheses 5a–5c) 
Continuous variable: Firm size (log equity)  
 
CEO recruitment channel (hypotheses 6) 
Dummy variables: CEO recruited from the private sector (=1) versus 
from the public sector or within the firm (=0) 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
– 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
– 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
– 
 
 
? 
    
   150
Managerial influences 
 
Board size (hypotheses 7a–7b) 
Continuous variable: Number of corporate directors on the board 
 
Compensation committee (hypotheses 8a–8b)  
Dummy variable: Compensation committee present (=1) versus non-
present (=0) 
 
CEO tenure (hypotheses 9a–9b) 
Continuous variable: Number of years in the CEO position 
 
Chair is CEO (hypotheses 10a–10b) 
Dummy variables: Chair is a CEO (=1) versus non-CEO (=0) 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
– 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
+/– 
 
 
+/– 
 
 
 
+/– 
 
 
+/– 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
– 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
Controls 
 
Nationality  
Dummy variable: Norway (=0) versus Sweden (=1) 
 
Time trend 
Continuous variable ranging from 1-5 (2001,…, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
+/– 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
+/– 
 
 
– 
 
 
 
 
+/– 
 
 
? 
 
 
Note: A plus (minus) sign in a column indicates that the independent variable is expected to have a positive (negative) effect on the compensation outcome. A combined plus/minus sign indicates that 
the prospective impact on compensation outcomes is uncertain (theoretical ambiguity). A question mark indicates no strong à priori expectation regarding the sign of the independent variable.  
 
* The predicted sign is valid when comparing listed and non-listed firms under partial state control to the benchmark category. In line with theory, however, I expect the major difference between the 
categories is found between listed SOCs and non-listed SOCs.  
 
To increase the robustness of analysis, I also test for some alternative measures. The chairman’s professional background is also measured by a dummy variable that distinguishes between public 
sector employees (=1) and private sector employees (=0). The state control variable also includes the equity fraction held by the state. Additionally, I use a set of dummy variables indicating voting 
threshold levels with three cut-off points (33.34%, 50.01% and 66.67%) and state ownership stake = 100% as benchmark category. In line with theory, I expect a successively stronger negative 
relationship between these voting threshold levels and compensation outcomes. Similarly, co-investment characteristics are measured by both the equity fraction held by the largest co-investor and a 
set of dummy variables indicating voting and conventional cut-off points (5%, 33.34%, and 50.01%) and state ownership stake = 100% as benchmark category. According to theory, I expect a 
successively stronger positive relationship between these threshold levels and compensation outcomes. To account for co-investor identity I use a set of dummy variables, distinguishing between 
cases where the largest co-investor is public or non-public, and with state ownership stake = 100% as benchmark category. The firm size variable includes the additional measures of total assets (log) 
and number of employees (log). Finally, the CEO tenure variable includes the additional measure of board independence, which is assessed in terms of the tenure of the board chairman minus the 
tenure of the CEO. Two different specifications are used, one including all years the chairman has served on the board (i.e., including years served as a rank-and-file director), the other including only 
those years in the chairman position. 
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To analyse these issues, we note that the original sample covers data about 
CEO compensation contracts over the period 2000-2005. To ensure time-
matching of data, however, we need to account for the fact that those 
compensation packages being observed in, say, the 2001 annual reports, 
were actually agreed upon by the SOC boards in year 2000. Therefore, to 
make sure that the independent variables might actually have an impact on 
the design of compensation contracts, they are lagged by one year. But, due 
to data unavailability prior to year 2000, this means that I use compensation 
data for five years only (2001-2005). 
As regards the method that is used to analyse CEO compensation 
contracts, it includes random-effects models with linear regression for 
continuous outcomes (CEO pay levels) and logistic regression for binary 
outcomes (the presence of incentives schemes and golden parachutes). 
Besides the above-discussed advantages of the random-effects procedure, we 
should also note that this procedure is particularly helpful in mitigating 
compensation outliers (which are normally present in cross-sectional 
studies), in that it averages compensation outcomes over the five-year 
period. Previously, however, I have drawn attention to the problem that one 
of the independent variables in our compensation models – namely, the 
chairman’s professional background – is possibly explained by some of the 
other independent variables (e.g., corporate objective and state control). 
Undeniably, this problem might severely impede our possibilities to estimate 
the effects of the various independent variables on CEO pay-setting. But, 
since the analysis in Chapter 6 revealed that the board appointment equations 
were largely insignificant, this suggests that I pay no special attention to this 
problem in the present analysis.  
 
7.2 How do the CEO Compensation Contracts look like? 
While today company annual reports often provide detailed data on CEO 
compensation contracts, such data might be reported in very different ways. 
Those interested parties who cursory inspect annual reports might therefore 
find it difficult to compare executive pay across firms and over time. 
Moreover, financial press reports of executive pay data are mostly anecdotal 
and non-representative. For these reasons, I provide in this section a 
thorough description of the basic components of CEO compensation 
contracts among our sample firms. Table 7.2 reports the summary statistics 
for the level and structure of executive compensation packages. 
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Table 7.2. Summary statistics for the CEO compensation variables. 
 
CEO compensation variables Norway Sweden 
 Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 Std.dev. n Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 Std.dev. n 
Compensation levels             
Total cash compensation 1621.01 859 1326 1938 1121.14 254 2312.94 1063 1617 2696 2039.91 215 
Fixed salary  1525.05 823 1314 1861 942.57 234 2093.00 1046 1612 2392 1516.00 208 
Incentive components 
            
Incentive scheme 0.26 0 0 1 0.44 254 0.32 0 0 1 0.47 215 
Short-term incentive programme 0.84 1 1 1 0.37 67 1 1 1 1 0 69 
Internal performance standard 1 1 1 1 0 40 0.95 1 1 1 0.22 60 
Multiple incentive dimensions 0.70 0 1 1 0.46 40 0.73 0 1 1 0.45 60 
Bonus cap 29.01 20.8 25 30 12.86 34 30.33 15 30 50 18.52 51 
Bonus payment 473.44 54.5 207 417.5 712.07 32 844.86 30.5 434 1156 1484.97 56 
Bonus share  15.06 3 11.5 23 16.40 32 20.69 2.5 14 29.5 38.82 56 
Long-term incentive programme 0.52 0 1 1 0.50 67 0.35 0 0 1 0.48 69 
Value shareholding 1801.53 438 715 2666.5 2104.15 32 5008.75 430 1134.5 6084.5 7942.62 20 
CEO ownership share  0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 32 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0006 20 
Golden parachutes             
Golden parachute 0.42 0 0 1 0.49 254 0.89 1 1 1 0.31 215 
Golden parachute size 14.03 9 12 18 7.96 106 16.43 18 18 18 5.06 191 
 
Note: The table reports the sample statistics, by nationality, for the principal components of CEO compensation contracts. The columns show the mean, quartiles, and the standard deviation of the compensation 
measures. Q1, Q2 (median) and Q3 refer to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile, respectively. n is the number of firm/year observations. Total cash compensation is the sum of fixed salary, annual bonuses, and 
miscellaneous benefits. Fixed salary is the base (non-contingent) salary. Incentive scheme is a dummy variable set to one if the compensation contract includes performance-based pay components (short-term 
and/or long-term), zero otherwise. Short-term incentive programme is a dummy variable set to one if the incentive scheme includes an annual bonus component, zero otherwise. Internal performance standard 
is a dummy variable set to one if the measure(s) used to evaluate managerial performance in the annual bonus plan are based on firm-specific goals, zero otherwise. Multiple incentive dimensions is a dummy 
variable set to one if the annual bonus plan includes multiple performance criteria to evaluate managerial performance, zero otherwise. Bonus cap states the maximum bonus paid (in percent of fixed salary) if 
the CEO achieves the pre-determined performance criteria. Bonus payment is the value of the actual bonus paid. Bonus share is the share (in percent of fixed salary) of actual bonus paid. Long-term incentive 
programme is a dummy variable set to one if the CEO holds shares and/or stock options, zero otherwise. Value shareholding is the number of shares held by the CEO multiplied by the market value of the 
stock at year-end. CEO ownership share is the percentage of the firm’s outstanding shares held by the CEO. Golden parachute is a dummy variable set to one if the compensation contract includes a golden 
parachute, zero otherwise. Golden parachute size refers to the magnitude (number of months) of the golden parachute contract. All compensation amounts are expressed in 2005 NOK thousand and adjusted for 
CPI. 
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7.2.1 Compensation levels 
How much are CEOs in firms under state control really paid? Looking at the 
compensation measures in Table 7.2, some important facts emerge. The most 
striking aspect is that the level of total cash compensation is considerably 
higher among Swedish SOCs than among their Norwegian counterparts. 
This result corresponds with that of previous research, which has found the 
level of executive pay to be significantly higher among Swedish firms than 
among Norwegian ones, where the sample includes publicly traded firms 
(Randøy and Nielsen, 2002). Indeed, our data show that while Swedish 
CEOs receive, on average, an annual total cash compensation of NOK 2313 
thousand, Norwegian CEOs obtain an annual average total pay of NOK 1621 
thousand. These pay differences are also reflected in terms of fixed salary, in 
which case top managers in Swedish and Norwegian SOCs receive, on 
average, a base annual salary of NOK 2093 thousand and NOK 1525 
thousand, respectively. Even more interesting, we might infer from these 
numbers that total cash compensation is largely attributable to non-
contingent pay and only limitedly so to annual bonuses. Moreover, in both 
countries, the median levels of pay are below average pay levels (median 
levels are shown in the Q2, or second quartile, column), which indicate some 
skewness in the compensation measures. Additionally, the pay data reveals 
substantial variation in executive pay levels across SOCs. More precisely, 
data shows that, in Norway, the SOC at the 25th percentile (Q1) pays its CEO 
a total amount of NOK 859 thousand whereas the SOC at the 75th percentile 
(Q3) offers a cash compensation of NOK 1938 thousand. Likewise, in 
Sweden, the SOC at the 25th percentile grants its CEO a total pay of NOK 
1063 thousand whereas the SOC at the 75th percentile pays a cash 
compensation of NOK 2696 thousand. 
To examine if, and by how much, compensation levels have changed 
over the sample period, Figure 7.1 depicts the median levels of total cash 
compensation in Norway and Sweden over the years 2000-2005.100 In line 
with the dummy variable notation, Norwegian compensation data are 
displayed at the left-hand side (value 0) and Swedish compensation data are 
shown at the right hand-side (value 1) of the figure. One striking observation 
is that, in Norway, the compensation level has increased substantially 
between 2000 and 2005 (in 2005-constant NOK thousand); from NOK 999.5 
thousand in 2000 to NOK 1548 thousand in 2005. By contrast, Swedish 
compensation levels are fairly stable over the six-year period, increasing 
from NOK 1666.5 thousand in 2000 to NOK 1726 thousand in 2005 (with 
some annual drops in compensation levels over the period). Importantly, 
                                                 
100 For the sake of parsimony, the figure only shows the level of total cash compensation. The 
same pattern applies to the level of fixed salary.  
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these patterns indicate that Norwegian CEOs are about to catch up to the 
compensation levels of their Swedish counterparts.   
 
 
Figure 7.1. Level of total CEO cash compensation, by nationality. 
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Note: The figure shows the median level of total cash compensation (in 2005-constant NOK thousand) in 
Norway and Sweden over the years 2000-2005. In line with the dummy variable notation, Norwegian 
SOCs are assigned the value 0 and Swedish SOCs are assigned the value 1 (Norwegian and Swedish 
SOCs thus appear at the left-hand and right hand-side of the figure, respectively). The samples include all 
SOCs from which compensation data are available (n = 254 and n = 215 for Norway and Sweden, 
respectively).  
 
 
7.2.2 Incentive schemes 
Now that we know how much the CEOs in sample are paid, we turn our 
attention to the question of how they are paid. Is the compensation of top 
managers in SOCs dependent on performance or are CEOs virtually paid like 
bureaucrats?101 While incentives schemes have grown to become natural 
parts of CEO compensation contracts in for-profit and publicly traded firms, 
                                                 
101 This question paraphrases that of Jensen and Murphy (1990b). More generally, the trade-
off between contingent and non-contingent pay is probably the most central concern in the US 
literature on executive compensation.  
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there are strong reasons to expect that performance-based pay components 
are less pervasive among firms under state control. As discussed in Chapter 
4, this might be due to political concerns about incentive schemes leading to 
excessive compensation levels, difficulties in measuring performance in non-
commercial SOCs, and a low political risk profile. The data in Table 7.2 
confirms this expectation insofar as incentive schemes are, on average, 
included in 26% and 32% of the CEO compensation contracts in Norway 
and Sweden, respectively. Among those SOCs including incentive schemes 
in the CEO compensation contracts, nearly all use short-term incentives, 
which are recorded in 84% of the Norwegian cases and 100% of the Swedish 
cases. However, long-term incentives are also present in the compensation 
packages. Indeed, shareholdings, stock options, or both are present in 52% 
and 35% of the incentive schemes in Norway and Sweden, respectively.   
To improve our understanding of the type of incentive schemes used 
in SOCs, we take a closer look at some of the different components in CEO 
annual bonus plans. Following Murphy (2001), annual bonus plans can be 
categorised in terms of three basic elements, including performance 
standards, performance measures, and bonus caps.102 Broadly speaking, 
performance standards refer to whether the CEO’s performance is measured 
relative to internal or external factors. More specifically, performance 
standards are categorised as internal if the measure(s) used to evaluate 
managerial performance are based on firm-specific goals. By contrast, 
performance standards are categorised as external if based on performance 
measured relative to other firms in the industry or market. From Table 7.2, 
we note that for those SOCs which data on performance standards are 
available, almost every firm uses an internal performance standard (which is 
present in 100% and 95% of the observations in Norway and Sweden, 
respectively). Although we should expect that both internal and external 
performance standards provide incentives to improve firm performance, 
there are yet some additional incentive effects in firms with internally 
determined standards. Most important, the CEO can take actions that affect 
the standard in a current or future year (e.g., income smoothing), which 
might actually conflict with the corporate objective(s) (Murphy, 2001). 
While the present data set does not allow empirical testing of this 
proposition, we only note the possibility that top managers in SOCs might 
have profound influence over the standard-setting process.  
As to the specific performance measures used in the annual bonus 
plans, Appendix C provides a detailed overview of these criteria as well as 
                                                 
102 Actually, the bonus cap is only a sub-element in the incentive component covering pay-
performance relations. According to Murphy (2001), pay-performance relations signify the 
shape of the bonus plan (convex, linear, or concave), whether bonus is paid at a performance 
threshold, and whether the bonus is capped. As regards the first two among these measures, 
the annual reports at hand do not provide such information.  
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the other incentive components being included in the CEO compensation 
contracts of individual firms. One result emerging from this descriptive 
analysis is that SOCs use a variety of financial and non-financial 
performance measures. As documented in Table 7.2, the vast majority of 
SOCs in Norway and Sweden uses in fact multiple performance criteria 
(instead of a single criterion) to evaluate managerial performance, which 
appear in 70% and 73% of the cases, respectively. While the financial 
measures typically include accounting figures, budgetary plans, or economic 
value added, the non-financial measures include product quality, customer 
satisfaction, and safety, amongst others. Another result is that while the 
incentive schemes are largely explicit, some are even based on discretion. In 
line with US data on annual bonus plans, discretion shows up in that boards 
might exercise discretion in allocating the bonus pool or in that the CEOs 
might have some portion of their bonus depend on ‘individual performance’ 
(Murphy, 2001). Also, we should note that only one sample firm explicitly 
states the need to adjust for external fluctuations (e.g., unforeseen price 
increases) in order not to reward or punish the CEO for factors he cannot 
control. 
Finally, the bonus cap states the maximum bonus paid if the CEO 
achieves the pre-determined performance criteria. Interestingly, nearly 40% 
of the SOCs do not provide any information about such threshold levels. 
Among those SOCs that report on this issue, the incentive plans are 
averagely capped at 29% and 30% of fixed salary in Norway and Sweden, 
respectively. While, in Table 7.2, it is reported that the average bonus share 
paid amounts to 15% (in Norway) and 21% (in Sweden) of fixed salary, 
there is thus a gap between actual bonus payments and target bonuses. Given 
this, it seems that the criteria underlying incentive schemes are not only 
stated for symbolic purposes, but are actually not easy to fulfil. Again, 
however, we should note that the data reveals substantial variation. This 
observation becomes particularly evident when looking at the absolute 
numbers of bonus payments. In both countries, the median level of annual 
bonus payment is significantly lower than the average bonus level. Also, 
when using the average bonus payments to estimate the bonus share in 
percent of (average) fixed salary, these numbers now amount to 31% and 
40% in Norway and Sweden, respectively. Although the small sample size of 
firms using incentive schemes prevents us from drawing any statistically 
sound conclusions on this matter (remember that the n in Table 7.2 refers to 
firm/year observations and not the absolute number of SOCs), the data 
strongly suggest that short-term incentive pay is very unequally distributed 
across SOCs.  
To examine whether the use of incentive schemes has changed over 
the sample period, Figure 7.2 shows the annual percentage of SOCs using 
incentive schemes (short-term or long-term incentives, or both). Once again, 
Norwegian SOCs are displayed at the left-hand side (value 0) and Swedish 
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SOCs at the right hand-side (value 1) of the figure, in which two striking 
patterns emerge. The first observation is that, in Norway, incentive schemes 
have successively grown in importance from 2000 to 2005, from 10% in 
2000 to 34% in 2005. Interestingly, this result largely corresponds with the 
increase in Norwegian pay levels over the six-year period (cf. Figure 7.1). 
But since we have already documented that fixed salaries are also increasing 
over the sample period (not shown in figure), this suggests that bonus 
payments are merely put on the top of CEOs’ fixed salary. Accordingly, 
there are no indications that SOCs substitute contingent for non-contingent 
compensation. The second observation concerns the considerable drop in the 
use of incentive schemes (from 37% in 2000 to 14% in 2005) among 
Swedish SOCs, which coincides with the government policy of prohibiting 
incentives at the top managerial level. Thus, while in the period 2000-2003, 
incentive schemes were more commonly employed among Swedish SOCs 
than among their Norwegian counterparts, the pattern is reversed from 2004. 
In support of the Norwegian case (but in the opposite direction), we also 
note that the reduction in incentive schemes among Swedish SOCs are not 
followed by any cutbacks in total compensation levels. By contrast, it seems 
that top managers who were previously candidates for receiving annual 
bonuses are somewhat compensated for the removal of potential bonus 
payments by receiving higher levels of fixed salaries. By and large, 
therefore, there are strong indications that the incentive schemes employed 
by Norwegian and Swedish SOCs provide the CEOs with beneficial effects 
only and few (if any) compensation risks (like financial penalties for poor 
performance). 
As regards long-term incentive schemes, these mostly include 
shareholdings and stock options. Among the two, direct ownership of shares 
represents the most powerful link between shareholder wealth and executive 
wealth (Jensen and Murphy, 1990b). Table 7.2 reports that, among those 
CEOs holding ownership in SOCs, the average value of such shareholdings 
amounts to NOK 1802 thousand and NOK 5009 thousand in Norway and 
Sweden, respectively. Yet, variation across SOCs is high in that the 
corresponding median value of these shareholdings equals NOK 715 
thousand and NOK 1135 thousand (with standard deviations equal to NOK 
2104 thousand and NOK 7943 thousand, respectively). However, rather than 
merely looking at the cash value of CEOs’ shareholdings, one might argue 
that the incentive effects of direct ownership are mainly tied to the 
percentage of the firm’s outstanding shares the CEO owns (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990a). Looking at the data, this incentive effect is very small as 
the average CEO controls only 0.0001% and 0.0004% of the stock in 
Norway and Sweden, respectively (the corresponding median numbers equal 
0.0000% and 0.0000%). Although we do not have sufficient information to 
estimate the value of CEO stock options, there is no indication that options 
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might bear some stronger incentive effects than direct ownership (using the 
number of stock options granted as a rough proxy).  
 
 
Figure 7.2. Percentage of SOCs using incentive schemes, by nationality. 
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Note: The figure shows the percentage of SOCs using incentive schemes in Norway and Sweden over the 
years 2000-2005. In line with the dummy variable notation, Norwegian SOCs are assigned the value 0 
and Swedish SOCs are assigned the value 1 (Norwegian and Swedish SOCs thus appear at the left-hand 
and right hand-side of the figure, respectively). The samples include all SOCs from which compensation 
data are available (n = 254 and n = 215 for Norway and Sweden, respectively).  
 
 
7.2.3 Golden parachutes 
With regard to SOC boards’ inclination to adopt golden parachutes, there are 
once again significant national differences. In fact, while 42% of Norwegian 
SOCs include golden parachutes in their CEO compensation contracts, as 
much as 89% of Swedish SOCs provide such contractual agreements. 
Intuitively, this is a striking result since most Swedish SOCs are under full 
state control. Thus, the standard argument that golden parachutes are offered 
to managers who are forced to leave the firm when a change of control takes 
place, seems not to be valid. Yet, the prevalence of golden parachutes should 
not come as a surprise, since the governments’ guidelines concerning terms 
of employment offer the possibility of providing CEOs security during a 
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transitional period. While this might not explain the fact that golden 
parachutes are more commonly employed among Swedish SOCs than among 
Norwegian ones, we might only speculate that Swedish firms are more likely 
to ‘import’ governance elements (like the adoption of golden parachutes) 
from the Anglo-American corporate governance system (Oxelheim and 
Randøy, 2003). Focusing on the adoption of golden parachutes on a year-to-
year basis, Figure 7.3 shows that, in Norway, golden parachute contracts 
have slightly gained more importance (increasing by an order of magnitude 
from 37% in 2000 to 51% in 2005). By contrast, the Swedish data indicate 
that the frequency with which SOCs have adopted golden parachutes has 
changed little over the sample period. 
 
 
Figure 7.3. Percentage of SOCs adopting golden parachutes, by nationality. 
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Note: The figure shows the percentage of SOCs adopting golden parachutes in Norway and Sweden over 
the years 2000-2005. In line with the dummy variable notation, Norwegian SOCs are assigned the value 0 
and Swedish SOCs are assigned the value 1 (Norwegian and Swedish SOCs thus appear at the left-hand 
and right hand-side of the figure, respectively). The samples include all SOCs from which compensation 
data are available (n = 254 and n = 215 for Norway and Sweden, respectively).  
 
 
As to the magnitude of golden parachutes, we recall that these number are 
obtained by adding the net notice period (i.e., the number of months of 
which the notice period in the event of employer termination exceeds that of 
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employee termination) and the number of months with severance pay (i.e., 
the number of months of which compensation is paid to the CEO who has 
his or her employment ‘severed’ and which does not include the required 
notice of termination on any parts). Given this, the size of payment in the 
case of dismissal is fairly similar across the two countries. In Norway, CEOs 
who are candidates for golden parachutes are, on average, offered 14 
monthly (fixed) salary payments, whereas Swedish CEOs are averagely 
granted 16 months of fixed salary pay. Moreover, these numbers roughly 
correspond to those described in the governments’ compensation guidelines, 
which suggest that if notice of termination is given on the part of the firm, 
golden parachutes may be payable to at most 12 and 18 monthly salary 
payments in Norway and Sweden, respectively.103  
 
 
7.3 Empirical Analysis 
Table 7.3 presents descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) for 
the main variables (any alternative measures are only commented upon in 
the multivariate analysis). While some of the descriptive statistics are known 
from the above, there are some variables that are unique to the CEO 
compensation issue. As to the CEO recruitment channel, we note that, in the 
full sample, 38% of the CEOs are recruited from the private sector, which 
means that 62% are recruited from the public sector or from within the firm. 
In Norway, however, an even larger proportion of the CEOs are recruited 
from the private sector, while the opposite holds for Swedish SOCs. On the 
issue of board structure, it sits, on average, eight members on SOC boards in 
the full sample. The average board size is yet somewhat larger in Sweden 
(9.3 board members) than in Norway (7.7 board members). Moreover, a total 
of 20% of the SOC boards have established a compensation committee. The 
two countries differ significantly, however, in that such a committee is used 
by only 5% of Norwegian SOCs, while the corresponding number for 
Swedish SOCs is 36%. As regards CEO tenure, the average top manager has 
served for a period of 4.5 years, a finding which holds for both countries. 
Finally, in both Norway and Sweden, the chairman occupies himself a CEO 
position in about 30% of the cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
103 Note, however, that these guidelines mainly apply to fully state-owned firms, which might 
explain why, in Norway, the average size of golden parachutes exceeds 12 months.  
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Table 7.3. Descriptive statistics: Means and standard deviations. 
 
 
 
Variables 
All SOCs 
 
Mean    St.dev.     n 
Norwegian SOCs 
 
Mean    St.dev.     n 
Swedish SOCs 
 
Mean   St.dev.    n 
Total cash compensation (log) 
Incentive scheme  
Golden parachute 
Chairman political representative 
State control 
Corporate objective 
Non-listed SOCs  
Listed SOCs  
Firm size (log equity) 
CEO recruited private sector 
Board size 
Compensation committee 
CEO tenure 
Chair is CEO 
Nationality 
Time trend 
3.19 
0.30 
0.64 
0.29 
0.34 
0.49 
0.24 
0.10 
2.78 
0.38 
8.46 
0.20 
4.48 
0.30 
0.47 
3.16 
0.27 
0.46 
0.48 
0.45 
0.47 
0.50 
0.43 
0.30 
1.24 
0.49 
1.76 
0.40 
3.28 
0.46 
0.50 
1.38 
382 
382 
382 
382 
382 
382 
382 
382 
376 
314 
382 
382 
368 
380 
382 
382 
3.14 
0.30 
0.42 
0.27 
0.45 
0.41 
0.35 
0.10 
2.58 
0.46 
7.71 
0.05 
4.52 
0.28 
– 
3.22 
0.24 
0.46 
0.50 
0.44 
0.50 
0.49 
0.48 
0.30 
1.36 
0.50 
7.71 
0.05 
4.52 
0.28 
– 
3.22 
203 
203 
203 
203 
203 
203 
203 
203 
198 
172 
203 
203 
194 
201 
– 
203 
3.24 
0.31 
0.89 
0.32 
0.21 
0.58 
0.11 
0.10 
3.00 
0.29 
9.30 
0.36 
4.43 
0.32 
– 
3.10 
0.29 
0.46 
0.31 
0.47 
0.41 
0.49 
0.32 
0.30 
1.05 
0.45 
1.63 
0.48 
2.87 
0.47 
– 
1.39 
179 
179 
179 
179 
179 
179 
179 
179 
178 
142 
179 
179 
174 
179 
– 
179 
Note: The table shows means and standard deviations for all main variables in the lagged sample. Due to 
the use of lagged data, the descriptive statistics might deviate somewhat from the statistics reported for 
the full sample (cf. Table 7.2 and the descriptive statistics displayed in Chapter 3). 
 
Correlations among all main variables are shown in Table 7.4.104 Overall, the 
correlation matrix indicates no severe multicollinearity problems, except for 
the fact that the state control variable and the two dummy variables 
pertaining to stock market listing (non-listed SOCs and listed SOCs) are 
highly correlated (0.72 and 0.55, respectively).105 Such correlations were 
expected, since the listing variables are only finer specifications of the state 
control variable. Thus, the two variables essentially measure the same thing 
and are thereby used in separate models. Moreover, following the same 
procedure as in Chapter 6, I use the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test to 
rule out the possibility that some of the modest correlations are causing 
problems of estimation. As this test shows no multicollinearity problems (all 
VIFs < 2.5), all main variables are included within the model. 
                                                 
104 Like in Chapter 6, I use Spearman correlation to handle non-parametric data. 
 
105 Additionally, some of the alternative measures (not shown in the table) are strongly 
internally related.  
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Table 7.4. Correlations among variables. 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Total cash compensation (log) 
2. Incentive scheme  
3. Golden parachute 
4. Chairman political representative 
5. State control 
6. Corporate objective 
7. Non-listed SOCs  
8. Listed SOCs  
9. Firm size (log equity) 
10. CEO recruited private sector 
11. Board size 
12. Compensation committee 
13. CEO tenure 
14. Chair is CEO 
15. Nationality 
16. Time trend 
 
  0.56** 
  0.31** 
–0.15** 
  0.12* 
  0.61** 
–0.30** 
  0.53** 
  0.69** 
  0.19** 
  0.35** 
  0.52** 
–0.04 
–0.06 
  0.18** 
  0.10 
 
 
  0.20** 
–0.07 
  0.46** 
  0.54** 
  0.07 
  0.57** 
  0.41** 
–0.03 
  0.12* 
  0.19** 
  0.05 
–0.02 
–0.02 
–0.09 
 
 
 
–0.03 
–0.02 
  0.40** 
–0.18** 
  0.18** 
  0.37** 
–0.13* 
  0.29** 
  0.29** 
–0.06 
  0.06 
  0.48** 
  0.05 
 
 
 
 
–0.18** 
–0.08 
–0.00 
–0.25** 
–0.05 
  0.03 
–0.11 
–0.05 
  0.08 
–0.24** 
–0.03 
  0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.26** 
  0.72** 
  0.55** 
–0.01 
–0.00 
–0.18** 
  0.06 
  0.03 
–0.08 
–0.22** 
  0.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.00 
  0.36** 
  0.43** 
  0.05 
  0.21** 
  0.42** 
–0.03 
–0.07 
  0.26** 
–0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.18** 
–0.38** 
  0.07 
–0.36** 
–0.27** 
  0.11 
–0.04 
–0.27** 
–0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.44** 
–0.08 
  0.18** 
  0.40** 
–0.08 
–0.07 
  0.01 
  0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.06 
  0.43** 
  0.40** 
–0.04 
  0.01 
  0.14* 
  0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.18** 
  0.04 
  0.01 
–0.12* 
–0.15** 
  0.05 
 
Note: The table shows Spearman correlation coefficients. * p < 0.05 (two-tailed); ** p < 0.01 (two-tailed).  
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Table 7.4. (Continued) 
 
Variables 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Total cash compensation (log) 
2. Incentive scheme  
3. Golden parachute 
4. Chairman political representative 
5. State control 
6. Corporate objective 
7. Non-listed SOCs  
8. Listed SOCs  
9. Firm size (log equity) 
10. CEO recruited private sector 
11. Board size 
12. Compensation committee 
13. CEO tenure 
14. Chair is CEO 
15. Nationality 
16. Time trend 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.40** 
–0.19** 
  0.11 
  0.47** 
–0.03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.12* 
–0.07 
  0.43** 
  0.15** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.14* 
–0.03 
  0.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.06 
–0.07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.06 
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In support of the descriptive evidence discussed in Section 7.2, we find a 
significant positive correlation between total compensation level and the use 
of incentives schemes. Thus, SOCs which are including incentive schemes in 
the CEO compensation contracts also tend to pay their top managers higher 
levels of compensation. Moreover, the correlations show that there is a 
positive and significant correlation between golden parachutes on the one 
hand and pay levels and incentive schemes on the other. All in all, therefore, 
it seems that some CEOs are being offered considerably more lucrative 
compensation packages than others.  
Looking at the independent variables, the table confirms many of the 
predicted relationships. In particular, we note that the variables pertaining to 
economic reasoning (i.e., corporate objective, stock market listing, firm size, 
and CEO recruitment channel) are significantly correlated with the CEO 
compensation measures, although some signs contrast with those predicted 
by theory. Moreover, the correlations display that both compensation levels 
and incentive schemes are positively and significantly related to partial state 
control. By contrast, there is no simple relationship between state control and 
golden parachutes. While there is a significant and negative association 
between political representation on boards and the level of compensation, 
there are no associations between the chairman’s professional background 
and the two other compensation components. As to the scope for managerial 
influences, both board size and the presence of a compensation committee 
show a significant and positive relationship with all three aspects of the CEO 
compensation contract, albeit the latter in the opposite direction to theory. 
Neither CEO tenure nor the fact that the chairman is a CEO is associated 
with any of the compensation measures. Finally, nationality is positively and 
significantly related to compensation levels and golden parachutes, but not to 
incentive schemes. The time trend variable has seemingly little influence on 
the compensation measures. As will be shown below, however, some of the 
bivariate relationships disappear or change when we are instead examining 
partial effects. 
The results of the random-effects regression analyses are shown in 
Table 7.5 for the level of total cash compensation, the use of incentive 
schemes, and the adoption of golden parachutes, respectively.106 The table is 
presented with separate models for tests of state control (Model 1) and stock 
market listing (Model 2) (only one model is reported for the use of incentive 
scheme, since stock market listing came out as a complete determinant). 
Evidently, each compensation measure appears to be influenced by some 
different sets of independent variables, which indicates a complex dynamic 
                                                 
106 Note that the analyses include all independent variables, also those for which I have 
previously made no theoretical predictions. The reason why I include all variables is simply to 
obtain a richer analysis, which might possibly give some new insights into the issue of CEO 
compensation in the case of state ownership. 
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in board decision-making about CEO compensation contracts. As regards the 
level of total cash compensation, there are several statistically significant 
predictors: Corporate objective, state control/stock market listing, firm size, 
CEO recruitment channel, the presence of a compensation committee, CEO 
tenure, and time trend. By contrast, there are fewer significant predictors of 
the probability that SOCs adopt incentive schemes and golden parachutes. 
Regarding incentive schemes, the significant predictors include state 
control/stock market listing, corporate objective, and firm size. While 
corporate objective and firm size are also significantly related to golden 
parachutes, this dependent variable is mainly explained by nationality and 
time trend. As I return to the interpretation of these findings below, suffice it 
to note here that the equations are statistically significant in terms of the 
Wald and likelihood-ratio statistics (as well as R-square for the linear 
regression). In support of the random-effects model, we also note that rho is 
very high (spanning from 0.93 to 0.72 in the full sample), which indicates 
that a large proportion of the total error variance is due to the panel-level 
error component. In other words, most of the unexplained variance in the 
three models is contributed by firm-specific factors and not by differences 
across SOCs. Accordingly, it seems that the random-effect model is the 
preferred alternative to pooled OLS, which is supported by the Breusch-
Pagan LM-test for linear regression and the likelihood-ratio test for logistic 
regression (rho ≠ 0, p < 0.000, respectively). 
To test for the moderating effects of political influences I also divide 
the sample into political chairmen and non-political chairmen subsamples 
(Table 7.6) as well as full state control and partial state control subsamples 
(Table 7.7). Moreover, to examine whether the impact of independent 
variables differs across Norway and Sweden, Table 7.8 presents separate 
regression analyses for the two nationality subgroups. However, as a very 
large share of Swedish SOCs (89%) have adopted golden parachutes, 
variation on this variable is deemed too small for separate analysis to be 
performed, which means that the subsample analysis for this dependent 
variable includes only Norwegian SOCs. To formally inspect whether the 
regression coefficients are significantly different across subgroups, I also 
perform moderated regression analyses, which include interactions between 
independent variables and the subsample variable of interest (e.g., chairman 
is a political representative). The results from these moderated regressions 
are reported in Appendix D, while the marginal effects pertaining to the 
logistic regression coefficients are shown in Appendix E. Together, the 
results from Tables 7.5–7.8 and the Appendices will serve as basis for the 
following reporting and discussion of results.  
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Table 7.5. Random-effects regression analysis for the compensation measures. Main effects, full sample. 
 
Independent variables Total cash compensation 
 
              Model 1                            Model 2 
Incentive scheme 
 
      Model 1 
Golden parachute 
 
               Model 1                           Model 2 
Intercept 
 
Political influences 
Chairman political representative 
State control 
 
Economic criteria 
Commercial objective 
Non-listing 
Listing 
Firm size (log equity) 
CEO recruited private sector 
 
Managerial influences 
Board size 
Compensation committee 
CEO tenure 
Chair is CEO 
 
Controls 
Nationality 
Time trend 
 
Number of firm/year observations 
Number of firms 
Rho 
Wald chi2/LR chi2 
R² (overall) 
Estimation method 
  2.770*** 
 
 
–0.010 
  0.036* 
 
 
  0.090*** 
 
 
  0.101*** 
  0.031* 
 
 
–0.001 
  0.039*** 
  0.003** 
  0.007 
 
 
  0.059 
  0.017*** 
 
307 
77 
0.93 
211.07*** 
0.66 
Linear 
(0.090) 
 
 
(0.011) 
(0.021) 
 
 
(0.032) 
 
 
(0.019) 
(0.017) 
 
 
(0.007) 
(0.013) 
(0.002) 
(0.011) 
 
 
(0.042) 
(0.003) 
 
 
 
 
  2.781*** 
 
 
–0.005 
 
 
 
  0.094*** 
–0.011 
  0.122** 
  0.096*** 
  0.027 
 
 
–0.000 
  0.033** 
  0.004** 
  0.007 
 
 
  0.051 
  0.017*** 
 
307 
77 
0.91 
222.81*** 
0.71 
Linear 
(0.088) 
 
 
(0.012) 
 
 
 
(0.031) 
(0.027) 
(0.050) 
(0.018) 
(0.017) 
 
 
(0.007) 
(0.013) 
(0.002) 
(0.011) 
 
 
(0.039) 
(0.003) 
–10.623*** 
 
 
    0.121 
    4.102*** 
 
 
    4.727*** 
 
 
    1.584*** 
  –0.614 
 
 
    0.045 
  –1.028 
    0.144 
    0.131 
 
 
  –0.980 
  –0.230 
 
307 
77 
0.72 
72.35*** 
 
Logistic 
(2.814) 
 
 
(0.975) 
(1.174) 
 
 
(1.295) 
 
 
(0.581) 
(0.935) 
 
 
(0.285) 
(0.870) 
(0.120) 
(0.925) 
 
 
(1.250) 
(0.207) 
–8.308** 
 
 
  0.424 
–0.410 
 
 
  2.525* 
 
 
  0.895* 
–0.353 
 
 
  0.197 
  0.150 
  0.038 
  1.038 
 
 
  5.022*** 
  0.564** 
 
307 
77 
0.79 
58.31*** 
 
Logistic 
(3.323) 
 
 
(0.932) 
(1.013) 
 
 
(1.300) 
 
 
(0.484) 
(1.071) 
 
 
(0.386) 
(1.215) 
(0.109) 
(0.860) 
 
 
(1.265) 
(0.225) 
–8.232** 
 
 
  0.449 
 
 
 
  2.528* 
–0.489 
–0.274 
  0.874 
–0.340 
 
 
  0.193 
  0.110 
  0.039 
  1.044 
 
 
  5.019*** 
  0.564** 
 
307 
77 
0.79 
58.35*** 
 
Logistic 
(3.430) 
 
 
(0.965) 
 
 
 
(1.301) 
(1.308) 
(1.627) 
(0.532) 
(1.080) 
 
 
(0.387) 
(1.286) 
(0.109) 
(0.863) 
 
 
(1.266) 
(0.225) 
 
Note: The table reports unstandardised regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Rho denotes the proportion of total error variance contributed by the panel-
level error component. The Wald chi2 (for linear regression) and LR chi2 (likelihood-ratio) (for logistic regression) statistics report whether the independent variables are 
jointly significant. R² is the overall variation explained by the model. * p < 0.10 (two-tailed); ** p < 0.05 (two-tailed); *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed).  
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Table 7.6. Random-effects regression analysis for the compensation measures by SOC chairman subsamples. 
 
Independent variables Total cash compensation 
  Political chairmen         Non-political chairmen 
Incentive scheme 
   Political chairmen          Non-political chairmen 
Golden parachute 
   Political chairmen          Non-political chairmen 
Intercept 
 
Political influences 
State control 
 
Economic criteria 
Commercial objective 
Non-listing 
Listing 
Equity (log) 
CEO recruited private sector 
 
Managerial influences 
Board size 
Compensation committee 
CEO tenure 
Chair is CEO 
 
Control 
Nationality 
Time trend 
 
Number of firm/year observations 
Number of firms 
Rho 
Wald chi2/LR chi2 
R² (overall) 
Estimation method 
  2.706*** 
 
 
–0.032 
 
 
  0.125** 
 
 
  0.098*** 
  0.075 
 
 
–0.001 
  0.030 
  0.023*** 
  0.013 
 
 
  0.045 
–0.002 
 
94 
32 
0.95 
141.17*** 
0.59 
Linear 
(0.097) 
 
 
(0.021) 
 
 
(0.053) 
 
 
(0.021) 
(0.048) 
 
 
(0.012) 
(0.020) 
(0.006) 
(0.016) 
 
 
(0.047) 
(0.005) 
  2.796*** 
 
 
 
 
  
  0.086** 
–0.002 
  0.183*** 
  0.084*** 
  0.030* 
 
 
  0.004 
  0.045*** 
  0.001 
–0.006 
 
 
  0.043 
  0.018*** 
 
213 
62 
0.88 
169.30*** 
0.75 
Linear 
(0.107) 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.034) 
(0.037) 
(0.070) 
(0.022) 
(0.017) 
 
 
(0.008) 
(0.017) 
(0.002) 
(0.018) 
 
 
(0.046) 
(0.003) 
–15.493** 
 
 
    1.712 
 
 
    4.505* 
 
 
    3.777** 
    1.344 
 
 
  –0.055 
  –0.641 
  –0.027 
  –1.546 
 
 
  –1.944 
  –0.297 
 
94 
32 
0.53 
27.23*** 
 
Logistic 
(7.050) 
 
 
(2.643) 
 
 
(2.655) 
 
 
(1.750) 
(1.443) 
 
 
(0.529) 
(1.449) 
(0.273) 
(1.723) 
 
 
(2.695) 
(0.406) 
 
–12.810*** 
 
 
    5.328*** 
 
 
    6.502*** 
 
 
    1.036 
  –2.322* 
 
 
    0.244 
  –2.197* 
    0.151 
    0.873 
 
 
  –0.663 
  –0.029 
 
213 
62 
0.74 
64.79*** 
 
Logistic 
(3.646) 
 
 
(1.425) 
 
 
(2.016) 
 
 
(0.712) 
(1.333) 
 
 
(0.369) 
(1.242) 
(0.154) 
(1.262) 
 
 
(1.477) 
(0.278) 
 
 
–10.209 
 
 
    0.932 
 
 
    1.475 
 
 
    0.936 
  –1.563 
 
 
    0.143 
    0.658 
  –0.284 
  –0.074 
 
 
   6.086** 
   1.989*** 
 
94 
32 
0.78 
32.99*** 
 
Logistic 
(6.365) 
 
 
(2.342) 
 
 
(2.260) 
 
 
(1.004) 
(2.068) 
 
 
(0.775) 
(2.408) 
(0.332) 
(2.003) 
 
 
(2.777) 
(0.628) 
 
 
 
–6.034 
 
 
–0.816 
 
 
  2.998* 
 
 
  1.854*** 
–0.552 
 
 
–0.175 
–2.793 
  0.008 
  1.513 
 
 
  6.492*** 
–0.039 
 
213 
62 
0.79 
49.92*** 
 
Logistic 
(4.220) 
 
 
(1.414) 
 
 
(1.654) 
 
 
(0.651) 
(1.265) 
 
 
(0.508) 
(2.049) 
(0.129) 
(1.128) 
 
 
(1.721) 
(0.292) 
 
Note: As to the notation, see the note in Table 7.5. 
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Table 7.7. Random-effects regression analysis for the compensation measures by state control subsamples. 
 
Independent variables Total cash compensation 
 
     Full state control          Partial state control 
Incentive scheme 
 
     Full state control       Partial state control 
Golden parachute 
 
       Full state control         Partial state control 
Intercept 
 
Political influences 
Chairman political representative 
 
Economic criteria 
Commercial objective 
Stock market listing 
Equity (log) 
CEO recruited private sector 
 
Managerial influences 
Board size 
Compensation committee 
CEO tenure 
Chair is CEO 
 
Control 
Nationality 
Time trend 
 
Number of firm/year observations 
Number of firms 
Rho 
Wald chi2/LR chi2 
R² (overall) 
Estimation method 
  2.922*** 
 
 
  0.001 
 
 
  0.048** 
 
  0.058** 
  0.037* 
 
 
–0.002 
  0.033** 
  0.004** 
  0.009 
 
 
  0.058 
  0.015*** 
 
210 
56 
0.95 
137.26*** 
0.42 
Linear 
(0.108) 
 
 
(0.011) 
 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.024) 
(0.020) 
 
 
(0.008) 
(0.013) 
(0.002) 
(0.011) 
 
 
(0.045) 
(0.003) 
 
 
 
 
  2.632*** 
 
 
–0.074** 
 
 
  0.228*** 
  0.201*** 
  0.103*** 
  0.050* 
 
 
–0.003 
  0.080** 
  0.004 
  0.002 
 
 
  0.113** 
  0.026*** 
 
97 
26 
0.71 
772.80*** 
0.69 
Linear 
(0.074) 
 
 
(0.032) 
 
 
(0.068) 
(0.058) 
(0.025) 
(0.026) 
 
 
(0.010) 
(0.034) 
(0.003) 
(0.022) 
 
 
(0.049) 
(0.005) 
 
 
–6.012* 
 
 
  0.781 
 
 
  4.947*** 
 
  0.144 
–0.137 
 
 
  0.154 
–0.786 
  0.111 
  0.220 
 
 
–1.769 
–0.517** 
 
210 
56 
0.70 
26.64*** 
 
Logistic 
(3.084) 
 
 
(1.141) 
 
 
(1.545) 
 
(0.662) 
(1.091) 
 
 
(0.308) 
(0.961) 
(0.137) 
(1.115) 
 
 
(1.453) 
(0.254) 
 
 
 
 
–10.110* 
 
 
   1.174 
 
 
 
 
 
–1.353 
 
 
  1.061 
 
  0.239 
  0.352 
 
 
  1.907 
  0.381 
 
102 
26 
0.83 
8.51 
 
Logistic 
(5.909) 
 
 
(2.289) 
 
 
 
 
 
(1.864) 
 
 
(0.653) 
 
(0.271) 
(1.515) 
 
 
(2.127) 
(0.403) 
 
 
–11.538** 
 
 
    0.351 
 
 
    2.653* 
 
    2.235*** 
    0.213 
 
 
  –0.036 
    0.907 
  –0.144 
    1.914 
 
 
    6.835*** 
    0.806** 
 
210 
56 
0.79 
56.53*** 
 
Logistic
(4.847) 
 
 
(1.252) 
 
 
(1.515) 
 
(0.727) 
(1.471) 
 
 
(0.546) 
(1.674) 
(0.179) 
(1.336) 
 
 
(1.787) 
(0.338) 
–8.395 
 
 
  2.201 
 
 
  3.567 
 
  0.228 
–2.877 
 
 
  0.532 
–3.034 
  0.356 
  0.036 
 
 
  5.475** 
  0.152 
 
97 
26 
0.81 
16.90* 
 
Logistic 
(5.479) 
 
 
(2.464) 
 
 
(4.930) 
 
(1.635) 
(2.063) 
 
 
(0.650) 
(3.093) 
(0.235) 
(1.536) 
 
 
(2.393) 
(0.407) 
 
 
 
Note: As to the notation, see the note in Table 7.5. 
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Table 7.8. Random-effects regression analysis for the compensation measures by nationality subsamples. 
 
Independent variables Total cash compensation 
             Norway                          Sweden 
Incentive scheme 
               Norway                           Sweden           
Golden parachute 
              Norway            
Intercept 
 
Political influences 
Chairman political representative  
State control 
 
Economic criteria 
Commercial objective 
Non-listing 
Listing 
Firm size (log equity) 
CEO recruited private sector 
 
Managerial influences 
Board size 
Compensation committee 
CEO tenure 
Chair is CEO 
 
Control 
Time trend 
 
Number of firm/year observations 
Number of firms 
Rho 
Wald chi2/LR chi2 
R² (overall) 
Estimation method 
  2.876*** 
 
 
–0.014 
 
 
 
  0.195*** 
–0.022 
  0.040 
  0.084*** 
  0.022 
 
 
–0.012 
  0.039* 
  0.002 
–0.000 
 
 
  0.021*** 
 
166 
46 
0.93 
208.16*** 
0.68 
Linear 
(0.177) 
 
 
(0.014) 
 
 
 
(0.050) 
(0.036) 
(0.037) 
(0.020) 
(0.026) 
 
 
(0.018) 
(0.023) 
(0.002) 
(0.015) 
 
 
(0.003) 
 
  2.802*** 
 
 
–0.000 
 
 
 
  0.048* 
–0.012 
  0.405*** 
  0.098*** 
  0.031 
 
 
  0.002 
  0.029* 
  0.003 
  0.020 
 
 
  0.015*** 
 
141 
31 
0.91 
137.39*** 
0.72 
Linear 
(0.123) 
 
 
(0.017) 
 
 
 
(0.029) 
(0.047) 
(0.106) 
(0.032) 
(0.024) 
 
 
(0.008) 
(0.017) 
(0.003) 
(0.023) 
 
 
(0.004) 
–18.502*** 
 
 
    0.292 
    2.363 
 
 
   6.541*** 
     
     
   0.627 
   0.395 
 
 
   0.764 
   1.148 
   0.165 
   1.151 
 
 
   0.769** 
 
166 
46 
0.78 
46.22*** 
 
Logistic 
(5.304) 
 
 
(1.457) 
(1.608) 
 
 
(1.903) 
    
    
(0.813) 
(1.455) 
 
 
(0.611) 
(2.358) 
(0.194) 
(1.322) 
 
 
(0.367) 
–13.213** 
 
 
–0.296 
  7.957** 
 
 
 
 
 
  4.655*** 
–1.852 
 
 
–0.096 
–0.641 
  0.152 
–1.389 
 
 
–1.427*** 
 
141 
31 
0.74 
49.96*** 
 
Logistic 
(5.497) 
 
 
(1.735) 
(3.221) 
 
 
 
 
 
(1.542) 
(1.785) 
 
 
(0.405) 
(1.332) 
(0.226) 
(1.900) 
 
 
(0.505)
–11.148** 
 
 
    0.319 
    0.190 
 
 
    3.582** 
      
      
    0.928 
  –1.448 
 
 
    0.566 
  –1.464 
  –0.219 
  –0.219 
 
 
    0.933*** 
 
166 
46 
0.80 
28.94*** 
 
Logistic  
(4.826) 
 
 
(1.254) 
(1.360) 
 
 
(1.709) 
     
     
(0.648) 
(1.340) 
 
 
(0.579) 
(1.950) 
(0.175) 
(1.158) 
 
 
(0.319) 
 
Note: As to the notation, see the note in Table 7.5. 
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7.3.1 Political influences  
Although politicians have no direct say on the compensation issue, theory 
suggests that they might indeed succeed in putting some constraints on the 
level and structure of CEO compensation contracts. More specifically, 
Hypotheses 1a–1c and 2a–2c postulate that political influences might operate 
through board appointments and state ownership positions. According to 
Table 7.5, the results only partly support this notion. In particular, the results 
show that firms being headed by political chairmen are not distinguishable 
from firms being chaired by non-politicians. While the results remain largely 
unchanged when using sector affiliation as an alternative measure to political 
experience (not shown in table), public sector employees are found to have a 
significant negative impact on the probability that SOCs will adopt golden 
parachutes (coefficient of –1.962; p < 0.05).107 Even more interesting, the 
marginal effect is non-trivial, since SOCs with public sector employees in 
the chairman position have a 20% lower probability of adopting golden 
parachutes than SOCs being chaired by private sector employees. However, 
since this result contrasts markedly with other insignificant results related to 
sector affiliation, we are led to speculate if public sector employees are 
associated with lower chances for golden parachute adoption for other 
reasons than to signify adherence to political preferences. For instance, it 
seems plausible that, when compared to private sector employees, public 
sector employees have less personal experience with golden parachute 
agreements, which also make them less prone to adopt such compensation 
elements.   
As to the effect of state control (shown in Model 1), there is some 
evidence that partly state-owned firms pay their CEOs more than firms under 
full state control. More precisely, CEOs in partly state-owned firms are paid 
3.6% more than CEOs in firms under full state control (p < 0.10). Moreover, 
partial state control significantly increases the chance that the CEO 
compensation contract includes an incentive scheme (coefficient of 4.102; p 
< 0.01). In a practical sense, the impact of a firm being partly state-owned 
leads to about 52 % higher probability of using incentive schemes than if the 
firm is fully controlled by the state. In both cases, however, it seems that the 
effect of partial state control is confounded with the effect of stock market 
listing. In fact, the use of incentive schemes is perfectly determined by 
listing (which also means that Model 2 is dropped for this dependent 
variable). Moreover, for total cash compensation, Model 2 shows that listed 
firms pay their CEOs significantly higher levels than fully state-owned firms 
insofar as the pay difference between the two groups of firms amounts to 
12.2% (p < 0.05). By contrast, there is no significant difference between 
                                                 
107 This result is obtained from Model 2. Model 1 produces a coefficient of –1.846 and p < 
0.05. 
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firms under full state control and non-listed firms under partial state control, 
which indicate that stock market listing is the key important predictor of 
CEO pay levels (also note that the reason why the significant listing effect is 
not captured by the state control measure in Model 1 is due to the small 
number of listed firms). Surprisingly, neither state control nor stock market 
listing has any profound impact on the probability that SOCs will adopt 
golden parachutes.   
Seeking to further explicate the effect of ownership characteristics, I 
performed some additional tests using more precise variable specifications 
(not reported in table). While none of the finer measures had any significant 
impact on the likelihood that firms are adopting golden parachutes, several 
interesting results emerged regarding total compensation levels and the use 
of incentive schemes. First, it appeared that the probability that SOCs will 
provide incentive schemes as part of their compensation contracts is 
positively and significantly related to different threshold levels of state 
control (except for the category of state super-majority). Indeed, the results 
showed that incentive schemes were employed by all firms in which the state 
holds simple majority, and that firms in both the negative control and the 
minority post categories were more likely than fully state-owned firms to 
offer incentive schemes (coefficients of 4.872 and 5.745; p < 0.01 and < 
0.05; marginal effects of 80% and 89%, respectively). With regard to the 
compensation level, the threshold levels were largely insignificant – except 
for the finding that firms in the negative control category paid their CEOs 
more than firms under full state control (coefficient of 0.062; p < 0.10; 
marginal effect of 6.2%).108 While these results intuitively suggest that the 
mere presence of co-investors is more important than how much the state 
owns, we should also note that the lower threshold levels of state control are 
strongly associated with stock market listing. Once again, therefore, the 
results indicate that state ownership characteristics actually mask the impact 
of listing.  
Second, regarding co-investment characteristics, the results further 
support the idea that listing is more important than state control, since both 
compensation levels and incentive usage were significantly explained by 
lower levels of co-investor concentration. More precisely, the results showed 
that in those firms where the largest co-investor holds either 5% control or 
less than 5% control (which is typical for publicly traded SOCs), pay levels 
were significantly higher than among firms under full state control 
(coefficients of 0.054 and 0.050, respectively; p < 0.10 for both groups; 
                                                 
108 Using the state equity fraction instead of threshold levels of state control, the former was 
found to be significantly related to both the probability that firms employ incentives schemes 
(coefficient of –0.084; p < 0.01; marginal effect of –0.5%) and the compensation level 
(coefficient of –0.001; p < 0.05; marginal effect of –0.1%).  
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marginal effects of 5.4% and 5%, respectively). Also, the probability that 
SOCs will compensate their CEOs by way of incentive schemes was 
positively affected by lower levels of co-investor concentration. In fact, all 
firms with less than 5% co-investor control were found to provide incentive 
schemes, while firms with 5% co-investor control were significantly more 
likely than firms under full state control to include this element in the 
compensation contract (coefficient of 3.406; p < 0.05; marginal effect of 
46%).109 
Finally, the results revealed that among those firms where the largest 
co-investor is non-public, pay levels were significantly higher than among 
firms under full state control (coefficient of 0.051; p < 0.05; marginal effect 
of 5.1%), while firms controlled by public co-investors were no different 
from 100% state-owned firms. Similarly, non-public co-investors affected 
the propensity to employ incentive scheme in a positive way (coefficient of 
5.001; p < 0.01; marginal effect of 76%), while public co-investors had no 
significant effect on incentive usage. But, since there is a high correlation 
between listing and the presence of non-public co-investors, these results 
mainly confirm the interpretation that stock market listing is the underlying 
mechanism explaining the level and structure of CEO compensation 
contracts.  
 
7.3.2 Economic criteria 
Focusing our attention on the economic criteria conducive to ‘optimal’ 
design of CEO compensation packages, I have already confirmed that stock 
market listing is a key important predictor of pay levels and the probability 
that firms will offer incentive schemes as part of their CEO compensation 
contracts. Accordingly, the results from Table 7.5 provide strong support for 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b, but do not confirm Hypothesis 4c. The latter non-
result is tricky, since stock market listing is indeed the main economic 
rationale why SOCs should adopt golden parachutes. Yet, the insignificant 
influence of listing is not difficult to explain, since most practitioners would 
consider the takeover threat of SOCs as illusory.  
Moreover, the findings confirm Hypotheses 3a and 3b, which state 
that commercial SOCs offer higher pay levels than non-commercial SOCs 
and that commercially oriented SOCs are more likely than societal-oriented 
SOCs to provide incentive schemes. Even more precisely, the results tells us 
that CEOs in commercial SOCs are paid about 9% more and have a 40% 
                                                 
109 Using the equity fraction of the largest co-investor instead of threshold levels of co-
investor concentration, I found that the equity fraction had a significant effect on the 
probability that firms employ incentive schemes (coefficient of 0.073; p < 0.05; marginal 
effect of 0.3%). As regards the compensation level, this measure had no significant effect.  
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higher probability of being offered incentive schemes than CEOs in non-
commercial SOCs (p < 0.01 for both groups). By contrast, the probability 
that firms will adopt golden parachutes is traced to corporate objective with 
a sign opposite to that predicted by theory (in Model 1 there is a coefficient 
of 2.525; p < 0.10). Interestingly, the magnitude of the estimated effect is 
non-trivial as commercial SOCs have a 31% higher probability than non-
commercial SOCs of granting golden parachutes. Yet, this finding is not 
surprising, since Hypothesis 3c rests on theoretical reasoning alone rather 
than more conventional ideas about the conditions under which golden 
parachutes are adopted.  
To test the sensitivity of these results to alternative specifications of 
the type of activity performed by SOCs, I also produced descriptive statistics 
to check whether the level and structure of CEO compensation contracts 
vary by sector classification (tables are shown in Appendix F). While these 
results are more speculative than conclusive (due to small within-group 
numbers), there are yet some crucial differences to be noted. Most important, 
the descriptive evidence illustrate that, in Sweden, SOCs in the utilities 
sector pay their CEOs considerably higher levels of compensation than do 
SOCs in other sectors. In Norway, the highest pay levels are found within 
the telecommunication service sector. But not only do pay levels differ 
across sectors; CEOs in different sectors are also paid differently. In 
particular, Norwegian top managers in the sectors of consumer staples and 
telecommunications are more likely than CEOs in other sectors to receive 
pay in the form of annual bonuses, stock options, shareholdings, and alike. 
In Sweden, the use of incentive schemes is concentrated among a few sectors 
only (mainly telecommunication services and utilities). As regards the 
adoption of golden parachutes, it seems that, in both countries, CEOs within 
the sector of consumer discretionary have a lower probability than CEOs in 
other sectors to be compensated in the case of dismissal (in Norway, the 
adoption of golden parachutes is even less commonly employed among 
SOCs in the utilities sector).   
The results of the multivariate analyses also confirm Hypothesis 5a, 
which postulates that firm size is positively related to compensation levels, 
with the elasticity roughly equal to 0.10 (p < 0.01). Thus, a 1% increase in 
equity leads to a modest 0.1% increase in total cash compensation. 
Additionally, both the probability that firms will adopt incentive schemes 
and golden parachutes is significantly related to firm size in the very same 
magnitude as pay levels (p < 0.01 and < 0.10, respectively). However, the 
signs appear in the opposite direction from that of Hypotheses 5b and 5c. 
The results therefore indicate that the presumed complexity of large SOCs 
does not prevent these firms from offering performance-based pay, and that 
CEOs are to some extent compensated for the increased risk exposure which 
is often associated with running large firms. Importantly, these results are 
not altered when using alternative measures of firm size (log number of 
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employees and log total assets), which makes firm size a robust, although 
fairly modest, predictor of CEO compensation contract design. Finally, the 
results provide support for Hypothesis 6, which states that CEOs who are 
recruited from the private sector are paid a premium over the compensation 
level being offered to CEOs recruited from the public sector or from within 
the firm. In practice, however, this effect is fairly small as private sector 
employees are paid a premium of 3.1% over public sector employees and 
internal candidates (p < 0.10).  
 
7.3.3 Managerial influences 
As Table 7.5 indicates, managerial influences on the pay-setting process are 
fairly modest. In fact, regarding both the adoption of incentives schemes and 
golden parachutes, none of the Hypotheses 7–10 are confirmed under the full 
sample (which also means that the bivariate significant correlations between 
the three compensation measures on the one hand and board size and the 
presence of a compensation committee on the other, simply mask the effect 
of other independent variables). By contrast, the findings suggest that the 
presence of a compensation committee significantly enhances the level of 
CEO pay. While the result is practically small – firms with a compensation 
committee are paying their CEOs 3–4% more than firms without such a 
specialised committee – it still supports the opposite statement of Hypothesis 
8a (p < 0.01 and < 0.05 in Model 1 and 2, respectively). Intuitively, this 
finding seems hard to explain, given the ceteris paribus assumption of the 
model. Yet, we might speculate that the very formalisation of the task of 
designing compensation contracts can stimulate more lucrative 
compensation packages; for instance, if members on such expert committees 
may believe they own talent is partly reflected by the status, and thus the pay 
level, of the firm’s CEO (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988). Alternatively, 
compensation committees could be more willing than ‘ordinary boards’ to 
pay a premium to attract high-quality CEOs or to compensate for the non-
provision of incentive schemes with higher levels of pay. The latter idea 
seems particularly compelling as there is a negative (although insignificant) 
relationship between the presence of a compensation committee and the 
probability that SOCs are offering incentive schemes.  
The results also provide statistical support for Hypothesis 9a, which 
states that CEO tenure has a significant impact on the level of compensation. 
However, this effect is only trivial as an additional year in position results in 
a maximum of 0.4% pay increase (p < 0.05). More interesting is to examine 
whether the tenure effect is increasing or decreasing over the sample period, 
which means I also estimate the tenure effect by way of a quadratic function 
(not shown in table). Using Model 2 (Table 7.5) to calculate this effect, it 
seems that CEO tenure has a diminishing effect on the total compensation 
level (tenure coefficient of 0.013 and quadratic tenure coefficient of –
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0.00089, p < 0.01 for both coefficients). The result thus suggests that while 
the first year in office is worth about a 1.3% pay increase, adding one year to 
the average tenure (4.5 years) yields a pay increase of 0.5%. The curvilinear 
tenure effect peaks at 7.3 years in office.  
Finally, neither board size nor the fact that the chairman holds a 
CEO position seems to be putting upward pressure on CEO compensation 
levels, which means that Hypotheses 7a and 10a are not confirmed. 
Additionally, we note that using board independence as an alternative 
measure to CEO tenure does not alter the results.  
 
7.3.4 Is there still room for political influences? 
Having confirmed the relevance of economic and other criteria in the CEO 
pay-setting process and contested any direct political manoeuvres therein, 
we might still ask if there is scope for political influences. More specifically, 
I have suggested above that political influences can be identified to the 
extent that they suppress the importance of economic criteria, since the latter 
are possibly not perceived as politically legitimate reasons why contractual 
differences should exist. Also, it would be interesting to explore whether the 
impact of managerial influences differs according to the presumed strength 
of political influences. To investigate these issues, Tables 7.6 and 7.7 
provides the results of subsample analyses, where I split the sample into 
subgroups according to political representation (public sector employees) on 
SOC boards and state control.  
In line with these results, the proposition that political chairmen and 
full state control might play a moderating role in the compensation design 
achieves mixed support. To further elaborate, we note that regarding the 
CEO compensation level, there are no significant subgroup differences as to 
the economic criteria pertaining to corporate objective and firm size – except 
for the finding that the commercialisation effect is significantly stronger 
within the group of partly state-owned firms than within the group of firms 
under full state control (marginal effects of 22.8% and 4.8%; p < 0.01 and < 
0.05 respectively).110 We also note that while stock market listing is 
excluded from the subgroups of political chairmen (since there are no 
political representatives on the boards of listed SOCs) and full state control, 
the magnitude of the listing effect is even larger within these subsamples 
than in the full sample (marginal effects of 18.3% and 20.1%, respectively; p 
                                                 
110 While the moderated regression suggests that there is a firm size effect related to SOC 
chairman background, this effect is masked by the listing effect pertaining to partly state-
owned firms (which is confirmed by using the state control dummy in both SOC chairman 
subsamples). 
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< 0.01 for both groups).111 There are no significant differences between 
subgroups regarding their propensity to pay a premium to CEOs recruited 
from the private sector.  
As to managerial influences, a particular interesting result relates to 
the positive impact of CEO tenure on pay levels within the group of SOCs 
being chaired by political representatives (marginal effect of 2.3%; p < 
0.01). While the two subgroups are statistically different on this issue, it is 
yet important to note that the inclusion of a quadratic term to capture any 
diminishing returns to time-in-office only yields a significant contribution 
within the subsample of SOCs being headed by non-politicians (not shown 
in table). Thus, the results suggest that the previously identified curvilinear 
tenure effect can largely be ascribed to SOCs being chaired by non-
politicians. Moreover, we note that the presence of a compensation 
committee is a significant predictor of pay levels within all four subgroups, 
except for the group of SOCs being chaired by political representatives. The 
moderated regression displays, however, that there are no significant 
subgroup differences. Additionally, when using sector affiliation instead of 
political experience as the subsample division criteria (not shown in table), 
the results showed that there were no significant differences between those 
firms being chaired by public sector employees and those being chaired by 
private sector employees.  
Focusing on the probability that SOCs will offer incentive schemes 
there is evidence that the relationship between commercial orientation and 
incentive usage is stronger among SOCs being chaired by non-politicians 
than among those firms being headed by political representatives, but the 
difference is not statistically significant. Moreover, this relationship seems to 
hold also with regard to state control, as the percentage of commercial SOCs 
under partial state control that use incentive schemes largely outweighs the 
equivalent number for the group of firms under full state control (in fact, due 
to no incentive observations among non-commercial SOCs, the corporate 
objective variable is removed from the partial state control subgroup).112 We 
also note that there are significant differences between SOCs being chaired 
by political versus non-political chairmen regarding the (not hypothesised) 
relationship between CEO recruitment channel and incentive schemes 
(coefficients of 1.344 and –2.322, respectively; only the latter coefficient is 
significant with p < 0.10). More precisely, among firms with non-political 
chairmen, CEOs recruited from the private sector have a 11% lower 
                                                 
111 Also note that the significant interaction effect pertaining to state control and political 
representation on SOC boards is presumably somewhat confounded with stock market listing.  
 
112 Also removed from the subgroup of partly state-owned firms are the variables pertaining to 
the presence of a compensation committee (due to perfect prediction) and firm size (due to 
collinearity with the remaining variables).  
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probability of being offered incentive schemes than have CEOs recruited 
from the public sector or from within the firm. Conversely, in SOCs being 
headed by political chairmen, there is about 3% higher probability that CEOs 
recruited from the private sector will be offered incentive schemes. 
Attempting to explain these results, it is possible that non-politicians 
consider private sector employees to be so accustomed to think about 
corporate value that they are less in need of such incentives than are public 
sector employees. Alternatively, they might deem it important that private 
sector employees shift their focus away from narrowly specified 
performance criteria to some broader concerns. Conversely, non-politicians 
might find it wanted to sharpen the focus of CEOs recruited from the public 
sector by way of offering them explicit incentives. From the point of view of 
political chairmen, it seems that they are more apt to adjust to conventional 
pay practices.113  
As regards the adoption of golden parachutes, it appears that the 
effects pertaining to corporate objective and firm size in the full sample are 
mainly due to SOCs being chaired by non-political chairmen. However, as 
shown by the moderated regression, this difference is not significant.114 
Actually, the only significant subsample difference relates to CEO tenure in 
that time-in-office is apparently a more important determinant within the 
subsample of partial state control than within that of full state control. Due to 
large standard errors, however, the tenure effect is not statistically significant 
per se. It is interesting, however, to note that some more significant 
subgroup differences came into view when using sector affiliation as the 
subsample division criterion (not shown in table). In particular, the results 
showed that, within the group of SOCs being chaired by private sector 
employees, both the presence of a compensation committee and the fact that 
the chair is also a CEO are significantly and negatively associated with 
golden parachute adoption (coefficients of –5.644 and –3.012, respectively; 
                                                 
113 The subsample analysis also indicates that compared to the subgroup of SOCs with non-
political chairmen, SOCs being chaired by political representatives are more positively 
associated with firm size and the presence of a compensation committee. According to the 
moderated regression results, however, these differences are not statistically significant. Using 
instead sector affiliation as the subsample division criteria, it was now displayed a significant 
subgroup difference with respect to the presence of a compensation committee (for private 
sector chairmen there is a coefficient of –4.107; p < 0.05. For public sector chairmen, this 
effect is insignificant). In economic terms, there is a 17.3% lower probability that SOCs with 
compensation committees are offering incentive schemes if the chairman is recruited from the 
private sector than if recruited from the public sector.  
 
114 Also note that, due to large standard errors, the significant effects of corporate objective 
and firm size that are identified within the subgroup of fully state-owned firms are not 
captured by the interaction effects. 
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p < 0.10 for both groups; marginal effects of –12.5% and –25.9%).115 Thus, 
it seems that private sector employees might be concerned about not 
mimicking the compensation practices of private businesses. By contrast, 
within the group of SOCs being headed by public sector employees, golden 
parachute adoption is significantly and positively influenced by the chair–
CEO combination (coefficient of 3.978; p < 0.01; marginal effect of 31.3%), 
while the effect of compensation committees is insignificant. Interestingly, 
this result is consistent with the already noted finding of a direct and 
negative association between public sector employees and golden parachute 
adoption. Namely, if golden parachute adoption is sensitive to the presumed 
fact that public sector employees have little experience with such contractual 
agreements, it might still be the case that public sector CEOs are more 
familiar with this element than non-CEOs, and thereby more disposed to 
adopt golden parachutes. A cruder explanation is that CEOs are only 
pursuing their own interests as they seek to make golden parachutes more 
commonly accepted within the public sector. 
 
7.3.5 Nationality and time effects 
While, in Section 7.2, it was shown that the design of CEO compensation 
contracts differ across Norway and Sweden, the descriptive evidence also 
demonstrated that some of these differences were actually wiped out (with 
regard to pay levels) or reversed (with regard to the use of incentive 
schemes) over the sample period. These patterns are confirmed by the 
multivariate regression results in Table 7.5, in which nationality has no 
direct effect on pay levels or the probability that SOCs compensate their 
CEOs by way of incentive schemes. By contrast, nationality is the key 
important predictor of the probability that firms will adopt golden parachutes 
– and the results support the descriptive evidence that this compensation 
element is significantly more prevalent among Swedish SOCs than among 
their Norwegian counterparts (in Model 1 there is a coefficient of 5.022; p < 
0.01). In fact, the marginal effects estimations show that Swedish CEOs 
have a 58% higher probability than their Norwegian counterparts of being 
granted golden parachutes, all else considered.  
Apart from examining direct effects, we also want to know whether 
nationality might have some indirect effects on the results. To investigate 
whether the results from the full sample differ according to nationality, I 
therefore performed subsample analyses distinguishing between Norwegian 
and Swedish SOCs. While these results (reported in Table 7.8) corroborate 
                                                 
115 In fact, the marginal effect pertaining to the presence of a compensation committee is 
understated, since the estimation of marginal effects required that nationality was removed 
from the regression (due to nearly perfect prediction). But since nationality is somewhat 
confounded with the presence of a compensation committee, the marginal effect became 
reduced. 
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several findings from the full sample, some striking results emerge. For one 
thing, the above-discussed effect of stock market listing on CEO pay levels 
is entirely subscribed to Swedish firms (p < 0.01), as confirmed by the 
moderated regression and the fact that listing is not a significant predictor 
among Norwegian firms. Actually, Swedish CEOs in listed firms are paid 
40.5% more than CEOs in firms under full state control, while the 
corresponding number for Norway is 0.4%.116 Another interesting result 
from the split sample analysis is that the influence of corporate objective on 
CEO compensation levels seems mainly associated with Norwegian firms. In 
support of this finding, the moderated regression shows that there is a 
significantly stronger relationship between commercial SOCs and pay levels 
in Norway than in Sweden (with marginal effects of 19.5% and 4.8%; p < 
0.01 and < 0.10, respectively). Thus, whereas in Sweden, the link between 
market exposure and pay levels works through the stock market, it seems 
that, in Norway, higher pay levels are more broadly associated with 
corporate activity. Apparently, the former result is easier to explain than the 
latter, since the competition for CEO talent is normally stronger among 
listed firms. We also note that the significant impacts of firm size and the 
presence of a compensation committee that were identified in the full sample 
are valid in both subgroups, which means that these effects are not sensitive 
to nationality. The same argument holds for the impact of CEO tenure, 
although this effect is not longer significant in the split sample. The results 
do not provide any support for the supposition that political representation or 
public sector affiliation on SOC boards are more important determinants of 
CEO pay packages in Sweden than in Norway.  
From the subsample analysis it also seems that nationality matters to 
which variables have the most impact on incentive usage. Although every 
listed firm in both Norway and Sweden are offering incentive schemes, the 
state control coefficient is only significant in the Swedish subsample. There 
are thus indications that Swedish non-listed firms under partial state control 
have a higher probability than their Norwegian counterparts of providing 
performance-based pay components. Moreover, the relationship between 
firm size and incentive schemes which is evident in the full sample is only 
apparent among Swedish SOCs. Seemingly, however, some parts of both the 
state control and firm size effects are confounded with corporate objective, 
which is excluded from the Swedish subsample as incentive schemes are 
used by less than 1% of non-commercial SOCs (i.e., corporate objective is 
almost a perfect predictor in the Swedish subsample). The relative effect of 
                                                 
116 Moreover, in Norway, there are no significant differences between fully and partly state-
owned firms with respect to any of the other ownership characteristics (i.e., state equity 
fraction, co-investor ownership concentration, and co-investor identity), which means that the 
previously described ownership effects are mainly due to Swedish SOCs. 
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corporate objective versus state control and firm size is therefore difficult to 
discern within the Swedish subsample.  
With respect to golden parachute adoption, the results from the 
Norwegian subsample again confirm the importance of corporate objective 
(coefficient of 3.582; p < 0.05; marginal effect of 67%), while firm size is 
not longer a significant predictor. Interestingly, we also note that stock 
market listing is nearly a perfect predictor of the probability that firms will 
adopt golden parachutes and is therefore excluded from the model (golden 
parachutes are present in 95% of the firm/year observations).117 While this 
result is consistent with the theoretical prediction (Hypothesis 4c), it also 
suggests that the insignificant effect pertaining to stock market listing in the 
full sample is due to Swedish firms.  
Regarding time effects, the time trend variable largely supports the 
descriptive evidence from Section 7.2 in that CEO pay levels show a steady 
increase over the five-year period. In both full sample models, there is an 
annual time trend effect of 1.7% (p < 0.01 in both models). More interesting, 
however, is the finding that time effects are sensitive to both the professional 
background of chairmen and state control. Specifically, the positive time 
effect is only due to SOCs being chaired by non-politicians and mainly to 
firms under partial state control (with marginal effects of 1.8% and 2.6%; p 
< 0.01 for both groups, respectively), which suggests that political influences 
slow down any time influences. In addition, the adoption of golden 
parachutes shows a positive association with the time trend variable in the 
full sample (in Model 1 there is a coefficient of 0.564; p < 0.05); from one 
year to another there is a 6.2% higher probability that firms will adopt 
golden parachutes. In contrast to the case of pay levels, however, there is a 
positive time trend effect due to SOCs being chaired by political 
representatives coefficient of 1.989; p < 0.01). Among those SOCs which are 
headed by political chairmen, the probability of granting golden parachutes 
increases with about 21% from one year to the next, while the corresponding 
number for SOCs chaired by non-politicians is –0.4%. Contrary to the 
expectation, this means that the increase in golden parachute adoption over 
the sample period has taken place in those firms where political influences 
are presumably the strongest.118 Finally, the probability that SOCs use 
incentive schemes is not significantly related to the time trend variable in the 
                                                 
117 The exclusion of stock market listing also means that the effect of corporate objective is 
somewhat overstated. 
 
118 The subsample analysis also displays evidence that the positive time trend effect is mainly 
due to SOCs under full state control, but the moderated regression suggests that the difference 
between firms under full and partial state control is not statistically significant. 
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full sample – or to any of the political channel subsamples.119 In line with the 
descriptive evidence, however, there is a significant time effect related to 
incentive usage in both the Norwegian and Swedish subsamples (coefficients 
of 0.769 and –1.427; p < 0.05 and < 0.01, respectively). Over the sample 
period, the probability that Norwegian SOCs will offer incentive schemes 
increases with roughly 3% on an annual basis. Conversely, the probability 
that Swedish SOCs will include incentives schemes as part of their CEO 
compensation contract is annually reduced by about 7%.  
  
7.3.6 Some further issues of interpretation 
Apart from the results discussed above, there are still some issues that raise 
questions of interpretations. One question which arises from the descriptive 
evidence relates to the mix of compensation elements: Why are there so 
many golden parachutes and so few incentive schemes (reported in 64% and 
30% of the total cases, respectively)? One explanation that would seemingly 
be consistent with the observed pattern is that the two compensation 
elements are viewed in terms of a trade-off. That is, for SOC boards being 
able to offer competitive pay packages without exposing themselves to the 
risks associated with incentive schemes (e.g., that CEOs take manipulative 
actions or engage in unwanted activities), they choose to add golden 
parachutes as these represent some less-risk compensation extras. Yet, this 
explanation is not entirely satisfactory as the two elements are often used in 
combination. Moreover, golden parachutes are certainly not risk-free as they 
might actually induce CEOs to take on extra risk, knowing that they would 
be compensated for any bad results. Thus, rather than looking at the two 
compensation elements as interdependent parts of the CEO pay package, it 
seems more fruitful to explain the use of incentives schemes and golden 
parachutes as separate phenomena. 
As to the low fraction of incentive schemes, theory indeed suggests 
that incentive usage could be optimally low. In particular, the multi-tasking 
of many SOCs means that incentives might substitute CEO effort away from 
those tasks that are difficult to measure to those that are easily measured. In 
support of this argument, the results of this study confirm that performance-
based pay is deemed to be inappropriate in most non-commercial SOCs. Yet, 
there might also be other reasons why SOC boards optimally choose flat 
wages. In the literature, particular attention is devoted to the notion that 
incentive schemes might actually be counterproductive if CEOs care about 
the ‘intrinsic rewards’ that they receive from the job (e.g., in terms of self-
esteem). More precisely, explicit incentives can erode this other motivation 
                                                 
119 Surely, there is a negative and significant relationship between time trend and incentive 
schemes in the subsample of full state control, but the moderated regression indicates that the 
subsample difference is not significant.  
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as they send a signal that the relationship between the CEO and the firm is a 
pure market relationship (see, for example, Baker et al., 1988; Kreps, 1997; 
Burgess and Ratto, 2003). Alternatively, SOC boards might consider explicit 
incentives as redundant to the extent that such schemes encourage behaviour 
that is already prompted by implicit incentives. In fact, the latter may be 
deemed as very strong in the public sector, since there are many stakeholders 
to evaluate CEO performance. The idea is thus that top managers’ concern 
for their reputation in the labour market, the political milieu, the firm, and 
the broader community will provide CEOs with adequate incentives. Yet, 
within a political context, there is also a risk that non-pecuniary rewards do 
not vary positively with the predefined goals subscribed to SOCs. Instead, 
implicit incentives might have severe implications as there are strong 
political and organisational forces that tend to define success in dimensions 
other than the publicly stated objectives of SOCs (e.g., trade unions and local 
communities exert pressure to maintain employment above efficient levels in 
commercial SOCs) (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a). For that reason, it might be 
that implicit incentives do not strengthen the case for goal fulfilment, but 
actually come at the expense of the realisation of corporate objective.  
Whereas these arguments suggest that the rationale underlying 
incentive scheme provision is difficult to interpret, it seems even more 
demanding to explain the adoption of golden parachutes. On this issue, 
theory provides us with few clues other than suggesting that this kind of 
contractual agreement might be influenced by fashion: To attract and retain 
managerial talents, SOC boards will adopt compensation elements that have 
gained widespread acceptance, which eventually results in firms following 
an imitative pattern in the pay-setting process (Larcker, 1983; Finkelstein 
and Hambrick, 1988). But we might also speculate that SOC boards are 
particularly apt to adopt golden parachutes for the purposes of easing the 
potential dismissal of CEOs and thereby increasing labour market mobility, 
since public sector employment is conventionally rather sticky.  
Another issue which requires interpretation relates to the impact of 
political influences. Notwithstanding the finding that political forces matter 
to which criteria are emphasised in the CEO compensation design, this result 
also raises the question of what are the implications for the very substance of 
pay packages. Thus, can we reveal any impact of politics on the content of 
CEO compensation contracts, even though we know that political forces do 
no directly translate into lower pay levels or lesser use of incentive schemes 
and golden parachutes? A direct test of this issue is to look at whether 
political influences result in both the lower and upper tail of the payoff 
distribution being truncated (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a), since such a pay 
strategy would allow politicians both to keep pay levels in check and to 
provide most CEOs with competitive salaries. The idea is thus that political 
influences might result in SOC boards deciding on pay levels which are 
close to an ‘accepted’ benchmark. The present data give little support to this 
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notion in that the SOC chairman and state control subsamples display few 
significant pay differences at the lower and higher percentiles.120 As this 
pattern also holds across countries, it is therefore little evidence that the 
political forces operating through SOC boards and direct state ownership 
stakes put restrictions on the payoff scale. Neither is there any strong 
evidence that political influences result in less lucrative golden parachute 
agreements (in terms of months of fixed salary pay) – a result which again 
holds for both countries. However, if we look at the bonus payments 
following the use of incentive schemes, some interesting results emerge. 
While the SOCs being chaired by political representatives pay an average 
bonus share of 2%, the corresponding number is 10% for those SOCs being 
chaired by non-politicians. The same pattern is observed for the state control 
subsamples, in which the average bonus shares paid by firms under full and 
partial state control amount to 6% and 11%, respectively. Although the 
number of observations is very small, this pattern seems to hold for both 
Norway and Sweden. Moreover, while these numbers reveal that the largest 
share of bonus payments is associated with listed firms (because the average 
bonus share in the full sample exceeds those reported above), they also 
indicate that incentive schemes are more low-powered in SOCs that are more 
susceptible to political demands. However, we should also note that the 
bonus caps exceed the bonus shares that are actually paid, which suggests 
that not only are bonus payments set deliberately low, but the performance 
criteria might also be difficult to attain or perhaps even badly constructed. In 
any case, it seems that the political forces which are putting restrictions on 
executive compensation packages relate not to the pay level per se, but 
rather to how CEOs are paid.  
 
7.4 Summary and Conclusions 
While there is much political antagonism towards CEO compensation 
contracts, little is known empirically about how political influences translate 
into executive pay design. Nor do we have much knowledge about the 
relative importance of economic factors, political forces, and managerial 
influences. The results of this study reveal that the CEO compensation 
design of firms under state control is responsive to a complex set of factors 
and is not easily explained by a single governance model. Yet, it seems that 
the observed empirical regularities are broadly consistent with some distinct 
                                                 
120 Listed firms are excluded from all subsample analyses, since listing would have masked 
the actual effects of partial state control and non-politicians in the chairman position 
(remember that there are no political representatives on the boards of listed firms). As regards 
the other significant predictors of CEO compensation elements, the descriptive statistics 
display that there are few differences across the subsamples, which means that the influence 
of other independent variables do not differ significantly across the subsamples.   
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motivational logics. For one thing, the results provide some support for the 
reputation model, since the economic criteria appear as significant predictors 
of all three compensation elements (although not all economic criteria are 
significant for all three pay elements and some effects run counter to theory). 
In terms of practical significance, the effects of economic criteria seem 
mainly related to corporate activity and stock market listing, which suggests 
that there is an upward pressure on CEO pay levels and the adoption of other 
pay elements due to market forces. It is though interesting to note that these 
findings are sensitive to nationality. In particular, the relationship between 
commercial orientation and pay levels is significantly stronger among 
Norwegian SOCs than among Swedish ones. Conversely, the listing effect 
on CEO pay levels is due to Swedish SOCs only. Accordingly, it seems that 
Norwegian and Swedish SOC boards differ as regards how they define the 
‘market’; that is, how they decide on the appropriate points of reference for 
making pay decisions (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  
For another, the findings provide some support for the widely held 
belief that politics matters to compensation design. However, rather than 
providing direct influences on the level and structure of CEO compensation 
contracts, political forces work in more subtle ways as they interact with 
economic criteria, managerial influences, and even time effects. In support 
of the theoretical predictions, it seems that political channels somewhat 
suppress the impact of economic criteria insofar as both pay levels and 
incentive usage are more sensitive to the commercial orientation of SOCs 
within the group of partly state-owned firms than within the group of firms 
under full state control. In addition, the positive time effect on CEO pay 
levels is mainly due to firms under partial state control. Moreover, SOC 
boards seem responsive to political pressure conditioned on the chairman’s 
professional background. In particular, there is a significant difference 
between those SOCs being chaired by political representatives and those 
being chaired by non-politicians as regards their proclivity for rewarding 
seniority. Not only is there is a positive relationship between CEO tenure 
and pay levels within the group of SOCs being chaired by political 
representatives, but there are no indications that this effect diminishes over 
time. By contrast, there is a positive time effect on pay levels which is only 
due to SOCs being chaired by non-politicians. Thus, while in those SOCs 
being chaired by political representatives, time effects work through the 
traditional merit pay systems of the public sector, pay levels are simply 
increased on a yearly basis among those SOCs being headed by non-
politicians.  
Even though it is possible to interpret these findings in terms that 
political representatives and non-politicians are accustomed to different pay 
practices, other results raise doubt about this view. For instance, compared to 
SOCs being headed by political chairmen, SOCs with non-political chairmen 
are significantly less likely to offer incentive schemes if the CEO is recruited 
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from the private sector than if being recruited from the public sector or from 
within the firm. Moreover, compared to SOCs being chaired by public sector 
employees, SOCs with private sector chairmen are significantly less likely to 
offer both incentive schemes and golden parachutes if the pay package is 
designed by a compensation committee (i.e., if the chairman is even more 
hands-on the pay-setting process). The same pattern holds regards the 
adoption of golden parachutes in the case which the chairman is also a CEO. 
Given this, it may seem that non-politicians and private sector employees are 
concerned about not simply imitating the pay practices by which they are 
familiar. Instead, it looks as if they consider what pay design is the most 
appropriate for the firm (e.g., some CEOs are more in need for incentives 
than others), which might certainly signal competence. Also, they send a 
signal of taking responsibility for not putting upward pressure on the pay 
package, which might be particularly important for chair–CEOs. In this way, 
non-politicians and private sector employees might actually be satisfying 
both reputation and re-election concerns. 
Interestingly, chairmen who are employed in the public sector seem 
to engage in CEO compensation design in ways that are more narrowly self-
dealing. In fact, the results show that among those SOCs being chaired by 
public sector employees, chair–CEOs are more likely than chairmen who are 
non-CEOs to adopt golden parachutes (while the opposite holds for private 
sector chairmen) – a practice which might possibly benefit chair–CEOs if 
becoming widely accepted in the political milieu. In support of this view, 
there is a positive time effect on golden parachute adoption among those 
SOCs being chaired by political representatives, but not among SOCs being 
chaired by non-politicians. Contrary to the theoretical expectations, but 
consistent with prior findings, the study thus provides evidence that some 
parts of the compensation package are more politically accepted than others. 
While such a pay practice is certainly not conducive to the reputation 
concern of chairmen, the seemingly broad accept of golden parachutes 
within the public sector makes it more difficult to assess whether it will 
negatively affect the chairman’s re-election prospects. 
To complete the summary of empirical findings, four broad patterns 
seem to emerge from this study. First, economic criteria are indeed important 
determinants of CEO compensation design, although the concept of ‘market 
forces’ is clearly differently interpreted within different national contexts. 
Second, while the observed compensation outcomes somehow reflect that 
political forces are at work, the effects are mixed. In particular, it seems that 
chairmen who are political experienced and/or recruited from the public 
sector are more likely to prefer those kinds of compensation decisions by 
which they are familiar or from which they might personally benefit than 
those that might signal competence or political loyalty (although seniority 
might naturally reflect some sort of loyalty to public sector pay systems). In 
contrast, the pay strategies of non-politicians and private sector employees 
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seemingly support both reputation and re-election concerns. Third, although 
one main conjecture is that political factors work to constrain the level and 
mix of CEO pay packages, there is actually no evidence that pay levels are 
more restrained or truncated within firms under strong political control. Nor 
is the size of golden parachutes responsive to political influences. In sharp 
contrast, there are stark political constraints on the bonus share paid to 
CEOs. Thus, to the extent that political channels are putting restrictions on 
the very content of CEO pay packages, their impact leads to the puzzling 
conclusion that it seems more acceptable to compensate top managers for 
bad results (as in the case of dismissal) than for good results (as in the case 
of bonus payments). Fourth, and related to this, the results highlight the 
importance of examining several pay components in order to achieve a more 
complete understanding of CEO compensation practices. In particular, it is 
possible to discover a positive relationship between pay levels and the use of 
incentive schemes. When also taking into account the evidence of low-
powered incentive contracts, we might conclude that CEOs do not incur any 
particular risk with their pay. Also consistent with the results of previous 
studies it is confirmed that the determinants of pay levels differ. 
The findings of this study carry implications for research both in the 
area of corporate governance and political economics. For corporate 
governance researchers, the results are broadly consistent with the political 
constraints hypothesis that has been explored for firms with non-political 
ownership. There is thus evidence that political pressures are mediated both 
through direct ownership stakes and via regulatory control. Moreover, the 
study adds important insights to the stream of research that focuses on the 
role of owner identity in the pay-setting process (see, for example, David et 
al., 1998; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; Hartzell and Starks, 2003). 
Paraphrasing Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003, p. 226), I use a population that is 
inherently interesting given the significant role of SOCs in several Western 
European countries and the hitherto lack of information on their CEO 
compensation practices. In addition, I build on agency theory in a 
meaningful way to better understand the compensation issues that are unique 
to CEO pay in firms under state control. Clearly, the findings of this study 
and other work suggest that further research into related forms of ownership 
might be fruitful. In particular, state institutional ownership is a viable 
candidate for empirical investigation, since public institutions (like state 
pension funds) are increasingly voicing their opinions about corporate 
governance (Hartzell and Starks, 2003).  
For political economics scholars, the results amplify the conclusions 
reached by previous studies that divestments of state ownership stakes affect 
both pay levels and incentive usage in a positive direction. Although the 
present study carries evidence of a similar pattern, the ownership effect 
pertains mostly to listed firms. Thus, it seems that governance decisions are 
not only sensitive to private ownership, but also to the very marketplace in 
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which they are made. But also, the results demonstrate that criteria other 
than the ownership structure are important to grasp the variety in CEO 
compensation contracts; notably, the corporate activity in which SOCs are 
engaged. Moreover, as the study has documented some peculiarities in the 
compensation design (e.g., the pervasiveness of golden parachutes and the 
low-powered incentive contracts), one interesting avenue for future research 
within this field is simply to better interpret this evidence. For instance, do 
SOC boards follow trends in designing compensation packages? Moreover, 
do SOC boards shy away from incentive schemes because they believe that 
such extrinsic rewards are at odds with other strong motivators, such as the 
intrinsic value of the job? Or, do they see incentive schemes as redundant to 
the extent that such schemes encourage behaviour that is already prompted 
by other motivators; for instance, if prestige among peers in the business 
community is in great part a function of firm performance? Apparently, to 
reveal such subtleties it is required that we draw on qualitative evidence, like 
documentary record examination and personal interviews (see, for example, 
Cragg and Dyck, 2003). 
More generally, it seems that further evidence on the issue of CEO 
compensation design can most successfully be achieved by looking more 
closely into board processes. In line with prior research, it seems particularly 
interesting to examine how SOC boards communicate the rationale 
underlying their compensation decisions (Zajac and Westphal, 1995). 
Specifically, the very strong role of third parties in the SOC contracting 
process suggests that the ‘reasonableness’ of a compensation package is 
strongly influenced by the political process (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a). 
One conjecture that could be tested by future studies is therefore that 
corporate directors seek to justify compensation contracts in terms of 
devaluing any aspects of managerial self-dealing while instead emphasising 
the potential benefits that accrue to the organisation (e.g., by designing 
‘reduced-windfall’ bonus or option plans so as to protect the firm against 
managerial opportunism and luck). Moreover, although the government-
owners focus on ‘competitive salaries’ as the main criterion to set CEO pay 
levels, very little is known about how the market’s ‘going rate’ is actually 
defined; that is, what it takes to pay a CEO at a level that is competitive to 
other similar firms (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997). Given this, evidence 
needs to be brought to the table about how SOC boards interpret this notion 
– is it only for symbolic purposes or do SOC boards actually engage in 
social comparison processes? In the latter case, do SOC boards seek advice 
from external compensation consultants to provide input in the pay-setting 
process, and if so, are such consultants likely to put an upward pressure on 
CEO pay levels (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003)? Additionally, since this study 
reveals that CEO compensation design is sensitive to the presence of a 
compensation committee, it is appealing to contrast the pay-setting processes 
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within such committees to those of SOCs boards without such a specialised 
committee.  
Another direction for future research is to examine pay-performance 
relationships to see whether CEOs are partly paid on the basis of shareholder 
wealth. While this study indicates that the compensation contracts generally 
provide few value-increasing incentives, some incentive schemes are even 
based on discretion, which makes it is difficult to evaluate whether bonuses 
are tied to financial performance or not. Moreover, we cannot neglect the 
possibility that fixed salaries are to some extent adjusted to performance 
improvements. However, because any full-sample analysis of SOCs can only 
involve some crude measures of firm performance, it seems that the most 
promising venue for this test is to perform intra-industry comparisons 
(which, due to few SOC observations, might possibly also involve some 
comparable private-owned firms or firms being held by regional/municipal 
authorities). Indeed, the informal sector test provided by this study displays 
that pay differences do exist, which is not very surprising given the large 
heterogeneity of the state ownership portfolio. An additional benefit of 
focusing on CEOs within a singly industry is that we might better control for 
the impact of contingency factors at the sector-level. Thus, we avoid any 
correlation of unmeasured job attributes (e.g., job complexity and autonomy) 
with variations in sector or regulatory environment (Wolfram, 1998; see also 
Finkelstein and Boyd, 1988).  
Finally, the results have implications for public policy makers in that 
the evidence suggests a strategic role for board appointments, since chairman 
personal characteristics (i.e., political experience, sector affiliation, and CEO 
position) is likely to have an effect on pay decisions. Moreover, it seems that 
the distinction between commercial and non-commercial SOCs does not 
only serves for symbolic purposes, but has actual effects on the level and 
structure of CEO compensation contracts. Moreover, the results suggest that 
both policy makers and practitioners should pay more attention to the costs 
and benefits of different incentive aspects rather than to the absolute value of 
bonus payment alone. For one thing, the very fact that a significant fraction 
of incentive-providing SOCs does not provide any information on bonus 
caps indicates that the potential (average) bonus share available to the CEOs 
in sample might actually be understated. In addition, such non-reporting 
might fuel public scepticism towards incentive pay. For another, it seems 
that organisational efficiencies might be gained by focusing on the 
possibility that internal performance standards might induce CEOs to 
manipulate the incentive scheme while at the same time steering clear of 
external comparisons.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Dividend Payments: Empirical Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do politicians generally insist on SOCs to pay dividends? If so, how much 
dividends are extracted from SOCs, and what factors might possibly explain 
the observed dividend patterns? Seeking answers to these questions is crucial 
to improve our understanding of the financial governance of SOCs – a topic 
which has not only important implications for the financial health of these 
firms, but also for voter welfare. The possibility for using SOCs as 
instrumental vehicles for public spending purposes is reflected in Norwegian 
corporate legislation, which allows the government-owner to overrule SOC 
boards’ judgments on the dividend issue in fully state-owned firms. Yet, to 
evaluate the effects of this institutional practice, we are so far left only with 
anecdotal evidence. For instance, in 2002, the dividend payments were 
raised for two SOCs – Statkraft (power generation) and Statnett (electricity 
transmission) – in the fiscal budget proposal from the government-owner. 
Rather than following a dividend policy of ‘approximately 50% of annual 
earnings’, the government-owner based its budget on a dividend of 90% of 
the earnings for each of the two, resulting in public complaints by the firms 
that these decisions would adversely affect their ability to raise investment 
capital. Using dividend data from an extensive sample of Norwegian and 
Swedish SOCs, I perform in this chapter a closer examination of the scope 
for political influence on dividend payments. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.1 provides 
a summary and specification of the theory, data and method that are used to 
examine dividend payments. Section 8.2 presents some basic facts about 
dividend payments in Norwegian and Swedish SOCs, while Section 8.3 
investigates the factors that are conjectured to affect the dividend payment 
ratio. Section 8.4 concludes with a summary and discussion of the theoretical 
and practical implications from this study.  
 
8.1 Theory, Data and Method: Recap and Specifications  
In line with the theoretical discussion, I use the following model to explain 
the dividend payment ratio:  
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Dividend payment ratio = ƒ{growth opportunities, debt ratio, 
corporate objective, income level, state control, chairman’s 
professional background, sponsor ministry, nationality, time trend, 
error term}.  
 
Since I have already explicated the theoretical ideas underlying the choice of 
these variables, suffice it here to provide a brief summary. The reputation 
model rests on the assumption that both politicians and corporate directors 
seek to behave as skilled representatives of shareholder welfare, which 
means they seek to control managerial opportunism by commanding SOCs 
to pay out excess cash. However, to ensure an efficient running of SOCs, 
they also give emphasis to other criteria, such as growth opportunities, debt 
ratio, and corporate objective. In comparison, the re-election model suggests 
that politicians and corporate directors make strategic use of the dividend 
decision to satisfy political and voter demands. More specifically, I propose 
that high-income SOCs are particularly at risk of being used as financial 
drains, since they posit more money to be spent on welfare purposes. As 
regards the scope for political influence, this is expected to hinge on both 
state control and the presence of political (public sector employee) 
representatives in the SOC chairman position. Additionally, I suggest that 
different sponsor ministries are not equally susceptible to political demands, 
and that the ownership ministry is particularly apt to resist any non-
economic claims on dividends. Moreover, I control for nationality as it likely 
that nation-specific legislation might have a substantial bearing on dividend 
payments. Finally, I also control for any time effects on dividend payments. 
Table 8.1 gives a summary of variable definitions and the hypothesised sign 
of bivariate relations between independent variables and the dividend 
payment ratio. 
The original sample comprises data over six years (2000-2005). 
Again, however, we need to ensure time-matching of data. In the present 
case, this means I first account for the fact that each year’s dividend 
allocation should reflect the firm’s financial condition in the very same year. 
Accordingly, the financial data that include debt ratio and income level 
match the dividend data on a year-to-year basis. However, as I rely on past 
growth in sales (amongst other measures) to capture growth opportunities, 
this variable is lagged by one year. Due to data unavailability prior to year 
2000, we are thus left with a five-year sample (2001-2005).121  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
121 While there are good reasons for employing even two- and three years lag of growth 
opportunities, this would severely affect the sample size. 
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Table 8.1. Summary of variable definitions and theoretical predictions. 
 
Variables Predicted sign 
Dependent variable 
 
Dividend payment ratio 
Continuous variable: Dividend-to-earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent variables 
 
Reputation model (economic criteria) 
 
Growth opportunities (hypothesis 1) 
Continuous variable: Annual sales growth rate 
 
Debt ratio (hypothesis 2) 
Continuous variable: Debt to total assets 
 
Corporate objective (hypothesis 3) 
Dummy variable: Commercial (=1) versus non-commercial (=0) objective 
 
 
 
 
 
– 
 
 
– 
 
 
+ 
 
Re-election model (political influences) 
Income level (hypothesis 4) 
Continuous variable: Operating revenue (log) 
 
State control (hypotheses 5) 
Dummy variable: Partial (=1) versus full (=0) state ownership 
 
Chairman’s professional background (hypotheses 6) 
Dummy variable: Political (=1) versus non-political (=0) representative 
 
Sponsor ministry (hypothesis 7) 
Dummy variable: Ownership (=1) versus sectoral (=0) ministry  
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
– 
 
 
+ 
 
 
– 
 
Controls 
Nationality  
Dummy variable: Norway (=0) versus Sweden (=1) 
 
Time trend 
Continuous variable ranging from 1-5 (2001,…,2005) 
 
 
 
+/– 
 
 
? 
 
Note: A plus (minus) sign in a column indicates that the independent variable is expected to have a positive (negative) 
effect on the dividend payment ratio. A combined plus/minus sign indicates that the prospective impact on dividend 
payments is uncertain (theoretical ambiguity). A question mark indicates no strong à priori expectation regarding the 
sign of the independent variable.  
 
To increase the robustness of analysis, I also test for some alternative measures. The two alternative measures of the 
dividend payment ratio include dividend-to-sales and dividend-to-cash-flow. Moreover, I use four alternative measures 
of growth opportunities, which include annual growth rates of earnings, fixed assets, total assets, and total cash flow. The 
state control variable also includes the equity fraction held by the state. Additionally, I use a set of dummy variables 
indicating voting threshold levels with three cut-off points (33.34%, 50.01% and 66.67%) and state ownership stake = 
100% as benchmark category. In line with theory, I expect a successively stronger (i.e., gradually less negative) 
relationship between these voting threshold levels and the dividend payment ratio. Similarly, co-investment 
characteristics are measured by both the equity fraction held by the largest co-investor and a set of dummy variables 
indicating voting and conventional cut-off points (5%, 33.34%, and 50.01%) and state ownership stake = 100% as 
benchmark category. According to theory, I expect a successively stronger (i.e., increasingly negative) relationship 
between these threshold levels and the dividend payment ratio. To account for co-investor identity I use a set of dummy 
variables, distinguishing between cases where the largest co-investor is public or non-public, and with state ownership 
stake = 100% as benchmark category. 
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As regards the impact of other variables, I seek to identify their relevant 
value at the time when the dividend is deliberately set. With regard to state 
control, this suggest I record the ownership stake at the general assembly 
meeting, in which shareholders give their consent to the board’s dividend 
proposal. But surely, as shareholders cannot raise the dividends payments 
proposed by the SOC boards, they will seek to influence the dividend 
decision ahead of this meeting. Normally, such influence operates through 
the establishment of dividend policies for each firm. Besides, in Norway, the 
government-owner is given a special privilege as the dividends are set 
through the state budget for 100% state-owned firms. Given these facts, I 
will carefully time-match ownership and dividend data so as to avoid a false 
link between any changes in state ownership positions approved at the 
general assembly and dividend decisions. In a similar manner, I will time-
match SOC board and dividend data so as to avoid any false link between 
the professional background of newly elected chairmen and dividend 
decisions. As to the final two variables, corporate objective and sponsor 
ministry, they are coded so as to reflect any changes in corporate activity or 
between-ministry transfers of SOCs during the year.   
Like in the previous two chapters, I use random-effect models as the 
basic estimation method, which allows the inclusion of both cross-sectional 
and fixed firm effects. Moreover, since the dividend payment ratio is a 
continuous variable, I rely on linear regression to examine the impact of 
independent variables.  
 
 
8.2 Basic Facts about SOC Dividend Payments 
As previously noted, there are often significant values at stake in dividend 
decisions. Seeking to enrich our knowledge about this very issue, I answer in 
this section a series of basic questions about dividend practices in Norwegian 
and Swedish SOCs. How many firms are potential dividend-payers, and how 
many firms do actually pay dividends over the sample period? What is the 
total value of dividend payments? Is corporate cash distributed to 
shareholders by other methods than paying dividends? Are dividend 
payment ratios increasing or decreasing over the sample period? Are there 
any significant differences in dividend payment practices between Norway 
and Sweden? Table 8.2 reports summary statistics on these issues.122 
                                                 
122 To maximise the number of dividend observations, data are drawn from the non-lagged 
sample (covering the years 2000-2005).  
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Table 8.2. Summary statistics for dividend measures and payouts to shareholders. 
 
Dividend payment variables Norway Sweden 
 Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 Std.dev. n Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 Std.dev. n 
General dividend characteristics             
Potential dividend-payers 0.53 0 1 1 0.50 277 0.59 0 1 1 0.49 234 
Actual dividend-payers 0.37 0 0 1 0.48 277 0.45 0 0 1 0.50 234 
Dividend payments  1188.48 23 99 688 2600.32 102 924.11 49 160.50 518 2057.01 106 
Total payments (dividends + share buyback) 1265.79 23 99 688 2688.27 102 1015.81 49 160.50 518 2681.27 106 
Net payments (dividends – share emissions) 845.68 10 63 524 3243.83 102 818.60 34 144.50 479 2915.37 106 
Dividend payment ratios             
Dividend-to-earnings  51.11 31.50 46 75 25.20 92 43.60 31 43.50 51 21.06 90 
Dividend-to-sales 6.54 1 3 6 9.69 99 6.77 1 4 7 11.30 108 
Dividend-to-cash-flow 27.97 15 24 39 18.88 77 24.67 10 18 36 19.20 87 
 
Note: The table reports the sample statistics, by country, for different dividend measures. The columns show the mean, quartiles, and the standard deviation of these measures. Q1, Q2 (median) and Q3 refer to 
the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile, respectively. n is the number of firm/year observations. Potential dividend-payers is a dummy variable set to one if the government-owner makes a public announcement that 
the firm is candidate for paying dividends, zero otherwise. Actual dividend-payers is a dummy variable set to one if the firm pays dividend, zero otherwise. Dividend payments are the total cash dividends paid 
to shareholders. Total payments are the sum of dividend payments and share buyback, where the latter is defined as a firm’s repurchase of own shares. Net payments are the sum of total payments less share 
emissions (equity sale). All payments are expressed in 2005 NOK million and adjusted for CPI. The numerator in the dividend payment ratios is the total cash dividend paid to shareholders, while the 
denominators are earnings, sales, and operating cash-flow. 
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From Table 8.2, we note that more than half of the SOCs in sample are 
candidates for paying dividends (53% and 59% of Norwegian and Swedish 
SOCs, respectively).123 However, as should be expected, fewer SOCs are 
actually paying dividends (37% and 45% of Norwegian and Swedish SOCs, 
respectively). Nevertheless, this means that among the potential dividend-
paying firms, a great majority are actual dividend-payers (70% and 75% of 
Norwegian and Swedish SOCs, respectively). While these numbers suggest 
that the general dividend pattern is fairly similar in Norway and Sweden, 
there are some noticeable differences between the two countries over time. 
In fact, Figure 8.1 reveals that while, in Norway, the fraction of potential 
dividend-paying SOCs is reduced over the sample period, the opposite 
pattern holds for Swedish SOCs (like above, Norwegian and Swedish SOCs 
are displayed at the left-hand side (value 0) and right-hand side (value 1) of 
the figure, respectively). More precisely, in Norway, the fraction of dividend 
candidates drops from 62% in 2000 to about 50% over the period 2002-
2005. By contrast, in Sweden, the number of dividend candidates increases 
from 56% in 2000 to 64% in 2005. For one thing, it seems possible to 
explain these patterns in terms of changes in the state ownership portfolios. 
In Norway, there became more non-commercial than commercial SOCs over 
the six-year period, while, for Sweden, it was observed an opposite pattern 
(cf. Table 3.2, Chapter 3). But also, it is possible that these changes are the 
result of a deliberate shareholder policy of seeking a better match between 
dividend candidates and their dividend-paying ability. Importantly, this latter 
interpretation receives some support from the Norwegian data as the fraction 
of actual dividend-payers raise from 36% in 2000 to 43% in 2005, thus 
reducing the gap between potential and actual dividend-paying SOCs. Yet, 
as no similar pattern is observed for Swedish SOCs, this explanation is at 
best nation-specific.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
123 More precisely, these numbers refer to firm/year observations. Because I have an 
unbalanced panel, this means that the number of actual firms that are candidates for paying 
dividends might slightly deviate from the registered numbers.  
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Figure 8.1. Percentage of potential and actual  
dividend-payers, by nationality. 
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Note: The figure shows the fraction of potential and actual dividend-paying SOCs in Norway and Sweden 
over the years 2000-2005. In line with the dummy variable notation, Norwegian SOCs are assigned the 
value 0 and Swedish SOCs are assigned the value 1 (Norwegian and Swedish SOCs thus appear at the 
left-hand and right hand-side of the figure, respectively). The samples include all SOCs from which 
dividend data are available (n = 277 and n = 234 for Norway and Sweden, respectively).  
 
 
As regards the real value of total dividend payments, Figure 8.2 shows that, 
in both Norway and Sweden, the dividend paid has increased significantly 
over the six-year period. After remaining in the range between 10725 and 
15508 NOK million from 2000 to 2003, Norwegian dividend payments 
increased sharply in the years 2004 and 2005 (with total dividends equal to 
28821 and 37991 NOK million, respectively). Interestingly, a very similar 
pattern is observed for Swedish SOCs. Whereas total dividend payments 
remained in the range between 11317 and 13492 NOK million from 2000 to 
2003, they increased sharply in the last two sample years (with total 
dividends equal to 19559 and 32909 NOK million, respectively). In both 
countries, the rising dividend payments reflected strong developments in the 
national economies. 
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Figure 8.2. Total level of dividend payments, by nationality. 
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Note: The figure shows the total level of dividend payments (in 2005-constant NOK million) in Norway 
and Sweden over the years 2000-2005. In line with the dummy variable notation, Norwegian SOCs are 
assigned the value 0 and Swedish SOCs are assigned the value 1 (Norwegian and Swedish SOCs thus 
appear at the left-hand and right hand-side of the figure, respectively). The samples include all actual 
dividend-paying SOCs (n = 102 and n = 106 for Norway and Sweden, respectively).  
 
 
Due to differences in firm size and other factors, it is naturally so that some 
SOCs pay much larger dividends than others. The summary statistics in 
Table 8.2 supports this notion as it shows that, in both Norway and Sweden, 
there is a considerable disparity between the mean and median dividend 
payment levels. More specifically, the average dividend payment is 
significantly higher than the median dividend value, with a mean–to–median 
ratio of 12–to–1 in Norway and roughly 6–to–1 in Sweden. Moreover, as the 
average dividend payments in the two countries exceed even the dividend 
values at the 75th percentile, this provides further evidence that dividends are 
concentrating among relatively few SOCs. As shown in Figure 8.3, however, 
there is no consistent pattern of an increasing disparity between mean and 
median total dividend payments.  
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Figure 8.3. Average and median levels of  
dividend payments, by nationality. 
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Note: The figure shows the average (mean) and median (p50) levels of total dividend payments (in 2005-
constant NOK million) in Norway and Sweden over the years 2000-2005. In line with the dummy 
variable notation, Norwegian SOCs are assigned the value 0 and Swedish SOCs are assigned the value 1 
(Norwegian and Swedish SOCs thus appear at the left-hand and right hand-side of the figure, 
respectively). The samples include all actual dividend-paying SOCs (n = 102 and n = 106 for Norway and 
Sweden, respectively).  
 
 
Apart from paying dividends, we would also like to know whether SOCs 
distribute corporate cash to shareholders by other methods, which typically 
include the repurchase of own shares. However, because such buybacks are 
only appropriate for partly state-owned firms in general and listed firms in 
particular, we should not expect them to have any major impact on the total 
payment distribution. This notion is supported by the descriptive statistics in 
Table 8.2, which show that the quartile numbers, Q1–Q3, do not change with 
the inclusion of buybacks. The results thus indicate that share repurchases 
are mostly due to large (listed) firms (in both Norway and Sweden, the 
inclusion of buybacks changes the mean payment value by nearly 100 NOK 
millions). Interestingly, the pattern is somewhat different for net payments, 
which means we also account for cash transfers from (existing and/or new) 
shareholders to the firm (stock emissions). In fact, the changes in quartile 
numbers demonstrate that stock emissions are both small- and large-sized. 
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While the real cash value of dividend payments provides information 
about the economic importance of firms’ cash allocation, the dividend 
payment ratio tells us more about the very distribution of money between 
shareholders and the firms themselves. In line with prior research, our 
primary measure of dividend payments is the dividend-to-earnings ratio (see, 
for example, La Porta et al., 2000). As shown in Table 8.2, the dividend-to-
earnings ratio is, on average, somewhat higher among Norwegian SOCs than 
among their Swedish counterparts (51% and 44%, respectively).124 
Moreover, in both countries, the mean and median ratios are fairly similar, 
which means there are no indications that the dividend-to-earning ratio is 
concentrating in the lower or upper percentiles. However, as revealed by 
Figure 8.4, there is a tendency in both countries that the median dividend-to-
earnings ratio is somewhat lower over the period 2003-2005 than over the 
years 2000-2002. As regards the two other measures of dividend payment 
ratios (dividend-to-sales and dividend-to-cash-flow), their average values are 
fairly similar in Norway and Sweden (7% (28%) and 7% (25%), 
respectively). Additionally, there is no evidence that these ratios are 
concentrating (their mean values are well below or roughly equal to the 
ratios at the 75th percentile). From Figure 8.4, we see that the median 
dividend-to-sales ratio is rather stable over the six-year period. By contrast, 
the median dividend-to-cash-flow ratio shows no consistent pattern over 
time, although there is an increasing four-year trend in both countries.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
124 Note that the actual dividend-paying observations exceed the number of firm/year 
observations for the dividend payments ratios, which is due to elimination of firms with 
missing accounting data and firms with negative earnings or cash flow. 
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Figure 8.4. Median dividend payment ratios, by nationality. 
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Note: The figure shows the median ratio of dividend payments (p50) in Norway and Sweden over the 
years 2000-2005, which includes dividend-to-earnings, dividend-to-sales, and dividend-to-cash-flow. In 
line with the dummy variable notation, Norwegian SOCs are assigned the value 0 and Swedish SOCs are 
assigned the value 1 (Norwegian and Swedish SOCs thus appear at the left-hand and right hand-side of 
the figure, respectively). The samples include all SOCs which are actual dividend-payers (n = 92 (99, 77) 
and n = 90 (105, 87) for Norway and Sweden, respectively).  
 
 
8.3 Empirical Analysis 
The dividend payment of SOCs is a scarcely examined issue. Thus, we know 
little about which firms are not required to pay dividends, which firms are 
candidates for dividend payments, and why some firms pay more dividends 
than others. Some evidence on these matters is shown in Table 8.3, which 
contrasts non-dividend paying firms with non-paying dividend candidates 
and actual dividend-payers concerning the main variables of this study.125 
Intriguingly, the descriptive statistics demonstrate that there are important 
differences between non-dividend paying firms and dividend candidates.  
                                                 
125 While the alternative measures to state control and the chairman’s professional background 
are commented upon only in the multivariate analysis, I include here all measures of the 
growth opportunities variable. The reason for this detailed treatment relates to the difficulties 
in measuring growth opportunities across very different firms, which suggests that we run 
several robustness checks.  
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Table 8.3. Descriptive statistics by firms’ dividend-paying status. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The table shows means, medians, and standard deviations for all main variables by firms’ dividend-paying status in the lagged sample. The number of observations 
changes by variables, due to elimination of firms with missing accounting data and firms with negative earnings or cash flow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Non-dividend paying firms Dividend candidates 
                     Non-payers                                                    Actual payers 
 Mean Median St.dev. n Mean Median St.dev. n Mean Median St.dev. n 
Dividend-to-earnings         46.81 44.5 23.72 150 
Dividend-to-sales         6.68 3 11.08 170 
Dividend-to-cash-flow         26.69 22 19.04 137 
Annual growth in sales 29.26 1 207.40 179 2.49 0 24.34 59 5.19 3.5 25.13 170 
Annual growth in earnings -216.74 -2.5 2879.96 150 -38.95 34 593.10 59 110.88 16 411.65 171 
Annual growth in fixed assets 47.36 3 267.60 169 -5.87 -7 27.67 52 88.40 4 955.11 154 
Annual growth in total assets 12.88 3 72.98 182 -2.64 -2 22.36 59 5.93 3.5 19.14 172 
Annual growth in total cash-flow 57.79 4 503.74 135 118.25 46 880.68 51 171 -8.5 1190.49 166 
Debt ratio 56.56 57.5 28.26 182 68.58 68 22.57 59 59.64 61 22.83 173 
Corporate objective 0.10 0 0.30 182 0.83 1 0.38 59 0.74 1 0.44 173 
Income level 2375.72 167.5 5007.26 182 7164.02 2013 12488.34 59 26056.54 5244 58333.81 173 
State control 0.35 0 0.48 182 0.36 0 0.48 59 0.38 0 0.49 173 
Chairman political representative 0.21 0 0.41 182 0.32 0 0.47 59 0.34 0 0.47 173 
Sponsor ministry 0.26 0 0.44 182 0.75 1 0.44 59 0.64 1 0.48 173 
Nationality  0.43 0 0.50 182 0.46 0 0.50 59 0.51 1 0.50 173 
Time trend 3.16 3 1.37 182 2.86 3 1.36 59 3.18 3 1.43 173 
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One striking result is that, compared to actual dividend-payers in particular, 
the annual sales growth rate is considerably more skewed among those firms 
which are not required to pay dividends. More precisely, the average growth 
rate of the latter firms largely exceeds the median, which suggests that high 
growth rates are concentrated among relatively few SOCs. Moreover, the 
average annual earnings growth rate is negative for both groups of non-
paying firms (i.e., both non-dividend and dividend candidates), but greatly 
positive for the group of actual dividend-payers. Again, however, the mean 
values are skewed. As regards the growth rates in fixed and total assets, non-
paying dividend candidates appear with negative mean and median values. 
By contrast, non-dividend paying firms and actual dividend-paying firms 
appear with positive mean and median values. In addition, within both of the 
latter groups, it seems that the growth rates in fixed assets are somewhat 
concentrated. As to the annual growth rate in cash-flow, this variable is also 
widely spread, and mostly so within the group of actual dividend-payers.  
As expected, and in contrast to dividend candidates, we also see that 
most non-dividend paying firms are non-commercial. In fact, among those 
SOCs which are not eligible for dividend payments, only 10% pursue a 
commercial objective. In comparison, the great majority among non-paying 
dividend candidates and actual dividend-payers are commercially oriented 
(83% and 74%, respectively). Additionally, the income level is significantly 
higher among dividend candidates than among non-dividend paying firms, 
which means that dividends are extracted from those firms that generate the 
most cash (in real value). To be even more specific, the median income level 
becomes successively higher as we move from non-dividend paying firms 
(167.5 NOK million), to non-paying dividend candidates (2013 NOK 
million) and actual dividend-payers (5244 NOK million). Interestingly, there 
is also evidence that, when compared to non-dividend paying firms, dividend 
candidates are more often chaired by a political representative (21% and 
32/34%, respectively). Thus, we are led to speculate whether government-
owners perceive it more important to control dividend-paying firms than 
non-dividend paying ones. We also note that non-dividend paying firms are 
more often administered by sectoral ministries than the ownership ministry 
(the latter ministry is the sponsor in 21% of the cases), while the opposite is 
true for non-paying dividend candidates and actual dividend-payers (the 
ownership ministry is the sponsor in 75% and 64% of the cases, 
respectively). Finally, there are few notable differences between the three 
subgroups as regards the debt ratio, state control, nationality and time trend 
variables, except for the fact that the average (and median) debt ratio is 
somewhat higher among non-paying dividend candidates.  
Directing our attention towards actual dividend-paying firms, Table 
8.4 presents a national breakdown of the above descriptive statistics. From 
this table, we note that while the dividend-to-sales and dividend-to-cash-
flow ratios are fairly similar in Norway and Sweden, the average dividend-
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to-earnings ratio is higher among Norwegian SOCs (51%, compared to 42% 
among Swedish SOCs). Moreover, with the exception of annual growth in 
cash-flow, all average growth measures are higher in Norway than in 
Sweden. In both countries, all growth variables also display a large spread. 
As regards the corporate objective of dividend-paying firms, the fraction of 
commercially oriented SOCs is higher in Sweden than in Norway (80% 
versus 68%, respectively). Thus, in Norway, more than 30% of the dividend-
paying firms are actually non-commercial. Additionally, the income level of 
dividend-paying firms is, on average, higher in Norway than in Sweden. But, 
again, there is a large spread in the variable. Interestingly, the two countries 
also differ regarding the level of state control as the fraction of dividend-
paying firms under partial state ownership is much larger in Norway than in 
Sweden (51% versus 26%, respectively). As to which is the sponsor ministry 
of dividend-paying firms, the ownership ministry plays a more dominant role 
in Sweden than in Norway (76% versus 51%, respectively). To end with, 
there are no significant differences between the two countries regarding debt 
ratio, the professional background of chairman, and the time trend variable.  
 
 
 
Table 8.4. Descriptive statistics of dividend-paying firms:  
Means and standard deviations. 
 
 
 
Variables 
Norwegian SOCs 
 
  Mean          St.dev.         n 
Swedish SOCs 
 
    Mean            St.dev.         n 
Dividend-to-earnings 
Dividend-to-sales 
Dividend-to-cash-flow 
Annual growth in sales 
Annual growth in earnings 
Annual growth in fixed assets 
Annual growth in total assets 
Annual growth in cash-flow  
Debt ratio 
Corporate objective 
Income level  
State control 
Chairman political representative 
Sponsor ministry 
Nationality 
Time trend 
51.21 
6.58 
27.17 
7.54 
142.56 
165.89 
6.96 
71.68 
61.05 
0.68 
33334 
0.51 
0.31 
0.51 
– 
3.29 
25.82 
10.15 
17.71 
23.63 
459.17 
1359.22 
12.81 
765.23 
21.25 
0.47 
77082.86 
0.50 
0.46 
0.50 
– 
1.40 
77 
83 
66 
82 
85 
76 
85 
81 
85 
85 
85 
85 
85 
85 
– 
85 
42.18 
6.78 
26.25 
3.01 
77.77 
12.73 
4.59 
261.03 
58.27 
0.80 
19027.97 
0.26 
0.36 
0.76 
– 
3.08 
20.45 
11.95 
20.32 
26.39 
356.86 
37.31 
23.85 
1477.66 
24.29 
0.41 
29813.57 
0.44 
0.48 
0.43 
– 
1.45 
73 
87 
71 
88 
87 
79 
88 
86 
88 
88 
88 
88 
88 
88 
– 
88 
 
Note: The table shows means and standard deviations for all main variables, by country, in the lagged 
sample. The number of observations changes by variables, due to elimination of firms with missing 
accounting data and firms with negative earnings or cash flow. 
 
Correlations among all main variables are shown in Table 8.5.126 Also note 
that, to handle widely spread variables, I employ from here onwards some 
                                                 
126 Like in previous chapters, I use Spearman correlation to handle non-parametric data. 
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different calculations of growth opportunities and income level. However, 
while the income variable is conventionally log-transformed, this method is 
not suitable for the growth rate variables (due to a non-trivial fraction of 
negative values). As an alternative, I therefore use the decile rank to divide 
the dividend-paying SOCs into 10 equal-sized groups (La Porta et al., 
2000).127 Given these adjustments, the correlation matrix indicates no severe 
multicollinearity problems, except for the strong positive link between 
corporate objective and sponsor ministry (0.66).128 Among dividend-paying 
firms, there is thus a positive relationship between commercial orientation 
and the ownership ministry. But, since the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
test indicates no multicollinearity problems (all VIFs < 2.5), all main 
variables are included within the model. 
As expected, the table shows that the three dividend payments ratios 
are significantly and positively related. Regarding the independent variables, 
the correlations confirm some of the predicted relationships. Noticeably, the 
state control variable shows a significant and negative association with all 
three dividend measures, which indicates that partly state-owned firms are 
paying lower dividend ratios than firms under full state control. Moreover, 
the ownership ministry is significantly and negatively related to both the 
dividend-to-earnings and dividend-to-cash-flow ratios. However, while there 
is a significant and positive relationship between the commercial orientation 
of SOCs and the dividend-to-sales ratio, commercial firms are actually 
negatively (but insignificantly) linked to the other dividend payments ratios. 
Among the growth opportunities measures, there is only scant evidence of 
any significant relationships between growth rates and dividend payment 
ratios, and two of these links even run counter to theory. The correlations 
show no evidence of any significant relationships between the dividend 
payments ratios and the other independent variables (i.e., debt ratio, income 
level, chairman’s professional background, nationality, and time trend). Yet, 
some of these bivariate relationships are significantly altered when 
examining partial effects.  
 
 
                                                                                                                   
 
127 The rank deciles range from 1 to 10 in ascending order.  
 
128 Also, some of the alternative measures relating to state control and the chairman’s 
professional background (not shown in the table) are strongly internally related.  
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Table 8.5. Correlations among variables. 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Dividend-to-earnings 
2. Dividend-to-sales 
3. Dividend-to-cash-flow 
4. Annual growth in sales (deciles) 
5. Annual growth in earnings (deciles) 
6. Annual growth in fixed assets (deciles) 
7. Annual growth in total assets (deciles) 
8. Annual growth in cash-flow (deciles) 
9. Debt ratio 
10. Corporate objective 
11. Income level (log) 
12. State control 
13. Chairman political representative 
14. Sponsor ministry 
15. Nationality 
16. Time trend 
 
  0.53** 
  0.42** 
  0.06 
–0.10 
–0.06 
–0.21* 
–0.06 
  0.01 
–0.17 
–0.02 
–0.27** 
–0.09 
–0.30** 
–0.06 
–0.08 
 
 
  0.34** 
  0.19* 
  0.19* 
–0.02 
  0.03 
  0.02 
–0.10 
  0.38** 
–0.13 
–0.27** 
–0.11 
  0.12 
  0.08 
  0.06 
 
 
 
–0.13 
  0.02 
  0.06 
  0.06 
–0.04 
–0.04 
–0.16 
  0.05 
–0.33** 
  0.05 
–0.28** 
–0.04 
  0.13 
 
 
 
 
  0.18 
  0.17 
  0.28** 
  0.06 
  0.04 
  0.17 
  0.04 
  0.01 
–0.16 
  0.09 
–0.05 
–0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.08 
  0.13 
  0.20* 
–0.30** 
  0.21* 
  0.05 
  0.02 
  0.08 
  0.20* 
  0.02 
  0.21* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.49** 
–0.23* 
  0.08 
  0.01 
  0.01 
  0.03 
  0.05 
–0.09 
  0.00 
  0.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.05 
  0.06 
  0.06 
–0.03 
  0.08 
–0.03 
  0.03 
–0.12 
  0.42** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.05 
  0.06 
–0.03 
–0.05 
  0.01 
  0.01 
–0.13 
  0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.03 
  0.19* 
–0.12 
–0.27** 
–0.17 
–0.00 
–0.17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.11 
  0.18 
–0.35** 
  0.66** 
  0.17 
–0.10 
 
Note: The table shows Spearman correlation coefficients. * p < 0.05 (two-tailed); ** p < 0.01 (two-tailed).  
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Table 8.5. (Continued) 
 
Variables 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Dividend-to-earnings 
2. Dividend-to-sales 
3. Dividend-to-cash-flow 
4. Annual growth in sales (deciles) 
5. Annual growth in earnings (deciles) 
6. Annual growth in fixed assets(deciles) 
7. Annual growth in total assets (deciles) 
8. Annual growth in cash-flow (deciles) 
9. Debt ratio 
10. Corporate objective 
11. Income level (log) 
12. State control 
13. Chairman political representative 
14. Sponsor ministry 
15. Nationality 
16. Time trend 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.16 
–0.30** 
–0.06 
–0.07 
–0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.20* 
  0.26** 
–0.41** 
  0.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.16 
  0.14 
  0.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.29** 
0.09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.13 
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The results of the random-effects regression analyses are presented in Table 
8.6 for the three dividend measures (dividend-to-earnings, dividend-to-sales, 
and dividend-to-cash-flow). In the regressions are used different proxies for 
growth opportunities, depending on which measure improves the statistical 
fit of the model.129 Among the economic criteria, the growth opportunities 
variable is significantly related to all three dividend payments ratios, while 
the corporate objective dummy is only statistically significant in the 
dividend-to-sales ratio regression. As regards the scope for political 
influence, the state control variable appears with significant and negative 
effects in all three regressions. Additionally, the time trend variable is 
significantly related to the dividend-to-sales ratio. Intriguingly, some of 
these relationships become even more manifest (and some new relationships 
enter) when testing for the moderating effects of political influences in state 
control (Table 8.7) and SOC chairman subsamples (Table 8.8). In addition, 
some relationships are being altered as I test for the impact of nationality 
interaction effects (Table 8.9). Like before, I perform moderated regression 
analyses to formally inspect whether the subsample coefficients are 
significantly different. The results from these regressions, which include 
interactions between independent variables and the relevant subsample 
variable, are reported in Appendix D. 
Noticeably, several of the below regressions are estimated by way of 
pooled OLS instead of random-effect models, which is due to the fact that 
most of the unexplained variance in these models is contributed by cross-
sectional differences and not firm-specific factors (i.e., the Breusch-Pagan 
LM-test shows that rho = 0). In this case, the use of pooled OLS both 
improves the overall model fit and makes several more variables enter as 
significant predictors of dividend payment ratios. With one exception, all 
equations are statistically significant in terms of the Wald (for random-
effects) and F-ratio (for pooled OLS) statistics. Together, the results from 
Tables 8.6–8.9 and the Appendix will serve as basis for the following 
reporting and interpretation of findings.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
129 For the dividend-to-earnings ratio is used the annual growth rate in total assets. For the 
dividend-to-sales ratio is used the annual growth rate in earnings, while for the dividend-to-
cash-flow ratio is used the annual sales growth rate.  
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Table 8.6. Random-effects and pooled OLS regression analysis for the dividend payment ratios. Main effects, full sample. 
 
Independent variables Dividend-to-earnings      Dividend-to-sales     Dividend-to-cash-flow 
              
Intercept 
 
Economic criteria 
Growth opportunities (deciles) 
Debt ratio 
Commercial objective 
 
Political influences 
Income level (log) 
State control 
Chairman political representative  
Ownership ministry 
 
Controls 
Nationality 
Time trend 
 
Number of firm/year observations 
Number of firms 
Rho 
Wald chi2/F 
R² (overall) 
Model 
  77.859*** 
 
 
–1.361** 
  0.144 
–4.410 
 
 
–4.739 
–10.912* 
–5.257 
–3.084 
 
 
–8.936 
  0.375 
 
150 
47 
0.55 
19.68** 
0.19 
RE 
(13.648) 
 
 
(0.630) 
(0.138) 
(6.716) 
 
 
(3.237) 
(6.150) 
(5.280) 
(4.453) 
 
 
(6.289) 
(1.144) 
  11.342 
 
 
  0.542*** 
–0.063 
  5.200** 
 
 
–2.124 
–4.675** 
–0.003 
–1.946 
 
 
  3.537 
  0.799*** 
 
169 
48 
0.93 
35.72*** 
0.08 
RE 
(8.223) 
 
 
(0.180) 
(0.069) 
(2.573) 
 
 
(2.256) 
(2.370) 
(1.003) 
(2.047) 
 
 
(5.564) 
(0.224) 
  40.041*** 
 
 
–1.377* 
–0.026 
  5.799 
 
 
–0.164 
–9.991** 
  0.045 
–7.736 
 
 
–3.470 
  0.975 
 
137 
43 
 
2.70*** 
0.14 
OLS 
(10.248) 
 
 
(0.706) 
(0.101) 
(4.571) 
 
 
(1.627) 
(4.564) 
(4.342) 
(5.182) 
 
 
(4.123) 
(1.124) 
 
 
 
Note: The table reports unstandardised regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Rho denotes the proportion of total error variance contributed by the 
panel-level error component. The Wald chi2 (for random-effects estimation) an F (for pooled OLS) statistics report whether the independent variables are jointly significant. 
Model estimation is performed by random-effects (RE) or pooled OLS (OLS). R² is the overall variation explained by the model. * p < 0.10 (two-tailed); ** p < 0.05 (two-
tailed); *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed).  
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Table 8.7. Random-effects and pooled OLS regression analysis for the dividend payment ratios by state control subsamples. 
 
Independent variables Dividend-to-earnings 
 
            Full state control             Partial state control 
Dividend-to-sales  
 
      Full state control             Partial state control 
Dividend-to-cash-flow 
 
      Full state control            Partial state control 
Intercept 
 
Economic criteria 
Growth opportunities  
Debt ratio 
Commercial objective 
 
Political influences 
Income level (log) 
Chairman political repr. 
Ownership ministry 
 
Controls 
Nationality 
Time trend 
 
Number of firm/year obs. 
Number of firms 
Rho 
Wald chi2 
R² (overall) 
Model 
 102.620*** 
 
 
–0.725 
  0.145 
–14.574 
 
 
–10.309** 
–0.476 
  5.137 
 
 
–9.743 
–2.078 
 
96 
30 
0.61 
20.07** 
0.20 
RE 
(14.939) 
 
 
(0.771) 
(0.177) 
(9.121) 
 
 
(4.786) 
(6.143) 
(4.937) 
 
 
(9.271) 
(1.412) 
 
 13.729 
 
 
–2.750** 
  0.454* 
 10.551 
 
 
–2.214 
–15.124* 
–3.962 
 
 
  6.127 
  5.226*** 
 
54 
18 
0.59 
53.06*** 
0.39 
RE 
(23.042) 
 
 
(1.148) 
(0.236) 
(8.609) 
 
 
(4.045) 
(8.933) 
(7.201) 
 
 
(8.936) 
(1.945) 
  11.917 
 
 
  0.621** 
–0.050 
  6.945 
 
 
–2.772 
  0.683 
–2.344 
 
 
  2.778 
  0.534* 
 
105 
31 
0.95 
20.11*** 
0.07 
RE 
(13.405) 
 
 
(0.264) 
(0.077) 
(7.953) 
 
 
(4.025) 
(1.003) 
(2.379) 
 
 
(9.571) 
(0.280) 
–12.730*** 
 
 
  0.308 
  0.088**        
  6.551*** 
 
 
–0.536 
–4.061*** 
–0.211 
 
 
  6.447*** 
  1.386*** 
 
64 
19 
 
5.79*** 
0.49 
OLS 
(3.278) 
 
 
(0.190) 
(0.038) 
(2.192) 
 
 
(0.633) 
(1.082) 
(1.327) 
 
 
(2.063) 
(0.418) 
 56.422*** 
 
 
–1.911** 
–0.071 
–12.137 
 
 
–1.604 
–3.681 
  8.110 
 
 
–3.112 
  0.542 
 
85 
26 
 
2.53** 
0.13 
OLS 
(10.762) 
 
 
(0.796) 
(0.121) 
(8.155) 
 
 
(2.706) 
(4.887) 
(8.190) 
 
 
(6.116) 
(1.457) 
  11.293 
 
 
–0.525 
  0.087 
  22.431 
 
 
–1.974 
  0.299 
–12.641 
 
 
  10.550 
   0.983 
 
52 
17 
 
2.96*** 
0.20 
OLS 
(22.279) 
 
 
(1.063) 
(0.205) 
(14.219) 
 
 
(3.577) 
(7.781) 
(7.752) 
 
 
(12.410) 
(1.884) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: As to the notation, see the note in Table 8.6. 
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Table 8.8. Random-effects and pooled OLS regression analysis for the dividend payment ratios by SOC chairman subsamples. 
 
Independent variables Dividend-to-earnings  
       Political chairmen         Non-political chairmen 
Dividend-to-sales  
      Political chairmen       Non-political chairmen 
Dividend-to-cash-flow 
    Political chairmen          Non-political chairmen 
Intercept 
 
Economic criteria 
Growth opportunities 
Debt ratio 
Commercial objective 
 
Political influences 
Income level (log) 
State control 
Ownership ministry 
 
Controls 
Nationality 
Time trend 
 
Number of firm/year obs. 
Number of firms 
Rho 
Wald chi2/F 
R² (overall) 
Model 
  26.694 
 
 
  0.112 
–0.279 
  0.363 
 
 
  17.664** 
–15.478 
–7.763 
 
 
–17.928** 
–4.120 
 
51 
17 
 
9.92*** 
0.43 
OLS 
(17.847) 
 
 
(1.390) 
(0.224) 
(5.300) 
 
 
(7.031) 
(9.857) 
(9.156) 
 
 
(7.716) 
(2.816) 
  83.944*** 
 
 
–1.458* 
  0.138 
  0.558 
 
 
–9.527** 
–3.704 
–7.571 
 
 
–0.974 
  2.175* 
 
99 
36 
0.64 
24.04*** 
0.19 
RE 
(15.080) 
 
 
(0.747) 
(0.162) 
(8.123) 
 
 
(3.751) 
(7.311) 
(4.933) 
 
 
(6.880) 
(1.297) 
 
  8.682** 
 
 
  0.263 
–0.020 
  4.389*** 
 
 
–2.373** 
–5.244*** 
–1.516 
 
 
  0.659 
  0.724 
 
 
56 
71 
3.84*** 
0.40 
OLS 
(3.258) 
 
 
(0.254) 
(0.035) 
(1.607) 
 
 
(1.116) 
(1.655) 
(2.423) 
 
 
(1.550) 
(0.507) 
  24.319** 
 
 
  0.680** 
–0.124 
  5.125* 
 
 
–4.571 
–4.643* 
–2.580 
 
 
  4.704 
  0.863*** 
 
113 
37 
0.95 
28.12*** 
0.06 
OLS 
(9.913) 
 
 
(0.283) 
(0.093) 
(2.825) 
 
 
(3.205) 
(2.578) 
(2.239) 
 
 
(7.362) 
(0.325) 
  20.607 
 
 
–1.117 
–0.115 
  20.546* 
 
 
  4.219 
–2.535 
–25.818 
 
 
  3.005 
  2.008 
 
47 
17 
 
3.61*** 
0.22 
OLS 
(24.548) 
 
 
(1.053) 
(0.207) 
(10.951) 
 
 
(5.629) 
(11.178) 
(16.819) 
 
 
(8.681) 
(2.744) 
  44.908*** 
 
 
–1.496 
–0.059 
  1.371 
 
 
–0.172 
–11.599** 
–2.224 
 
 
–5.666 
  0.764 
 
90 
31 
 
1.38 
0.13 
OLS 
(13.139) 
 
 
(0.971) 
(0.121) 
(5.527) 
 
 
(1.984) 
(5.241) 
(4.858) 
 
 
(5.180) 
(1.204) 
 
 
Note: As to the notation, see the note in Table 8.6. 
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Table 8.9. Random-effects and pooled OLS regression analysis for the dividend payment ratios by nationality subsamples. 
 
Independent variables Dividend-to-earnings 
                 Norway                              Sweden 
Dividend-to-sales 
             Norway                           Sweden                
Dividend-to-cash-flow 
               Norway                            Sweden 
Intercept 
 
Economic criteria 
Growth opportunities  
Debt ratio 
Commercial objective 
 
Political influences 
Income level (log) 
State control 
Chairman political repr. 
Ownership ministry 
 
Controls 
Time trend 
 
Number of firm/year obs. 
Number of firms 
Rho 
Wald chi2/F 
R² (overall) 
Model 
  51.10*** 
 
 
–0.289 
  0.255 
  2.199 
 
 
–2.037 
–20.254*** 
  4.777 
  1.177 
 
 
–0.025 
 
77 
25 
0.67 
10.17 
0.26 
RE 
(17.461) 
 
 
(0.879) 
(0.221) 
(8.799) 
 
 
(4.483) 
(7.791) 
(8.725) 
(7.564) 
 
 
(1.455) 
  90.743*** 
 
 
–2.562*** 
–0.109 
–2.326 
 
 
–4.042 
  0.561 
–15.796*** 
–17.910*** 
 
 
  2.561 
 
73 
22 
 
4.39*** 
0.31 
OLS 
(11.872) 
 
 
(0.869) 
(0.095) 
(5.843) 
 
 
(2.976) 
(5.225) 
(5.367) 
(6.495) 
 
 
(2.005) 
  0.612 
 
 
  0.742** 
–0.040 
  7.469* 
 
 
  0.617 
–7.061** 
–1.176 
–1.220 
 
 
  0.207 
 
83 
25 
0.76 
13.70* 
0.39 
RE 
(4.728) 
 
 
(0.291) 
(0.070) 
(4.042) 
 
 
(1.288) 
(3.014) 
(1.807) 
(5.063) 
 
 
(0.268) 
 
 
 
  22.729* 
 
 
  0.561 
–0.058 
  8.185*** 
 
 
–5.654** 
  3.240 
–4.632 
–8.158*** 
 
 
  1.968*** 
 
86 
23 
 
2.95*** 
0.21 
OLS 
(12.337) 
 
 
(0.467) 
(0.045) 
(2.714) 
 
 
(2.832) 
(2.185) 
(3.760) 
(2.766) 
 
 
(0.740) 
 48.861*** 
 
 
–1.156 
  0.081 
  8.258 
 
 
–2.161 
–13.485 
  0.238 
–7.266 
 
 
–1.722 
 
66 
22 
 
2.32** 
0.20 
OLS 
(15.192) 
 
 
(1.002) 
(0.155) 
(12.059) 
 
 
(1.925) 
(8.599) 
(5.866) 
(7.393) 
 
 
(1.548) 
  23.414* 
 
 
–1.912** 
–0.108 
  8.172 
 
 
  3.007 
–6.829 
  0.029 
–10.040 
 
 
  3.597** 
 
71 
21 
 
3.43*** 
0.19 
OLS 
(13.028) 
 
 
(0.903) 
(0.124) 
(7.878) 
 
 
(2.787) 
(9.068) 
(5.048) 
(7.742) 
 
 
(1.602) 
 
Note: As to the notation, see the note in Table 8.6. 
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8.3.1 Economic criteria versus political influences 
In evaluating the relevance of the reputation model, we first note that the 
results from the main effects regressions (Table 8.6) provide partial support 
for Hypothesis 1. Specifically, using the total assets growth rate to proxy for 
growth opportunities, the results show that moving from the bottom to the 
top decile of this growth rate is associated with a 12.2 percentage point 
lower dividend-to-earnings ratio (p < 0.05). Similarly, moving from the 
bottom to the top decile of the sales growth rate is associated with a 12.4 
percentage point lower dividend-to-cash-flow ratio (p < 0.10). In contrast to 
the theoretical prediction, however, the findings reveal that moving from the 
bottom to the top decile of the earnings growth rate leads to a 4.9 percentage 
point higher dividend-to-sales ratio (p < 0.01). Yet, compared to the other 
two ratios, we should not that the economic interpretation of the dividend-to-
sales ratio is not very transparent (La Porta et al., 2000). If accentuating 
those dividend measures which have a natural economic interpretation, the 
results therefore support the prediction that high-growth firms experience 
lower dividend payment ratios.  
Moreover, the debt ratio shows no significant relationship with any 
of the dividend measures, which means that Hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
By contrast, the results provide some support for Hypothesis 3, in that the 
dividend-to-sales ratio is higher among commercial SOCs than among non-
commercial SOCs. Specifically, commercial firms have a 5.2 percentage 
point higher payment ratio (p < 0.05). The effect of corporate objective is not 
significant for the two other dividend payment ratios. Using some finer 
specifications of the corporate objective variable, Appendix F indicates that 
there is little uniform distribution of dividend payment ratios across sectors – 
with the exception of consistently high payout ratios in the Norwegian 
utilities sector.  
As to the impact of political influences, there is evidence that firms 
under full state control are paying higher dividend payment ratios than partly 
state-owned firms. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 5, and the 
practical implication is that firms under partial state control have about an 
11% percentage point lower dividend-to-earnings ratio (p < 0.10), a 5% 
percentage point lower dividend-to-sales ratio (p < 0.05), and a 10% 
percentage point lower dividend-to-cash-flow ratio  (p < 0.05). Evidently, 
and in line with the re-election model, politicians thus seem to prefer higher 
dividend payment ratios to lower ones. When using some more precise 
ownership measures (not reported in table), it appeared that the dividend-to-
earnings ratio was negatively related to all higher threshold levels of state 
control (as compared to the benchmark category of full state control), but 
positively related to the minority post category. However, only the two 
categories of super-majority and negative control entered with significant 
effects (coefficients of –22.311 and –15.819; p < 0.05 and < 0.10, 
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respectively). The similar pattern was observed for the dividend-to-sales 
ratio (coefficients of –5.849 and –6.586; p < 0.05 and < 0.01, respectively). 
With regard to the dividend-to-cash-flow ratio, all higher threshold levels of 
state control appeared with significant and negative effects (coefficients of –
9.999, –13.386, –10.063; p < 0.10, <0.01, < 0.10, for the categories of state 
super-majority, simple majority, and negative control, respectively). The 
results thus contradict the prediction of a gradually less negative relationship 
between state voting threshold levels and the dividend payment ratio.130  
Regarding the ownership characteristics of the largest co-investor, 
the results showed that both the categories of 5% control and less than 5% 
control are negatively associated with the dividend-to-earnings ratio, but 
only the former is significant (coefficient of –13.519; p < 0.10). While the 
negative control category is positively related to the dividend-to-earnings 
ratio, it showed up as insignificant.131 As to the dividend-to-sales ratio, all 
three categories of co-investor concentration have a negative sign, but only 
the negative control category was found to be significant (coefficient of – 
5.034; p < 0.05). The fairly same pattern applied in the case of dividend-to-
cash-flow, where all three categories of co-investor concentration have a 
negative sign, but only the categories of negative control and less than 5% 
control were found to be significant (coefficients of –14.666 and –9.834; p < 
0.05 and < 0.10, respectively).132 The findings thus provide mixed support 
for the prediction of an increasing negative relationship between co-investor 
threshold levels and the dividend payment ratio. Moreover, the results 
revealed that, when compared to firms under full state control, the dividend-
to-earnings ratio is significantly lower among those firms where the largest 
co-investor is non-public (coefficient of –14.775; p < 0.01). Whereas also 
firms in which the largest co-investor is public were found to be negatively 
associated with this ratio, the effect was not significant. Interestingly, the 
very same pattern was observed for the dividend-to-sales and dividend-to-
cash-flow ratios (for non-public co-investors there was a coefficient of –
5.804 and –12.203; p < 0.10 and < 0.05, respectively). Finally, we note that 
none of the other variables under the re-election model are significantly 
                                                 
130 The alternative measure of state equity fraction is not significantly related to any of the 
three dividend measures.  
 
131 Note that the negative control and simple majority categories were merged, due to very 
few (< 1%) observations in the category of simple majority. 
 
132 Using the equity fraction of the largest co-investor instead of threshold levels of co-
investor concentration, I found that this alternative measure had a significant effect on the 
dividend-to-sales ratio (coefficient of –0.114; p < 0.01). As regards the other two dividend 
measures, the equity fraction had no significant effect.  
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influencing dividend payment ratios, which means that Hypothesis 4, 6 and 7 
are not supported.133 
Seeking to examine whether the impact of economic and other 
criteria differ according to the scope for political influence, the findings 
displayed in Tables 8.7 and 8.8 confirm that both state control and political 
representation on SOC boards are important moderating factors. As for the 
dividend-to-earnings ratio, the results provide some support for the re-
election model. In fact, it appears that the significant and negative impact of 
growth opportunities on this ratio is mainly ascribed to those firms in which 
the scope for political influence is presumably the weakest. Specifically, the 
results show that, for partly state-owned firms, moving from the bottom to 
the top decile of the total assets growth rate is associated with a 24.8 
percentage point lower dividend-to-earnings ratio (p < 0.05). In a similar 
manner, for firms being chaired by non-politicians, moving from the bottom 
to the top decile of the total assets growth rate is associated with a 13.1 
percentage point lower dividend-to-earnings ratio (p < 0.10). However, as 
the interaction effects show that none of these subsample differences are 
significant, we are left with no solid statistical support for the idea of 
moderating influences. Nor when using the two other dividend measures, we 
might observe some significant subsample differences regarding the growth 
opportunities variable. These results are also more difficult to interpret, since 
the positive effect of growth opportunities on dividend-to-sales is mainly due 
to firms under full state control (coefficient of 0.621; p < 0.05) and to firms 
being chaired by non-politicians (coefficient of 0.680; p < 0.05). Moreover, 
while the growth opportunities variable has a negative impact on the 
dividend-to-cash-flow ratio in all four subgroups, this effect is only 
significant within the subgroup of fully state-owned firms (coefficient of –
l.911; p < 0.05). Given the results pertaining to the growth opportunities 
variable, there is thus no clear evidence for any of the two governance 
models.     
While not significant in the main effects regressions, debt ratio 
enters as a significant variable within the subsample of partly state-owned 
firms – but not with the expected sign. Specifically, for firms under partial 
state control, the debt ratio is positively related to both dividend-to-earnings 
and dividend-to-sales (p < 0.10 and < 0.05, respectively). Yet, the magnitude 
of the estimated effects is very small: A 1% percentage point higher debt 
ratio result in a 0.5% and 0.01% percentage point higher dividend-to-
earnings and dividend-to-cash-flow ratios, respectively. Although we should 
                                                 
133 Using the chairman’s sector affiliation as an alternative proxy, this variable was not 
significantly related to the dividend-to-earnings and dividend-to-sales ratios. In comparison, 
and in contrast to the theoretical prediction, public sector affiliation was found to have a 
negative and significant impact on the dividend-to-cash-flow ratio (coefficient of –11.448; p < 
0.01).  
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not put too much weight on these results (the subsample differences are not 
significant), they might possibly imply that (some) partly state-owned firms 
are older, more stable, and profitable, being able to pay dividends more 
easily (von Eije and Megginson, 2006). Among the economic criteria, we 
also find that the significant and positive effect of commercial orientation on 
the dividend-to-sales ratio is mainly ascribed to partly state-owned firms, 
albeit the subsample difference is not significant. Finally, we should note 
that although we do find some other significant subsample differences when 
using the dividend-to-earnings and dividend-to-cash-flow ratios, these 
coefficients are not statistically significant per se.  
If we look at the variables under the re-election model, the income 
variable is significant within some of the subgroups. However, the results are 
inconclusive as the sign of the income variable on dividend-to-earnings is 
both positive and negative for firms subject to political control (coefficients 
of –10.309 and 17.664 for fully state-owned firms and firms being chaired 
by a political representative, respectively; p < 0.05 for both subgroups). 
While the only significant subsample difference concerns the chairman 
subsample, we note that the practical effect is fairly small: A 1% increase in 
income leads to about a 0.2% percentage point higher dividend-to-earnings 
ratio.134 Based on these results, it thus seems that politicians are not paying 
particularly emphasis to the notion that greater income implies a greater 
capacity to distribute cash.135 As regards the impact of political chairmen in 
the state control subsample, there is some evidence that political influences 
in partly state-owned firms work to negatively affect dividend-to-earnings 
and dividend-to-sales. Although this effect contradicts the theoretical 
prediction, it is possible that political representative prefer earnings being 
kept in the SOCs for (possible) welfare purposes instead of being paid to 
(private) co-investors. In statistical terms, however, these subsample 
differences are not significant. Nor in the parallel case, as regards the impact 
of state control in the SOC chairman subsamples, are there any significant 
subsample differences. Moreover, resembling the pattern from the main 
effects regressions, the sponsor ministry variable is not significant in any of 
the subsample analyses.136  
                                                 
134 When the independent variable, but not the dependent variable, is logged, one percent 
change in the independent variable is associated with 1/100 times the coefficient change in the 
dependent variable. 
 
135 Also note that, using the dividend-to-sales ratio, the income variable appears with a 
significant and negative sign within the political chairman subsample, but the subsample 
difference is not significant. 
   
136 Although we note that there is a significant subsample difference concerning the dividend-
to-cash-flow ratio.   
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Lastly, we find some significant time effects both in the main effects 
regression and in the subsample analyses. In the full sample, there is a 
positive time effect on the dividend-to-sales ratio (0.799; p < 0.01). Using a 
split sample approach, however, we see that this time effect is mainly due to 
those firms in which the scope for political influence is seemingly less 
effective. Noticeably, from one year to another, the dividend-to-sales ratio 
increases with 1.4 percentage point (p < 0.01) for the group of firms under 
partial state control (the subsample difference is significant). In addition, 
there is a significant difference between the state control subsamples: While 
the time trend variable is not significant within the group of firms under full 
state control, the dividend-to-earnings ratio is associated with an annual 
increase of 5.2 percentage point for partly state-owned firms.   
 
8.3.2 National differences 
Given the above results, we find no conclusive evidence on which 
governance model is the most relevant. Interestingly, however, a much more 
consistent pattern comes into view when examining nationality subsamples 
(Table 8.9). Generally, these findings reveal that the impact of independent 
variables differs widely across Norwegian and Swedish SOCs. Specifically, 
the results demonstrate that while the growth opportunities effect is mainly 
due to Swedish firms, the state control effect is entirely ascribed to 
Norwegian firms. In fact, it appears that, for Swedish firms, moving from the 
bottom to the top decile of the total assets growth rate is associated with a 23 
percentage point lower dividend-to-earnings ratio (p < 0.01). Although the 
interaction effect is not significant, there is yet evidence that higher growth 
SOCs pay considerably lower dividend payment ratios in Sweden than in 
Norway. Moreover, the results strongly support the idea that the Norwegian 
government-owner will exploit its opportunity to extract high dividends from 
fully state-owned SOCs: Compared to the Swedish case, Norwegian firms 
under partial state control pay about a 20% percentage point lower dividend-
to-earnings ratio than fully state-owned firms (p < 0.01). The accompanying 
interaction effect is also significant.  
Whereas several other variables appear as significant predictors in 
the nationality subsamples, most of the interaction effects are not significant. 
Yet, we do note that there are strong negative dividend-to-earnings effects 
associated with political board chairmen and the ownership ministry in the 
Swedish subsample. More precisely, the findings suggest that firms being 
chaired by political representatives have about a 16% percentage point lower 
dividend-to-earnings ratio than firms being headed by non-politicians (p < 
0.01). Thus, it seems that, in Sweden, political influences on SOC boards do 
not substitute for direct state ownership inferences on the dividend issue. By 
contrast, this result indicates that politicians have a preference for retained 
cash over high dividends, which means that Hypothesis 6 is not supported. 
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Moreover, firms which are administered by the ownership ministry have 
roughly an 18% percentage point lower dividend-to-earnings ratio than firms 
being managed by sectoral ministries (p < 0.01). Interestingly, this result 
supports the idea that the ownership ministry is more likely than sectoral 
ministries to defy political pressure to raise dividend payments (Hypothesis 
7). As a final point, we note that there is a significant between-country effect 
related to the time trend variable. While there are no significant time effects 
in the Norwegian subsample, the dividend-to-sales and dividend-to-cash-
flow ratios rise with about 2% and 3.5% percentage points for Swedish 
SOCs on an annual basis (p < 0.01 and < 0.05, respectively). The same 
pattern is valid for the dividend-to-earnings ratio, but the moderated 
regression displays no significant subgroup difference.  
 
 
8.4 Summary and Conclusions 
The main finding of this study is that nation-specific institutional systems 
matter to dividend payments. Generally, the results support the supposition 
that the legal right of the Norwegian government-owner to decide on 
dividend payments for firms under full state control will result in high 
payout ratios. Using our primary dividend measure, the dividend-to-earnings 
ratio, the findings confirm that partly state-owned firms are paying much 
lower dividend ratios than firms under full state control – a relationship 
which is associated with Norwegian firms only. Evidently, this result is 
consistent with the re-election model, and is further strengthened by the 
finding that none of the economic criteria apply to the dividend-setting of 
Norwegian SOCs. In sharp contrast to the Norwegian case, we find that 
Swedish dividend outcomes seem fairly consistent with the reputation 
model. In fact, we find that fast growth firms pay lower dividend-to-earnings 
and dividend-to-cash-flow ratios than slow growth firms, a result which 
supports the idea that SOCs which are shielded from political intervention 
are less at risk of loosing (presumably profitable) investment opportunities. 
In support of the latter argument, we also find a negative relationship 
between the ownership ministry and dividend payment ratios, which imply 
that there are strong mechanisms within the Swedish government offices to 
defy political pressure. Another noteworthy result relates to the time trend 
variable, for which there is evidence that annual increases in dividend 
payment ratios only apply to those firms in which the scope for political 
influence is presumably the weakest. Somewhat surprisingly, there is weak 
evidence of any substitute or complementary effects between dividends and 
debt. Nor do we find any consistent pattern of higher dividend payment 
ratios among commercially oriented SOCs, which indicates that corporate 
objective is not a very suitable proxy for firms’ dividend-paying ability. 
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Also, there is little evidence that SOCs’ income-generating capacity has any 
profound influence on dividend payments.  
Although this study suggests that the growth opportunities variable 
is an important predictor of dividend payment ratios, the proxies used to 
capture firms’ investment opportunities have some severe limitations. In 
particular, past growth rates have the disadvantage of relying on the past as a 
proxy for the future (La Porta et al., 2000). Additionally, due to the short 
time-span, I was forced to rely on annual growth rates, although it would 
have been more appropriate to consider firm’s economic developments over 
a longer time-horizon (e.g., by computing average annual growth rates over 
a five-year period).137 Moreover, we might ask if even better proxies could 
be obtained by way of assessing growth opportunities on qualitative grounds. 
This concern seems particularly justified with regard to firms operating in 
regulated sectors, in which there are possibly some politically defined 
restrictions on the scope for expanding activities.  
Interestingly, the findings of this study are seemingly at odds with 
the widely held view in the literature that SOCs pay much higher dividends 
after they are partially privatised (see, for example, Megginson et al., 1994; 
D’Souza et al., 2000). However, as the present sample provides no direct 
evidence on the privatisation effect, the results from this study is not directly 
comparable to those of prior research. Moreover, whereas previous studies 
have mainly directed their attention to the effect of share issue privatisation, 
the present study also includes non-listed firms among those under partial 
state control. By and large, therefore, the results from this study shed some 
new light on the dividend issue rather than contesting the findings of prior 
work. Also, this study supplements the finding of previous research that 
state-controlled firms have larger dividend payment ratios than firms with 
other control structures (e.g., family-controlled firms) and are also most 
reluctant to cut dividends (Gugler, 2003).       
As regards future research on the SOC dividend issue, there is 
clearly an opportunity to investigate some issues in more detail. For instance, 
it would be interesting to examine whether dividend payment ratios are 
substantially affected by the political environment in which firms operate 
(Bank et al. 2004). While, in Chapter 4, I made the case for theoretical 
ambiguity concerning the effect of political ideology on SOC dividend 
payments, the present sample does not allow direct testing of the ideology 
effect (due to lagging of variables, which leads to the exclusion of the 
sample year 2000). Thus, it seems that a particularly challenging approach 
for future research is to draw on dividend data that cover more election 
periods and government changes, preferably including in the analysis also 
                                                 
137 We should note that any market-based growth measures, such as the Tobin’s q, are 
generally less applicable in a state ownership context.  
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firms with other control structures so as to test whether SOCs are really 
‘special cases’.  
Obviously, the results of this study have important implications for 
public policy and practice. In particular, the findings substantially contribute 
to the recurring discussion of whether the dividend payments for fully state-
owned firms should be decided upon by the SOC boards rather than 
determined in the state budget. Although the Norwegian practice might be 
defended on welfare grounds, because politicians extract SOC earnings for 
use on welfare activities, the problem arises as the public might forego future 
capital gains. Thus, if we recognise that firms’ investment policy cannot be 
taken as independent of their dividend payments (La Porta et al., 2000), 
paying out large dividends from high growth firms might severely affect 
their future profitability. Because this problem is accentuated by the long-
term and unpredictable processes of state capital injections, it provides a 
weighty argument for the Parliament to change the current legal regime. 
From the view of practitioners, the current system places a special 
responsibility on both corporate directors and state bureaucrats to better 
inform politicians about the future wealth losses (lower investment quality) 
that follow from the apparent neglect of economic criteria.  
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Chapter 9  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Despite the harsh critique that often goes with state ownership, this type of 
ownership continues to play a very important role in Western Europe. The 
reasons why politicians favour state ownership are multi-faceted, including 
national interest protection, distributional and social concerns, difficulties in 
contracting with private service providers, developments in public-private 
partnership, and government ideology. Interestingly, the very continuance of 
state involvement in the production of goods and services has led corporate 
governance activists to abandon privatisation as the only viable strategy to 
solve the alleged governance problems under state ownership. Instead, they 
have sought to improve the management of state ownership portfolios by 
raising political awareness towards corporate governance. Yet, even though 
corporate governance advocates have succeeded in bringing issues of owner 
monitoring and control to the forefront of the political agenda, we know little 
about what governance decisions are actually made and the factors which 
might explain these outcomes. In fact, existing research has generated few 
predictions about, let alone empirical tests of, how politicians and corporate 
directors exercise their governance function. Given this, the contributions of 
this thesis relate both to the development of a theoretical framework for 
understanding governance decision-making and the thorough empirical 
treatment of this topic.  
 The aim of this last chapter is to take stock of the empirical findings 
and suggest some possible routes for future research. Accordingly, Section 
9.1 provides a summary of the main results from the three empirical studies, 
and discusses the feasibility of theoretical ideas. Thereafter, Section 9.2 
outlines some directions for future research, which stem both from the 
puzzles and limitations of the present studies as well as some of the broader 
research challenges within the field of state ownership and corporate 
governance. 
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9.1 What Have we Learned from the Analyses? 
The overarching perspective of this thesis is one where the research field of 
political economy meets corporate governance research. More specifically, I 
assume that all actors in the state-owned firm hierarchy are pursuing their 
private interests, which, despite the connotations of this term, embrace such 
different concerns as material wealth, power, self-esteem, and pride. Given 
the latter, I further make the assumption that both politicians and corporate 
directors might be motivated by quite different motivational concerns, which 
are all consistent with the notion of self-interest. To put theoretical ideas to 
empirical tests, the strategy employed in this thesis is rather straightforward: 
I specify and estimate three different governance functions, to which I have 
added independent variables (institutional features and firm characteristics) 
designed to capture the motivational concerns of decision-makers. Then 
again, the task of evaluating whether the empirical findings are more 
consistent with one type of motivational concern than another is challenging, 
since there are possibly some trade-offs which are not easily observed. Thus, 
although some results match up better with some governance models than 
others, I consider these results to reflect empirical regularities rather than 
the supremacy of particular models.  
The thesis has provided a thorough empirical investigation of three 
basic governance mechanisms, which includes board appointments, CEO 
compensation contracts, and dividend payments. Beyond the fact that these 
are mechanisms which politicians are entitled to influence either directly or 
indirectly (via the board of the directors), they are held as among the most 
promising to align the interests of corporate managers with those of the 
shareholders. Though, as should be clear from the theoretical discussion, it is 
not necessarily so that politicians and corporate directors will look for those 
governance decisions that minimise agency costs (the reputation model). 
Instead, they might search for those governance decisions which strengthen 
their chances of being re-elected to current positions (re-election model). 
Besides, politicians might pursue those governance decisions which support 
their ideological view of the world (ideology model). Using data from the 
population of Norwegian and Swedish SOCs over the period 2000-2005, this 
study examines the merits of these governance models. The two countries 
are excellent test cases as they are characterised by extensive state ownership 
portfolios; increased political attention towards corporate governance issues; 
different legal regimes and policy practices on corporate governance; and 
highly comparable political and administrative structures regulating SOCs. 
While, in the area of SOC board appointments, theoretical ideas and 
actual practice seem particularly disassociated, the empirical results suggest 
that the governance models framing the explanation of CEO compensation 
contracts and dividend payments captures important aspects of reality. More 
precisely, the key points from the study of SOC board appointments are: 
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1. Who serves as chairmen of the SOC boards? In both Norway and 
Sweden, the political representation on SOC boards is fairly strong. 
However, the fraction of political chairmen who are appointed by their 
own government is significantly lower in Sweden, which might indicate 
that politicians are more comfortable with recruiting rival political 
representatives who are also members of the Parliament. As regards the 
sector affiliation of SOC chairmen, the two countries display some very 
different board recruitment patterns. While, in Norway, the majority of 
chairmen are recruited among private sector employees, the exact 
opposite pattern is observed in Sweden. Thus, there is strong evidence 
that the Norwegian practice of excluding currently serving politicians 
and state bureaucrats from taking SOC board seats result in fewer public 
sector employees being recruited to the chairman position. 
 
2. Evidence of a gap between theory and practice. Interestingly, theoretical 
ideas about board appointments are only weakly associated with actual 
practices. Moreover, nearly all significant results are traced to nation-
specificity, which makes the governance models less applicable across 
national boundaries. However, because some of the very same variables 
are found to be strong predictors of the other two governance decisions, 
this indicates no severe misspecification of the governance models. 
Instead, the major reason why we observe such a great gap between 
theory and practice could simply be that SOC board appointments follow 
other logics than those suggested in this thesis. In addition, there is a 
possibility that the results of this study pertain to the specific sample 
period and that the outcomes would have been altered if more years were 
included.  
 
 
In the area of CEO compensation contracts (pay levels, incentive use, and 
golden parachute adoption), the following serves to summarise the findings: 
 
1. How do the CEO compensation contracts look like? CEO pay packages 
differ across both firms and countries, as well as over time. The level of 
total cash compensation is higher among Swedish SOCs than among 
their Norwegian counterparts, and in both countries there is a substantial 
skewness in CEO pay levels. If looking at the median level of pay, it yet 
seems that Norwegian CEOs are about to catch up with their Swedish 
counterparts. Moreover, in both countries, there is only a modest use of 
incentive schemes, and the power of such plans seems fairly moderate. 
Additionally, from the point of view of CEOs, there are mostly up-sides 
related to the use of incentive schemes: When incentive schemes are 
introduced, the bonus pay is normally added to the CEO’s fixed salary. 
Conversely, when incentive schemes are removed, it seems that any 
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previous bonus payments are compensated by fixed salary increases. As 
regards golden parachute contracts, these are certainly more pervasive 
than incentive schemes. Not only are golden parachutes commonly 
employed among Swedish SOCs, but they are also gaining increased 
acceptance among Norwegian SOCs. Thus, we are left with the puzzling 
evidence that it seems more acceptable to compensate CEOs for bad 
results (as in the case of dismissal) than for good results (as in the case 
of bonus payments).  
 
2. The importance of economic criteria. In line with the reputation model, 
the multivariate findings suggest that compensation packages largely 
reflect an economic rationale (even though some effects appear with an 
unexpected sign). In support of the hypotheses, the results show that, 
compared to non-commercial SOCs, commercial firms are offering 
higher pay levels and are more likely to provide incentive schemes. 
Although at odds with the hypothesis (but probably in line with the 
conventional view), commercial SOCs are also more likely to adopt 
golden parachutes. Moreover, stock market listing significantly 
outweighs the importance of state control in being positively related to 
pay levels, and is also a key predictor of the probability that SOCs are 
providing incentive schemes. While both firm size and CEO recruitment 
channel are significantly related to pay levels in ways suggested by 
theory, their economic effects are rather small. In terms of practical 
significance, therefore, the effects of economic criteria relate mainly to 
SOCs’ degree of market exposure (i.e., corporate objective and listing).  
 
3. The politics of pay. Although political forces do not directly influence 
the compensation elements, the findings provide support for the widely 
held belief that politics matters to compensation design. In support of the 
theoretical prediction, it seems that strong state control of firms 
somewhat suppress the impact of economic criteria. As regards the 
strategic role of SOC board appointments, however, the effects are rather 
mixed. In fact, the results indicate that chairmen who are political 
experienced and/or recruited from the public sector are associated with 
those kinds of compensation decisions by which they are familiar or 
from which they might personally benefit. By contrast, the pay strategies 
which are associated with non-politicians and private sector employees 
are consistent with both reputation and re-election concerns. As far as 
the very content of CEO compensation packages is concerned, it seems 
that the constraining forces of politics relate not to the pay level per se, 
but rather to how CEOs are paid.  
 
4. The impact of nationality. The national context significantly matters to 
how the concept of ‘market forces’ market is interpreted. In Sweden, the 
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link between market exposure and pay levels works through the stock 
market, while, in Norway, higher pay levels are associated with the 
commercial orientation of SOCs.  
 
 
Finally, the findings related to dividend payments are summarised along the 
following lines: 
 
1. Dividend payment characteristics. The dividend data reveals that more 
than 50% of the SOCs in Norway and Sweden are candidates for paying 
dividends. Moreover, among the dividend candidates, a great majority 
are actual dividend-payers. However, while, in Norway, the fraction of 
potential dividend-paying SOCs is reduced over the sample period, the 
opposite pattern holds for Sweden. Additionally, there is tendency for 
Norway to reduce the gap between potential and actual dividend-paying 
SOCs. Using the dividend-to-earnings ratio as the primary measure of 
dividend payments, the mean of this ratio is somewhat higher among 
Norwegian SOCs than among their Swedish counterparts. In both 
countries, the mean and median ratios are fairly similar, which means 
there are no signs that the dividend-to-earning ratio is concentrating in 
the lower or upper percentiles. Though, it is naturally so that some SOCs 
pay much larger dividends (in absolute values) than others, and in both 
countries there is a considerable disparity between the mean and median 
dividend payment levels.  
 
2. The great importance of nation-specific institutional systems. In line 
with the theoretical expectations, the results reveal that the legal regimes 
defining government-owners’ right to intervene on the dividend issue 
have a significant impact on SOC dividend payments. In Norway, the 
legal right of the government-owner to decide on dividend payments for 
firms under full state control result in higher dividend-to-earnings ratios 
for these firms than for partly state-owned firms. In addition, none of the 
economic criteria apply to the dividend-to-earnings ratio of Norwegian 
SOCs. While the Norwegian case thus provides support for the re-
election model, we find that Swedish dividend outcomes bear out the 
idea of the reputation model. In Sweden, fast growth firms pay both 
lower dividend-to-earnings and dividend-to-cash-flow ratios than slow 
growth firms. Additionally, there is a negative relationship between the 
ownership ministry and dividend payment ratios, which indicates that 
there are strong mechanisms within the Swedish government offices to 
resist political pressure towards higher dividend payments.  
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In general, the findings of this study seem to support the assertion of Vickers 
and Yarrow (1991) that most SOC studies focus almost exclusively upon the 
ownership variable and thereby fail to take proper account of other relevant 
factors. In fact, the analyses have shown that both CEO compensation 
contract design and dividend payments are responsive to a complex set of 
factors and are not easily explained by a single governance model. One 
particularly noteworthy result is that governance decisions are very sensitive 
to the institutional system and national context within which SOCs operate. 
Moreover, the results have important implications for public policy and 
practice insofar as the scope for political influence seems to produce 
governance decisions which are possibly not conducive to efficiency (e.g., in 
the area of dividend payments). 
 
 
9.2 Directions for Future Research  
While the empirical findings have provided strong support for some of the 
theoretical models and ideas which are put forward in this thesis, the 
statistical analysis can take the analysis only so far. We are not in a position 
to draw inferences about causality or the motivational trade-offs made by 
politicians and corporate directors. Moreover, we are not able to make any 
serious judgements about governance decisions being ‘good’ or ‘bad’. 
Importantly, these are areas in which future research might contribute. The 
remainder of this thesis describes some possible routes to follow in 
examining issues of state ownership and corporate governance. As a means 
to organise the discussion, Figure 9.1 gives an illustration of the corporate 
governance process.  
 
 
Figure 9.1. The corporate governance process. 
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9.2.1 Unravelling motivational concerns 
In term of the above figure, the focus in this thesis has been directed towards 
the relationship between motivational concern, institutional features, and 
firm characteristics on the one hand and governance decisions on the other 
(boxes 1 and 2). While the empirical studies have provided some important 
insights on this subject, there remain several issues to explore. One basic 
issue relates to the very assumptions underlying the theoretical models. In 
particular, I made some important assumptions about voter preferences and 
voter information on the issue of corporate governance. Indeed, the re-
election model rests on the assumption that voters will not reward politicians 
for (presumably) ‘good’ governance decisions, but are likely to punish them 
for unpopular decisions (e.g., excessive CEO salaries and downsizing of 
SOCs). Yet, I lack the empirical data needed to substantiate this proposition. 
One interesting route for future research would therefore be to collect survey 
(interview) data which might shed light on voters’ attitude towards corporate 
governance issues (see, for example, Rattsø and Sørensen, 2004). In 
addition, such survey data might also help to unveil electoral preferences 
along the left-right dimension of corporate governance issues.   
An alternative approach to test for the relevance of the re-election 
and the ideology models is to examine the effects of political cycles (see, for 
example, Alesina et al., 1999). From this perspective, it seems reasonable 
that politicians who are mainly concerned about being re-elected would care 
more about avoiding unpopular governance decisions in election years than 
when recently elected into office. For instance, we should be able to observe 
more political attention towards, say, lucrative compensation packages in 
election years (e.g., in terms of policy interventions). Moreover, conditional 
on loosing office, it seems likely that the very same type of politicians would 
seek to maximise their influence on governance decisions before elections. 
As such, they would like to replace rival political representatives or non-
politicians on the SOC boards with political affiliates. Or, there is the case in 
which politicians would extract higher dividends in election years to 
stimulate growth and fulfil electoral promises. In a similar manner, we might 
empirically examine whether ideological considerations influence dividend 
payments in election years. For instance, one conjecture would be that only 
left-wing governments will extract higher dividends when facing a 
probability of electoral defeat, because they put more weight on government 
spending than business concerns. By contrast, right-wing governments 
would have the opposite preference. Thus, we should test whether left-wing 
and right-wing governments are acting strategically when deciding on 
dividend payments (see, for example, Pettersson-Lidbom, 2001). 
More generally, it is possible to argue that further evidence about 
motivational trade-offs and strategic considerations can only be achieved by 
way of another type of research design. In fact, it seems that the case study 
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approach (relying on extensive interview data and documentary records) is 
the most salient for examining what sorts of trade-offs politicians and 
corporate directors face when making governance decisions (see, for 
example, Müller and Strøm, 1999). Particularly, the case study approach 
makes it possible to examine one important, but neglected, issue related to 
the ideology model; namely, the motivational trade-offs faced by minority 
governments and coalition governments (Budge and Keman, 1990; Laver 
and Schofield, 1990). Related to this, and resembling the above-mentioned 
concern of unveiling electoral preferences about corporate governance, one 
should attempt to corroborate the assumption of the ideology model by way 
of analysing election programmes and party-political platforms (see, for 
example, Budge and Laver, 1986).  
 
9.2.2 Effects on corporate behaviour and firm performance 
The thesis has asked the positive question of why governance decisions come 
to be the way they are in the first place, not how they ought to be designed. 
Although, under the reputation model, positive predictions are to some 
extent contrasted against a normative benchmark, it is not possible to draw 
any conclusions about the quality of governance decisions without looking at 
their effects on corporate behaviour and firm performance (boxes 3 and 4). 
In previous research only a few studies have examined the strategic activities 
undertaken by SOC corporate management. Based on the assumption that 
corporate managers in public enterprises have considerable discretion to 
pursue their private agendas, one key theoretical finding is that public 
enterprises may have both stronger incentives and greater ability than private 
enterprises to pursue anti-competitive activities (Sappington and Sidak, 
2003). Apart from such reduced-form analysis (i.e., focus on the link 
between the boxes 1 and 3), however, little is known about how governance 
decisions affect corporate behaviour. One fruitful avenue for future research 
is therefore to provide empirical evidence on the relationship between, say, 
political representation on SOC boards and firms’ investment decisions (e.g., 
investment in the home-market versus abroad, or investment in stakeholder 
versus shareholder welfare activities).  
Moreover, future research should address the persistent claim in the 
literature on state ownership that one major source of SOC inefficiency is 
weak corporate governance on the part of the government-owner (which 
often appear in combination with weak capital market discipline and lack of 
product market competition) (Horn, 1995; Boycko et al., 1996; Shleifer, 
1998; Parker, 2000). Importantly, this claim can only be corroborated by 
way of careful empirical investigation of the impact of governance decisions 
on firm performance. One viable empirical strategy is to compare the 
characteristics of state ownership to those of private ownership, because this 
approach will improve our insights into what is unique about the corporate 
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governance of private versus state owners. By considering certain 
governance mechanisms as intermediate variables between owner type and 
economic performance, we might thus explore (i) whether differences in 
governance decisions depend on whether the state or private owners control 
the firm, and (ii) whether differences in governance decisions actually 
manifests themselves in terms of performance differences (Ludvigsen and 
Bøhren, 2006). Because the criteria for judgment of SOC performance are 
controversial, it follows from this that researchers should not seek sweeping 
universal findings of success or failures of governance decisions, but should 
try to relate their findings to specific characteristics, like sector belonging or 
regulatory climate. Thus, it seems that empirical research on the 
relationships between institutional and firm characteristics, governance 
decisions, and firm performance (boxes 1, 2 and 4) would benefit from using 
industry-matched samples.  
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Appendix A 
 
Definition of variables used in the empirical analysis138  
 
 
 
VARIABLE 
 
DEFINITION  
Dependent variables 
 
The board chairman’s professional background 
 
Political representative 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the chairman is a current or former 
Parliamentary and/or government representative, zero otherwise (benchmark 
category: the chairman has no political experience) 
 
Party-political appointment d 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if a chairman with political experience is 
appointed by his/her ‘own’ government, zero otherwise (benchmark category: 
the chairman is appointed by a rival government) 
 
Sector affiliation  
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the chairman is employed in the public 
sector at the time of appointment to the chairman position, zero otherwise 
(benchmark category: the chairman is employed in the private sector at the time 
of appointment) 
 
Political representative * public 
sector affiliation d 
Dummy variable which equals one if the chairman is a political representative 
employed in the public sector at the time of appointment to the chairman 
position, zero otherwise (benchmark category: the chairman is a non-politician 
employed in the private sector at the time of appointment) 
 
Political representative * private 
sector affiliation d 
Dummy variable which equals one if the chairman is a political representative 
employed in the private sector at the time of appointment to the chairman 
position, zero otherwise (benchmark category: the chairman is a non-politician 
employed in the private sector at the time of appointment) 
 
Non-politician * public sector 
affiliation d 
Dummy variable which equals one if the chairman is a non-politician employed 
in the public sector at the time of appointment to the chairman position, zero 
otherwise (benchmark category: the chairman is a non-politician employed in 
the private sector at the time of appointment) 
 
Type of appointment d Dummy variable which equals one if the elected chairman has not previously 
served in the position, zero otherwise (benchmark category: the chairman is re-
elected to the position) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
138 Apart from the variables that are exposed to empirical testing, the table also describes 
those variables that are used for descriptive purposes only (marked with the letter d). 
Moreover, since some of the latter are merely classification variables, they need not be 
defined as dummy variables. Additionally, the table shows the background variables from 
which the final variables are constructed (marked with the letter b).  
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CEO compensation contracts139 
 
Total cash compensation 
 
The sum of fixed salary, miscellaneous benefits, and annual bonuses for a given 
year  
 
Fixed salary d 
 
The CEO’s base (non-contingent) annual salary, miscellaneous benefits included 
Incentive scheme 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the compensation contract includes 
performance-based pay components, which are tied to short-term (annual 
bonuses) and/or long-term (stock options and shareholdings) goals, zero 
otherwise (benchmark category: no performance-based pay components 
included in the compensation contract) 
 
Short-term incentive  
programme d 
Dummy variable which equals one if the compensation contract includes an 
annual bonus component, zero otherwise (benchmark category: no annual bonus 
components included in the compensation contract) 
 
Performance standard d 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the measure(s) used to evaluate managerial 
performance in the annual bonus plan are based on firm-specific goals, zero 
otherwise (benchmark category: the measure(s) used to evaluate managerial 
performance is measured relative to other firms in the industry or market) 
 
Performance criteria d Dummy variable which equals one if the annual bonus plan includes multiple 
performance criteria to evaluate managerial performance, zero otherwise 
(benchmark category: the annual bonus plan uses a single criterion to evaluate 
managerial performance) 
 
Bonus cap d The maximum amount of bonus pay which might be received by the CEO 
according to the short-term incentive contract expressed as a percentage of fixed 
salary 
 
Bonus payment d 
 
The value of the annual bonus paid to the CEO 
Bonus share d 
 
Bonus payment as a percentage of fixed salary 
 
Long-term incentive  
programme d 
Dummy variable which equals one if the CEO holds shares and/or stock options, 
zero otherwise (benchmark category: the CEO holds no shares and/or stock 
options)  
 
Value of shareholdings d The number of shares held by the CEO multiplied by the market value of the 
stock at year-end 
 
CEO ownership share d The percentage of the firm’s outstanding shares held by the CEO  
 
Notice period employee 
termination b 
The notice period defines the number of months in which the CEO is obligated 
to retain his/her position if the employment contract is terminated by the 
employee 
 
Notice period employer 
termination b 
The notice period defines the number of months in which the CEO is entitled to 
retain his/her position if the employment contract is terminated by the employer 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
139 All compensation amounts are expressed in 2005 NOK thousand and adjusted for 
Consumers’ Price Indexes (CPI). Exchange rates are drawn from the Central Bank of Norway 
(source: http://www.norges-bank.no), whereas CPI numbers are drawn from Statistics 
Norway and Statistics Sweden (where the base year is set to 1998 (= 100) for Norway and to 
1980 (=100) for Sweden) (sources: http://www.ssb.no and http://www.scb.se) 
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Net notice period b 
 
The number of months of which the notice period in the event of employer 
termination exceeds that of employee termination  
 
Severance pay b 
 
The number of months of which compensation is paid to the CEO who has his 
or her employment ‘severed’ (which does not include the required notice of 
termination)  
  
Golden parachute size b, d 
  
Net notice period plus the number of months with severance pay  
 
Golden parachute  
  
Dummy variable which equals one if the golden parachute size > 0, zero 
otherwise (benchmark category: golden parachute size ≤ 0) 
 
Dividend payments 
 
Potential dividend-payer d 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the firm is candidate for paying dividend, 
zero otherwise (benchmark category: the firm is not a dividend-paying 
candidate) 
 
Actual dividend-payer d 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the firm is paying dividends, zero 
otherwise (benchmark category: the firm is not paying dividends) 
 
Dividend payments b, d 
 
The total cash dividends paid to shareholders 
 
Dividend-to-earnings 
 
Dividend payment as a percentage of net profit/earnings 
 
Dividend-to-sales 
 
Dividend payment as a percentage of net sales 
 
Dividend-to-cash-flow 
 
Dividend payment as a percentage of cash flow from operations  
 
Share buybacks d 
 
The value of share repurchases from shareholders  
Total payments d 
 
The sum of dividend payment and buybacks  
 
Stock emissions d 
 
The flow of capital to the firm derived from stock emissions  
 
Net payments d 
 
Total payments less stock emissions  
 
Independent variables 
 
Time 
 
Year 2001 d 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the observation is in the year 2001, zero 
otherwise (benchmark category: year 2000) 
 
Year 2002 d 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the observation is in the year 2002, zero 
otherwise (benchmark category: year 2000) 
 
Year 2003 d 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the observation is in the year 2003, zero 
otherwise (benchmark category: year 2000) 
 
Year 2004 d 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the observation is in the year 2004, zero 
otherwise (benchmark category: year 2000) 
 
Year 2005 d 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the observation is in the year 2005, zero 
otherwise (benchmark category: year 2000) 
 
Time trend Continuous variable ranging from 1-6 (2000,…, 2005) 
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Nation-specificity 
 
Nationality 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the firm is Swedish, zero otherwise 
(benchmark category: the firm is Norwegian) 
 
Political ideology 
 
Government party 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the government is right-wing, zero 
otherwise (benchmark category: the government is left-wing) 
 
Type of firm activity 
 
Corporate objective 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the firm is commercial (i.e., the firm 
operates under market conditions and requirements), zero otherwise (benchmark 
category: the firm is non-commercial (i.e., the firm has special societal interests 
to fulfil))  
 
Listing 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the partly state-owned firm is listed on the 
stock exchange (publicly traded), zero otherwise (benchmark category: the firm 
is 100% state-owned) 
 
Non-listing Dummy variable which equals one if the partly state-owned firm is not listed on 
the stock exchange (publicly traded), zero otherwise (benchmark category: the 
firm is 100% state-owned) 
 
Sector classification d 
 
Sector classification is made according to Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS), which differentiates between 10 sectors. Those sectors are 10 
= energy; 15 = materials; 20 = industrials; 25 = consumer discretionary; 30 = 
consumer staples; 35 = health care; 40 = financials; 45 = information 
technology; 50 = telecommunications services; 55 = utilities 
 
State control 
 
State control  
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the state ownership stake is < 100%, zero 
otherwise (benchmark category: state ownership stake =100%) 
 
State equity fraction 
 
The fraction of a firm’s equity held by the state 
State super-majority  
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the state ownership stake is < 100% and ≥ 
66.67%, zero otherwise (benchmark category: state ownership stake = 100%) 
 
State simple majority  
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the state ownership stake is < 66.67% and 
> 50%, zero otherwise (benchmark category: state ownership stake = 100%) 
 
State negative control 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the state ownership is ≤ 50% and > 
33.33%, zero otherwise (benchmark category: state ownership stake = 100%) 
 
State minority post 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the state ownership stake is ≤ 33.33%, zero 
otherwise (benchmark category: state ownership stake = 100%) 
 
Co-investment characteristics 
 
Largest co-investor simple 
majority  
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the largest co-investor’s ownership stake is 
< 100% and > 50%, zero otherwise (benchmark category: state ownership stake 
= 100%) 
 
Largest co-investor negative 
control  
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the largest co-investor’s ownership stake is 
≤ 50% and > 33.33%, zero otherwise (benchmark category: state ownership 
stake = 100%) 
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Largest co-investor 5% control 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the largest co-investor’s ownership stake is 
≤ 33.33% and ≥ 5%, zero otherwise (benchmark category: state ownership stake 
= 100%) 
 
Largest co-investor less than 5% 
control 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the largest co-investor’s ownership stake is 
< 5%, zero otherwise (benchmark category: state ownership stake = 100%) 
 
Largest co-investor equity 
fraction  
 
The fraction of a firm’s equity held by the largest co-investor 
2nd largest co-investor equity 
fraction d 
 
The fraction of a firm’s equity held by the second largest co-investor  
3rd largest co-investor equity 
fraction d 
 
The fraction of a firm’s equity held by the third largest co-investor  
4th largest co-investor equity 
fraction d 
  
The fraction of a firm’s equity held by the fourth largest co-investor  
5th largest co-investor equity 
fraction d 
 
The fraction of a firm’s equity held by the fifth largest co-investor  
Number of co-investors d Classification of the number of co-investors, distinguishing between cases in 
which the number of co-investors equal 1, 2-10, 11-100, or more than 100 
 
Largest co-investor is non-public  Dummy variable which equals one if the largest co-investor is public (including 
governmental agencies, local and regional authorities, and SOCs), zero 
otherwise (benchmark category: state ownership stake = 100%) 
 
Largest co-investor is public  Dummy variable which equals one if the largest co-investor is non-public, zero 
otherwise (benchmark category: state ownership stake = 100%) 
 
Co-investor type d Classification of co-investor type, distinguishing between cases in which the 
largest co-investor is financial, corporate, international, or public 
 
Other control structures 
 
Sponsor ministry 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the firm is administered by the ‘ownership 
ministry’, zero otherwise (benchmark category: the firm is administered by  a 
sectoral ministry) 
 
Debt ratio 
 
Debt to assets, defined as the firm’s book value of total liabilities and 
commitments divided by book value of total assets  
 
Societal and economic importance 
 
Regional presence 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the firm employs a regional workforce, 
zero otherwise (benchmark category: the firm does not employ any regional 
workforce) 
 
Number of employees 
 
The number of employees in the firm, measured as an annual average 
Equity 
 
The book value of equity held by the firm, measured at year-end 
Total assets  
 
Balance sheet total assets, defined as the sum of total fixed assets and current 
assets, measured at year-end  
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Board characteristics 
 
Board size  
 
The total number of corporate directors on the board 
Compensation committee 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the board has appointed a compensation 
committee, zero otherwise (benchmark category: the board has not appointed 
any compensation committee) 
 
Chairman is CEO 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the chairman is a CEO, zero otherwise 
(benchmark category: the chairman is not a CEO) 
 
CEO characteristics 
 
CEO recruitment   
 
 
Dummy variable which equals one if the CEO is recruited from the private 
sector, zero otherwise (benchmark category: the CEO is recruited from the 
public sector or from within the firm) 
 
CEO tenure 
 
The CEO’s number of years in position 
Chair tenure 1 b 
 
The chairman’s number of years in position 
Chair tenure 2 b 
 
 
The chairman’s number of years on the board, rank-and-file position included 
CEO influences 1 
 
The tenure of the board chairman (chair tenure 1) minus the tenure of the CEO  
 
CEO influences 2 
 
The tenure of the board chairman (chair tenure 2) minus the tenure of the CEO  
 
 
Financial characteristics140 
 
Growth opportunities  
 
Annual percentage growth in net sales, earnings, total cash flow, total assets, and 
fixed assets 
 
Income level Operating revenue (i.e., accounting income)  
 
Operating profit b 
 
Operating revenues less operating costs for the period 
Net profit/earnings b Profit after tax and minority interests, which is measured by the firm’s operating 
profit less net financial items plus investment income (= profit before tax and 
minority interests) less tax and minority interests (= net profit/earnings) 
 
Net sales b 
 
Sales revenues  
Cash flow from operational 
activities b 
 
Net amount of cash in-/outflows relating to main revenue-producing activities of 
firm 
Cash flow from investment 
activities b 
 
Net amount of cash in-/outflows on investing activities 
Cash flow from financing 
activities b 
 
Net amount of cash in-/outflows on financing activities 
Total cash flow b Change in assets (the sum of operational, investment and financing activities)  
 
Fixed assets b Tangible assets used on a continuing basis to support firm’s business 
                                                 
140 All accounting figures are expressed in 2005 NOK million and adjusted for CPI (cf. also 
footnote 90). 
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Total fixed assets b 
 
The sum of fixed (tangible) assets, intangible fixed assets and financial fixed 
assets  
 
Current assets b 
 
Cash or cash-equivalents or operating asset  
Total liabilities and commitments 
b 
The claims of creditors and others to a firm’s assets 
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Appendix B 
 
Board chairmen and political representation in Norwegian and 
Swedish SOCs over the years 2000-2005 
 
 
 
Company Chairman141  Political experience 
 
Norwegian SOCs 
 
  
Akvaforsk AS Kjell Aksnes (n/a) 
Jan Reid Hole (2002) 
No 
No 
 
Arcus AS Bård Mikkelsen (2000) 
 
No 
Argentum Fondsinvesteringer AS Tormod Hermansen (2001) 
Widar Salbuvik (2005) 
 
Yes (Arbeiderpartiet) 
No 
Avinor AS Anders Talleraas (2002) 
 
Yes (Høyre) 
Bane Tele AS Stein O. Nes (2003) 
Bjørg Kristiansen (2005) 
 
No 
No 
Carte Blanche AS Hallvard Bakke (2000) 
 
Yes (Arbeiderpartiet) 
Cermaq ASA Sigbjørn Johnsen (1997) 
 
Yes (Arbeiderpartiet) 
Den Norske Opera AS Leif Terje Løddesøl (1996) 
Einar Solbu (2005) 
 
No 
No 
DNB NOR ASA Olav Hytta (2004) 
 
No 
Eksportfinans AS Øyvind Birkeland (2001) 
Erik Borgen (2003) 
 
No 
No 
Electronic Chart Centre AS Knut Ole Flåthen (1999) 
Siri Norset Christiansen (2004) 
 
No 
No 
Enova SF Ted Hanisch (2001-2004) 
 
Yes (Arbeiderpartiet) 
Entra Eiendom AS Steinar Stokke (2000) 
Grace Reksten Skaugen (2004) 
 
No 
No 
Flytoget AS Endre Skjørestad (2003) 
 
Yes (Senterpartiet) 
Gassco AS Brit K. Sæbø Rugland (2001) 
 
No 
Grødegaard AS Gunnar Bjørkavåg (n/a) 
Per Helge Nilsen (2003-2004) 
 
No 
No 
Helse Midt-Norge RHF Ragnhild Berge (2001) 
Per Sævik  (2003) 
 
No 
Yes (Kristelig Folkeparti) 
 
                                                 
141 The year elected into the chairman position in parentheses. 
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Helse Nord RHF Olav Helge Førde (2001) 
Bjørn Kaldhol (2005) 
 
No 
No 
Helse Sør RHF Nils F. Wisløff (2001) 
Oluf Arntsen (2003) 
Erling Valvik (2004) 
 
No 
Yes (Kristelig Folkeparti) 
No 
Helse Vest RHF Mai Vik (2002) 
Oddvar Nilsen (2005) 
No 
Yes (Høyre) 
 
Helse Øst RHF Siri B. Hatlen (2001) 
 
No 
Industritjeneste AS Ingar Pettersen (1997) 
Sissel Ose Pedersen (2003) 
 
No 
No 
Innovasjon Norge Steinar Olsen (2004) No 
 
Kings Bay AS Kari Gjesteby (2000) 
Knut M. Ore (2002) 
 
Yes (Arbeiderpartiet) 
No 
KITH AS Milian Myraunet (2000) 
Ivar Gammelmo (2003) 
 
No 
No 
Kommunalbanken AS Else Bugge Fougner (1999) 
 
Yes (Høyre) 
Kongsberg Gruppen ASA  Christian Brinch (1996) 
Finn Jebsen (2005) 
 
No 
No 
Mesta AS Frode Alhaug (2003) 
 
No 
Nammo AS Karl Glad (2000) 
 
No 
Nationaltheatret AS Jan V. Johannessen (2001) No 
 
NOAH Holding AS Jostein Devold (1993) 
 
No 
NORFUND  Arve Johnsen (1997) 
Einar Stensnæs (2005) 
 
Yes (Arbeiderpartiet) 
Yes (Kristelig Folkeparti) 
Norges Statsbaner AS (NSB) Olav Fjell (2000) 
Ingeborg Moen Borgerud  
(2003) 
 
No 
Yes (Arbeiderpartiet) 
 
Norsk Eiendomsinformasjon AS Erik Keiserud (2000) 
 
No 
Norsk Hydro ASA Einar Kloster (1997) 
Egil Myklebust (2001) 
Jan Reinås (2004) 
 
No 
No 
No 
Norsk institutt for fiskeri- og 
havbruksforskning AS (Fiskeriforskning) 
Terje E. Martinussen (1999) 
Trygve Myrvang (2003) 
 
No 
No 
Norsk Rikskringkasting AS (NRK) Kåre Willoch (1998) 
Torger Reve (2000) 
Anne Carine Tanum (2001) 
Eldbjørg Løwer (2004) 
 
Yes (Høyre) 
No 
No 
Yes (Venstre) 
Norsk Tipping AS Sigmund Thue (1997) No 
 
 Harald Overvaag (n/a) No 
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NORUT Gruppen AS Arne Benjaminsen (2003) 
Jarle Aarbakke (2004) 
 
No 
No 
Petoro AS  Tore I. Sandvold (2001) 
Bente Rathe (2002) 
 
No 
No 
Posten Norge AS Magnus Stangeland (2000) 
Arvid Moss (2002) 
 
Yes (Senterpartiet) 
Yes (Høyre) 
Rogaland Teater AS Arne Norheim (n/a) 
Inger Østensjø (2003) 
Brit K. Sæbø Rugland (2005) 
 
No 
No 
No 
Simula Research Laboratory AS Berit Svendsen (2001) 
 
No 
SIVA SF Harald Ynnesdal (1996) 
Siri B. Hatlen (2004) 
 
No 
No 
Statkraft SF Terje Vareberg (2000) 
Arvid Grundekjøn (2004) 
 
No 
No 
Statnett SF Grete Faremo (2000) 
Svein Rennemo (2005) 
 
Yes (Arbeiderpartiet) 
No 
Statoil ASA Ole Lund (1999) 
Leif Terje Løddesøl (2002) 
Jannik Lindbæk (2003) 
 
No 
No 
No 
Statskog SF William Engseth (1997) 
Kirsti Kolle Grøndahl (2001) 
 
Yes (Arbeiderpartiet) 
Yes (Arbeiderpartiet) 
 
Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani AS Johan P. Barlindhaug (1999) 
Petter Thomassen (2002) 
Steinar Høgaas (2004) 
 
No 
Yes (Høyre) 
Yes (Høyre) 
Stor-Oslo Lokaltrafikk AS (SL) Martin Killi (2000) 
Ragnar Kristoffersen (2004) 
 
No 
No 
Telenor ASA Eivind Reiten (2000) 
Tom Vidar Rygh (2001) 
Torleif Enger (2003) 
 
Yes (Senterpartiet) 
No 
No 
UNINETT AS Bjørn Henrichsen (1993) 
 
No 
Universitetssenteret på Svalbard AS (UNIS) Kjell A. Sælen (n/a) No 
 
Veterinærmedisinsk oppdragssenter AS 
(VESO) 
Helge Skinnemoen (n/a) 
Bjørn Kolltveit (2001) 
No 
No 
 
A/S Vinmonopolet Harald Arnkværn  (1996) 
Siri B. Hatlen (2005) 
 
No 
No 
Yara International ASA Øyvind Lund (2004) 
 
No 
 
Swedish SOCs 
 
  
Akademiska Hus AB 
 
Lennart Nilsson (1995) 
Claes Ljungh (2004) 
 
No 
Yes (Socialdemokraterna) 
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ALMI Företagspartner AB Per-Ola Eriksson (2000) 
Kai Hammerich (2003) 
 
Yes (Centerpartiet) 
No 
Apoteket AB Jan Bergqvist (2000) 
 
Yes (Socialdemokraterna) 
Göta kanalbolag AB Kaj Janérus (n/a) 
Björn Eriksson (2002) 
 
No 
No 
Green Cargo AB Karl Gunnar Holmqvist (2001) 
 
No 
Imego AB Mauritz Sahlin (1998)  
Christina Ullenius (2003) 
 
No 
No 
IRECO Holding AB Gunnar Svedberg (1997) 
Anders Narvinger (2003) 
 
No 
No 
Kungliga Dramatiska Teatern AB (Dramaten)  Jan-Erik Wikström (1997) 
Sigbrit Franke (2003) 
 
Yes (Folkpartiet) 
No 
Kungliga Operan AB Hans Dalborg (1997) 
Lars G Nordström (2005) 
 
No 
No 
Lernia AB Bo Dockered (1996) 
Tomas Eneroth (2002) 
 
No 
Yes (Socialdemokraterna) 
Luossavaara Kirunavaara AB, LKAB Björn Sprängare (1997) 
 
No 
Nordea Bank AB Vesa Vainio (2000) 
Hans Dalborg (2002)  
 
No 
No 
OMX AB Olof Stenhammar (1984) 
 
No 
Posten AB Göte Bernhardsson (1998) 
Marianne Nivert (2003) 
 
No 
No 
Rymdbolaget  Lennart Lübeck (1998) 
 
Yes (Folkpartiet) 
Samhall AB Håkan Tidlund (1998) 
Peter Lagerblad (2003) 
 
No 
Yes (Socialdemokraterna) 
SAS AB Egil Mykebust (2001) 
 
No 
SIS Miljömärkning AB Sven Thiberg (1998) 
Eva Smith (2002) 
 
No 
No 
SJ AB Daniel Johannesson (2001) 
Ulf Adelsohn (2002) 
 
No 
Yes (Moderaterna) 
SOS Alarm Sverige AB Curt Persson (1995) 
Ewa Back (2005) 
 
No 
No 
Specialfastigheter Sverige AB Eva-Britt Gustafsson (1998) 
 
No 
Statens Väg- och Baninvest AB Gösta Gunnarsson (1995) 
 
Yes (Centerpartiet) 
Sveriges Bostadsfinansieringsaktiebolag 
(SBAB) 
Ingemar Eliasson (1996) 
Claes Kjellander (2003) 
 
Yes (Folkpartiet) 
No 
Sveaskog AB Bo Dockered (1999) 
 
No 
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Svensk Bilprovning AB Olof Johansson (2000) 
 
Yes (Centerpartiet) 
Svenska Spel AB Bengt-Åke Berg (1996) 
Anders Gustafzon (2003) 
 
No 
No 
Svensk Exportkredit AB (SEK) Björn Wolrath (1998) 
 
No 
Svenska Skeppshypotekskassan Pehr G Gyllenhammar (1984) 
 
No 
Sveriges Provnings- och Forskningsinstitut 
AB (SP) 
Jan-Crister Persson (n/a) 
Birgitta Böhlin (2002) 
 
No 
No 
Sveriges Rese- och Turistråd AB Lars Carmén (1999) 
Elizabeth Nyström (2004) 
 
No 
Yes (Moderaterna) 
Swedesurvey AB Joakim Ollén (1997) 
Stig Jönsson (2004) 
 
Yes (Moderaterna) 
No 
Swedfund International AB Jan Cedergren (1999) 
Lars Gårdö (2002) 
 
No 
No 
Systembolaget AB Gunnar Larsson (1999) 
Olof Johansson (2002) 
 
No 
Yes (Centerpartiet) 
TeliaSonera AB Lars-Eric Petersson (2000) 
Tapio Hintikka (2002) 
Tom von Weymarn (2004) 
 
No 
No 
No 
Teracom AB Gösta Gunnarsson (1992) 
Per-Ola Eriksson (2001) 
Håkan Tidlund (2003) 
 
Yes (Centerpartiet) 
Yes (Centerpartiet) 
No 
Vasakronan AB Egon Jacobsson (2000) 
 
Yes (Socialdemokraterna) 
Vasallen AB Pär Nuder (2000) 
Sten Olsson (2003) 
 
Yes (Socialdemokraterna) 
Yes (Socialdemokraterna) 
Vattenfall AB Gerhard Larsson (2000) 
Dag Klackenberg (2001) 
 
Yes (Centerpartiet) 
No 
Venantius AB Curt Persson (1995) 
 
No 
Vin & Sprit AB (V&S) Claes Dahlbäck (1993) No 
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Appendix C 
 
The basic components of annual bonus plans 
 
 
The table shows, for every SOC that uses short-term incentive schemes, the 
basic components of CEO annual bonus plans. Performance standards are 
categorised as ‘internal’ if the measure(s) used to evaluate managerial 
performance are based on firm-specific goals. By contrast, performance 
standards are categorised as ‘external’ if based on performance measured 
relative to other firms in the industry or market. Performance criteria 
indicate whether the firm uses a single criterion or multiple criteria to 
evaluate managerial performance, whereas the performance measures 
column describe the criteria used. The bonus cap column states the 
maximum bonus paid if achieving the pre-determined performance criteria. 
n/a indicates that information is not applicable. 
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Company Years 
granted 
Performance 
standard 
Performance 
criteria 
Performance measure Bonus cap 
Norwegian SOCs      
Arcus AS 2001-2003 
 
n/a n/a n/a 2001-2002:  TNOK 200  
(≈ 20-25% of fixed salary) 
2003: TNOK 250  
(≈ 30% of fixed salary) 
 
Cermaq AS 2004-2005 
 
Internal Single Bonus pay is based on Return 
on capital employed. 
 
30% of fixed salary 
DNB NOR AS 2004-2005 
 
n/a n/a Bonus pay is set on a 
discretionary basis. 
 
n/a 
Eksportfinans AS 2001-2005 Internal Single The incentive scheme bases the 
total amount to be distributed 
on a formula relating to 
achieved return on equity 
compared to the risk free rate of 
interest. The bonus is 
distributed partly in relation to 
salaries and partly on 
discretionary basis.   
 
n/a 
Entra Eiendom AS 2004-2005 Internal 
 
Multiple Bonus pay is determined partly 
on the basis of Economic Value 
Added (EVA) and partly on the 
achievement of predetermined 
goals related to customer 
satisfaction and other key 
indicators. The bonus amount 
for each employee is allocated 
to an individual bonus bank. 
Each year, one third of the 
bonus bank balance is paid to 
the employee.  
 
12% of fixed salary 
Gassco AS 
 
 
 
 
2002-2005 Internal 
 
Multiple The bonus scheme is linked to 
performance goals within 
several areas, including health, 
environment, safety and quality, 
costs, regularity, product 
quality, customer satisfaction 
and strategic goals.  
 
15% of fixed salary 
Kommunalbanken 
AS 
 
 
2003-2005 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Kongsberg 
Gruppen ASA 
2000-2005 Internal 
 
Multiple The bonus scheme is linked to 
the value added for the 
shareholders or to the Group’s 
performance trends over time.  
 
2.5 times the monthly salary 
Nammo AS 2003-2005 Internal 
 
Single Bonus pay is determined on the 
basis of Economic Value 
Added (EVA), defined as the 
operating result reduced by 
average capital employed 
multiplied by the weighted 
average cost of capital. Half of 
the bonus is paid the year after 
the year it was earned, together 
with half of the remaining net 
bonus from previous years.  
 
 
 
n/a 
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Norsk Eiendoms-
informasjon AS 
 
2002-2005 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Norsk Hydro ASA 2000-2005 Internal 
 
Multiple The bonus scheme is linked to 
performance goals in the 
business plan. The established 
performance goals eliminate 
effects of price variations of the 
company’s main products and 
foreign exchange fluctuations. 
It is therefore the actual 
improvements of Hydro’s 
activities that are measured and 
rewarded.  
 
2000: n/a 
2001: 3 months’ fixed salary 
2002-2005: 6 months’ fixed 
salary 
 
Posten Norge AS 2002-2005 Internal 
 
Multiple The primary condition for the 
payment of a bonus is that a 
profit is made before tax. If a 
bonus is payable according to 
the profit criterion, a bonus may 
also be paid based on individual 
goals.  
 
25% of fixed salary 
Statoil ASA 2002-2005 Internal 
 
Multiple Bonus pay depends on the goals 
achieved by the group in 
relation to the commercial 
targets determined by the board 
of directors.  
 
30% of fixed salary 
Telenor ASA 2004-2005 Internal 
 
Single  50% of the bonus is paid if the 
budget reaches a pre-
determined level. 100% of the 
bonus may only be paid as a 
result of exceptional financial 
performance exceeding budget.  
  
6 months’ fixed salary 
VESO AS 2002-2005  n/a 
 
n/a n/a 
 
n/a 
Yara ASA 2004-2005 Internal Multiple Bonus pay is based on the 
achievement of financial goals, 
but with even stronger 
emphasis on individual 
performance.  
50% of fixed salary. Also 
note that 20% of gross bonus 
payment must be used to buy 
Yara shares in the market 
with a one-year lock-up 
period.  
Swedish SOCs      
Akademiska Hus 
AB 
2000-2003 
 
 
Internal Multiple The incentive programme 
‘Target’ (Måltavlan) is based 
on performance criteria linked 
to profitability, a satisfied 
customer index, customer 
benefits, and energy savings. 
 
1 month’s fixed salary 
Green Cargo AB 2001 Internal Multiple Bonus pay is based on the 
achievement of common goals 
(40%) and individual goals 
(60%). 
 
1.5 month’s fixed salary 
Nordea AB 2000-2005 Internal*  
(2000-2005) 
  
 
* One external 
component 
was employed 
in the 2004 
incentive 
programme 
Multiple 2000: n/a.  
In the period 2001-2005, bonus 
pay is determined by a 
combination of Group 
performance in relation to a 
predetermined level of return 
on equity and the attainment of 
personal objectives approved at 
the outset of the year. In 2003, 
an additional executive 
incentive programme was 
2000: n/a  
2001: 15 % of fixed salary  
2002: 35% of fixed salary 
2003-2005: 47% of fixed 
salary (includes a variable 
pay that can amount to a 
maximum of 35% of fixed 
salary and an executive 
incentive pay which can give 
a maximum of 12% of fixed 
salary) 
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introduced. The 2003-2004 
performance criteria include 
economic profit compared to a 
predetermined level and 
Nordea’s relative performance 
compared to the Nordic peer 
group as measured by return on 
equity. The 2005 performance 
criteria relate equally to 
economic profit, income growth 
and costs. 
 
OMX AB 2003-2005 Internal Multiple  The incentive scheme 
comprises quantitative targets 
and qualitative targets, with 
quantitative goals accounting 
for 60% and qualitative goals 
for 40% in 2005 (in 2003-2004 
these numbers were 70% and 
30%, respectively). The 
quantitative target for 2003-
2005 is linked to budgeted 
operating profit (no information 
given for the period 2000-
2002). 
 
2002: 12 months’ fixed 
salary 
2003-2005: 6 months’ fixed 
salary  
Posten AB 2000-2002 Internal 
 
Multiple  The incentive scheme is based 
on financial results, 
performance quality and 
employees.  
 
30% of fixed salary 
Rymdbolaget AB 2003 Internal 
 
Single The incentive programme 
entails that if the company’s 
income for the year exceeds a 
defined level which has been 
established by the board in 
advance, a share of the surplus 
income shall be reserved in a 
‘bonus bank’ from which 
payment will be made in 
instalments over a long period 
of time.   
 
n/a 
SAS AB 2001-2005 Internal 
 
Multiple The incentive scheme includes 
a performance-based variable 
salary and an earnings-based 
salary. The target criteria for 
the variable salary cover budget 
and earnings targets as well as 
organisational and business 
targets that are accorded 
different weights.  
 
50% of fixed salary (includes 
a performance-based pay 
that can amount to a 
maximum of 37.5% of fixed 
salary and an earnings-based 
salary which can give a 
maximum of 12.5% of fixed 
salary) 
 
Svensk 
Exportkredit AB 
 
2000-2004 Internal 
 
Multiple Bonus pay is related to targets 
in the company’s business plan. 
 
n/a 
Svenska 
Skeppshypoteks-
kassan  AB 
 
2001-2005 n/a n/a n/a 2001: 25% of fixed salary  
2002-2005: 20% of fixed 
salary 
 
Swedesurvey AB 2000-2003 Internal 
 
Single Bonus pay is based on the 
company’s profit. 
 
n/a 
Swedfund AB 2003-2004 Internal Multiple 
 
Bonus pay is based on the 
company’s performance and 
development goals. 
 
 
 
2 months’ fixed salary  
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TeliaSonera AB 2000-2005 Internal 
 
Multiple Bonus pay is based on the 
Group’s financial performance 
and individual performance 
objectives.  
 
2000-2001: 35% of fixed 
salary  
2002-2005: 50% of fixed 
salary  
Teracom AB 2000-2004 Internal 
 
Multiple Bonus pay is determined by a 
combination of company 
performance in relation to key 
accounting figures and the 
attainment of individual goals.  
 
n/a 
Vasakronan AB 2000-2003 Internal 
 
Single The incentive scheme is based 
on Economic Value Added 
(EVA). 
 
1 month’s fixed salary  
Vasallen AB 2000-2003 Internal 
 
Single The incentive scheme is based 
on Economic Value Added 
(EVA). The bonus amount for 
each employee is allocated to 
an individual bonus bank. Each 
year, one third of the bonus 
bank balance is paid to the 
employee.  
 
2 months’ fixed salary  
Vattenfall AB 2000-2004 Internal 
 
2000-2001: 
Multiple  
 
 
 
 
2002-2004: 
Single  
 
In the period 2000-2001, the 
CEO is entitled to a special 
performance-related bonus 
based on financial targets, 
growth in cash flow and return 
on equity.  
In the period 2002-2004, bonus 
pay is directly linked to value 
creation (defined as the positive 
change in operating profit 
minus the required return on the 
average of net assets). 
 
All years: 33 % of fixed 
salary 
Vin & Sprit AB 2001-2003 Internal 
 
Multiple Bonus pay is based entirely on 
individual goals established by 
the board of directors.  
 
15% of fixed salary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  257
Appendix D 
 
Interaction effects in multivariate regression models 
 
 
The appendix supplements the subsample regression results in Chapters 6–8 
by presenting the results of moderated regressions with interaction effects.  
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D.1.1. Results of random-effects moderated regression analysis for the two professional 
background measures with state control interactions. 
 
Independent variables Political experience Sector affiliation 
Intercept 
 
Main effects 
Commercial objective 
State control 
Equity (log) 
Regional presence 
Ownership ministry 
Debt ratio 
Government party 
Time trend 
 
Interaction effects 
State control * commercial objective  
State control * equity (log) 
State control * regional presence 
State control * ownership ministry 
State control * debt ratio 
State control * government party 
State control * time trend 
 
Number of firm/year observations 
Number of firms 
Rho 
LR chi2 
Estimation method 
–2.084 
 
 
–1.925* 
–1.338 
  0.551 
  0.472 
–0.472 
–0.003 
–0.518 
–0.036 
 
 
  2.063 
–0.747 
–3.721* 
  2.705 
–0.008 
  0.689 
  0.360 
 
374 
96 
0.76 
19.47 
Logistic 
(1.915) 
 
 
(0.991) 
(3.414) 
(0.561) 
(1.228) 
(0.763) 
(0.017) 
(0.859) 
(0.140) 
 
 
(2.734) 
(1.071) 
(2.080) 
(2.161) 
(0.034) 
(1.673) 
(0.360) 
  4.237** 
 
 
–1.098 
–3.115 
–0.699 
–0.500 
–0.442 
–0.015 
–2.587*** 
  0.193 
 
 
–5.073* 
  1.433 
  0.269 
  3.872** 
  0.030 
  3.048** 
–0.729** 
 
373 
96 
0.76 
23.24* 
Logistic 
(1.914) 
 
 
(0.967) 
(2.968) 
(0.528) 
(1.148) 
(0.803) 
(0.017) 
(0.905) 
(0.143) 
 
 
(2.978) 
(0.906) 
(1.839) 
(1.922) 
(0.029) 
(1.478) 
(0.356) 
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D.1.2. Results of random-effects moderated regression analysis for the two professional 
background measures with government party interactions. 
 
Independent variables Political experience Sector affiliation 
Intercept 
 
Main effects 
Commercial objective 
Non-listing 
Listing 
State control 
Equity (log) 
Regional presence 
Ownership ministry 
Debt ratio 
Time trend 
 
Interaction effects 
Government party * commercial objective  
Government party * non-listing 
Government party * listing 
Government party * state control 
Government party * equity (log) 
Government party * regional presence 
Government party * ownership ministry 
Government party * debt ratio 
Government party * time trend 
 
Number of firm/year observations 
Number of firms 
Rho 
LR chi2 
Estimation method 
–1.722 
 
 
–1.937* 
 
 
–1.949* 
  0.447 
–0.190 
  0.223 
–0.005 
–0.005 
 
 
  2.473 
 
 
  1.130 
  0.761 
–1.987 
–4.254** 
  0.002 
–0.248 
 
374 
96 
0.75 
18.13 
Logistic 
(1.616) 
 
 
(1.013) 
 
 
(1.115) 
(0.517) 
(1.135) 
(0.779) 
(0.016) 
(0.137) 
 
 
(2.326) 
 
 
(1.682) 
(0.683) 
(1.753) 
(2.091) 
(0.022) 
(0.333) 
  3.007* 
 
 
–1.305 
  0.009 
  1.126 
 
–0.890* 
  0.275 
–0.063 
  0.004 
  0.220 
 
 
–0.231 
  1.756 
–0.443 
 
  1.060* 
–1.888 
  0.720 
–0.031 
–0.636* 
 
373 
96 
0.77 
23.14 
Logistic 
(1.648) 
 
 
(0.989) 
(1.154) 
(1.714) 
 
(0.474) 
(1.097) 
(0.795) 
(0.015) 
(0.144) 
 
 
(2.034) 
(1.447) 
(2.378) 
 
(0.570) 
(1.524) 
(1.753) 
(0.020) 
(0.310) 
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D.1.3. Results of random-effects moderated regression analysis for the two professional 
background measures with nationality interactions. 
 
Independent variables Political experience Sector affiliation 
Intercept 
 
Main effects 
Commercial objective 
Non-listing 
Listing 
State control 
Equity (log) 
Regional presence 
Ownership ministry 
Debt ratio 
Nationality 
Time trend 
 
Interaction effects 
Nationality * commercial objective  
Nationality * non-listing 
Nationality * listing 
Nationality * state control 
Nationality * equity (log) 
Nationality * regional presence 
Nationality * ownership ministry 
Nationality * debt ratio 
Nationality * time trend 
 
Number of firm/year observations 
Number of firms 
Rho 
LR chi2 
Estimation method 
–2.311 
 
 
–0.580 
 
 
–0.459 
  1.715** 
–4.160** 
–2.353 
–0.018 
  1.432 
–0.106 
 
 
–1.513 
 
 
–2.974 
–2.221** 
  6.558*** 
  2.155 
  0.026 
  0.152 
 
374 
96 
0.75 
25.46** 
Logistic 
(2.507) 
 
 
(1.766) 
 
 
(1.242) 
(0.709) 
(1.710) 
(1.527) 
(0.026) 
(3.323) 
(0.222) 
 
 
(2.132) 
 
 
(2.153) 
(1.010) 
(2.339) 
(1.753) 
(0.032) 
(0.267) 
  3.145 
 
 
–1.409 
  1.493 
  1.853 
 
  0.087 
–2.923** 
  0.959 
–0.034 
  1.857 
–0.342 
 
 
–0.154 
–1.824 
–1.302 
 
–1.689* 
  5.846*** 
–2.520 
  0.049 
  0.620** 
 
373 
96 
0.77 
44.90*** 
Logistic 
(2.360) 
 
 
(1.657) 
(1.169) 
(1.829) 
 
(0.601) 
(1.427) 
(1.410) 
(0.024) 
(3.393) 
(0.199) 
 
 
(2.067) 
(2.345) 
(2.900) 
 
(0.944) 
(2.060) 
(1.707) 
(0.031) 
(0.257) 
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D.2.1. Results of random effects-moderated regression analysis for the three compensation measures with SOC chairman interaction effects. 
 
Independent variables Total cash compensation Incentive scheme Golden parachute 
Intercept 
 
Main effects 
Chair political representative 
State control 
Commercial objective 
Equity (log) 
CEO recruited private sector 
Board size 
Compensation committee 
CEO tenure 
Chair is CEO 
Nationality 
Time trend 
 
Interaction effects 
Chair political representative * state control 
Chair political representative * commercial objective  
Chair political representative * equity (log)  
Chair political representative * CEO recruited private sector  
Chair political representative * board size  
Chair political representative * compensation committee  
Chair political representative * CEO tenure  
Chair political representative * chair is CEO  
Chair political representative * nationality  
Chair political representative * time trend 
 
Number of firm/year observations 
Number of firms 
Rho 
Wald chi2/LR chi2 
R² (overall) 
Estimation method 
  2.765*** 
 
 
–0.020 
  0.064** 
  0.080** 
  0.099*** 
  0.034** 
  0.000 
  0.052*** 
  0.002 
  0.000 
  0.057 
  0.019*** 
 
 
–0.085** 
  0.040 
–0.018* 
–0.000 
  0.007 
–0.025 
  0.012*** 
  0.016 
–0.004 
–0.010* 
 
307 
77 
0.94 
247.40*** 
0.66 
Linear 
(0.100) 
 
 
(0.067) 
(0.027) 
(0.033) 
(0.020) 
(0.016) 
(0.008) 
(0.016) 
(0.002) 
(0.017) 
(0.044) 
(0.003) 
 
 
(0.035) 
(0.026) 
(0.010) 
(0.018) 
(0.009) 
(0.023) 
(0.004) 
(0.022) 
(0.026) 
(0.006) 
 
–12.630*** 
 
 
–4.552 
  5.176*** 
  6.379*** 
  1.019 
–2.112 
  0.232 
–1.925 
  0.157 
  1.100 
–0.549 
–0.052 
 
 
–2.240 
–0.896 
  3.146 
  4.407* 
–0.449 
  1.162 
–0.169 
–2.896 
–1.425 
–0.214 
 
307 
77 
0.73 
84.29*** 
 
Logistic 
(3.639) 
 
 
(8.554) 
(1.395) 
(1.986) 
(0.714) 
(1.318) 
(0.365) 
(1.191) 
(0.151) 
(1.238) 
(1.438) 
(0.275) 
 
 
(3.862) 
(3.848) 
(1.982) 
(2.345) 
(0.712) 
(1.961) 
(0.388) 
(2.462) 
(3.729) 
(0.560) 
 
–5.956 
 
 
–4.070 
–0.679 
  3.422** 
  1.650** 
–0.722 
–0.125 
–2.956 
  0.004 
  1.341 
  6.475*** 
  0.001 
 
 
  1.816 
–1.947 
–0.930 
–0.932 
  0.269 
  3.466 
–0.296 
–1.549 
  0.028 
  2.091*** 
 
307 
77 
0.79 
78.82*** 
 
Logistic 
(4.243) 
 
 
(7.392) 
(1.425) 
(1.668) 
(0.647) 
(1.261) 
(0.510) 
(2.079) 
(0.127) 
(1.115) 
(1.700) 
(0.293) 
 
 
(2.749) 
(2.646) 
(1.121) 
(2.191) 
(0.904) 
(3.178) 
(0.333) 
(2.284) 
(3.010) 
(0.161) 
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D.2.2. Results of random-effects moderated regression analysis for the three compensation measures with state control interaction effects. 
 
Independent variables Total cash compensation Incentive scheme Golden parachute 
Intercept 
 
Main effects 
Chair political representative 
State control 
Commercial objective 
Equity (log) 
CEO recruited private sector 
Board size 
Compensation committee 
CEO tenure 
Chair is CEO 
Nationality 
Time trend 
 
Interaction effects 
State control * chair political 
State control * commercial objective  
State control * equity (log)  
State control * CEO recruited private sector  
State control * board size  
State control * compensation committee  
State control * CEO tenure  
State control * chair is CEO  
State control * nationality 
State control * time trend 
 
Number of firm/year observations 
Number of firms 
Rho 
Wald chi2/LR chi2 
R² (overall) 
Estimation method 
  2.872*** 
 
 
–0.001 
–0.327** 
  0.091*** 
  0.082*** 
  0.026 
–0.003 
  0.037** 
  0.004** 
  0.010 
  0.032 
  0.013*** 
 
 
–0.063* 
  0.174* 
  0.013 
  0.013 
  0.014 
  0.047 
–0.002 
–0.016 
  0.073 
  0.013** 
 
307 
77 
0.91 
355.55*** 
0.73 
Linear 
(0.106) 
 
 
(0.012) 
(0.130) 
(0.029) 
(0.023) 
(0.018) 
(0.008) 
(0.014) 
(0.002) 
(0.012) 
(0.039) 
(0.003) 
 
 
(0.036) 
(0.096) 
(0.027) 
(0.031) 
(0.010) 
(0.044) 
(0.003) 
(0.024) 
(0.059) 
(0.006) 
 
 
 
 
 
–4.453 
 
 
  0.220 
–6.660 
 
 
  0.003 
  0.244 
 
  0.115 
–0.105 
  0.091 
–0.675*** 
 
 
  0.869 
 
 
–1.317 
  0.871 
 
  0.195 
–0.144 
  1.968 
  0.978 
 
313 
77 
0.78 
42.20*** 
 
Logistic 
(2.879) 
 
 
(1.123) 
 
 
 
(1.147) 
(0.290) 
 
(1.139) 
(1.089) 
(1.292) 
(0.223) 
 
 
(2.399) 
 
 
(2.083) 
(0.632) 
 
(0.296) 
(1.837) 
(2.252) 
(0.457) 
 
–10.554** 
 
 
  0.301 
  2.807 
  2.326 
  2.204*** 
  0.662 
–0.219 
  0.986 
–0.221 
  2.064 
  7.667*** 
  0.957*** 
 
 
  1.888 
–0.054 
–1.749 
–3.670 
  0.695 
–2.400 
  0.590** 
–2.100 
–3.371 
–0.839 
 
307 
77 
0.79 
76.05*** 
 
Logistic 
(4.746) 
 
 
(6.765) 
(1.278) 
(1.518) 
(0.734) 
(1.454) 
(0.535) 
(1.720) 
(0.183) 
(1.363) 
(1.812) 
(0.346) 
 
 
(2.722) 
(4.970) 
(1.657) 
(2.479) 
(0.747) 
(3.186) 
(0.296) 
(1.951) 
(2.663) 
(0.528) 
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D.2.3. Results of random-effects moderated regression analysis for the three compensation measures with nationality interaction effects. 
 
Independent variables Total cash compensation Incentive scheme Golden parachute 
Intercept 
 
Main effects 
Chair political representative 
State control 
Commercial objective 
Non-listing 
Listing 
Equity (log) 
CEO recruited private sector 
Board size 
Compensation committee 
CEO tenure 
Chair is CEO 
Nationality 
Time trend 
 
Interaction effects 
Nationality * chair political 
Nationality * state control 
Nationality * commercial objective  
Nationality * non-listing 
Nationality * listing 
Nationality * equity (log)  
Nationality * CEO recruited private sector  
Nationality * board size  
Nationality * compensation committee  
Nationality * CEO tenure  
Nationality * chair is CEO  
Nationality * time trend 
 
Number of firm/year observations 
Number of firms 
  2.864*** 
 
 
–0.015 
 
  0.191*** 
–0.028 
  0.048 
  0.085*** 
  0.023 
–0.010 
  0.040* 
  0.002 
–0.000 
–0.055 
  0.021*** 
 
 
  0.015 
 
–0.144** 
  0.016 
  0.360*** 
  0.012 
  0.008 
  0.012 
–0.011 
  0.001 
  0.020 
–0.006 
 
307 
77 
(0.175) 
 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.049) 
(0.037) 
(0.039) 
(0.020) 
(0.027) 
(0.018) 
(0.024) 
(0.002) 
(0.016) 
(0.214) 
(0.003) 
 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.056) 
(0.059) 
(0.116) 
(0.038) 
(0.036) 
(0.020) 
(0.030) 
(0.003) 
(0.028) 
(0.005) 
–18.895*** 
 
 
  0.356 
  2.022 
  7.448*** 
 
 
  0.420 
  0.474 
  0.833 
  1.064 
  0.167 
  1.079 
  3.807 
  0.790 
 
 
–0.066 
  8.001** 
 
 
 
  3.266* 
–2.868 
–0.995 
–1.830 
–0.050 
–1.133 
–2.500*** 
 
307 
77 
(5.314) 
 
 
(1.438) 
(1.531) 
(1.705) 
 
 
(0.781) 
(1.438) 
(0.602) 
(2.823) 
(0.191) 
(1.302) 
(7.841) 
(0.364) 
 
 
(2.492) 
(4.039) 
 
 
 
(1.740) 
(2.394) 
(0.757) 
(2.688) 
(0.308) 
(2.608) 
(0.634) 
 
 
–12.699*** 
 
 
  0.213 
  0.034 
  3.687** 
 
 
  0.885 
  0.043 
  0.699 
–1.371 
–0.214 
–0.175 
  19.135** 
  0.934*** 
 
 
–0.792 
–3.921 
–3.795 
 
 
  1.001 
 
–1.561* 
  3.527 
  0.521 
  1.906 
–0.843 
 
307 
77 
(4.785) 
 
 
(1.225) 
(1.358) 
(1.718) 
 
 
(0.655) 
(1.141) 
(0.582) 
(1.911) 
(0.171) 
(1.139) 
(8.467) 
(0.315) 
 
 
(.2.225) 
(2.817) 
(3.296) 
 
 
 (1.333) 
 
(0.946) 
(2.838) 
(0.343) 
(2.645) 
(0.545) 
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Rho 
Wald chi2/LR chi2 
R² (overall) 
Estimation method 
0.91 
364.87*** 
0.72 
Linear 
0.78 
83.56*** 
 
Logistic 
0.80 
70.85*** 
 
Logistic 
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D.3.1. Results of random-effects and pooled OLS moderated regression analysis for the three dividend measures with state control interaction 
effects. 
 
Independent variables Dividend-to-earnings Dividend-to-sales Dividend-to-cash-flow 
Intercept 
 
Main effects 
Growth opportunities (deciles) 
Debt ratio 
Commercial objective 
Income level (log) 
State control 
Chairman political representative 
Ownership ministry 
Nationality 
Time trend 
 
Interaction effects 
State control * growth opportunities (deciles) 
State control * debt ratio 
State control * commercial objective 
State control * income level (log) 
State control * chairman political representative 
State control * ownership ministry 
State control * nationality 
State control * time trend 
 
Number of firm/year observations 
Number of firms 
Rho 
Wald chi2/F 
R² (overall) 
Model 
  102.011*** 
 
 
–0.704 
  0.143 
–15.054 
–10.136** 
–77.116*** 
–0.524 
  5.312 
–9.418 
–2.088 
 
 
–2.088 
  0.269 
  25.196** 
  6.686 
–16.105 
–12.278 
  14.585 
  7.552*** 
 
150 
47 
61 
83.83*** 
0.29 
RE 
(15.103) 
 
 
(0.781) 
(0.180) 
(9.181) 
(4.869) 
(23.985) 
(6.231) 
(5.037) 
(9.315) 
(1.436) 
 
 
(1.370) 
(0.294) 
(12.641) 
(6.132) 
(10.720) 
(8.891) 
(12.565) 
(2.372) 
  10.658 
 
 
  0.635** 
–0.048 
  7.073 
–2.329 
–2.291 
  0.491 
–1.991 
  2.066 
  0.488* 
 
 
–0.295 
–0.028 
–2.868 
–0.180 
–2.771 
  1.917 
  3.327 
  0.901* 
 
169 
48 
0.94 
40.98*** 
0.10 
RE 
(13.139) 
 
 
(0.269) 
(0.077) 
(6.818) 
(3.935) 
(15.544) 
(1.055) 
(2.372) 
(8.464) 
(0.281) 
 
 
(0.342) 
(0.162) 
(7.201) 
(4.107) 
(2.344) 
(3.549) 
(12.797) 
(0.472) 
  56.422*** 
 
 
–1.911** 
–0.071 
–12.137 
–1.604 
–45.128* 
–3.681 
  8.110 
–3.112 
  0.542 
 
 
  1.387 
  0.158 
  34.568** 
–0.370 
  3.980 
–20.751* 
  13.663 
  0.441 
 
137 
43 
 
4.44*** 
0.21 
OLS 
(10.919) 
 
 
(0.808) 
(0.123) 
(8.274) 
(2.746) 
(24.326) 
(4.958) 
(8.310) 
(6.205) 
(1.478) 
 
 
(1.314) 
(0.235) 
(16.153) 
(4.441) 
(9.068) 
(11.236) 
(13.606) 
(2.358) 
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D.3.2. Results of random-effects and pooled OLS moderated regression analysis for the three dividend measures with SOC chairman interaction 
effects. 
 
Independent variables Dividend-to-earnings Dividend-to-sales Dividend-to-cash-flow 
Intercept 
 
Main effects 
Growth opportunities (deciles) 
Debt ratio 
Commercial objective 
Income level (log) 
State control 
Chairman political representative 
Ownership ministry 
Nationality 
Time trend 
 
Interaction effects 
Chair political representative * growth opportunities (deciles) 
Chair political representative * debt ratio 
Chair political representative * commercial objective 
Chair political representative * income level (log) 
Chair political representative * state control 
Chair political representative * ownership ministry 
Chair political representative * nationality  
Chair political representative * time trend 
 
Number of firm/year observations 
Number of firms 
Rho 
Wald chi2/F 
R² (overall) 
Model 
  82.340*** 
 
 
–1.441* 
  0.133 
  3.593 
–10.004*** 
–2.489 
–45.156 
–5.896 
–1.714 
  1.832 
 
 
  0.511 
–0.158 
–6.593 
  21.745** 
–18.462 
  9.561 
–21.825* 
–4.390 
 
150 
47 
0.48 
52.50*** 
0.28 
RE 
(14.517) 
 
 
(0.812) 
(0.151) 
(7.364) 
(3.444) 
(6.903) 
(29.464) 
(5.295) 
(6.405) 
(1.431) 
 
 
(1.445) 
(0.299) 
(10.481) 
(9.808) 
(13.698) 
(9.895) 
(11.363) 
(2.768) 
  18.134** 
 
 
  0.689** 
–0.094 
  5.715** 
–4.049 
–4.494* 
–25.331 
–2.301 
  5.707 
  0.867** 
 
 
–0.266 
  0.117 
  4.030 
  5.669 
–1.504 
  0.854 
–7.044* 
  0.251 
 
169 
48 
 
40.71*** 
0.06 
RE 
(9.082) 
 
 
(0.285) 
(0.086) 
(2.662) 
(2.902) 
(2.486) 
(16.091) 
(2.238) 
(6.541) 
(0.335) 
 
 
(0.385) 
(0.093) 
(5.347) 
(3.983) 
(4.137) 
(5.214) 
(3.760) 
(0.518) 
  44.908*** 
 
 
–1.496 
–0.059 
  1.371 
–0.172 
–11.599** 
–24.301 
–2.224 
–5.666 
  0.764 
 
 
  0.379 
–0.056 
  19.175 
  4.391 
  9.064 
–23.594 
  8.671 
  1.245 
 
137 
43 
 
2.50*** 
0.18 
OLS 
(13.375) 
 
 
(0.988) 
(0.123) 
(5.626) 
(2.019) 
(5.335) 
(27.199) 
(4.945) 
(5.273) 
(1.226) 
 
 
(1.417) 
(0.235) 
((11.970
(5.794) 
(12.032) 
(16.964) 
(9.897) 
(2.918) 
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D.3.3. Results of random-effects and pooled OLS moderated regression analysis for the three dividend measures with nationality  
interaction effects. 
 
Independent variables Dividend-to-earnings Dividend-to-sales Dividend-to-cash-flow 
Intercept 
 
Main effects 
Growth opportunities (deciles) 
Debt ratio 
Commercial objective 
Income level (log) 
State control 
Chairman political representative 
Ownership ministry 
Nationality 
Time trend 
 
Interaction effects 
Nationality * growth opportunities (deciles) 
Nationality * debt ratio 
Nationality * commercial objective 
Nationality * income level (log) 
Nationality * state control 
Nationality * chairman political representative 
Nationality * ownership ministry 
Nationality * time trend 
 
Number of firm/year observations 
Number of firms 
Rho 
Wald chi2/F 
R² (overall) 
Model 
  51.890*** 
 
 
–0.274 
  0.302 
  1.572 
–2.115 
–23.496*** 
  1.363 
  2.046 
  39.389 
–0.266 
 
 
–1.888 
–0.306 
–6.834 
–5.503 
  21.656* 
–11.396 
–9.451 
  2.062 
 
150 
47 
0.52 
31.67** 
0.30 
RE 
(16.248) 
 
 
(0.930) 
(0.197) 
(8.930) 
(3.909) 
(7.376) 
(8.113) 
(7.547) 
(25.211) 
(1.527) 
 
 
(1.278) 
(0.264) 
(13.770) 
(6.508) 
(11.865) 
(10.635) 
(9.941) 
(2.419) 
  3.876 
 
 
  0.705*** 
–0.076 
  5.668* 
  0.482 
–5.035** 
  0.553 
–2.557 
  24.819 
  0.236 
 
 
–0.285 
  0.078 
  0.402 
–8.076 
  3.893 
–1.506 
–0.497 
  1.384*** 
 
169 
48 
0.93 
40.09*** 
0.14 
RE 
(4.920) 
 
 
(0.252) 
(0.075) 
(2.904) 
(1.658) 
(2.431) 
(1.579) 
(5.044) 
(22.840) 
(0.234) 
 
 
(0.359) 
(0.128) 
(9.868) 
(6.219) 
(10.114) 
(2.119) 
(5.517) 
(0.447) 
 
  48.861*** 
 
 
–1.156 
  0.081 
  8.258 
–2.161 
–13.485 
  0.238 
–7.266 
–25.447 
–1.772 
 
 
–0.757 
–0.190 
–0.085 
  5.168 
  6.655 
–0.209 
–2.773 
  5.369** 
 
137 
43 
 
2.74*** 
0.20 
OLS 
(15.148) 
 
 
(0.999) 
(0.154) 
(12.024) 
(1.919) 
(8.574) 
(5.849) 
(7.372) 
(20.003) 
(1.543) 
 
 
(1.348) 
(0.198) 
(14.387) 
(3.390) 
(12.497) 
(7.735) 
(10.705) 
(2.227) 
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Appendix E 
 
Marginal effects for logistic regression models 
 
 
The appendix supplements the logistic regression results in Chapters 6 and 7. 
In the tables below, dy/dx is the marginal effects (or elasticities) on the 
probabilities of each of the independent variables of the model. For dummy 
variables, dy/dx is for discrete change from 0 to 1. All marginal effects are 
calculated as the predicted probability at the sample means, as given by the 
X’s in the table. Also reported is the standard error of marginal effects.   
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E.1.1. Results of random-effects logistic regression analysis with political experience as dependent variable. Marginal effects, full sample. 
 
Independent variables                 Model 1                                  Model 2                                      Model 3                                   Model 4                                Model 5 
 
 
Reputation model 
Commercial objective 
 
Re-election model 
State control 
State ownership < 100% and ≥ 66.67% 
State ownership < 66.67% and > 50% 
State ownership ≤ 50% 
Largest co-investor < 100% and > 33.33% 
Largest co-investor ≤ 33.33 % 
Largest co-investor non-public 
Largest co-investor public 
Equity (log) 
Regional presence 
Ownership ministry 
Debt ratio 
 
Ideology model 
Government party 
 
Controls 
Nationality 
Time trend 
 dy/dx 
 
 
–0.137 
 
 
–0.087 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.055 
–0.059 
–0.029 
–0.000 
 
 
–0.021 
 
 
 
–0.001 
Std.err. 
 
 
(0.092) 
 
 
(0.057) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.039) 
(0.092) 
(0.057) 
(0.001) 
 
 
(0.050) 
 
 
 
(0.010) 
  X 
 
 
0.50 
 
 
0.31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.75 
0.60 
0.51 
58.8 
 
 
0.29 
 
 
 
3.64 
 dy/dx 
 
 
–0.147 
 
 
–0.086 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.058 
–0.066 
–0.036 
–0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.052 
–0.002 
Std.err. 
 
 
(0.098) 
 
 
(0.059) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.041) 
(0.098) 
(0.061) 
(0.001) 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.071) 
(0.010) 
  X 
 
 
0.50 
 
 
0.31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.75 
0.60 
0.51 
58.8 
 
 
 
 
 
0.62 
3.64 
 dy/dx 
 
 
–0.138 
 
 
 
  0.079 
–0.056 
–0.117** 
 
 
 
 
  0.050 
–0.030 
–0.026 
–0.000 
 
 
–0.040 
 
 
 
–0.000 
Std.err. 
 
 
(0.089) 
 
 
 
(0.158) 
(0.054) 
(0.050) 
 
 
 
 
(0.036) 
(0.079) 
(0.052) 
(0.001) 
 
 
(0.046) 
 
 
 
(0.009) 
 X 
 
 
0.50 
 
 
 
0.07 
0.07 
0.17 
 
 
 
 
2.75 
0.60 
0.51 
58.8 
 
 
0.29 
 
 
 
3.64 
 dy/dx 
 
 
–0.138 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.081* 
–0.081 
 
 
  0.051 
–0.053 
–0.030 
–0.000 
 
 
–0.021 
 
 
 
–0.001 
Std.err. 
 
 
(0.091) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.046) 
(0.050) 
 
 
(0.039) 
(0.089) 
(0.056) 
(0.001) 
 
 
(0.050) 
 
 
 
(0.010) 
 X 
 
 
0.50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.10 
0.20 
 
 
2.75 
0.60 
0.51 
58.8 
 
 
0.29 
 
 
 
3.64 
 dy/dx 
 
 
–0.140 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.076 
–0.057 
  0.056 
–0.057 
–0.027 
–0.000 
 
 
–0.021 
 
 
 
–0.001 
Std.err. 
 
 
(0.093) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.051) 
(0.058) 
(0.040) 
(0.092) 
(0.057) 
(0.001) 
 
 
(0.050) 
 
 
 
(0.010) 
 X 
 
 
0.50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.18 
0.12 
2.75 
0.60 
0.51 
58.8 
 
 
0.29 
 
 
 
3.64 
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E.1.2. Results of random-effects logistic regression analysis with sector affiliation as dependent variable. Marginal effects, full sample. 
 
Independent variables                       Model 1                                             Model 2                                     Model 3                                       Model 4                                        Model 5 
 
Reputation model 
Commercial objective 
Non-listing 
Listing 
 
Re-election model 
State control 
State own. < 100% and ≥ 66.67% 
State own. < 66.67% and > 50% 
State own. ≤ 50% and > 33.33% 
State own. ≤ 33.33% 
Largest co-inv. < 100% and > 50% 
Largest co-inv. ≤ 50% and > 33.33% 
Largest co-inv. ≤ 33.33% and > 5% 
Largest co-inv. < 5% 
Largest co-investor non-public 
Largest co-investor public 
Equity (log) 
Regional presence 
Ownership ministry 
Debt ratio 
 
Ideology model 
Government party 
 
Controls 
Nationality 
Time trend 
  dy/dx 
 
–0.253 
  0.070 
  0.178 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.124 
–0.037 
  0.063 
–0.001 
 
 
–0.383*** 
 
 
 
  0.017 
Std.err. 
 
(0.196) 
(0.204) 
(0.234) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.099) 
(0.219) 
(0.166) 
(0.003) 
 
 
(0.137) 
 
 
 
(0.029) 
 X 
 
0.50 
0.22 
0.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.75 
0.61 
0.51 
58.9 
 
 
0.28 
 
 
 
3.63 
 dy/dx 
 
–0.249 
 
 
 
 
  0.170 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.116 
–0.026 
–0.014 
–0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.714*** 
–0..004 
Std.err. 
 
(0.184) 
 
 
 
 
(0.139) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.084) 
(0.194) 
(0.151) 
(0.003) 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.109) 
(0.024) 
 X 
 
0.50 
 
 
 
 
0.31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.75 
0.61 
0.51 
58.9 
 
 
 
 
 
0.62 
3.63 
  dy/dx 
 
–0.272 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.044 
–0.214 
  0.253 
  0.341 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.121 
–0.034 
  0.085 
–0.002 
 
 
–0.378*** 
 
 
 
  0.020 
Std.err. 
 
(0.195) 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.273) 
(0.335) 
(0.191) 
(0.149) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.093) 
(0.226) 
(0.167) 
(0.003) 
 
 
(0.140) 
 
 
 
(0.029) 
 X 
 
0.50 
 
 
 
 
 
0.07 
0.07 
0.09 
0.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.75 
0.61 
0.51 
58.9 
 
 
0.28 
 
 
 
3.63 
 dy/dx 
 
–0.256 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.281 
–0.105 
  0.250 
–0.130 
 
 
–0.096 
–0.050 
  0.076 
–0.001 
 
 
–0.394*** 
 
 
 
  0.017 
Std.err. 
 
(0.195) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.220) 
(0.322) 
(0.167) 
(0.362) 
 
 
(0.095) 
(0.216) 
(0.165) 
(0.003) 
 
 
(0.137) 
 
 
 
(0.029) 
 X 
 
0.50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.03 
0.07 
0.15 
0.04 
 
 
2.75 
0.61 
0.51 
58.9 
 
 
0.28 
 
 
 
3.63 
 dy/dx 
 
–0.261 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.253 
  0.013 
–0.122 
–0.037 
  0.035 
–0.002 
 
 
–
0.398*** 
 
 
 
  0.018 
Std.err. 
 
(0.195) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.167) 
(0.265) 
(0.096) 
(0.219) 
(0.168) 
(0.003) 
 
 
(0.137) 
 
 
 
(0.029) 
 X 
 
0.50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.18 
0.12 
2.75 
0.61 
0.51 
58.9 
 
 
0.28 
 
 
 
3.63 
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E.1.3. Results of random-effects logistic regression analysis with political experience and sector affiliation as dependent variables.  
Marginal effects, state control subsamples.  
 
Independent variables                                Political experience                                                                   Sector affiliation 
          Full state control                  Partial state control                     Full state control                        Partial state control 
 
Reputation model 
Commercial objective 
Non-listing 
Listing 
 
Re-election model 
Equity (log) 
Regional presence 
Ownership ministry 
Debt ratio 
 
Ideology model 
Government party 
 
Controls 
Time trend 
  dy/dx 
 
–0.232 
 
 
 
 
  0.062 
  0.039 
–0.050 
–0.001 
 
 
–0.048 
 
 
–0.004  
Std.err. 
 
(0.141) 
 
 
 
 
(0.069) 
(0.137) 
(0.092) 
(0.002) 
 
 
(0.089) 
 
 
(0.017) 
 X 
 
0.50 
 
 
 
 
2.86 
0.62 
0.50 
56.3 
 
 
0.32 
 
 
3.61 
  dy/dx 
 
–0.011 
 
 
 
 
–0.001 
–0.080 
  0.040 
–0.000 
 
 
  0.005 
 
 
  0.005  
Std.err. 
 
(0.040) 
 
 
 
 
(0.014) 
(0.096) 
(0.049) 
(0.000) 
 
 
(0.022) 
 
 
(0.006) 
 X 
 
0.49 
 
 
 
 
2.48 
0.56 
0.53 
64.2 
 
 
0.41 
 
 
3.68 
  dy/dx 
 
–0.222 
 
 
 
 
–0.140 
–0.149 
–0.074 
–0.004 
 
 
–0.541*** 
 
 
  0.040  
Std.err. 
 
(0.216) 
 
 
 
 
(0.124) 
(0.252) 
(0.187) 
(0.004) 
 
 
(0.151) 
 
 
(0.033) 
 X 
 
0.50 
 
 
 
 
2.87 
0.63 
0.50 
56.5 
 
 
0.23 
 
 
3.61 
  dy/dx  
 
–0.958*** 
  0.102 
–0.461 
 
 
  0.326 
  0.068 
  0.759 
  0.008 
 
 
  0.145 
 
 
–0.139* 
Std.err. 
 
(0.067) 
(0.749) 
(0.661) 
 
 
(0.227) 
(0.391) 
(0.199) 
(0.006) 
 
 
(0.273) 
 
 
(0.083) 
 X 
 
0.49 
0.71 
0.48 
 
 
2.48 
0.56 
0.53 
64.2 
 
 
0.41 
 
 
3.68 
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E.1.4. Results of random-effects logistic regression analysis with political experience and sector affiliation as dependent variables.  
Marginal effects, government party subsamples.  
 
Independent variables                                   Political experience                                                                  Sector affiliation 
    Left-wing government               Right-wing government            Left-wing government             Right-wing government 
 
Reputation model 
Commercial objective 
Non-listing 
Listing 
 
Re-election model 
State control 
Equity (log) 
Regional presence 
Ownership ministry 
Debt ratio 
 
Controls 
Time trend 
  dy/dx 
 
–0.216 
 
 
 
 
–0.131* 
  0.041 
  0.003 
  0.024 
–0.000 
 
 
–0.002  
Std.err. 
 
(0.141) 
 
 
 
 
(0.074) 
(0.049) 
(0.095) 
(0.065) 
(0.001) 
 
 
(0.012) 
  X 
 
0.55 
 
 
 
 
0.25 
2.85 
0.63 
0.58 
58.2 
 
 
3.32 
  dy/dx  
 
  0.032 
 
 
 
 
–0.031 
  0.067 
–0.221 
–0.138 
–0.001 
 
 
–0.003 
Std.err. 
 
(0.121) 
 
 
 
 
(0.068) 
(0.047) 
(0.179) 
(0.115) 
(0.001) 
 
 
(0.015) 
  X 
 
0.36 
 
 
 
 
0.45 
2.47 
0.53 
0.35 
60.3 
 
 
4.43 
  dy/dx 
 
–0.271 
–0.020 
  0.086 
 
 
 
–0.137 
  0.078 
–0.038 
  0.002 
 
 
  0.043  
Std.err. 
 
(0.192) 
(0.262) 
(0.297) 
 
 
 
(0.108) 
(0.236) 
(0.160) 
(0.003) 
 
 
(0.029) 
 X 
 
0.55 
0.16 
0.09 
 
 
 
2.85 
0.63 
0.58 
58.2 
 
 
3.32 
  dy/dx 
 
–0.244 
  0.313 
  0.215 
 
 
 
  0.014 
–0.469* 
  0.324 
–0.007 
 
 
–0.079  
Std.err. 
 
(0.285) 
(0.268) 
(0.537) 
 
 
 
(0.115) 
(0.245) 
(0.361) 
(0.005) 
 
 
(0.061) 
 X 
 
0.36 
0.37 
0.09 
 
 
 
2.49 
0.54 
0.34 
60.7 
 
 
4.24 
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E.1.5. Results of random-effects logistic regression analysis with political experience and sector affiliation as dependent variables.  
Marginal effects, nationality subsamples.  
 
Independent variables                                    Political experience                                                                     Sector affiliation 
                    Norway                                     Sweden                                         Norway                                     Sweden 
 
Reputation model 
Commercial objective 
Non-listing 
Listing 
 
Re-election model 
State control 
Equity (log) 
Regional presence 
Ownership ministry 
Debt ratio 
 
Ideology model 
Government party 
 
Controls 
Time trend 
  dy/dx  
 
–0.024 
 
 
 
 
–0.022 
  0.080* 
–0.324 
–0.090 
–0.001 
 
 
  0.020 
 
 
–0.010 
Std.err. 
 
(0.075) 
 
 
 
 
(0.057) 
(0.048) 
(0.205) 
(0.072) 
(0.001) 
 
 
(0.049) 
 
 
(0.017) 
 X 
 
0.38 
 
 
 
 
0.43 
2.49 
0.56 
0.33 
60.0 
 
 
0.75 
 
 
3.76 
  dy/dx 
 
–0.208  
 
 
 
 
–0.168* 
–0.039 
  0.167 
–0.016 
  0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.004 
Std.err. 
 
(0.171) 
 
 
 
 
(0.096) 
(0.058) 
(0.125) 
(0.072) 
(0.002) 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.012) 
 X 
 
0.57 
 
 
 
 
0.23 
2.90 
0.63 
0.63 
58.0 
 
 
 
 
 
3.56 
 dy/dx  
 
–0.238 
  0.262 
  0.340 
 
 
 
  0.012 
–0.485** 
  0.215 
–0.006 
 
 
  0.136 
 
 
–0.092 
Std.err. 
 
(0.238) 
(0.223) 
(0.397) 
 
 
 
(0.102) 
(0.223) 
(0.275) 
(0.004) 
 
 
(0.164) 
 
 
(0.059) 
 X 
 
0.37 
0.35 
0.08 
 
 
 
2.50 
0.56 
0.32 
60.4 
 
 
0.75 
 
 
3.75 
  dy/dx  
 
–0.132 
–0.034 
  0.043 
 
 
 
–0.140 
  0.369 
–0.122 
  0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.024 
Std.err. 
 
(0.129) 
(0.218) 
(0.130) 
 
 
 
(0.092) 
(0.285) 
(0.092) 
(0.001) 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.018) 
 X 
 
0.57 
0.14 
0.09 
 
 
 
2.90 
0.63 
0.63 
58.1 
 
 
 
 
 
3.65 
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E.2.1. Results of random-effects logistic regression analysis with incentive schemes and golden parachutes as dependent variables.  
Marginal effects, full sample. 
 
Independent variables Incentive scheme 
 
                    Model 1 
Golden parachute 
 
                     Model 1                                          Model 2 
 
 
Political influences 
Chairman political representative 
State control 
 
Economic criteria 
Commercial objective 
Non-listing 
Listing 
Firm size (log equity) 
CEO recruited private sector 
 
Managerial influences 
Board size 
Compensation committee 
CEO tenure 
Chair is CEO 
 
Controls 
Nationality 
Time trend 
  dy/dx 
 
 
  0.008 
  0.517** 
 
 
  0.395** 
 
 
  0.097* 
–0.035 
 
   
  0.003 
–0.051 
  0.009 
  0.008 
 
 
–0.059 
–0.014 
Std.err. 
 
 
(0.062) 
(0.256) 
 
 
(0.162) 
 
 
(0.057) 
(0.054) 
 
 
(0.017) 
(0.043) 
(0.008) 
(0.059) 
 
 
(0.075) 
(0.014) 
  X 
 
 
0.31 
0.32 
 
 
0.52 
 
 
3.01 
0.37 
 
 
8.65 
0.23 
4.34 
0.33 
 
 
0.46 
3.23 
  dy/dx 
 
 
  0.044 
–0.048 
 
 
  0.308 
 
 
  0.098 
–0.040 
 
 
  0.022 
  0.016 
  0.004 
  0.101 
 
 
  0.581*** 
  0.062* 
Std.err. 
 
 
(0.093) 
(0.123) 
 
 
(0.194) 
 
 
(0.068) 
(0.130) 
 
 
(0.043) 
(0.126) 
(0.012) 
(0.084) 
 
 
(0.176) 
(0.034) 
  X 
 
 
0.31 
0.32 
 
 
0.52 
 
 
3.01 
0.37 
 
 
8.65 
0.23 
4.34 
0.33 
 
 
0.46 
3.23 
 dy/dx 
 
 
  0.047 
 
 
 
  0.309 
–0.060 
–0.033 
  0.096 
–0.039 
 
 
  0.021 
  0.012 
  0.004 
  0.102 
 
 
  0.582*** 
  0.062* 
Std.err. 
 
 
(0.097) 
 
 
 
(0.196) 
(0.180) 
(0.206) 
(0.070) 
(0.130) 
 
 
(0.044) 
(0.136) 
(0.012) 
(0.085) 
 
 
(0.176) 
(0.034) 
  X 
 
 
0.31 
 
 
 
0.52 
0.19 
0.12 
3.01 
0.37 
 
 
8.65 
0.23 
4.34 
0.33 
 
 
0.46 
3.23 
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E.2.2. Results of random-effects logistic regression analysis with incentive schemes and golden parachutes as dependent variables.  
Marginal effects, SOC chairman subsamples. 
 
Independent variables Incentive scheme 
         Political chairmen               Non-political chairmen 
Golden parachute 
             Political chairmen                    Non-political chairmen 
 
 
Political influences 
State control 
 
Economic criteria 
Commercial objective 
Non-listing 
Listing 
Equity (log) 
CEO recruited private sector 
 
Managerial influences 
Board size 
Compensation committee 
CEO tenure 
Chair is CEO 
 
Control 
Nationality 
Time trend 
  dy/dx 
 
 
  0.050 
 
 
  0.156 
 
 
  0.060 
  0.026 
 
 
–0.001 
–0.008 
–0.000 
–0.016 
 
 
–0.031 
–0.005 
Std.err. 
 
 
(0.150) 
 
 
(0.162) 
 
 
(0.063) 
(0.046) 
 
 
(0.008) 
(0.020) 
(0.004) 
(0.025) 
 
 
(0.050) 
(0.009) 
X 
 
 
0.19 
 
 
0.46 
 
 
2.97 
0.39 
 
 
8.30 
0.20 
4.40 
0.16 
 
 
0.44 
3.27 
  dy/dx 
 
 
  0.636** 
 
 
  0.542*** 
 
 
  0.058 
–0.114 
 
 
  0.014 
–0.086 
  0.008 
  0.054 
 
 
–0.037 
–0.002 
Std.err. 
 
 
(0.264) 
 
 
(0.209) 
 
 
(0.062) 
(0.086) 
 
 
(0.022) 
(0.067) 
(0.011) 
(0.087) 
 
 
(0.084) 
(0.016) 
  X 
 
 
0.37 
 
 
0.55 
 
 
3.03 
0.36 
 
 
8.81 
0.24 
4.31 
0.40 
 
 
0.47 
3.22 
 dy/dx 
 
 
  0.078 
 
 
  0.151 
 
 
  0.097 
–0.188 
 
 
  0.015 
  0.059 
–0.029 
–0.008 
 
 
  0.650** 
  0.206 
Std.err. 
 
 
(0.168) 
 
 
(0.256) 
 
 
(0.123) 
(0.309) 
 
 
(0.081) 
(0.185) 
(0.042) 
(0.216) 
 
 
(0.309) 
(0.152) 
  X 
 
 
0.19 
 
 
0.46 
 
 
2.97 
0.39 
 
 
8.30 
0.20 
4.40 
0.16 
 
 
0.44 
3.27 
 dy/dx 
 
 
–0.090 
 
 
  0.367 
 
 
  0.186 
–0.059 
 
 
–0.018 
–0.453 
  0.001 
  0.141 
 
 
  0.725*** 
–0.004 
Std.err. 
 
 
(0.172) 
 
 
(0.253) 
 
 
(0.118) 
(0.152) 
 
 
(0.051) 
(0.413) 
(0.013) 
(0.124) 
 
 
(0.181) 
(0.030) 
  X 
 
 
0.37 
 
 
0.55 
 
 
3.03 
0.36 
 
 
8.81 
0.24 
4.31 
0.40 
 
 
0.47 
3.22 
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E.2.3. Results of random-effects logistic regression analysis with incentive schemes and golden parachutes as dependent variables.  
Marginal effects, state control subsamples. 
 
Independent variables Incentive scheme 
 
           Full state control               Partial state control 
Golden parachute 
 
           Full state control                      Partial state control 
 
 
Political influences 
Chairman political representative 
 
Economic criteria 
Commercial objective 
Stock market listing 
Equity (log) 
CEO recruited private sector 
 
Managerial influences 
Board size 
Compensation committee 
CEO tenure 
Chair is CEO 
 
Control 
Nationality 
Time trend 
  dy/dx 
 
 
  0.015 
 
 
  0.220 
 
  0.002 
–0.002 
 
 
  0.003 
–0.011 
  0.002 
  0.004 
 
 
–0.035 
–0.008 
Std.err. 
 
 
(0.026) 
 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.011) 
(0.018) 
 
 
(0.005) 
(0.014) 
(0.003) 
(0.020) 
 
 
(0.036) 
(0.007) 
  X 
 
 
0.36 
 
 
0.43 
 
3.03 
0.37 
 
 
8.80 
0.21 
4.37 
0.35 
 
 
0.53 
3.23 
  dy/dx 
 
 
  0.162 
 
 
 
 
 
–0.247 
 
 
  0.182 
 
  0.041 
  0.057 
 
 
  0.259 
  0.065 
Std.err. 
 
 
(0.266) 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.377) 
 
 
(0.135) 
 
(0.049) 
(0.237) 
 
 
(0.263) 
(0.081) 
  X 
 
 
0.19 
 
 
 
 
 
0.40 
 
 
8.26 
 
4.54 
0.25 
 
 
0.28 
3.20 
  dy/dx 
 
 
  0.019 
 
 
  0.152 
 
  0.125 
  0.012 
 
 
–0.002 
  0.041 
–0.008 
  0.092 
 
 
0.705*** 
0.045 
Std.err. 
 
 
(0.067) 
 
 
(0.140) 
 
(0.088) 
(0.077) 
 
 
(0.031) 
(0.066) 
(0.012) 
(0.081) 
 
 
(0.198) 
(0.034) 
  X 
 
 
0.36 
 
 
0.43 
 
3.03 
0.37 
 
 
8.80 
0.21 
4.37 
0.35 
 
 
0.53 
3.23 
  dy/dx 
 
 
  0.221 
 
 
  0.674 
 
  0.036 
–0.519 
 
 
  0.083 
–0.593 
  0.056 
  0.006 
 
 
  0.548* 
  0.037 
Std.err. 
 
 
(0.244) 
 
 
(0.752) 
 
(0.258) 
(0.393) 
 
 
(0.119) 
(0.551) 
(0.048) 
(0.238) 
 
 
(0.284) 
(0.066) 
 X 
 
 
0.19 
 
 
0.71 
 
2.97 
0.37 
 
 
8.33 
0.27 
4.29 
0.27 
 
 
0.30 
3.24 
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E.2.4. Results of random-effects logistic regression analysis with incentive schemes and golden parachutes as dependent variables.  
Marginal effects, nationality subsamples. 
 
Independent variables Incentive scheme 
                    Norway                                         Sweden                  
Golden parachute 
                    Norway                
 
 
Political influences 
Chairman political representative  
State control 
 
Economic criteria 
Commercial objective 
Non-listing 
Listing 
Firm size (log equity) 
CEO recruited private sector 
 
Managerial influences 
Board size 
Compensation committee 
CEO tenure 
Chair is CEO 
 
Control 
Time trend 
dy/dx 
 
 
0.013 
0.144 
 
 
0.699*** 
 
 
0.027 
0.018 
 
 
0.033 
0.080 
0.007 
0.064 
 
 
0.033 
Std.err. 
 
 
(0.069) 
(0.180) 
 
 
(0.242) 
 
 
(0.043) 
(0.068) 
 
 
(0.032) 
(0.251) 
(0.010) 
(0.094) 
 
 
(0.026) 
  X 
 
 
0.31 
0.41 
 
 
0.40 
 
 
2.85 
0.44 
 
 
7.95 
0.07 
4.58 
0.30 
 
 
3.31 
  dy/dx 
 
 
–0.015 
  0.959*** 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.241 
–0.075 
 
 
–0.005 
–0.032 
  0.008 
–0.063 
 
 
–0.074 
Std.err. 
 
 
(0.080) 
(0.083) 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.202) 
(0.082) 
 
 
(0.021 
(0.072) 
(0.013) 
(0.087) 
 
 
(0.063) 
  X 
 
 
0.29 
0.21 
 
 
 
 
 
3.20 
0.29 
 
 
9.48 
0.43 
4.06 
0.35 
 
 
3.14 
 dy/dx 
 
 
  0.062 
  0.036 
 
 
  0.666*** 
 
 
  0.174 
–0.258 
 
 
  0.106 
–0.190 
–0.041 
–0.040 
 
 
  0.175** 
Std.err. 
 
 
(0.247) 
(0.260) 
 
 
(0.252) 
 
 
(0.138) 
(0.237) 
 
 
(0.111) 
(0.179) 
(0.035) 
(0.210) 
 
 
(0.079) 
  X 
 
 
0.31 
0.41 
 
 
0.40 
 
 
2.85 
0.44 
 
 
7.95 
0.07 
4.58 
0.30 
 
 
3.31 
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Appendix F 
 
Governance decisions and sector breakdown 
 
 
The appendix provides graphical illustrations of the governance outcomes 
described in Chapters 6–8, by sector and nationality. Figures F.1.1–F.1.2 
show the professional background of SOC chairmen, as given by political 
experience and sector affiliation (n = 145 (144) and n = 232 for Norway and 
Sweden, respectively). Figures F.2.1–F.2.3 show the level and structure of 
CEO compensation contracts, including total cash compensation (in 2005-
constant NOK thousand), incentive usage, and golden parachute adoption (n 
= 254 and n = 215 for Norway and Sweden, respectively). Figures F.3.1–
F.3.3 shows the dividend payment ratio as measured by dividend-to-
earnings, dividend-to-sales, and dividend-to-cash-flow (n = 77 (83, 66) and n 
= 73 (87, 71) for Norway and Sweden, respectively). In line with the dummy 
variable notation, Norwegian SOCs are assigned the value 0 and Swedish 
SOCs are assigned the value 1 (Norwegian and Swedish SOCs thus appear at 
the left-hand and right hand-side of the figures, respectively). Sector 
classification is made according to the Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS), which differentiates between 10 sectors, including 10 = 
energy; 15 = materials; 20 = industrials; 25 = consumer discretionary; 30 = 
consumer staples; 35 = health care; 40 = financials; 45 = information 
technology; 50 = telecommunications services; 55 = utilities.  
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F.1.1. Percentage of SOCs being chaired by political representatives,  
by sector and nationality. 
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F.1.2. Percentage of SOCs being chaired by public sector employees,  
by sector and nationality. 
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F.2.1. Median level of total CEO cash compensation, by sector and nationality. 
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F.2.2. Percentage of SOCs using incentive schemes, by sector and nationality. 
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F.2.3. Percentage of SOCs adopting golden parachutes, by sector and nationality. 
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F.3.1. Dividend-to-earnings ratio, by sector and nationality. 
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F.3.2. Dividend-to-sales ratio, by sector and nationality. 
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F.3.3. Dividend-to-cash-flow ratio, by sector and nationality. 
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